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The landscape gave to me a loom 
And bid me to weave a garment true 
"For who?" I asked, as it was not clear 
"For me" it replied, "for me to wear" 
So I took the threads of my experience 
And lay them together as warp and weft 
And because the threads came from this place 
The pattern to emerge was one of grace 
But why was such a lovely gown 
Woven by me without a plan? 
But then at last the answer came: 
Both loom and threads came from the land. 
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ABSTRACT 
"Na cava na i sau ni taro ni kena tamusuki na veikau e Viti?", a vuqa era taroga. Au 
nanuma ni bibi cake na taro. Kevaka e cala na veitaro e tarogi sa dredre sara me kunei 
na kena i sau a veiganiti. E gadrevi Ii me vakavinakataki na kena vakatulewataki? Se 
na navunavuci vinaka Ii? Na bula toro cake vakailavo Ii? Se na i tovo vakavanua? Au 
nanuma ni vu ni nodra vakacacana na tamata na veika e tu tikivi keda a Viti me vaka 
na musu kau e vakatau mai na noda i tovo vakavanua. la na mataqali tovo vakavanua 
cava a tokoni e Viti me baleta na kena i tuvaki ni vanua, se tiki ni tovo cava e cala? E 
Viti e kunei kina na bula veimaliwai ni veimatatamata, ia sa bula ka donumaka e dua 
na gauna ni veisau You. N a veisau vovou sa kena i tovo na kila ka, kei na i tovo e 
bucini cake ena yavu ni vakasama e taucoko. Na veisau vovou sa veisautaka na i rairai 
ni vanua e Viti ka kidomoka na veika kece e vakamareqeti ki na dua na kena yaga e 
qiqo. la, na tamusuki ni vaikau sa vakayacori makawa e Viti ni bera na gauna ni veisau 
oqo, e na gauna ni bula va-Koloni, ka sa dodonu me rau beitaki ruarua na i tovo e rua 
oqo. Na nona dusi e dua me beitaki ena sega ni vukea na leqa, ia na veika e rawa ni 
vakayacori sa i koya na noda taqomaki keda mai na noda vakalecalecava ni sega ni cala 
na i tovo ena kena vakacacani na veika e tu tikivi keda. Na vei tovo kece sara e dodonu 
me ra vakaitavi ena kena kunei na bula toro caki. N a i vakarau ena sega ni vunitaki dua 
mai na i tavi me qaravi. Na kena rawati na i naki ni nodra karoni me tudei na veika bula 
e tu tikivi keda sa gadrevi kina na vakatulewa matau ka ni veika e dau yaco e sega ni 
vaka i vakarau. Sa gadrevi talega kina na i tovo ka sega ni okata na kila ka me 
gaunisala duadua ni kena veivosakitaki na i tuvaki ni vanua. Na kena vakaduavatataki 
ni veivakasama kei na rokovi ni veika tawa kilai vakakina na veika e taw a siqemi rawa 
sa rawa ni kunei ena vuqa na i tovo, ka okati kina na vei tovo makawa vaka-Viti kei na 
nodra na vavalagi. Kevaka e vakasaqarai dina me tudei tu na vanua era bula voli kina 
na veika bula tikivi keda, na i tavi e tu sa i koya na kena vakasaqarai se kunei YOU tale 
eso na veivakasama vovou kei na kena vakauqeti na nodra bula vakataki ira ga na veika 
bula. 
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"What is the answer to deforestation in Fiji?" many people are asking. To find an 
answer we first need a question. If the wrong question is asked the possibility of an 
appropriate answer is out of reach. Is better management needed? Is it better planning? 
Perhaps it is a greener economy? Or is it culture? I argue that the causes of human 
induced environmental degradation in Fiji such as deforestation lie in the character of 
culture. But what culture or cultures do the landscapes of Fiji support, and what aspect 
of culture is at fault? Fiji is culturally diverse but currently dominated by modernity. 
Modernity is a culture of knowledge, and a culture built upon the foundations of a 
steady state rationality. Modernity has disenchanted the landscapes of Fiji and squeezed 
all forms of value into the narrow framework of utility. However, deforestation also 
happened in Fiji before modernity arrived with the colonial British, and so both pre-
modern and modern cultures in Fiji must share the blame. Pointing at someone to blame 
does not solve our problem, but what it can do is prevent us from pretending that 
cultures are innocent when it comes to environmental disharmony. All cultures are 
responsible for enacting a sustainable life. Tradition will not hide anyone from that 
responsibility. Fulfilling the obligation of ecological sustainability requires a rationality 
of process because reality is in a constant state of flux. It also requires a culture that 
does not see knowledge as the only way of engaging in a conversation about or with a 
landscape. A rationality of process and a respect for the unknown and unknowable can 
be found in many different cultures, including the non-modern Fijian culture and non-
modern cultures in the West. If ecological sustainability is what is sought, the task is a 
discovery or re-discovery of process thinking and a re-enchantment of Nature. 
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PREFACE 
I invite you on a journey: A journey to understanding ecological sustainability. I can't 
promise that you will get to the end, as there is no end - only an on-going journey. I 
began such a journey in 1990 at the onset of this doctoral research programme, and I 
am still on it. What you will find between the bindings of this dissertation is something 
of a travel diary describing my adventures on the way to the level of understanding I 
had when the thesis was submitted. This travel journal will hopefully provide you with 
a map that lets you walk a similar path. 
I take you through a metaphorical landscape, a landscape full of obstacles. Looking back 
to where I have been along the way presented me with an opportunity to clear a path 
for you to traverse, thus meeting me where I now stand at the outer limits of language, 
at the threshold of a kind of silence, at the edge of a flowing stream of linguistic 
nothingness. At the waters edge we are able to gain a glimpse of what lies on the other 
side - an understanding of ecological sustainability. The thesis cannot take you or I 
there, as to get there we must get wet. We must learn to swim in this silence. In each 
chapter I will attempt to guide you through each stage without having to encounter all 
of the obstacles that I was confronted with - only a select few. 
During the course of the various chapters we will pass quickly through a technical 
perspective and a non-critical social outlook. This will demonstrate the need for an 
adventure in theoretical development, in the preparation of a methodology. It involves 
the construction of a viewfinder that may be capable of uncovering the meaning of 
ecological sustainability, without reducing it to a false question. This becomes the main 
purpose of my work. We will prepare the ground for this theoretical exercise by passing 
through an introduction to a critical approach, an approach that is not afraid to question 
delicate issues. Following this we will discover the need to inspect the foundations of 
existing dominant theoretical frameworks. Such inspection involves a process of 
deconstruction where the philosophical foundations of modern viewfinders are 
dismantled. We will discover subtle flaws and realise the need to begin afresh, and 
proceed in such a way that the flow of understanding is not obstructed. We will then 
engage in a process of reconstruction, and the viewfinder that develops will begin to 
reveal what had been covered over and obscured. 
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I introduce a theory of ecological sustainability called the 'autobiography of the 
landscape' which is recited in language through a 'bioregional nalTative'. Language plays 
a crucial role, where narratives and myths begin to make sense as a metaphorical means 
of bringing meaning into culture from beyond the reach of language. It is a means of 
Jetting the landscape speak, and thus be capable of informing us in the way of ethical 
instruction. I then develop a politico-linguistic means of bringing such a bioregional 
narrative into being. 
It became clear that in different parts of the world the landscape to traverse on the way 
to understanding is completely different, with a different actual and metaphorical 
geography. The paths over such terrain will always need to fit the landscape they are in, 
and as such, a map that is successful in one place will not necessarily apply to another. 
We need to discover or re-discover these paths in our own landscape. In our adventures 
we must pay attention to the actual land we are in and not some hypothetical place. In 
order to prepare such a map and to walk the path it describes, we must experience the 
place we are in, and so, for this reason, I do not offer any universal formula - a map to 
end all maps, simply because no such thing is possible. 
I wish to make it clear that one of the primary tasks of my work is to prepare the basis 
for a meaningful dialogue with Fijian culture concerning this issue of ecological 
sustainability. In being a member of a Western culture I take my torch from a fire that 
was lit more than 2,000 years ago in a part of the world which we now call Europe. In 
journeying to Fiji I apologise for some of my heritage (as modern colonialism is a nasty 
stain on my diplomatic robe) but not all of it. In this journey I seek to engage in 
discourse with Fijians who apologise for some of their heritage but not all of it -
cannibalism notwithstanding. In bringing to the surface what I believe to be forgotten 
treasures of Western culture I hope to show that a true and meaningful dialogue is 
possible and desirable concerning ecological sustainability and e na kana taqomaki na 
Vanua (the protection of the landscape). 
Before such a dialogue is possible I must carefully prepare my own ground for this 
discourse. Preparing this ground involves coming to an understanding of who I really 
am and what aspect of Western culture I hope to represent. To be able to do this I have 
had to look closely at Western culture in the light of the issue of ecological 
sustainability. Without engaging in such an exercise of cultural self-reflection I cannot 
hope to be able to represent anything from the West authentically. For all my criticism 
of Western culture (which will become apparent in the pages to follow) I realise that the 
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West is not homogenous. My respect for those in the West who also hold such criticism 
commands me to exercise a degree of caution in my critique. Demonstrating my own 
capacity for respecting parts of my own culture provides what I hope to be an indication 
of my capacity to respect Fijian culture as well. 
All the romanticism and idealism in the world could not grant me the ability represent 
the Fijian side of such a dialogue. As such, my primary audience are not Fijians but 
modern people of any race. My thesis is a message to modernity. This message arises 
from a perspective that seeks to over-come the ecological contradictions of modern life. 
Modernity took a number of centuries to develop and similarly its over-coming is 
unlikely to happen over-night. I make no apologies for engaging in a debate concerning 
such an enormous cultural concern. I justify this by declaring that ecological 
sustainability is an enormous cultural issue and that it is incommensurable with 
modernity. It is a question that concerns the relationship between humanity and the rest 
of Nature in a particular landscape. The landscape of my concern is the Fiji Islands. 
Modernity is there, and ecological sustainability is not. I do not pretend that pre-modern 
cultures, by virtue of being pre-modern, are ipso facto ecologically sustainable. This is 
an unfOltunate form of romanticism which I seek to surpass without bowing out to the 
status quo. I develop an alternative way of approaching the whole question of 
indigenousness, an approach that will be controversial. But an unprejudiced eye will 
recognise the path I have chosen to walk, a path that many have feared to tread. 
The issue of indigenous forest conservation in Fiji presented for me a doorway into this 
debate concerning indigenousness, and ecological sustainability. The Vunivia catchment 
provides a case study which enabled me to guide my questioning from the lofty heights 
of philosophy to the dampness beneath my bare feet as I walked through the forests of 
that landscape, and the pains in my back, knees and ankles from the hours and hours of 
cross legged sitting in meetings with the local people there. Through the course of the 
thesis my thinking underwent a number of quite substantial changes in direction, as a 
yacht would do when tacking towards its destination. Like the yacht, my changes in 
direction were not random but were necessary in order to reach my target viz. an 
understanding of ecological sustainability. Although I was staying on course the research 
had the appearance of a waywardness as a sailing ship would appear to those unfamiliar 
with seafaring. The changes in direction were not preconceived as I did not known in 
advance where this research was taking me, they were discovered as I progressed. What 
remained important was that I continued to question relentlessly and also remain willing 
to discard my earlier views should they prove inadequate. It is for this reason that I 
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present my earlier views in chapters 3, and 4 then openly criticise them in order to move 
beyond them. 
This thesis is an engagement in questioning, and in this questioning I will uncover a 
way of asking just what ecological sustainability might be without it being a false 
question. This notion of ecological sustainability refers to a relationship between 
humanity and the rest of Nature in a particular place. It implies a sustainable 
relationship. For something to be sustainable it must be compatible. The notion of 
compatibility implies an aptness. The notion of apt underlies the meaning of ad.!!I21ation 
which is so commonly used in ecological and evolutionary theory (Toulmin 1981). 
However, the aptness of a human population in relation to the rest of the landscape is 
not merely a question of science. It is also a question of art. It is very much a human 
question. Accordingly, we are talking about social, cultural, political, economic, 
psychological, geographical, philosophical, aesthetic, and religious issues. 
Human sustainability, as an enduring adaptive condition with a landscape, requires the 
perpetuation of a compatible relationship between people and place. This also requires 
the perpetuation of compatible relationships within a human community in order to 
sustain their collective outward relationship with their ecological surroundings. If 
obstructions to compatibility exist then the condition is not a sustainable one, as it will 
not endure. It is for this very reason that I take the human condition seriously in my 
questioning concerning ecological sustainability. It is also because relationships within 
a human community are also part of Nature, as I do not construct an imaginary 
boundary between humanity and Nature as many people in the West do. 
If ecological sustainability is about the entire relationship between humanity and its 
ecological surroundings, then the ecological character of the whole of a human 
population must come under scrutiny. It cannot be addressed simply in terms of the 
activities and achievements of an 'environmental management sector'. Reducing 
ecological sustainability to a sectoral pursuit arises out of a misunderstanding of the 
ecological character of all human activities whether they be economic, social, political 
or even psychological. 
Through the course of the thesis I endeavour to weave a number of seemingly 
incommensurable threads into a cohesive garment able to be viewed for the picture that 
emerges in the final pattern. However, in order to do this I have had to reinvent the 
100m (standard of rationality) as these threads could not be woven using the one I 
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inherited in my formal education. In so doing I discovered that my line of thinking was 
not alone in the wilderness (i.e. outside the dominant Western world view). Out here I 
have come across countless other outsiders who, in their aggregate, comprise a 
genealogy of a difference; a deep alternative heritage that has a history that predates 
Socrates and post-dates modernity. 
This research programme has been a theoretical adventure, and to convey the meaning 
that it yielded required a careful unfolding of ideas so that its coherence and its 
relevance could be appreciated by my audience. A quote from Nietzsche is perhaps 
appropriate here - "One skill is needed - lost today, unfortunately - for the practice of 
reading is an alt: the skill to ruminate, which cows posses but modern man [sic] lacks." 
(Nietzsche 1956: 157). 
And so, as the Sierra Cognito lie ahead, in the spirit of Don Quixote i I mount my trusty 
steed (my conceptual framework), and with you upon a sturdy mount embark upon an 
adventure (this thesis), ready to engage in fierce and unequal debate with countless 
giants (philosophers of the Socratic tradition) and dragons (those driven by prejudice), 
all of which will endeavour to block our passage. It may have the appearance of insanity 
as it did with that self-acclaimed knight-errant of Castile. But whoever stands firm in 
their convictions takes on the appearance of madness in the eyes of those who do not 
understand their message. And like Don Quixote, I seek to augment a substantial change 
in my culture - to cultivate a reenchantment of Nature. 
II refer here to the character of Don Quixote of the first part of Cervantes' tale, before 
the author destroys his spirit of abandon in the second part. 
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PART I 
ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AS HUMAN ECOLOGY 
The thesis is divided into four parts. The Purpose of Part I is to introduce the thesis 
topic and the approach to be used in the investigation that follows. The various purposes 
of Parts II, III, and IV will be explained at the end of chapter 2. 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 A GENEALOGY OF INQUIRY 
The focus of this thesis is not so much Fiji but the issue of ecological sustainability. Fiji 
in general and the Vunivia catchment in particular presents a case study in which the 
question of ecological sustainability can be framed. Fiji provides a situation of 
environmental degradation, of landscape, of ecology, of societies, of economies, and of 
culture. Each of these ingredients playa part in the issue of ecological sustainability and, 
because of this, each of these aspects of a place called 'Fiji' have been subject to 
questioning. 
But what do we refer to when we use the name Fiji? and what is this place that goes 
by the name of Vunivia? When using the terms 'Fiji' and 'Vunivia' I do not refer to a 
society, an ecosystem, a geographical territory, an economy, or a culture. I refer to a 
place that has all of these things and more. Commonly, a name of a place gives us 
meaning in terms of a spatial surface upon which we can conceptually add a variety of 
components. We may study these components in the framework of different disciplines 
such as ecology, sociology, economics, and anthropology for example. But I wish to 
keep all of these components of place together conceptually from the beginning as a 
form of geography (human and physical). This is because 'Fiji' as unable to be separated 
into components for purposes of study without misunderstanding this place. For this 
reason I will not undertake to introduce Fiji by summarising its location, population, 
climate, economic character, social structure, ecological diversity, and culture. Because 
to do this will lead directly to a misconception of what it is that I am studying. 
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I wish to introduce a concept of place rather than a place as such. This is because this 
concept of place is crucial to understanding what follows. Hence, a place called 'Fiji' is 
an experience which I have had and seek to capture in language. I began experiencing 
this place when I took my first breath at the Suva War Memorial Hospital in April of 
1965. I have been experiencing Fiji ever since in a way that is peculiar to me, and as 
such, my experience of a place called Fiji will be necessarily different from that of any 
one else. I stayed in Fiji until the age of four when I came to live in AotearoalNew 
Zealand. I returned to Fiji many times in subsequent years and grew to understand that 
place in my own way. In 1986 my relationship with this landscape changed when I 
conducted my first research project there with my BSc Honours dissertation on the 
regeneration of Fiji kauri (Agathis macrophylla) (Weaver 1987). From then on Fiji was 
to be a place of questioning for me, where that questioning focused on landscape and 
the idea of environmental management. I initiated a reserve proposal in 1987 concerning 
a 4,000 ha area of Fiji's last remaining stand of dense old growth kauri forest, as a result 
of my interest generated with my BSc Honours dissertation on that species. The area 
was finally gazetted by the Fiji government as the 'Wabu Creek Nature Reserve' in 1992. 
My experiences with the political and planning processes surrounding this reserve 
proposal and its eventual protection kindled in me a vivid interest in the social and 
political process of environmental management, with particular concern for the 
indigenous forests of that country. I was employed as a contract 'biologist' in 1988 by 
the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society to undertake a 'survey' of Fiji (with three 
other members of a team) to investigate the feasibility of implementing a national parks 
and reserves system for Fiji, and to prepare a national proposal (Lees 1989). This work 
was to prove to be a turning point in the focus of my professional interests as they 
related to environmental protection in general and forest conservation in particular. 
Although ostensibly employed as a 'biologist' the work involved very little biology. Most 
of the time in Fiji on that 2 month contract was spent negotiating with government 
planners over the economics of environmental protection in the light of the development 
aspirations of the tribal owners of all of these areas of natural forest. This experience 
led me to realise that a PhD in forest ecology was not going to help me in my quest to 
contribute to the protection of what remained of the untouched tropical niinforests of 
Fiji. I needed to know about economics, policy and planning. 
These circumstances formed the backdrop to my research proposal to conduct this PhD 
thesis. The thesis proposal was driven by 1. a desire to understand ecological 
sustainability in relation to the forests of Fiji, and 2. a desire to know enough about 
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economics, policy and planning to be able to engage effectively in the process of 
environmental protection in Fiji. The thesis began in 1990, although I remained reluctant 
to place restrictions on the scope and the context of the research. Instead I proceeded 
to explore the issues in question viz. indigenous forest conservation in Fiji as a 
management process; and, answering the question: 'what does ecological sustainability 
mean?'. I was under the impression that the meaning of ecological sustainability would 
precipitate out of an inquiry into environmental management. I undertook a field trip in 
1990 to frame the context of the research and visit the case study area. This study area 
the Vunivia catchment is a place that I was already familiar with as it had been an area 
under investigation in the 1988 national parks survey. I focused on the economic, policy 
and planning dimensions of the issue in question with an eye on social concerns, which 
were then viewed from the perspective of a novice in the domain of the social. 
At this stage in my learning I began to see the potential for alternative forms of 
development (i.e. alternative to logging) for areas of indigenous forest as a means of 
protecting them. Of particular interest at this time was tourism. Also of interest in the 
domain of planning was that of compensation to landowners in the establishment of 
protected areas on tribal land. Another area of particular interest at this time was forest 
history and its relation to management. 
In 1991 I worked on a contract for the IUCN (World Conservation Union) as part of a 
consultancy to the Fiji Environment Unit (the National Environment Management 
Project). My role on the project team was varied. One of my tasks was to conduct a 
social case study of the Vunivia catchment (also my thesis study area) to help shed light 
on the social dimensions of environmental management in that country. In addition to 
this I designed a national environmental planning proposal for integrating the processes 
of site selection, planning and management of ecologically sensitive areas, which I 
called the 'Fiji Environmental Management Areas Programme Proposal'. I will discuss 
some of this work in chapter 3. 
As a result of this work I began to understand the necessity for an explicit social 
dimension in environmental research and management, and the need to view the Fiji 
situation in the light of a broader international economic perspective. The thesis 
developed along these lines in the absence of any substantial exposure to what is 
available in the domain of social science. I could have left that out of the work and still 
produced a thesis that carried the central message of the need to bring a social analysis 
into environmental management planning. 
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However, not satisfied with my lack of understanding of social theory I undertook to 
,study sociology in order that I could present a perspective on the domain of the social 
from a more informed position. Furthermore, and more importantly, I was still 
dissatisfied with my analysis as it seemed to be lacking a cohesive understanding of 
environmental management. Also I felt that I was still no closer to understanding the 
meaning of ecological sustain ability although I did have many thoughts on this. The 
dilemma facing me was whether or not to tackle this much bigger question concerning 
ecological sustainability knowing that it was a far bigger issue than I had originally 
thought. I knew that if I pursued this idea it would turn the thesis into a much more 
radical, critical and philosophical exercise. In so doing I ran the risk of contradicting my 
earlier work, losing the confidence of my department, and losing the support of those 
I was professionally involved with. But I decided that hiding from risks leads to 
conservatism and stagnation, and certainly is not an appropriate attitude if ecological 
sustainability is to be understood. 
For about 10 years or so I have had a hazy idea that the relationship between humanity 
and the rest of Nature rested upon the character of the human ecological niche. But what 
is this niche? I was at first under the impression that I could explain the human niche 
as the actual practising economy, but also knew that religion, world view, language and 
rationality played an important role. The common etymology of the words economy and 
ecology as the Greek aikas provided inspiration for a fusing of these two domains in a 
theory of ecological sustainability. I was then inspired to throw myself at ecological 
economics as the meta-discourse for framing the notion of ecological sustainability qua 
the human niche. However, I was still dissatisfied with this line of thinking as it still 
prevented me from going outside economics into the cultural milieu that make 
economics possible. 
I moved from a position of dialectical materialism into one of dialectical transcendental 
realism2 thus moving my professional position to one commensurate with my private 
one. I began to piece together a theory and method of environmental research which I 
call 'transcendental cultural ecology'. It is a transcendental, dialectical and holistic 
approach to understanding environmental issues sucn as deforestation in Fiji with 
specific reference to ecological sustainability. This theory and methodology is 
concomitantly a means and an end of this inquiry. The theory came about through a 
2Dialectical materialism and transcendental realism are discussed in chapters 5 and 6 
and appendix 2. 
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process of questioning and became a philosophical and theoretical platform from which 
to revisit the idea of ecological sustainability in Fiji. It provided a means of tying 
together many different threads that had appeared to be relevant yet hitherto could riot 
be woven into a cohesive fabric. The only way that such cohesion became possible was 
when the thesis moved back from the theoretical canvas far enough to be able to bring 
culture into view. It was at this level that I was able to present a discourse of ecology 
and of society without reducing one to the other, i.e. by developing a discourse that 
encompasses more than both. 
1.2 THE DEFORESTATION DEBATE IN FIJI TODAY 
The continued loss of indigenous forest ecosystems is a major problem in Fiji today. 
Statistics, however, are always conflicting and it is difficult to develop an accurate 
picture of the actual rate of deforestation in that country. Some predictions suggest that 
Fiji's indigenous forest resource will be all but exhausted within 50 years (Watts 1980), 
whilst others are less pessimistic. At present the exact total area of indigenous forest 
cover in Fiji remains unknown although various figures have been used. The most recent 
official estimates suggest that approximately 750,000 ha still remain from a total land 
surface of 1.83 million hectares (Watling and Chape 1992). Between 11 % and 16% of 
Fiji's forests had been converted to non-forest land uses between 1969 and 1991, with 
the rate of forest loss occurring at 0.5 0.8 % per year from a base of 838,000 ha in 
1967 (ibid.). However, figures such as these are not accompanied by an adequate 
definition of what is meant by the word 'forest'. Indigenous forests in Fiji are mostly 
logged over and in fact relatively little undisturbed natural forest remains. What does 
still exist tends to be targeted by logging companies and landowners as financial fruit 
ripe for picking. Furthermore, while indigenous forests are being removed or degraded, 
the establishment of exotic plantations obscure. the deforestation figures. Exotic 
afforestation in previously non-forested areas, and reforestation and 'enrichment' planting 
of exotics in cut-over indigenous forest boosts the national statistics in terms of the total 
area of forest cover. 
Due to much argument over the history of forest loss in Fiji (Weaver 1992b) the issue 
of indigenous forest conservation is shrouded in controversy. The debate is a complex 
one but principally revolves around the issue of whether the current industrial regime 
of forest utilisation (including the clearance of land for non-forest land uses) is any 
worse than pre-industrial phases in Fiji's cultural history. Some suggest that the modem 
Western economy is solely to blame (e.g. Weaver 1992a), while others argue that what 
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we are now witnessing in tropical deforestation is no worse than pre-colonial times (e.g. 
Brookfield and Overton 1988; Clarke 1988). To side with the former argument, for 
example, provides solidarity for indigenous rights movements inespective bf the way 
those rights might be exercised, and is naively anti-colonial as it implies that pre-modern 
Fijian culture was inherently ecologically benign. On the other hand, siding with the 
latter argument (perhaps inadvertently) provides political support for the socio-cultural 
status quo and ignores the ecological malfunctioning of modernity. As such, this 
argument is a false one as both sides fail to recognise which aspects of culture obstruct 
the possibility of sustainability. Western culture cannot be said to be innately 
ecologically belligerent, and Fijian culture cannot be said to be inherently sustainable 
without stereo-typing and romanticising. 
Undoubtedly the predominant factor in the process of forest loss in Fiji during the last 
few millennia relate to the activities of its resident human populations. It is important 
to recognise, however, that the current basic geographical pattern in Fiji of a humid, 
forested east contrasting with a dry deforested west was already in place when the first 
Europeans explored Fiji during the 18th and 19th centuries. One early explorer, Thomas 
Williams, describes a 19th century view of western Viti Levu: 
To the SW. are low shores with patches of brown, barren land; then succeed 
narrow vales, beyond which rise hills, whose wooded tops are in fine contrast 
with the bold bare front at their base (Williams 1858:8). 
A present day observation of the Mt. Evans range near Lautoka on the island of Viti 
Levu fits this description well. More recent research has indicated that this pattern may 
have existed for many centuries and that large areas in Fiji's western regions were 
deforested as early as 1,500 years ago (Southern 1986). In other Pacific Islands pre-
European deforestation has also been a significant part of the cultural ecology of this 
oceanic region. Flenley and King (1984), for example have provided evidence to suggest 
that forest loss was a significant factor in the collapse of megalithic culture on Easter 
Island. Pre-European deforestation of upland regions of the Hawaiian Island of 
Kaho'olawe, according to Kirch (1982), led to the abandonment of much of the interior 
region some 300 years ago. In addition to this, Nunn (1991) has pointed out that 
although much of the debate concerning land degradation in the Island Pacific has been 
attributed to human impacts, non-human factors must not be underestimated. He has 
suggested that climate changes are also likely to have played a major role in what is 
regarded as land degradation. 
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The historical situation of tropical deforestation in the Pacific is complex and cannot be 
reconstructed easily without making dangerous generalisations as to where the blame 
principally lies. But the search for blame tends to be motivated in one way or another 
by more than merely a desire to set the record straight. For example, these kind of data 
have led some authors to conclude that the pre~modern peoples of the Pacific themselves 
have been responsible for most of the forest loss in this region, which implies that more 
recent industrial activities, established by Europeans are far less to blame for 
deforestation (Blaikie, and Brookfield with Clarke 1987; Brookfield and Overton 1988; 
Clarke 1988). Pre~modern cultures may not have been as ecologically innocent as some 
would have us believe, but even if this were true it would in no way provide an 
adequate justification for supporting the cultural status qu03• Such an interpretation arises 
from an inadequate critique of both pre~modern culture and modernity, and cites 
unsustainable practices of pre~modern cultures as a scape-goat for the ecological 
problems of the present day. 
1.3 CAUSES OR MERELY SYMPTOMS? 
The formulation of effective strategies for attaining ecological sustainability must be 
grounded in accurate interpretations of the real causal agencies of non-sustainable life. 
Failure to do so renders environmental programmes ineffectual as such management 
essentially barks up the wrong tree. As a result a great deal of management may be 
carried out which, instead of moving a particular culture 'towards ecological 
sustainability', moves a culture no closer to the sustainable ideal because unsustainable 
aspects of cultural . life are left unconstrained. Pin~pointing these unsustainable, yet 
uninhibited cultural features is a crucial aspect of a critical approach to environmental 
problems in general and deforestation in Fiji in particular. 
Internationally the issue of tropical deforestation has also been a subject of much debate. 
Many official responses to the deforestation problems in developing countries echo the 
position held by the Food and Agriculture Organisation in the Tropical Forestry Action 
Plan which stated that deforestation is "mostly due to the transfer of forest land to 
31 do not suggest that supporting the modern industrial status quo was the intention of 
these authors. Instead I wish to point out that their argument can easily' be used to cover 
over some major cultural differences between modern and pre~modern societies. These 
cultural differences need further investigation as they form a crucial aspect of cultural 
ecology, and the study of ecological sustain ability. Such an investigation into the ecological 
differences between modem Western and pre-modern Fijian cultures is the precise aim of 
this thesis. 
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agricultural use through shifting and other forms of cultivation" (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation 1985: 1). This view was supported by the 1988 Fiji Minister of Forests who 
told the 2nd National Conservation Congress that:-
.. .it is generally recognised that the main cause of the destruction and the 
degradation of tropical forests is the poverty of the people who live in and 
around them and their dependence on the forest lands for their basic needs 
(Tavaiqia 1988:3). 
The burden of blame is placed on the rural poor. A slightly more informed view was put 
forward in the Fiji Government's 1992 National State of the Environment Report which 
reads:-
There are four principle causes of deforestation in Fiji - clearing of forests 
associated with large scale commercial agriculturel rural farm development 
projects; the continuing small but steady growth of smallholder mixed 
commercial and subsistence farming; the continuing spread of small settlements, 
urban growth and the infrastructure to service them (roads, dams); and fire .... 
[However] ... exploitation of forest for timber is also a factor in deforestation. 
[Although] Logging in itself does not necessarily permanently reduce forest 
cover (Watling and Chape 1992:54). 
My contention is that most of these 'causes', however, are merely symptoms of a much 
deeper equation of cultural disharmony with the landscape. Some are bold enough to say 
that logging itself is a principle cause of deforestation in Fiji (e.g. Dunlap 1980; Lees 
1992; Weaver 1989, 1992b) which demands more than a code of logging practice to 
solve Fiji's deforestation problems. But what of the causes of logging? Surely logging 
is only an epiphenomenon of a more general equation of resource abuse by an economy 
underpinned with a cultural value system that cannot see past the utility value of 
commodities in exchange? The dominant cultural character of Fiji today not only 
sustains but celebrates this cultural tendency of a disenchantment of Nature where all 
value is vested in utility. This is not to say that all people living in Fiji support this view 
but that the dominant cultural disposition, as it is currently practised, is one that views 
Nature in terms of its ability to be used for profit. 
Opposing views that do argue for a different form of valuation are not hard to find but 
they are not taken seriously as an adequate or sophisticated account of environmental 
strategy making. The value system of the pre-modern Fijian tribal culture does not give 
utility precedence over all other forms of value, but this cultural equation has been 
pushed to the periphery of modern life in Fiji. The call for a different cultural basis of 
value is not restricted to Fiji, as of course, environmentalists, human rights campaigners, 
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social justice advocates, feminists, supporters of racial equality, some religions, and 
indigenous rights activists the world over are also seeking a re-examination of the basis 
of value in modernity. But what aspects of culture and, value in Fiji are unsustainable, 
and. a fortiori what alternative cultural formula can lay claim to ecological 
sustainability? I believe that the place to look is the philosophical and common sense 
ontology of culture. In other words, how does the dominant cultural configuration in a 
country like Fiji envisage reality? Does this culture see humanity as separate from or 
part of Nature? Is an individual separate (Le. alien) from others or are individuals all 
interconnected as beings in Being4? Is reality in a deterministic steady state or is it in 
a constant state of creative flux? The cultural implications of this riddle are profound 
indeed, and I suggest that the way they are answered will make the difference between 
the possibility or the impossibility of ecological sustainability. 
~his terminology is that of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. 'Being' with a 
capital 'B' encompasses the interconnectedness of Nature (the whole), whereas 'being' with 
a lower case 'b' refers to individuals as part of that whole (see Heidegger 1962 for 
example). 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE QUESTION OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Nothing is more revolting than the majority; for it consists of few vigorous 
predecessors, of knaves who accommodate themselves, of weak people who 
assimilate themselves, and the mass that toddles after them without knowing in 
the least what it wants (Goethe)l. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Exploring the question concerning ecological sustainability is not a trivial undertaking 
and leads one into the basis of human cultures and the relationship these cultures have 
with the rest of Nature. In exploring this issue I have been repeatedly confronted with 
the need to call into question my own culture and aspects of this culture that are dear 
to the hearts of many of its members. Attempting to criticise this culture, or any culture, 
if reproach becomes necessary, is often met with unwelcoming resistance, frequently 
laced with prejudices designed to blindly defend a tradition in spite of a disclosure of 
its ecological shortcomings. 
In my questioning of modernity2, which comprises the dominant cultural influence in 
relation to the forests of Fiji, I uncovered a number of fundamental ecological flaws in 
this cultural scheme. It becomes necessary to develop alternatives that are ecologically 
appropriate. However, so many critics of modernity have in the last 150 years sought 
spiritual and ethical refuge in non-Western settings, such as those of Asia and or tribal 
cultures. I wish to show that an abandonment of all of Western culture is not necessary 
in order to locate a genuine creative alternative to modernity. In so doing one is also 
forced to pin point with far more precision what ecological sustainability means. This 
i(Cited in Kaufmann 1980: 17). 
2I use the term 'modernity' to refer to a cultural formation that developed in Europe 
following the fall of the medieval world, accompanied by the rise of science as a form of 
knowledge. Modernity has since migrated out of the West into Asia, Africa, the Americas, 
and Oceania. The modern condition stretches historically back to the 16th and 17th 
centuries, when the foundations of modern science, politics, and economics were being 
drafted. However, modernity must not be seen as an historical period, but rather a cultural 
tendency. In this way we can see that modernity, as a cultural phenomenon, arrived in Fiji 
with the explorers and settlers during the 18th and 19th centuries. Modernity as a culture 
includes capitalism and socialism, and for this reason I talk about 'pre-modern' instead of 
'pre-capitalist' Fiji. The cultural flavour of modernity will become more and more apparent 
through the course of the thesis. 
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can also help prevent the inadvertent cultivation of romanticism, the construction of 
more 'noble savages', and the following of alternatives simply because they are dressed 
in 'Eastern' or tribal clothes. It also helps to prevent the burning of Western straw figures 
in the environmental inquisition. Irrespective of one's cultural heritage, taking seriously 
the dictum 'know thy self is a crucial moment in the path to understanding the issue of 
ecological sustainability. Indeed, one need only look outward to the landscape and there, 
whether we realise it or not, we see before us a reflection of what we really are. 
2.1 THE POSSIBILITY OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
There are two major thematic undercurrents in this thesis. The first revolves around the 
question concerning ecological sustainability in general (Le. a general theory). The 
second concerns the consequences of ecological sustainability with particular regard to 
the indigenous forests and the people of Fiji. Rather than defining the term 'ecological 
sustainability' at the onset and proceeding to test its presence or absence in Fiji, I instead 
use the entire thesis to pose the question and frame an answer. Both of these aspects of 
the thesis will be dealt with in tandem throughout the thesis and will be developed in 
stages corresponding to different levels of understanding. Each stage gives rise to a 
deeper understanding of both aspects and provides a new platform with which to explore 
the next stage. 
This outlook implies first that there is such a condition as ecological sustainability, and 
that it is possible to achieve this condition as a way of life. It must be made clear from 
the beginning, however, that the question concerning 'ecological sustainability' is not 
necessarily a question concerning environmental management. The two may indeed 
coincide but this is not necessarily the case. If the inquiry were merely about 
environmental management, then the issue of ecological sustainability could be avoided. 
Indeed this is often the case with environmental research and practice. The term 
'sustainability' is used as if it had a meaning that is understood by its users and its 
audience, and indeed as if this meaning was commensurate with environmental 
management (what ever that is). As such 'sustain ability' is a much abused word. It has 
become a platitude used to placate an environmentally concerned audience who search 
for words that please the conscience rather than meanings that make a difference. 
Some people see ecological sustainability as a technical issue, able to be apprehended 
at the technical level, at the level of management within the context of existing socio-
economic structures. A great deal of environmental debate conducted by non-government 
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groups and within and between official agencies is carried out at this level. It amounts 
to a technocratic discourse framed by the language of planning, management, law, and 
policy. Within this language game the" term 'ecological su stainability , is supposed to have 
authentic meaning, as if it were merely a planning, management, legal, or policy issue, 
and as if these disciplines were a sufficient framework for positing the question 
concerning ecological sustainability. It is an issue at these levels, but it is also much 
more than this. Ecological sustainability is a social issue. The social aspects of this issue 
coexist with the technical and, as such, an authentic discourse concerning ecological 
sustainability must be framed in social language with social meaning. Only then can the 
technical have meaning vis-a-vis the social dimensions of ecological sustainability. But 
is it sufficient to engage in discourse and action at the level of the social? 
I believe that, like the technical, sustainability is social, but it is also more than this. It 
is a cultural issue, where the level of the social exists with culture. It is at the level of 
culture that we can begin to question language and standards of rationality of a society 
in general, and we can bring an ecological dimension back into the discourse. This 
discourse is cultural ecology. We must remember that social life is cultural by viItue of 
it being acted out within the framework of a language, a standard of rationality, a world 
view, and a belief structure that is not universal for all human societies in all landscapes. 
It is within the context of culture that social relations are acted out in human societies. 
Culture is inherited by the members of a society through actions, ritual, language and 
the rationality that underlies language, which lends meaning to social life, and gives 
people their conscious world. Culture is also actively created through social actions, 
language, and the apprehension of new meanings gained from experiences in social life -
experiences of realities such as landscape. In this sense cultures evolve. A debate on 
the question concerning ecological sustain ability must, at least, be framed within a 
discourse on culture. 
When the idea of ecological sustain ability is questioned at the level of culture one can 
begin to uncover what it is about people that makes ecological adaptation to a changing 
landscape possible. It is this adaptation, this changing in people through culture, that 
makes ecological sustainability possible. But how do people adapt, and what is this 
process called adaptation? These questions will be addressed later in the thesis, but 
suffice it to say that the types of questions to be confronted will be of this form. Hence: 
how is ecological sustainability as culture possible? 
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2.3 QUESTIONING AS A METHODOLOGY 
Many questions have been posed in the above paragraphs; which should be regarded as 
a sign of things to come, as this thesis is foremost an engagement in questioning. 
Through relentless questioning I can hope to gain access to meaning - the meaning of 
ecological sustainability and its appearance in social and political life in Fiji. 
Questioning of this form sees nothing as unquestionable, and in this sense the approach 
is openly a critical one. I do not place any caveats on this questioning by erecting a 'not 
negotiable' sign over certain aspects of this inquiry. To do so would be to hide from 
questioning as if there were something to be afraid of. Moreover, this questioning 
extends to myself, and I also become an object of inquiry. As such the approach is 
phenomenological and reflexive. Hence, I disagree with Francis Bacon and sustain the 
view that (contra Bacon) the "strength and excellence of the wit" has everything to do 
with the matter. This self reflection will appear in a number of different forms. For 
example, my own language and ability to possess knowledge about reality will be 
questioned. This is where science spills over into philosophy. 
The momentum gained from such questioning can take us further than we may have 
expected, to deeper meanings. But some of this cannot be done through thinking or 
speaking (it is no longer science or philosophy), because a great deal of meaning in 
cultural life passes swiftly through the net of language. And as Wittgenstein (1922:7) 
tells us: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence". However, even 
though we cannot utter the unutterable, we can point to it in various ways. This is what 
art does. This is what poetry is capable of. As such, we can begin to uncover new tools 
of inquiry and hence endure long after many others would have given up. We have 
poetics, we have metaphor, and we have myth. And here is where we can continue 
questioning in the domain where language cannot venture. Through a repeated revisiting 
of these ideas in subsequent stages in the thesis, I hope that my audience will be able 
to detect the locus of my own understanding of ecological sustainability. 
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2.4 PRESENTING HERMENEUTICAL UNDERSTANDING 
The approach to this research is broadly hermeneutical3• I wish to focus, for a moment, 
on what I mean by 'hermeneutical', and elaborate on the difficulties associated with 
presenting hermeneutical understanding. Hermeneutics is a methodology of the 
interpretation of meaning, deriving its name from the Greek god Hermes, who 
transmitted the messages of the gods to mortals (Bleicher 1980). It has been used as a 
means of extracting meaning from texts from the time of the ancient Greeks, but has 
also been used extensively in different religions that have sacred texts, as a means of 
extracting authentic meaning from such texts (Bleicher 1980). In Europe this 
methodology reached a high point with the work of Protestant theologian Schleiermacher 
who sought to uncover deeper meanings from Christian writings in the absence of 
ecclesiastical guidance (Carr and Kemmis 1986; Connolly and Keutner 1988 for 
example). From the interpretation of sacred texts hermeneutics has spilled over into 
philosophy and the social sciences under the general agreement that human 
understanding is thoroughly bound up in language, and where the human intellect does 
not have the capacity for a pure vision of reality in itself (Wachterhauser 1986). This 
form of social inquiry begins with the acknowledgement of the centrality of language 
as a pivotal mediator of meaning in social life. 
Hermeneutics focuses on the unveiling of subjective meanings through the repeated 
revisiting of a text (or a social situation), where the authentic meaning as originally 
captured in language, is able to be apprehended by both the observer and the observed. 
This school of thought become popular in the social sciences during the 20th century 
following the work of Dilthy (Wilson 1989), the social theory of Weber, the 
phenomenology of Husserl (see Bell 1990), Heidegger (1962), the hermeneutical method 
of Gadamer (e.g Gadamer 1975), and later the critical hermeneutics of Habermas (e.g 
Habermas 1973, 1979). The principle issue at stake is the understanding of inter-
subjectivity in social life, incorporating the subjectivity of both the observer and the 
observed. 
This focus on SUbjectivity arose out of a reaction against the positivist claim that social 
reality can be studied objectively, as if the author is capable of removing herself or 
31 do not employ the 'hermeneutic method' as defined by the school of hermeneutics 
in the tradition of Hans Georg Gadamer. I instead derive my inspiration from the later 
works of Martin Heidegger himself as they developed from the mid 1940s. The details of 
this approach will be explored in chapter 4. 
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himself entirely from the research (see Carr and Kemmis 1986, Outhwaite 1987; Fay 
1987, for example). This, of course, is not possible (see Kuhn 1970; Ricoeur 1973; Fay 
1987; Rainbow and Sullivan 1979) or even necessalY in order to gain an understanding 
of social life (see Heidegger 1962). What is more impOltant is to understand the nature 
of inter-subjectivity itself, which comes from the constant reflection of what is studied, 
combined with reflection on the investigative apparatus employed, that is, perception and 
the methods of interpretation of empirical information by the person/s conducting the 
study. 
A hermeneutical approach invites the researcher to interpret a situation in the light of 
the details and the overall situation, gain a degree of understanding, and use this 
understanding to reinterpret the situation from a more informed position. Each time a 
new level of understanding is achieved it can be called a turn of the hermeneutic circle 
(see Wachterhauser 1986; Dreyfus 1987; Gadamer 1988 for example). To give an 
example, imagine viewing an environmental problem such as deforestation in Fiji for 
the first time. It may appear prima facie to be a technical problem. Thus the interpreter 
puts on a technical viewfinder and views the situation. If the situation were purely 
technical the interpretation would reveal a solution at the technical level. If, however, 
the situation were more than merely technical, then the interpretation is likely to uncover 
numerous contradictions in the process of attempting to understand the issue using the 
technical interpretive approach. These may be social contradictions that stand in the way 
of resolving the problem in question. Thus, no matter how sophisticated the technical 
approach might be, and how elaborate the creative response is (in the way of 
management options for example), the technical approach will miss the point in terms 
of locating a robust solution for the problem. 
This demonstrates the need to revisit the situation from a revised perspective, for 
example, a social one. If this is catTied out, the social framework of interpretation will 
reveal much more about the situation than was possible if viewed solely at the technical 
level. However, this is not to say that the technical stage of hermeneutical understanding 
was not valuable - it was. It is because of the first viewing of the situation that the 
second viewing became possible. It served as a pointer to a deeper locus of the source 
of the problem in question. If the source of the problem was indeed social then the 
investigation would lead to a solution at the level of the social, perhaps with a number 
of additional turns of the hermeneutic circle using modifications of the social 
framework. However, a social perspective may still, at best, provide merely a platform 
that points to a deeper source of the problem (which may lie in culture), which 
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necessitates the employment of a cultural interpretive framework of inquiry. If the issue 
is indeed a cultural one then the location of cohesive answers becomes possible. I began 
at the level of the technical and ended up in culture, metaphysics, and post-metaphysical 
inquiry. My task is to show you how and why I went where I did in my questioning 
about ecological sustainability. But first a note on praxis. 
The nature of the hermeneutical approach, as it is practised, does not lend itself to the 
rigid separation of theory and practice. This is because at each turn of the hermeneutic 
circle both theory and practice are employed which together facilitate the need for a 
revisiting of the situation from a broader perspective. Hence, theory does not inform 
practice any more than practice informs theory - the two share a similar status (as 
opposed to one dominating the other). The result is called praxis. The notion of praxis, 
which can be traced back to the Greeks, is an on-going dialectical process of action and 
reflection, guided by a moral disposition to act 'justly' in what the Greeks called 
phrollesis (Carr and Kemmis 1986). 
The methodology of this thesis as a form of praxis was not something that was able to 
be defined at the onset of the research programme, but something which evolved along 
with the understanding gained from conducting the research itself. To present the 
method as if it were established at the beginning and merely carried out according to 
pre-defined rules would be to misrepresent the actual process of coming to 
understanding in the work. The methodology evolved with the research. Indeed, the way 
that it did evolve presented me with the oppOltunity to refine the processes that I 
employed in order to develop a methodology as one of the principle outcomes of this 
research. I call this methodology 'transcendental cultural ecology'. 
2.5 WHAT IS 'ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY'? 
Any attempt to define ecological sustainability as a fixed standard and able to be placed 
into an unchanging box labelled "Ecological Sustainability" will have misunderstood the 
magnitude of the issue. Ecological sustainability is not a thing as such, nor is it a 
process that lends itself to any fixed definition. This does not point to a kind of nihilism 
concerning the notion of sustainability but serves as a reminder that we are not talking 
about a trivial issue. This is why I make an early distinction between ecological 
sustainability and environmental management. The latter is a process of controlling the 
world where it has been damaged, the former is a process of not damaging as a way of 
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life. They do not merely differ in degree, they differ in kind from each other4. The 
question concerning ecological sustainability is a far more challenging question than that 
concerning environmental management. This is because we are very familiar with 
management and can recognise it easily enough. But ecological sustainability? What 
does this look like? What must we look for when we search for it? What constitutes it 
and makes it different from anything else? Why is it not the same as management? 
To talk sensibly about the differences between sustainability and management we must 
also pose the question:- what is meant by 'management'? When we talk about 
management we tend to refer to the controlling of something outside ourselves. We 
manage something to conform to a rule, law or a model as a form of stoicism5. Many 
times we concoct a model of how we believe the world should be (based upon a law of 
some form) and then go out to engineer a management situation into shape so that it fits 
our modeL But where does this model come from? And who is to be the judge of the 
appropriateness of the model managers, scientists, planners, politicians, philosophers, 
God? Until we are prepared to question management critically, we will never be able 
to understand the way it differs from ecological sustainability. To play the devil's 
advocate I refer to one of Nietzsche's comments on the morality of stoicism which also 
applies to the idea of management: 
Your pride wants to impose your morality, your idea, on nature ... you demand 
that she be nature "according to the Stoa," and you would like all existence to 
exist only after your own image .... And some abysmal arrogance finally still 
inspires you with the insane hope that because you know how to tyrannize 
yourselves - Stoicism is self tyranny - nature, too, lets herself be tyrannized: is 
not the Stoa - a piece of nature? (Nietzsche 1973: 15-16). 
In terms of the management model mentioned above, where is the source of legitimation 
for any model? This is an important question as it lies in the realm of ethics which may 
guide us in our actions in the world - actions such as management. There are many 
4In chapter 9 I will revisit this question concerning management. There I make a 
distinction between 'management' and 'mitigation'. The former involves controlling the 
environment, the latter involves controlling ourselves. I do not suggest that all forms of 
environmental mitigation should be avoided in relation to the question of ecological 
sustainability. I only show that mitigation is only that - a last ditch effort to 'mop up' after 
the damage has been done, or to try and stop existing damage from continuing. 
51 use the term 'stoicism' in reference to the Stoic rationality rooted in the philosophy 
of Zeno (died in 261 b.c.) (see Rist 1978) which embraces a form of determinism and 
holism which leads to ethical systems of control (see Jonas 1963; Cheney 1989b). 
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ways of legitimating a discourse of ethics, and of management, but is the process of 
legitimation able to be grounded in a form of justice, a justice to the earth, a justice to 
people? Where does it come from - this justice, this source of good, of environmental 
benevolence, of ecological sustainability? This is a big question. It may sound obscure, 
but I believe that it lies at the heart of our problem. I will undertake to answer this big 
question through the course of this thesis. 
2.6 POSING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 
As suggested in the abstract I wish to focus, not merely on the formulation of answers 
to the question concerning ecological sustainability, but more importantly, the posing of 
appropriate questions. But what is an appropriate question? I am attempting to 
understand ecological sustainability. As such I need to find a way of uncovering it. I 
could ask an enormous variety of sophisticated questions but the answers so revealed 
can only be as good as the question. For example, if ecological sustainability was merely 
a legal issue, a legal question would be capable of uncovering an authentic answer. I 
could ask - "is ecological sustainability possible in Fiji if the New Zealand Resource 
Management Act (1991) were implemented there?" Now, I will suggest here that such 
a question is about as sensible as asking - "is ecological sustainability in Fiji heavier or 
lighter than an elephant?" They are questions, yes, but they are not relevant questions. 
They both do not even come close to addressing the issue of ecological sustainability. 
In terms of establishing the rules for this method of questioning I heed the advice of 
Bergson in his attempt to clarify what constitutes an appropriate question. There are 
three dimensions to Bergson's formulation. The first is the establishment of a problem. 
The second involves the discovery of genuine differences in kind (as opposed to degree), 
and the third concerns the apprehension of real time (Deleuze 1988). For Bergson, 
the truth ... is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positing it, 
even more than of solving it. For a speCUlative problem is solved as soon as it 
is properly stated ... its solution exists ... although it may remain hidden and, so 
to speak, covered up: The only thing left to do is to uncover it... The stating and 
solving of the problem are very close to being equivalent: The truly great 
problems are set forth only when they are solved (Bergson 1946:58). 
In this respect Bergson has much in common with Heidegger, who also focuses on the 
importance of questioning as a methodology in itself. They are also similar in the way 
they extend their questioning to the dominant Western concept of time. In so doing they 
add a new and exciting dimension to metaphysics that (they claim) helps to unmask 
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much of what Western philosophy has left concealed since Aristotle (see chapter 7). 
Questioning, which is the "piety of thinking" for Heidegger (1976, 1977), may be seen 
by some as inappropriate at a stage in histolY when there is no time to waste by sitting 
and thinking. However, according to Heidegger (1968:4) "it could be that prevailing 
[humanity] has for centuries now acted too much and thought too little", where he goes 
on to say that "most thought provoking in our thought provoking time is that we are still 
not thinking" (ibid.:6, his emphasis). 
I believe that the problem of ecological sustainability is one of the great problems of our 
time. The solving of which can only come in the framing of the appropriate questions. 
Deciding whether or not we have posited an appropriate question is the next dilemma. 
How is this done? A starting point for this is also taken from Bergson. He makes a 
distinction between two types of false problems. The first are non-existent problems 
whose terms contain a confusion by establishing a search for a difference in degree 
rather than a difference in type of condition. The second are badly stated questions 
which contain badly analyzed composites (Bergson 1946). 
An example of the first kind of false problem is the searching for a means of bringing 
forth ecological sustainabiIity by attempting only to find ways of reducing the rate of 
resource use in an economy. This is sensible if, and only if, the problem of 
unsustainability is a problem of degree and not a problem of kind, in terms of the 
relationship between humanity and the rest of Nature. The idea of sustain ability contains 
an implicit reference to 'in perpetuity'. This notion of 'perpetuity' contains a reference 
to a condition of 'for ever' or 'eternity'. I will return to this idea later with regard to the 
notions of time, but state it here to indicate a need to take 'eternity' seriously. 'Eternity' 
or 'in perpetuity' is not merely different in degree from 'for a very long time', it is 
different in kind6• 
It is this difference in kind that underlies the meaning of the idea of sustainability and 
distinguishes it from environmental management. It demands more than merely a 
modification in the rate of current practices. It demands a change in the context of our 
lives, a transformation in our cultural being. 
6I will look more closely into the question of time in chapter 7. 
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Another example is the age old question of "which comes first, the chicken or the egg?". 
The answer lies not in a decision based on an analysis of the question but comes 
through something which lies outside the question itself - in the standard of rationality 
that makes the question possible. The question points to a contradiction. But this 
contradiction points the way to an alternative way of thinking. The answer can come, 
in this case through dialectics, where neither the chicken nor the egg are temporally or 
existentially distinct from each other, they are two sides of the same coin. I mention 
dialectics here because it is to reappear in later chapters as a central ingredient to a form 
of rationality that (I believe) enables an understanding of ecological sustain ability. 
The second type of false problem (involving the use of badly analyzed composites) can 
be depicted by considering the confusion of ontology and epistemology in philosophical 
argument. This amounts to a poor analysis of the composites viz. ontology and 
epistemology, where they are mistakenly seen as only different in degree rather than 
different in kind. One is a theory of reality (ontology), the other is a theory of how we 
might come to have knowledge about that reality (epistemology). The conflation of the 
two (called the epistemic fallacy by Bhaskar 1975) can happen in rationalism for 
example, where the map is seen as being the same as the landscape which it 
symbolically describes (such as when mathematics is seen as more than a human 
language system). 
These are not simply mistakes but serious methodological misconceptions that can lead 
entire research programmes up blind alleys, where rather than finding an authentic 
solution, all that is found is an answer that satisfies the inadequate criteria laid out in 
a false set of questions. Technically orientated approaches to the question concerning 
ecological sustainability do precisely this, and so too do those undertaken at the level 
of the social, whilst leaving culture out of the picture. I will set out to demonstrate this 
in subsequent chapters. 
I believe that much of science in practice is so preoccupied with finding of solutions that 
little effort is spent framing appropriate questions. In this thesis I shift the emphasis 
from the solution to the question. This is not employed as a means of obscuring the 
issue or avoiding getting on with 'good science'. But it is a way of questioning that can 
do justice to the issue of ecological sustainability, an issue which I believe is not only 
scientific but metaphysical. Without such a focus on questioning, the issue of ecological 
sustainability is easily trivialised. Some scientists, for example, may decide to define the 
term 'ecological sustainability' first and then proceed to exercise an axiomatic 
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methodology that reinforces the definition (see Rota 1990 for an account of the mis-use 
of mathematical logic in metaphysics). But the circularity of such an approach will not 
be capable of uncovering any deeper meanings in relation to ecological sustainability, 
if indeed it is a metaphysical issue. It would if the meaning of the tenn 'ecological 
sustainability' was self evident, but I seek to demonstrate that it is far from this. Both 
the framing of the question and the answer come simultaneously as a consequence of 
this inquiry. 
2.7 CULTURE AND LANDSCAPE 
That the landscape is an active agency in social life is not commonly made explicit in 
technical, or social forms of discourse that attempt to deal with the issue of ecological 
sustainability. During the course of this research I was faced with a dilemma in this 
regard. I knew that sustainability was a social issue, but I also knew that it was 
ecological. However, I found it impossible to reconcile the social and the ecological 
dimensions of my questioning whilst imprisoned in the theoretical domain of the social 
on one hand or the ecological on the other. The question is often asked about aspects 
of human life - 'Nature or nUliure?' as if there had to be a choice between the two. This 
question is a false one as it asks us to select one from a pair that in reality are 
inseparable. To state it more specifically, "is our relationship with the landscape social 
or ecological?" The answer is that it is bigger than both. We are social beings, but we 
are also ecological beings, and because of this society, any society qua humanity is ipso 
facto ecological. 
One of the biggest problems faced by people questioning at this level is the theoretical 
and common-sense distinction between humanity and Nature the humanity/Nature 
dualism. This dualism is sustained by a false argument which suggests on one hand, that 
the social world is in some way separate from the landscape, and on the other that 
ecological reality is not social. Some attempts at reconciling this have been made in the 
field of socio-biology (see Midgley 1978; Alexander and Noonan 1979; Dwyer 1986; 
Wrangham 1987) and social ecology (e.g. Bookchin 1986). 
This conceptual separation between humanity and the rest of Nature extends into the 
scientific literature on both sides of this false fence. For example, landscape ecology 
tends to differentiate between 'cultural' and 'non-cultural' landscapes in relation to 
ecosystem dynamics (Godron and Forman 1983; Weinstein and Shugart 1983; Forman 
1989). Slesser (1989) for example, maintains this humanitylNature dualism whilst 
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suggesting that "the distinction is necessarily blurred" (ibid.:423). We are told by Slesser 
that "ecology deals with the natural system, which is driven by solar energy, and mans 
[sic] perturbation and management of it" (ibid.:423). Existing on the basis of solar 
energy is supposedly what makes things natural. But the criteria is a tenuous one at best, 
as there is no attempt to substantiate the assumption that human actions are outside 
Nature, rather than being a particular aspect of Nature. Furthermore Slesser goes on to 
define human ecology in terms of the relation of ecology to economics, as if the entire 
relationship between humanity and the rest of Nature was able to be reduced to this. I 
hope to show that such a reductionist approach to human ecology can help up to a point, 
but ends up obscuring the meaning of ecological sustainability. 
The interpretive social sciences, and critical theorists have reacted against the intrusion 
of the natural sciences (i.e. positivism) into the social domain, implying that there are 
ontological distinctions between the domain of the 'natural' and that of the 'social' (e.g. 
see Outhwaite 1987; Bhaskar 1979, 1981). As such, both ecology and sociology have 
a tendency to maintain a distinction between each other or, as in the case of positivist 
socio-biology, there is a denial that the social domain is anything but mechanistic. There 
is also a tendency in modern societies to keep disciplines and institutions 
administratively separate (which affects the way we think about their subject matter), 
and there remains a common-sense humanitylNature dualism in our own language. 
The English language, for example, has a word called 'Nature'. But what do we call 
'Nature'? We tend to have 'Nature' as meaning something like 'that greenery outside the 
window'. Nature is seen as something outside ourselves. The point is that when we look 
at the world through our own view-finder labelled 'Nature' we do not see people or 
ourselves in the field of view. And if we do see our selves we see only our 'biological' 
body, with our non-biological mind or self still sitting behind the viewfinder doing the 
viewing. This is an example of the Cartesian dualism of body and mind, as if they were 
two separate things (see Capra 1982; Bohm 1980; Bhaskar 1975, 1979, Davies and 
Gribbin 1991; Johansson 1989; Whitehead 1929, 1930 for example). If we were to see 
the reality of body and mind as something bigger than both we might begin to 
understand why there is no need to separate humanity from the rest of Nature in an 
inquiry about ecological sustainability. 
When viewed in this light the landscape can easily be seen as more than merely a social 
utility (Shields 1990, 1992; Jameson 1988). It is more than a surface upon which we 
humans act out our relations of production, our institutional restructuring, or our 
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revolutions. But what is it in our relationship with landscape that might have something 
to do with ecological sustainability? 
At this stage the role of language and the standards of rationality that underlie the 
meaning of words in language become important concerns worthy of questioning. Social 
life has meaning where that meaning comes from within, through the recreation of 
culture through language (Geertz 1973, 1987; Dreyfus 1987), but meaning is also 
apprehended from outside language, through intuition (see Bergson 1946; Sheldrake 
1981, 1991), and an unconscious perception of Nature (Cheney 1989a; Maslow 1971; 
Ross 1993). This perception and intuition can be recreated in culture symbolically 
through ritual and in descriptive poetical language (e.g. Halliburton 1981; Cheney 1989a; 
Kockelmans 1972). This is where my science of transcendental cultural ecology leaps 
across the threshold and becomes art. This is because it is through what we commonly 
call art that a culture maintains a link with the rest of Nature that explicitly embraces 
the inter-subjectivity of this relationship (see Campbell 1986 for example). Art is also 
a way of bringing into culture that which language cannot grasp, that aspect of reality 
which lies beyond the reach of language (Murdoch 1993). 
Through art human societies can symbolically engage in a discourse with the landscape, 
and each other, where that conversation happens outside the boundaries of the individual 
consciousness (Neuman 1959). It is a psychological process of a collective unconscious 
dialogue with reality as it is apprehended outside or prior to thinking (see J ung 1959 for 
example). As such, the thesis looks more specifically at the spiritual dimensions of the 
question of ecological sustainability. Because of this, my methodology called 
'transcendental cultural ecology' must question at the level of this post-metaphysical 
domain of culture. 
2.8 DEFORESTATION AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY IN FIJI 
As mentioned above, the issue that triggered my interest in the question of ecological 
sustainability, was that of deforestation in Vunivia. My task was to explore this problem 
and eventually frame an appropriate set of questions which might reveal the source of 
the problem and provide a framework for action capable of solving it. My concern is 
not about solving the problem of deforestation in one particular place such as Vunivia, 
as environmental management can achieve this without doing anything for ecological 
sustainability. This is because deforestation could easily be stopped in that small comer 
of the Fiji landscape through the employment of technical solutions. But what about the 
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consequences of a halting of deforestation in Vunivia? In so doing have we solved the 
problem of deforestation in Fiji or merely shifted the spatial locus of deforestation to 
another patt of that country? And for that matter, if we were to stop all logging of 
indigenous forest in that country, would this amount to ecological sustainability, or 
would it merely shift the pressure onto forest resources in other countries, or to other 
types of economic resources in Fiji, or both? Is this ecological sustainability? No, it is 
only management, and not necessarily good management vis-a-vis ecological 
sustainability as it does not confront the issue of ecological sustainability itself but by-
passes it in the name of 'protected area establishment', 
This is not to say that indigenous forests of Fiji should not be protected, but protecting 
them without changing the economic pressures on them will be no guarantee that they 
will remain protected7 in some way in perpetuity which is what sustain ability demands. 
This is because, if the economic forces that currently target indigenous forests as a 
resource are left untouched, there is no guarantee that they will not (a) increase in 
intensity, and (b) look to the legally protected indigenous forests of Fiji at some future 
date and, through a socially instructed change in the law, legally fell them then. We 
have done nothing for ecological sustainability by looking only at forests. We must look 
at the socio-economic system that uses them, and the culture that makes that form of 
economy/society possible. 
Now we can begin the process of framing an appropriate type of question. Is 
deforestation in Vunivia an isolated technical problem relating to poor management 
within the context of a potentially sustainable forest industry? Or is it more than this? 
Perhaps it is a structural problem relating to inappropriate resource allocation within the 
context of a potentially sustainable economy? Or is it something deeper? Is it possible 
that the economy itself is at fault, and that a different greener economic system is what 
is needed, given that ecological sustainability within that culture is feasible? Or, are 
there really some serious problems with the basis of the culture itself in terms of its 
foundations of value, world view, and rationality which render the above possibilities 
as merely symptoms of what is essentially an unsustainable way of life? 
I hope to demonstrate that any form of environmental research that has any interest in 
ecological sustainability must remain open to undertaking a cultural analysis. Such an 
71 do not see ecological sustainability as a condition of protecting natural areas in 
perpetuity as such, but the recreation of a culture that is able to co-exist with the rest of 
Nature in a dialectical synchronicity. I will discuss this further in chapter 4. 
24 
analysis must include an investigation into issues such as social and political 
relationships, world view, language, meanings that underlie language, mythology, 
spirituality, ritual and ceremony, technology, the role of knowledge and the way 
knowledge is legitimated, the basis of value, the use of resources, and the way that 
resources are distributed. This is a far broader approach to environmental issues than are 
commonly carried out in an official capacity by governments or non-government 
environmental organisations that wish to do as much as they can without rocking the 
political boat. 
The Fiji National Environment Management Project conducted by the Fiji Government 
during 1991 and 1992 is a good example of an official programme. Even basic social 
issues relating to the appropriateness of certain management practices were not 
sufficiently addressed. An investigation into the deeper social and political causes of 
many of Fiji's environmental problems were completely ol!-t of the question, partly 
because they would point to more general social and political issues that are definitely 
'not negotiable' in a government sponsored environmental review. This establishes a 
political framework for environmental management programmes that are so narrow that 
the real issues are left out of the debate, and recommendations forming the basis of a 
grand national strategy are only those which are politically expedient. This effectively 
amounts to the implementation of management programmes that politely sweep the 
symptoms of an unsustainable culture beneath the carpet. All the rest remains 
diplomatically unsaid, or is left to lie still-born in renegade consultancy repol1s, and 
collect dust in the filing systems of government bureaucracies. 
Environmental agencies of any description that ignore the deeper social and cultural 
issues surrounding environmental degradation often serve to perpetuate the very problem 
itself. Advocates of environmental management of this type may, inadvertently, help to 
support oppressive and violent cultural structures in the name of 'diplomacy' or in the 
maintenance of their own privileges as 'house slaves' in an unjust society. In this way 
the oppressed and those who represent an oppressed realm (such as advocates of 
indigenous forest protection in Fiji) may be just as guilty as their masters in failing to 
act to change the structures of society where those structures are oppressive and 
unsustainable (Freire 1972). This thesis presents an approach to deforestation in Fiji 
which refuses to remain agnostic to issues that are politically delicate. It suggests that 
anything less than the kind of critique offered here will fail to comprehend the meaning 
of ecological sustainability, and in so doing fail to present a cultural configuration that 
is capable of living in harmony with the rest of Nature in Fiji or any country. 
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When people talk about culture and anthropology they often refer to non-Western 
culture, and non-Western life. Indigenous peoples and indigenous cultures are frequently 
studied by Westerners, like myself, perchance to capture the essence of what it is to be 
indigenous to something. Perhaps it relates to an anxiety in modern life expressed as a 
passion to make contact with something more real than modernity. I believe that we are 
all potentially indigenous to something some landscape somewhere, but this relates not 
only to where we are from (our historical cultural roots), but more importantly, to where 
we are going, which is influenced by the culture we are practising. This is what 
ecological sustainability is all about - what we are becoming in the creative cultural 
process of becoming. In this sense I side with Heraclitus, as opposed to Democritis and 
Parrnenides and their disciples in the main stream of Western rationality. But what have 
the ancient Greeks got to do with this research? 
The primary reason why I pursue an enquiry into the thinking of the ancient Greeks 
stems from my desire to understand the foundations of what it is to be living within a 
Western culture a culture now well established in Fiji. These foundations have been 
can-ied with the Western culture where ever it has ventured in the world. One such place 
is the Fiji Islands. According to Heidegger:-
That which was thought and in poetry was sung at the dawn of Greek antiquity 
is still present today, present in such a way that its essence, which is still hidden 
from itself, evelywhere comes to encounter us and approaches us most of all 
where we least expect it, namely, in the rule of modern technology, which is 
thoroughly foreign to the ancient world, yet nevertheless has in the latter its 
essential origin (Heidegger 1977: 158). 
The Western philosophical tradition reaching back to Parmenides holds that substance 
is permanent (Lacey 1989; Kenney 1991). Parmenides (6th century b.c.) argued 
(successfully at the time) for the view that Nature existed in an intrinsic steady state of 
'being'. Heraclitus argued to the contrary, that all things flow - all is 'becoming'. Then 
Democritus believed to have solved this dilemma by saying that all things do flow but 
what flows are unchanging, indivisible bits - atoms. This assumption on the existence 
of such unchanging bits set in motion what was to become the touch stone of Western 
scientific knowledge, grounded in what Whitehead (1930) called the 'doctrine of matter'. 
The assumption of the existence of these atoms as unchanging indivisible bits enabled 
'permanence' to survive and become entrenched in the Western world view. Arguments 
against this conception of the ontology of Nature have been around for at least as long, 
and have represented a significant metaphysical challenge to the Western mind set. Such 
a challenge, until the 20th century, tended to be metaphysical. For example, the theology 
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of Meister Eckhart (Caputo 1978; Cox 1986) and Thomas Aquinas (Arraj 1988) 
challenged the dominant Western notions on the structure and dynamics of Nature, as 
did the metaphysics of Nietzsche, Bergson, Whitehead, Heidegger (see Nietzsche 1956, 
1973, 1967; Bergson 1911; Whitehead 1929, 1930; and Heidegger 1959, 1962, 1971, 
1977 for example). The philosophy of science has also witnessed similar polemics as 
can be seen in the work of Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1986 for example) who developed a 
theory of science called transcendental realism. However, relativity theory and its 
offspring in branches of 20th century quantum mechanics since Einstein and Niels Bohr 
have also provided a scientific framework for such a challenge (see Bohm 1980; Davies 
and Gribbon 1991; Krips 1987; Capra 1975,· 1982, Zohar 1990, Zukav 1979 for 
example). In spite of these challenges, the assumption of permanence and 'being' held 
sway and 'becoming' (constant flux) was pushed, as heresy, to the periphery of the 
Western consciousness. 
The symbolic relationship between permanence, order and substance on the one hand, 
and impermanence, creativity and destruction on the other was depicted in the plays of 
the early Greek dramatists in Attic tragedy. Here the interplay between Apollo 
(permanence, being) and Dionysus (impermanence, becoming) was a central theme 
(N ietzsche 191 1, 1956; Pfeffer 1972; Kenney 1991). The dominant Western tradition 
has, since Parmenides, given primacy to Apollo. For me, however, reality is in a 
constant state of creative flux, of change, and of 'becoming' (see Kahn 1979; Heidegger 
1962, 1975; Bhaskar 1979; Kenney 1991; Whitehead 1929; Zohar 1990; Bohm 1980; 
Prigogine 1979; Foltz 1984; Zimmerman 1983; Keffer et al 1991, for example - the list 
is huge), which is why I am an ecologist. 
As mentioned above, a number of 19th and 20th century philosophers have challenged 
the metaphysical assumption of permanence in various ways. In the 19th century 
Nietzsche viciously attacked ideas of permanence and its implications for morality. He 
argued for a reinstatement of 'becorning' calling his alternative "my Dionysian world of 
the eternally self-creating, the eternally self destroying ... \I (his emphasis, Nietzsche 
1967:550). Nietzsche successfully deconstructed the metaphysical foundations of 
Western culture but was only able to point to where its overcoming could begin. 
Nietzsche reversed Western metaphysics by substituting Dionysus for Apollo in his 
ontology (see Heidegger 1975; Heine 1985 for example). Others such as Heidegger, 
Bergson, and Whitehead agree with Nietzsche in terms of the need to overcome the 
entrenchment of permanence in Western thinking. However, they argue for a creative 
alternative that is not only Dionysian, but one that recaptures the dialectical 
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interrelationship of Dionysus and Apollo, as Nietzsche suggested in his later works 
(Pfeffer 1972) but never fulfilled (Heine 1985). Such a view is similar to that held in 
China in the tradition of Taoism and is symbolised in the dialectic of yin and yang, and 
in India with the dynamic between the Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu (Campbell 1986). 
In this thesis I explore the possibility of recovering the dialectic of Dionysus and Apollo 
as a conceptual touchstone for developing a form of environmental ethics that can obtain 
ecological sustainability. The result is a re-enchantment of Nature. But why is Western 
rationality getting so much attention? Why is a critique of Western cultural 
developments so important? It is because modern Western life has penetrated the 
landscapes of Fiji in many ways and has greatly influenced the relationship between 
landscape and culture in that archipelago over the last 200 years. To ignore this 
influence is to mis-interpret what contemporary Fijian culture is (see Bayliss-Smith et 
al 1988). Fijian culture in all its diversity is not what it used to be 200 years ago, and 
200 years ago it was different from 500 years before that. All cultures are dynamic and 
changing. 
To imply that cultures are static is to conceptually set them in concrete, and fantasise 
about how a culture ought to fulfil a romantic legend rather than understand how it 
really is or was. This may be obvious to anthropologists but many people contributing 
to the debate concerning ecological sustainability are forgetting the dynamic nature of 
culture, and that modern Fiji and modern Fijians are not the same people who walked 
in that landscape in days of old. It is this changing character that allows cultures to 
transform into approximately sustainable or unsustainable forms. 
2.9 OVERVIEW OF THESIS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT 
The purpose of Part II to follow is to initiate a process of reflection on the issue of 
ecological sustainability by first addressing the problem from a technical perspective. 
Although this perspective is able to bring a social dimension into the discourse, it is 
unable to question structural problems that relate to the context of social life and the 
social"economic, and politi"cal context of technical approaches. Obstructions to human 
adaptation to the landscape are struck at the level of the social context, which demands 
a critical inspection of this context. The context is modernity. 
This leads to the need for the establishment of an appropriate theoretical framework 
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capable of addressing the relevant aspects of this social critique. Theoretical 
development is the task of Part III. Here the context of social life in Fiji is explored in 
terms of its heritage and philosophical basis, the latter of which is used to legitimate' 
practices that obstruct ecological sustainability. This philosophical basis is deconstructed 
and an alternative is developed. This allows for theoretical reconstruction as both a tool 
and a theoretical outcome. A theory of ecological sustainability is developed which is 
supported by the deconstruction and reconstruction conducted at the level of metaphysics 
and post-metaphysics. This leads to Part IV in which the local Fiji situation is able to 
be re-addressed and an authentic question concerning ecological sustainability can be 
framed. This is followed by the development of a social and political prescription that 
is capable of bringing about the kind of cultural transformation needed if ecological 
sustainability is to become a possibility. 
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PART II 
THE VUNIVIA CATCHMENT 
Part II brings us to the Vunivia catchment, to where we can begin the process of 
framing an authentic question concerning ecological sustainability. In the following two 
chapters I trace my own evolution of thought in relation to the social dimensions of 
ecological sustainability. I present an analysis that was in the process of transforming 
as the thesis progressed. This process began in 1990 and I present rny perspective as it 
stood at that time and show how and why I moved beyond it. It is undertaken at the 
technical, pragmatic level within the framework of the existing planning structures and 
resource management opportunities and constraints. 'Constraints' often amount to social 
obstructions to environment management goals when viewed from the perspective of an 
environmental manager. Such 'constraints' either pose a hinderance to or an opportunity 
for achieving ecological sustainability, depending on the attitudes of the observer. If the 
social realities that obstruct 'good management' are seen purely as a hinderance to the 
achievement of ecological sustainability, the observer has dismally failed to comprehend 
what human ecology is about (as I had done in 1990). 
Ecological sustainability is not about sustaining ecosystem dynamics in the absence of 
humans. It is about the ability of human communities to exist in a compatible 
relationship with their ecological surroundings. People are part of the equation. Social 
issues are endemic attributes of human ecology. We are both social and ecological 
beings. It became clear to me that this point could not be ignored in any approach to the 
question of ecological sustain ability without reducing it to a false question. This 
realisation was made during 1991 and 1992 where it became obvious that the technical 
approach must transform into one that is explicitly social. 
An introduction to an exploration of the social dimensions of the question concerning 
ecological sustainability is carried out in chapter 4, where the analysis proceeds from 
within a non-critical social perspective. It is non-critical in the sense that it does not 
critique the existing context of social life but is confronted with the need to do so. I 
avoided this critique at the time because at that stage in the research I was incapable of 
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doing so in the absence of an appropriate background in social theory. I was also 
reluctant (at first) to move into an explicitly political arena which becomes necessary 
once the context of social life is called into question. 
In relation to a critique of the context of social life, an adequate theoretical viewfinder 
must be employed in order to address the social dimensions. The development of such 
a framework became one of the main tasks of the thesis as a whole, and is presented in 
PaIts III and VI. 
CHAPTER 3 - A TECHNICAL APPROACH 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
My first visit to the Vunivia catchment was in November 1988. This visit was conducted 
as part of a contract with the NZ Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society on a national 
survey of indigenous forest resources in Fiji with the view of developing a national 
parks system proposal for that country. This trip served as an introduction to the social 
and economic issues in the Vunivia catchment. As mentioned in chapter 1, this work in 
Fiji in 1988 set the context for what was to become the original research proposal for 
this PhD thesis. The findings of the 1988 survey can be found in a report prepared by 
Lees (1989). Part of this report was designed to serve as an introduction to a reserve 
proposal for the Vunivia catchment area. However, the degree and depth of social 
enquiry was minimal. The inventory nature of the survey did not allow any detailed 
social inquiry. 
The Vunivia situation presented an array of real social circumstances that are central to 
the issue of ecological sustainability. This included a landscape covered with natural 
forest that was being logged; the social and economic needs and aspirations of local 
people; the opportunities they had in order to meet these needs from their own 
resources; and the interests of outside agencies in relation to the various resources in this 
catchment. Confronting this social dimension in Vunivia provided an opportunity to 
examine how this particular social world interacted with the ecological dimensions of 
the landscape. The social system is an aspect of the ecosystem. The social dynamic has 
an ecological character. But how does this socio-ecological dynamic function, and what 
is necessary for it to function in an enduring harmonious fashion? The landscape is 
always changing; society is always changing too. But how can these changes be co-
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adaptive as opposed to contradictory? I set out in this research, to frame an authentic 
question in this regard. I spent two years failing badly, because I was tied up in a non-
critical framework. In chapters 3 and 4 I show why and how I failed, and why I needed 
to spend the final year of the thesis researching the literature in order to realign the 
theoretical context of the analysis. 
3.2 VUNIVIA - A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The Vunivia catchment, comprising some 5,300 hectares, lies at the eastern end of the 
north coast of Vanua Levu (figure 3.1). It survives as the last remaining extensive area 
of lowland dry-zone forest in Fiji. It had escaped conversion to non-forest land uses 
primarily due to its former isolation. This situation has changed in recent years through 
the construction of roads in the area. The loss of forest cover in the catchment has been 
increasing in recent years through a combination of commercial logging and small scale 
cash-crop agriculture. The catchment is almost entirely owned by a single native land-
owning unit- the mataqali (clan) Namako. This aspect of the thesis is focused primarily 
on this mataqali and its relationship with the Vunivia landscape. 
This catchment is dissected by four climate zones as defined by Beny and Howard 
(1973), where mean annual rainfall ranges from 1650mm at the coast to 3800mm in the 
highest part of the catchment. Effects of seasonality are variable with an extensive mid-
year dry season at the coast (particularly the Naqaralevu peninsula), with a greatly 
reduced seasonality at the head of the catchment, where rainfall is generally much 
higher. 
Geologically, Vunivia consists of one of the largest deposits of acid volcanics in Fiji 
comprised of dacite and ryolite flows and breccias, glass breccias, and thinly bedded 
pumaceous sediments, estimated to be mid Miocene to late Pliocene in age (Rickard 
1970). The topography of the area is influenced by more recent uplifts accompanied by 
a northward tilting of fault blocks. Steep hills underlain by Vunivia breccias occur along 
the northern watershed with moderately sloping and steep hill masses adjacent to the 
Vu'nivia and Vunivia Lailai rivers. A strongly weathered humic latosol soil of low base 
status is widespread in the area, with red-yellow podsols mapped as Dogotuki hill soils 
located on the more acidic parent materials (Twyford and Wright 1965). 
Most of the catchment is covered in natural forest, some of which has been modified 
by selective logging in recent years (since 1980). There are a number of isolated non-
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forest parts of the catchment associated with human settlement and land use, where 
forest had been cleared for gardens and commercial cropping. The vegetation type has 
been loosely defined as closed canopy tropical rain forest (Berry and Howard 1973c). 
The specific vegetation, however, is variable depending on soil type, climate zone, 
topography, and location in relation to village and settlement sites. There is an extensive 
mangrove system (Briguiera sp. and Rhizophora sp.) at the coastal fringe situated in a 
protected bay reaching inland along the margins of the Vunivia river and the Bourewa 
creek. The coastal zone immediately behind the mangrove swamp on dry, low nutrient 
soils is comprised of open, small leaved, sclerophyllous vegetation dominated by 
Burckella sp., Gymnostoma vitiensis, Syzygium. sp., Homalium sp., and Pittosporum sp .. 
Low coastal shorelines overlain with coralline dust deposits support a semi-deciduous 
low forest with busia bijuga, Gyrocarpus americanus, Terminalia and Ficus spp. Stands 
of Pandanus sp. intermixed with cyperaceous grassland, Dicranopteris linearis (a reptant 
fern), Spathoglottis sp. (orchid), and myrtaceous shrubs dominate fresh water swamp 
land near to the coast. The hill vegetation varies depending on soil moisture and 
topography. Dry ridge sites tend to be dominated by Dacrydium nidulum, Gymnostoma 
nodiflora, Syzygiwn sp., and other myrtaceous tree species. Valley floors support a rich 
and diverse vegetation including Dysoxylum spp., Endospermum sp., Eleaocarpus sp., 
Myristica sp., Patinari sp. Bischofia sp., Burckella sp., and Heritiera sp. in a dense 
canopy, with a diverse and many-layered understorey with numerous fems, vines, 
epiphytes, and climbers. Valley slopes support a similar vegetation to valley floors but 
in places are characterised by the large emergent crowns of Agathis macrophylla over 
a dense canopy of Syzygium spp., Myristica spp., Bischofia sp. and Dysoxylum spp .. 
The modified vegetation near coastal settlements and villages is characterised by coconut 
plantations intermixed with food gardens at the edge of cleared dry-forest remnants. 
Inland settlements have fewer coconuts but maintain large garden areas at the edge of 
the forest. 
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As mentioned above, the land under investigation is that held by the mataqali Namako. 
This mataqali had a 1992 population of 221 people spread throughout 12 settlements 
and one village (figure 3.2). This mataqali is comprised of four tokatoka (sub-clans) 
including Naqara, Malumusere1, Bulu and Namako. In addition to these kinship 
groupings the mataqali is divided into five different (Christian) religions: Catholic, 
Methodist, Seventh Day Adventist, Assembly of God, and Every Home (see figure 3.3). 
The settlements have tended to be established on the basis of religion. The local 
economy could be generally described as semi-subsistence, with a monetary component 
arising from cash-crop agriculture, a limited amount of wage labour (within the 
catchment), with income also arising from remittances and timber royalties. Small scale 
traditional harvest (Le. fish and crabs) for cash provides an income for some families 
living near the coast. 
A commercial cocoa growing project was established in 1986 with government 
assistance. Commercial timber extraction has been a feature of local resource use since 
it began in 1980. A timber concession over the entire forest component of the 
catchment area is held by Fiji Forest Industries Ltd (FFI). Some landowners have 
participated in the logging operation as contractors to the logging company. Commercial 
logging came to an end in April 1992 as the result of negotiations I had with the 
landowners, the logging company, the Fiji Environment Unit (Department of Town and 
Country Planning), and the Department of Forestry. It was the desire of the landowners 
that the logging be stopped. A number of different logging coups had been logged at a 
low intensity. Some of these coups, although partly logged, still maintain a closed 
canopy. Other coups however, have been more intensively logged and have been opened 
up to a much greater extent, leaving a discontinuous canopy and a remaining forest that 
is vulnerable to wind damage on exposed aspects. 
lThe tokatoka Malumusere is an internal kinship group within the tokatoka Namako. 
It no longer maintains official status of a tokatoka but is important to its members. This 
will be clarified in chapter 4. 
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- Not belonging to the mataqali Namako 
Catholic 
- Assembly of God 
- Every Home 
- Seventh Day Adventist 
- Methodist 
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During this research programme the logging of the Vunivia forests was continuing. The 
immediate threat of forest loss from this operation was a central concern for this 
research, which was initially being undertaken as a form of action research. Of particular 
concern was the continued loss of forest by a commercial operation in a area supporting 
the last remaining example of such a forest type - an ecologically sensitive area. The 
uniqueness of the Vunivia forest was what originally attracted my attention as a topic 
for research. 
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In terms of action research, I undertook to become involved in a real-life environmental 
management situation which demanded immediate action at a technical level in order 
to make environmental management gains. By becoming involved in a management· 
situation like this one I was able to obtain an insight into how environmental 
management operated in a country like Fiji. I had previously been actively involved in 
a reserve proposal on Viti Levu (the Wabu Creek catchment) which was in the process 
of being formally protected when the PhD research was being conducted. The Wabu 
Creek was eventually gazetted as a Nature Reserve under the Forests Act in 1992. The 
Vunivia situation, however, presented a different set of circumstances relating to 
environmental management than Wabu. Firstly, the Wabu Creek catchment IS 
uninhabited, and no logging operation was in action, although applications for 
concessions were being considered by the Department of Forestry and the Native Land 
Trust Board prior to its protection. Vunivia, on the other hand, had a far more complex 
social dimension, and the area was being actively logged. 
I sought to help to bring about the protection of the Vunivia catchment forests in such 
a way that the landowners could be actively involved in its protection, and alternative 
forms of community development implemented as a means of satisfying local 
development aspirations. The landowner of the Wabu Creek (a single person in this 
case) received compensation for the loss of income which amounted to an equivalent 
sum to what would have been received in timber royalties. Instead of compensation, I 
believed that alternative forms of community development would be more valuable in 
Vunivia, as it would show that conservation could be achieved whilst maintaining the 
momentum of development in an area as far as the land owners were concerned. This, 
in turn, could serve as a test case which, if it succeeded, could be used as a model for 
similar approaches to environmental protection in other parts of Fiji. It would also help 
to expose the kinds of social issues that would need to be accommodated in an 
environmental management situation· that was attempting to contribute to ecological 
sustainability. By changing the context of resource use people could continue to co-
inhabit a natural forest area in an on-going fashion. This (I thought) would be a 
necessary and sufficient basis for ecological sustainability. I have since modified my 
view, the details of which will become apparenfin subsequent chapters. 
One of the overriding problems in relation to the implementation of 'sustainable 
development' as I understood it during the early stages of the thesis, was the differences 
in financial expectations between land owners and commercial timber companies, for 
the same area of forest. For example, the AotearoalNew Zealand Ministry of External 
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Relations and Trade (1990) stated that sustained yield timber harvesting from tropical 
forests was generally biologically, but not economically feasible. The rationale 
supporting this was that industrial forestry operations could generally not sustain a 
commercial interest at the low extraction rates associated with small scale logging 
ventures. Research was recently initiated by the Fiji Department of Forestry on the 
feasibility of sustained yield harvesting of indigenous forests in that country. 
My own feeling in this regard was that the task of forest resource management was not 
solely to serve the interests of a forest industry, but had a much broader mandate. If the 
local Fijian landowners were regarded as the principle client in relation to forest 
management, then sustained yield harvesting, or alternatives to commercial timber 
extraction were economically feasible. This is because the landowners would not have 
to satisfy the principle of maximising corporate profits in relation to high extraction 
costs, as would be the case in an industrial forestry company. Furthermore, landowners 
could conceivably participate in the small scale commercial use of their own resources 
where their over-heads remained very low compared with a large scale operation. To 
give an example, Fiji kauri (Agathis macrophylla) had a 1991 royalty rate for 
landowners of Fl$25-34/M3 (Waqaisavou pers. comm.2). The same cubic metre has a 
sawn timber value of approximately $P1400-500 on the local timber market, if the 
landowners extracted the timber themselves. On a per hectare basis, landowners could 
easily run a small scale commercial timber extraction operation whilst using only a 
fraction of the timber volume used by commercial operators. The milling could be 
conducted with portable mills and in the process, a small scale social forestry project 
could be implemented instead of an intensive large scale commercial venture. 
Alternatively, timber extraction could be put aside and existing non-forest areas in a 
catchment like Vunivia could be incorporated into a programme of agricultural 
intensification in cash cropping, combined with management assistance to bring about 
a much desired increase in local income, without having to remove any trees at all. 
Other available resources could also be utilised, such as a fishery resource (currently 
under utilised in Vunivia), and even the establishment of income generating service 
operations such as retail or transport services. Lowering the local costs of living could 
be included in this community development equation. It was these kinds of community 
development ideas that attracted me to Vunivia, and I went about exploring how such 
2Timoci Waqaisavou is the Senior Estates Officer (Forestry) of the Native Land Trust 
Board. 
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a form of integrated community development and conservation could be implemented. 
As a result of various meetings with officials in government departments and with the 
Chief Executive of Fiji Forest Industries, the logging company agreed to discontinue 
their operation in the area and withdrew their contractors. Up until this point my action 
research was demonstrating that a great deal could be achieved in terms of 
environmental management at the technical level, within the existing legislative 
framework, without ideologically challenging anyone. However, the next phase in this 
research was to strike problems in this regard. 
As mentioned earlier, my task was to come to an understanding of the meaning of 
ecological sustainability. I attempted to do this by ascertaining whether or not 
ecologically sustainable development of some form was possible, through a combination 
of environmental management and community development. There was also the broader 
issue of the protection of natural areas in more general terms beyond a single catchment 
area. 
As such, my next task was to situate the Vunivia example in a more systematic national 
framework. This necessitated a viewing of the institutional structure of environmental 
management generally, in order to see if the Vunivia case was an exceptional situation. 
For ecological sustainability to become remotely meaningful it would at least have to 
apply at the nationallevel. Furthermore, if a community development dimension was to 
be added to environmental management it would need· to be institutionalised in some 
way so that it was able to occur in an on-going fashion as part of the general activities 
of the nation as a whole. 
3.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT 
Environmental management will tend to be a role assigned to governments, with a share 
of the responsibility for environmental management extended to the private sector. 
However, for the private sector to involve itself in this process it often requires 
directives and incentives from government agencies which represent a broader public 
interest. As such, environmental management tends to involve an interaction between 
policy, planning and law, together with the institutions that are responsible for these 
governmental roles. 
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In many cases environmental management is able to be conducted from within the 
existing framework of policy, planning and law, where efforts are put into implementing 
a set of management strategies through formal government channels. This is the precise 
task of government agencies which have a specific mandate for environmental 
management. In AotearoalNew Zealand an obvious agency in this regard is the 
Department of Conservation, which has an environmental management mandate written 
into the Conservation Act, which it employs as a legal template for conducting its 
management activities. In Fiji, however, no such department or corresponding legislation 
exists (as yet), and environmental management responsibilities fall into the hands of a 
number of different government agencies, in a poorly defined legal and planning 
framework. In spite of this, Fiji does have a number of policy and legislative instruments 
capable of being employed in the domain of environmental management of varying 
forms. 
Before looking more specifically into environmental planning it will be useful to situate 
the environment sector in the general planning scheme. National planning in Fiji was 
formally organised through the preparation of national development plans, spanning five 
year periods. The last development plan (DP9) covered the period between 1986-1990. 
This arrangement has since changed where national planning is now conducted through 
the yearly National Economic Summits. Here national strategies are formulated together 
with sectoral plans. The CUlTent emphasis is on promoting export led economic growth, 
particUlarly through the activities of the private sector. This has been encouraged 
through deregulation, corporatisation, reforms in the financial and service sectors and 
the labour market, and a phasing out of tariffs, trade restrictions, and agricultural 
subsidies (Fiji Government 1990; James 1992). National environmental planning must 
fit into this overall framework if it is to be conducted in an official capacity. 
Fiji's most recent National Development Plan (DP9; 1986-1990), stated that the 
Government sought to maintain a healthy environment through the judicious utilisation 
of its resources, thus allowing environmental management to form an integral part of the 
development process (Fiji Government 1986). A subsequent indication of the 
Governme~t's environmental mission statement can be found in the Fiji Government's 
submission to the 1990 Geneva Round Table meeting on national development 
assistance requirements. The Government's objectives in relation to physical planning, 
conservation and environment were to:- protect and conserve unique features of Fiji's 
cultural and natural environment; ensure that environmental management is an integral 
part of the planning and development process; assess the long term needs for land, and 
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provide a basis for land allocation among competing uses; and, to strengthen 
environmental education (Fiji Government 1990). The National Economic Summit of 
1991 also recognised environmental concerns in relation to economic planning: 
Many countries have found that apparently rapid economic growth has been 
achieved only at the cost of a serious depletion of both renewable and non-
renewable assets and to the detriment of their living environment. It is 
recognised that measures have to be taken early to prevent these hidden and 
often inadequately accounted costs ... The objective is to promote sustainable 
development, incorporating a framework of project design, approval and 
monitoring that ensures the prevention of adverse environmental effects (cited 
in James 1992:2-3). 
At the national level (as opposed to the sectoral level) environmental management is 
defined in terms of the instrumental value of natural resources for an economy, 
underwritten by the mission of economic growth. As such, environmental management 
is legitimate if it serves the interests of the national economy. If it fails to serve this 
interest it is unlikely to gain support at the national level. This sets the political context 
within which the environment sector (currently the Environment Unit of the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development) must engage in its advocacy, planning and 
management activities. 
The legal framework, although under review, also provides prima facie many 
opportunities for successful environmental management. For example, biologically 
defined protected areas can be established in Fiji under at least 3 Acts (Native Lands 
Trust Act; Forests Act; National Trust Act). This arrangement has been criticised as 
inadequate for effective environmental management, and was the object of an inquiry 
into the legal framework for environmental management (Pulea 1991). Existing 
legislation (other than specific protected area legislation) that relates to nature 
conservation and environmental protection includes the following:-
1. - The Land Conservation And Improvement Act, Cap 120 Ed 1967 
2. - The National Trust For Fiji Act, Cap 265 Ed 1978 
3. - The Town And Country Planning Act, Cap 139 Ed 1978 
4. - The Subdivision Of Land Act, Cap 140 Ed 1978 
5. - The Forest Act, Cap 150 Ed 1978 
6. - The Mining Act, Cap 148 Ed 1978 
7. - The Birds And Game Protection Act, Cap 170 Ed 1978 
8. - The Fisheries Act, Cap 158 Ed 1978 
9. - Agriculture Landlord And Tenant Act, Cap 270 Ed 1987 
10. - The Rivers and Stream Act 1882 
11. - The Public Health Act 1935 
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Proposed Legislation (yet to be enacted):-
1. - The New Town And Country Planning Legislation 
2. - The Water And Land Resources Management Legislation 
3. - The National Parks And Reserves Bill 
4. - Wildlife Protection Bill 
5. - The Environmental Protection And Enhancement Legislation 
Source: Cabaniuk (1989) Pulea (1991). 
The relationship between agencies responsible for environmental management and the 
legislation and planning structures they hinge upon, was the subject of a national review 
undertaken by the National Environment Management Project (NEMP). The task of the 
Project was to conduct a review of the existing institutional situation in relation to the 
state of the national environment, and the national environmental management 
requirements as identified in the Project. The National Environment Strategy states that: 
Two principle components of an appropriate institutional structure can be 
distinguished: 
a high-level component (the Environment Commission) which develops 
environmental policy; monitors and maintains oversight on the status of 
the Government's efforts to manage Fiji's environment; and which co-
ordinates Government's activities which affect the environment. 
management components which are institutionally and legislatively 
responsible (and accountable) for specific aspects of environmental 
management. .. 
[T]he current sectoraL.environmental management responsibilities should, in 
general, be retained. However, in most cases they need to be more concisely 
defined and clarified and the depmtments held to be entirely responsible and 
accountable for their management activity ... [M]inistries should be expected to 
establish their environmental management functions .. [where in some cases] 
departments would [need to be established]. Such moves are already under way, 
for example, in Forestry, Health, and MPI [Ministry of Primary Industries] 
(Watling 1992:31-32). 
More specific environmental management reforms were also considered by the NEMP 
including environmental education, pollution control and prevention, ecological 
economic issues relating to natural resource accounting, agricultural sustainability, 
marine conservation, protected area legislation, protected area establishment and 
management, and environmental planning. I was a member of the project team for an 
eight month period during 1991. One of my roles on the project was focused on the 
issue of protected areas, with particular regard to the processes of site selection, 
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statutory protection, and management. My contribution concerned the preparation of a 
proposal for integrating social issues into environmental management. The Vunivia 
situation was a case study. 
Of particular concern was a broadening of the basis for environmental valuation, 
incorporating social (as opposed to merely biological) parameters into each stage in the 
management cycle. The general framework of this planning proposal is presented below. 
The rationale behind it was that many protected areas could be established using existing 
legislation in addition to social and economic forms of environmental valuation. 
3.3.2 THE FIJI NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AREAS 
PROGRAMME PROPOSAL 
A proposed national strategy was developed during 1991 for the identification of 
ecologically sensitive areas (ESAs), their statutory protection, and their management as 
Environmental Management Areas (EMAs). The basic principles and structure of this 
proposal is presented here, and has been summarised from the original report (Weaver 
1992d). The proposed programme focused on the protection and enhancement of areas 
of high or potentially high natural value. 
The forms of valuation that underpin the proposed site selection process include the 
biologically defined value of natural ecosystems as well as the socio-economic or 
cultural value of natural areas. Such an approach acknowledges the fact that many 
natural areas, in their intact state, produce a broad range of environmental values to 
human society. 
3.3.2.1 UNDERL VING PRINCIPLES 
The proposed programme consisted of a framework for selecting, protecting and 
managing Ecologically Sensitive Areas (ESAs) as Environmental Management Areas 
(EMAs). EMAs are areas that require some specific form of environmental management 
in order to sustain the environmental values they support. For some areas this may 
involve the implementation of protected area status, while others may require specific 
management without any change in the status of the area. 
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The EMA Programme proposal was shaped by a number of underlying principles. These 
are:-
1. To assist the establishment and maintenance of a national system of 
Environmental Management Areas in a nationally coordinated programme. 
2. To recognise different forms of environmental value for natural ecosystems. 
These different types of value are reflected in different methods for selecting 
NEMAs and different requirements for managing them according to their 
recognised value. 
3. To recognise existing protected area proposals or areas in need of specific 
environmental management and incorporate them into the proposed EMA 
programme framework. 
4. To establish procedures relating to the selection of sites, the implementation of 
appropriate protection, and the subsequent management of sites. Such procedures 
form separate, related; components of the proposed programme. 
5. To recognise the social character of Fiji as a central factor in all stages of the 
programme. ESA tenure and the social conditions that this dictates were built 
into the EMA programme at each level of organisation. 
3.3.2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The context of this proposed programme was originally based on the principles of 
ecologically sensitive areas (ESAs) as described in the National Environmental 
Management Project Inception Report using a definition developed by the Asian 
Development Bank. An ecologically sensitive area (ESA), according to the Asian 
Development Bank, is an area "of outstanding natural value for hydrological, geological, 
scenic, wildlife, or vegetation reasons and which should be converted [into economically 
productive uses] with great care or not at all" (Asian Development Bank 1989:8). This 
provides a framework for the development of a site selection process that is capable of 
recognising such areas according to those values. This provides for sites to be selected 
for purposes of nature conservation as well as the conservation of ecological goods and 
services provided by identifiable ESAs. 
The site selection process should, therefore, be able to encompass a range of site types 
selected from a range of site selection criterior that reflect different forms and scales of 
environmental valuation. Biologically defined value (e.g. biodiversity), as well as a 
variety of social and economic forms of environmental valuation should be included. 
Site selection should reflect site value. For purposes of a strategy a number of site types 
were identified. The following site types and sub-types were identified:-
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Agri cuI tural/harv es t 
Food/nutrition/medicine 
Socio-economic (Recreation/Tourism) 
Direct commercial resource 
Indirect commercial resource 






Each type of ESA could then be sub-divided further according to the range of 
ecosystems held within that particular type category. An example of this is presented for 
the 'Biological - Vegetation' category. 
Here a selection of terrestrial ecosystem types based on the character of the vegetation 




Dry montane forest 
Moist montane rainforest 
Lowland dry-zone forest 
Moist lowland rainforest 
Deciduous dry forest 
Mangrove (a variety of types) 
Grassland community types 
Coastal vine thicket 
Special parent material 
Wetland (a variety of types) 
Dune vegetation 
Coastal wet forest 
Coastal dry forest 
In addition to this there are many examples of biologically based environmental site 
selection procedures that could be adapted to this programme. The South Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) is running a major Pacific wide biodiversity 
programme. The techniques and standards being developed by SPREP could be 
incorporated into a Fiji national programme thus remaining compatible with regional 
initiatives (e.g. South Pacific Regional Environment Programme 1989, South 1993). In 
AotearoalNew Zealand there is the Protected Natural Areas Programme run by the 
Department of Conservation, which has a conceptual basis that could be adapted to Fiji. 
In Western Samoa a national lowland and coastal biodiversity survey was undertaken 
(Park et al 1992) which employed a site selection procedure that could easily be adapted 
for Fiji and fit into the EMA programme framework. 
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The way my proposal differs from the biodiversity approach is its inclusion of a number 
of non-biodiversity criteria as central components in the site selection process. This 
framework allows established resource classification systems to be built directly into a 
broad based national environmental planning process. Classification systems for non-
biodiversity values, which have already been developed both in Fiji and in other 
countries could be used in the EMA programme site selection process. For some site 
types (e.g. those falling into the 'Socio-economic (Resource) Water' category) there are 
likely to be existing data bases and site selection criteria already in use in other 
government departments (e.g. Ministry of Primary Industries, Mineral Resources 
Department). These data bases could be used by the EMA Programme and incorporated 
into a national data base for sites of significance. 
3.3.2.3 BIOLOGICAL VALUE AS A BASIS FOR SITE SELECTION 
The biological value of natural ecosystems has been used extensively as justification for 
creating protected areas throughout the world. Such sites tend to maintain very high 
value for scientific research as well as the protection of unique plant and animal habitats 
which, in their aggregate contribute to the biological character of a nation. Sites of this 
type tend to be managed as nature reserves where the integrity of natural ecosystems are 
protected from human disturbance as far as possible. Fiji has a small number of reserves 
of this type (e.g. the Ravilevu, Wabu Creek, and Yadua Taba Nature Reserves). 
Part of a site selection procedure has been prepared by Gillison (1992) for the National 
Environmental Management Project (NEMP) involving the use of a survey design which 
integrates plant functional (dynamic) attributes with perceived physical environmental 
gradients. This site selection procedure will be useful in identifying sites of high 
biological value under the vegetation category. Other site types of high biological value 
(such as breeding grounds for rare sea bird populations) will need to be identified using 
alternative site selection techniques. The identification of ESAs of all site types will 
need to be carried out using different techniques for site selection appropriate to the 
value in question. 
3.3.2.4 SOCIO·ECONOMIC VALUE AS A BASIS FOR SITE SELECTION 
Under existing legislation (e.g. The Preservation of Objects of Archaeological and 
Paleontological Interest Act 1940, Town and Country Planning Act 1946, Forests Act 
1953, Native Land Trust (Leases and Licences) Regulations, Land Conservation and 
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Improvement Act 1953) ESAs can also be legally protected for conservation purposes 
other than biologically defined value (Pulea 1991). Such areas may maintain high 
conservation value due to their role in the production of environmental goods or 
services, or sites of cultural significance. But these areas may not qualify as sites 
requiring some form of protection under a biologically defined site selection process. 
ESAs of this nature may consist of an ecosystem type that is already represented within 
an existing protected area. 
ESAs of this nature may include sites that are of high value in their intact state for such 
purposes as soil or water protection due to some important economic activity nearby. 
For example, the Vaturu Dam catchment is an area of high conservation value in its 
intact state even though it is extensively modified. The principle conservation value it 
sustains is the ability to protect the water quality within the reservoir which in turn is 
of great social and economic value to the human population of Nadi and Lautoka. The 
area should protected and managed as an EMA justified principally through socio-
economic site selection criterior. 
Other examples of the need for a site selection process that encompasses social and 
economic value of ESAs include sites that have high scenic and/or recreational value for 
the tourism industry, or a local human population. The Colo-i-Suva Forest Park 
consisting largely of a mahogany plantation would be unlikely to qualify as a site 
worthy of protected status under site selection criterior based on biodiversity index. 
However, the recreation and education value of this area is extremely high, as there are 
many indigenous plant and bird species in this reserve, and it is situated very close to 
Suva. Similarly, many other sites of value to recreation and tourism are likely to be 
excluded from a protected areas system justified solely on biological value. This may 
be because the ecosystems they support are already represented in existing reserves, or 
they may consist of modified habitats. The Vaturu Dam catchment again provides an 
example of an ESA that may fail to qualify as a site worthy of protection on the basis 
of biological value, and yet its value to the tourism industry as an EMA is potentially 
very high. 
3.3.2.5 MULTIPLE SITE VALUE 
It is likely that, in many cases, sites that maintain a high value according to one set of 
valuation criterior also maintain significant value under different site selection criterior. 
Areas that may be selected for their biological value, for example, may also be of high 
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value for purposes of soil and water quality protection, or direct economic value to a 
non-extractive industry such as tourism. The Wabu Creek Agathis macrophylla forest 
provides an example of this. Similarly, an area that is selected primarily for purposes 
of water quality protection may (at the present time or some time in the future) maintain 
high biological value as a habitat. The Monasavu Dam catchment is a good example. 
An important administrative aspect of site protection involving the implementation of 
protected status through the planning system concerns the form in which a site is 
formally presented for protection. A site of high biological value may also have other 
values that warrant protection. Other such values might include the ability of a site to 
produce important environmental goods and services, or may be a site of great potential 
for use in the tourism industry. A site selection process that formalises the presentation 
of multiple site value may facilitate the process of implementation of protected status. 
Such an approach recognises that a multiple value approach is likely to lead to conflicts 
of interest. However, a central aspect of this proposal is a recognition of the need for 
negotiation in the process of determining site value. Such negotiation needs to be 
conducted by all parties that maintain an interest in the site. 
3.3.2.6 ESA SCALE 
Different scales of valuation and management can be separated into a number of 
geographical categories. These include national, regional, district, and local scales. These 
scales do not correspond with existing administrative structures although they follow a 
geographical sequence of classification. This framework could be further developed into 
a set of regions and districts as with the New Zealand Protected Natural Areas (PNA) 
programme. 
A site of national significance should be managed at a national administrative level 
where benefits of the conservation of such a site accrue to the nation as a whole. Sites 
that are of regional significance are those where the direct benefits of conserving the 
particular attribute (e.g. a water catchment) accrue only to that region. Similarly, sites 
of district and local significance are those where the direct benefits of conserving the 
identified attribute (e.g. a drinking water resource for a village) accrue only to that 
district or locality. 
A variable scale site selection framework is able to justify the protection of ESAs that 
may be important in their own right, but may not qualify as being of sufficient national 
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significance to be protected in a system of protected areas justified only at a national 
level. It is vital that sites of high local value are incorporated into a national strategy for 
ESA protection. A water catchment for a village or villages will be of very high social . 
and economic value to the people who use that water. However, an ESA such as the 
Saniqari Creek catchment that formally supplied drinking water to the Dravuni villagers 
in Tailevu would not show up as an ESA of any significance based on criteria of 
biological value or at a national scale of significance. Also, a site may have a low local 
value in a protected form but may consist of a highly significant ecologically sensitive 
area at the national level. 
3.3.2.7 ADVANTAGES OF MULTIPLE TYPE AND SCALE 
A multi-tier and multiple type approach to site selection as described above has many 
advantages. Some may be useful immediately while others may prove their usefulness 
in the future. One advantage is the identification of multiple value sites from a number 
of data bases which communicate the conservation message in many 'valuation 
languages'. This has obvious political advantages as conservation proposals are not 
restricted to biologically defined value as a basis for environmental management. 
Environmental management proposals are able to be justified in a way that is more 
tangible to the lay person, and more importantly, the decision maker (neither of which 
are likely to be ecologists). This also has obvious benefits in the area of environmental 
education. 
Local initiatives in environmental management programmes can also be catered for 
within the above framework. In many cases conservation efforts aiming at sustainable 
development combined with the protection of biodiversity are most appropriately 
undertaken from a local perspective. A good example of this form of localised 
environmental management has been explored by Thaman (1985) with the concept of 
localised micro-parks. In their aggregate, locally inspired environmental management 
initiatives combine to form a national system. The importance of a bottom-up approach 
that take account of the needs of local people has been repeatedly stressed by those with 
experience in the actual implementation and management of environmental programmes 
(e.g. Lees 1991; Thorpe and Humphreys 1991; Park et al 1992; Reti 1985; Singh 1985; 
Cox and Elmqvist 1993). 
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3.4 SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
Many parts of the proposed EMA Programme described above have alluded to social 
issues. Social concerns in environmental management in Fiji have, until recently, been 
conspicuous by their absence. In some cases there is an active physical requirement in 
environmental management involving the rehabilitation of ecosystems and the 
management of endangered wildlife populations. However, environmental management 
requirements in Fiji tend to involve the need to modify the way people interact with the 
landscape. This may include the need to control the environmental impacts of a local 
population or industrial activity of some form. In order to carry out this kind of 
management a firm understanding of the social and economic circumstances that 
underpin environmental degradation is essential. 
Most of the Fiji landscape is owned by tribal clans (83%), as mentioned in chapter 1. 
Most Fijian landowners are endowed with natural resource of some form. These 
resources (either marine or telTestrial) are used by them in many ways. In the absence 
of any form of environmental management in Fiji, much of the tribally owned resources 
are likely to be used for economic development of some form if possible. Forest areas 
are valued highly for their ability to generate a cash income either through royalties or 
from a landowner operated commercial venture. Land that is not forested will often be 
used for agriculture. Some areas are valued by customary owners in their intact state for 
the provision of environmental goods and services but the vast majority of natural 
resources held in customary tenure are valued as an economic resource for the owners. 
The Willingness of customary owners to allow their resources to be managed for 
purposes of environmental protection may, in many cases, involve conditions set by 
owners, as was the case with the Wabu Creek, and the Vunivia catchment. Such 
conditions may involve compensation of some form, to offset the lost opportunity to use 
their resource for economic development as they had planned. It may also be possible 
to assist the owners to gain equivalent income through the implementation of some 
development alternative. However, to carry this out there needs to be a significant 
community development aspect in most forms of environmental management. The 
provision of community development assistance for the owners may form the essential 
component of negotiating protected status over an area. But it is important to realise that 
this approach can only be successful if the community development assistance does in 
fact arrive and is able to satisfy the owners. This, in turn, may lead to problems in 
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relation to the successful implementation of community development itself. This is an 
issue of great concern for many different non-government social justice agencies in and 
around the Pacific, for example - CORSO, World Vision, UNICEF, Council for 
International Development, Catholic Commission for Justice, World Council of 
Churches, Pacific Partnership for Human Development, Solomon Island Development 
. Trust, South Pacific Action Committee on the Human Environment and Ecology 
(SPACHEE), Oxfam, Pacific Institute for Resource Management, Trade Aid, and Water 
for Survival, PIANGO, and the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific 
International (FSPI). 
A national environmental management programme must take socio-economic aspects of 
management seriously, as the success of the programme hinges on it. If this part of a 
programme is poorly carried out, the effort put into the site selection process will be 
wasted. Furthelmore, if a national environmental management programme were to 
involve an explicit socio-economic component vis-a-vis community development, it is 
likely to receive a broad range of support. The kind of support it could gain could 
include national budgetary support normally associated with community development 
in the absence of any environmental component. Financial SUppOlt through international 
aid will be easier to attract as there is an explicit development component in the 
programme. 
The point behind this overview of environmental management is to critique its ability 
to (a) be effectively conducted, and (b) deliver ecological sustainability. What will 
transpire as a result of the following critique, is that· the existing official structure is 
quite incapable of even achieving (a) let alone (b). The reason for this stems from the 
innate weakness of environmental concerns when they are placed under the eves of 
development from start to finish - development defined by the current ideological 
framework of late 20th century capitalism. The task of the critique to follow is to 
declare that the reader has been misled, as I was, which necessitates a more closer look 
at the social dimension beyond the administrative framework. 
3.5 CRITIQUE OF THE TECHNICAL APPROACH 
Through the course of the thesis I became increasingly uncomfortable with the technical 
approach to environmental management and the issue of ecological sustainability. There 
needed to be a meaningful social justice dimension to ecological sustainability. One of 
the reasons for this is that many of the problems relating to effective environmental 
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management were structural, relating to the framework of government planning in 
general, and social. Among the many problems with environmental management was the 
basis of environmental valuation, the need for effective community development, the 
problem of ideological obstructions ingrained in government policies, the economic 
pressure on local resources relating to international economic issues, and the need to 
situate environmental concerns in a holistic framework that was not isolated in an 
environment sector. Many structural problems also hinder the possibility of effective 
community development so necessary as part of the equation of sustainable 
development. But this then raises a crucial question: is effective sustainable development 
going to foster ecological sustainability? This necessitates an inquiry into the ecological 
dimensions of the meaning of 'community' and 'development'. 
3.5.1 THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE SUSTAINABILITY DEBATE 
The remammg pages of this chapter asks the reader to step out of the official 
government frameworks into a broader, and more critical domain which is explicitly 
political. I gradually came to understand that the question of ecological sustainability 
was a deeply political issue, and that avoiding this political dimension would undermine 
any inquiry wishing to understand ecological sustainability. Also, I became vividly 
aware that the existing political and economic status quo is thoroughly underwritten by 
subjective ideological views. Because of this, any tacit agreement with an existing 
political regime, through exercising conservative or 'non-political' standpoints in 
environmental management, amounted to a defacto vote of support for such an ideology 
and its ecological consequences. 
If the overall ecological character of a political economy is incommensurable with 
ecological sustainability (as is the case with contemporary Fiji) then any government 
sponsored environmental management would be equally unsustainable. It may have the 
appearance environmental benevolence, but it will be constrained by the innate 
ecological and social character of the broader system of which it is a part. As mentioned 
in chapter 2, environmental management can often be gUilty of sweeping the symptoms 
of an unsustainable culture beneath the carpet. This is conducted through the cleaning 
up of isolated environmental damage after the event, whilst leaving the causes of such 
damage unconstrained. Such causes are, in many cases, inextricably linked to the very 
basis of the economic system that sets up shop in a country like Fiji. 
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3.5.2 THE PROBLEM OF INSTRUMENTAL VALUE 
The National Environment Strategy, developed in 1992 by the Environment Unit, has 
a number of major objectives inc1uding:-
to protect ecological processes and life support systems ... on which human 
survival and development depend; 
to provide for cultural, spiritual and other non-material needs of society by 
protection of, and development of diversity in the use of natural resources; 
to preserve genetic diversity ... on which depends the functioning of many life 
support systems and actual and potential commercial, medical and scientific uses; 
to ensure the sustainable use of renewable resources ... on which the Fiji economy 
is overwhelmingly based; 
to ensure that non-renewable resources are depleted at a rate that enables 
transition to the use of more abundant materials and ultimate sustainable use of 
renewable resources (my emphasis; Kalou 1992). 
Reference to the implied purpose of environmental management is highlighted in the 
above statement in order to show that official environmental concerns tend to focus 
(almost entirely) on the instrumental (utility) value of Nature as a resource for the use 
of a human economy. This ethical stance will be shown in later chapters to comprise a 
major obstruction to the possibility of ecological sustainability. In spite of this 
instrumental emphasis, the National Environment Strategy provides much in the way of 
opportunities to pursue the implementation of environmental management programmes 
through official channels. The question is whether such management is capable of 
delivering ecological sustainability. As Watling (1992) has stated in the National 
Environment Strategy: 
The challenge is to create an effective management capability largely within the 
.existing legislative framework for the short term, while more fundamental 
reviews of all the resource management legislation are undertaken. [The Fiji] 
Government's policies with respect of its activities and the civil service have 
been actively considered in the preparation of the [National Environment 
Strategy], these are: 
maximising private sector involvement 
minimising Government's activities 
reducing or at least not expanding the civil service 
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(ibid.:26) 
The challenge for ecological sustainability, however, is something quite different. It 
concerns the entire relationship between culture and landscape irrespective of 
government sponsored ideologies. It is also an issue that transcends an instrumental 
relationship. Recognition that the rest of Nature is more than merely an instrument of 
a human economy is a crucial step in coming to understand ecological sustainability. 
The sustainable development debate also provides an interesting example of the 
difference between environmental management and ecological sustainability. Watling 
(1992: 15) has stated: 
development is currently being promoted without due respect for the limits of 
renewal and replenishment of Fiji's natural resources. Fiji's 'natural capital' is 
being depleted while measures to manage this 'capital' are poorly developed and 
generally ineffective. 
While this perspective embraces a major shift in thinking about the economic use of 
natural resources, it falls short of breaking out of the mind-set of instrumentality so 
central to so many forms of economic theory and practice. Criticism is not directed at 
Watling, as he was working within the limits of a government sponsored review 
programme which needed cabinet approval. This necessitates the tailoring of consultancy 
documents and orientating the content of consultancy advice to a form that is compatible 
with the existing objectives of the government. To do otherwise would be to put up a 
direct challenge to the ideologies supporting the government, which will rarely, if ever, 
be tolerated by any government. 
Viewing natural resources as natural capital can greatly assist the movement towards a 
more complete form of natural resource accounting and non-market valuation. But at the 
end of the day Nature is still meaningful only in terms of its utility, and as such, 
valuation of this form is thoroughly anthropocentric in orientation. This raises some 
major ethical questions relating to the conceptual basis for human relationships with the 
rest of Nature in any landscape. For ecological sustainability to become possible there 
needs to be a shift in emphasis where instrumentality is not discarded, but embellished 
by a conception of Nature as being valuable in an intrinsic form as well. This involves 
a de-centring of the basis of value away from anthropocentricism, not necessarily to an 
exclusively biocentric mode, but a mode that is capable of recognising that value and 
worth are far deeper issues than modern neo-classical economics would have us believe. 
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3.5.3 ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Even though environmental management gains had been made at the technical level in 
Vunivia (i.e. the logging had stopped), the landowners there were still wondering what 
they were going to do with their land and their resources. If logging was to be phased 
out, something else was going to have to take its place. Some other form of 
development was needed. The various obstructions to effective community development 
in general will have to be faced by an environmental management agency if it wishes 
to ensure that effective community development is able to succeed. In so doing it will 
align itself with many other development agencies that are attempting to make 
development work in the rural landscape. 
There are many obstructions to community development in countries like Fiji, which 
often relate to the existing structure of the political economy. Many political battles have 
been fought in Fiji on the issue of effective rural community development, and many 
more will be fought in the future. Tackling development problems as part of an 
environmental programme will tend to shift environmental management into an explicitly 
political domain. Questions concerning access to government funding, legal issues, 
privileges of different segments of society, rural versus urban development debates, 
taxation, transpOlt, distribution, housing, water, markets, prices, wages, discount rates, 
the role of the private sector, health, education, and community welfare. These all 
become impOltant for any form of environmental management that ventures into the 
community development arena. 
If an environmental management agency is not well versed in these kinds of issues it 
is likely to fail to deliver the kinds of riches it promises under the development banner. 
This is because these are the kinds of issues that are central to the development debate 
in any country. An environmental management agency could hide behind a 'raise your 
income' slogan, and even get away with it for a while. But in the long run, which is 
what sustainability is all about, it will need to ensure that the standard of living that 
local people are seeking is what actually happens. Simply raising income levels will 
never guarantee that the kinds of services desired in rural Fiji will be delivered. 
Education and health services, for example, need to be explicitly catered for. I know 
there are many sophisticated monetarist arguments that claim laissez faire policies are 
capable of doing wonders in this regard (e.g. Douglas 1980). Yet empirically such an 
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economic ideology has done little more than increase the gap between the 'haves' and 
'have nots'. One of the basic reasons for this stems from the way the free market 
approach plays into the hands of the biggest and the strongest economic powers in any 
economy (Schumacher 1973; Daly and Cobb 1989; Meadows et al 1992; Lang and 
Heines 1993). 
Daly and Goodland (1992) have exposed a number of flaws in the assumption of a 
spiralling positive feed-back loop underlying the free market model for environmental 
protection, supported by free market economists such as Bhagwati (1988) and Low 
(1992). The positive feedback loop implies that free trade promotes growth; growth 
helps the environment; the environment helps growth; which in turn helps trade; which 
then helps growth again. 
The criticism of free market models differs depending on the perspective of the critic. 
Keynsian and neo-Keynsian critiques of capitalist production (like Daly and Goodland) 
throw stones at laissez faire and develop an alternative based on forms of market 
regulation. Marxist critiques of capitalism throw stones at all forms of capitalist 
production (including the neo-Keynsians) by exposing a great deal of social 
contradictions to the capitalist model of society. Some forms of ecological economics 
(e.g. Perrings) throw stones at Marxists, and capitalists for the way their assumptions 
both contradict the laws of thermodynamics. Some neo-Marxists throw stones at all 
social theories (including traditional Marxism) that reduce reality to economics. Then 
we have the postmodernists who throw stones at everybody including themselves. What 
I must do is find an appropriate basis for critique that is capable of authentically 
criticising the existing situation in relation to ecological sustainability. However, at this 
stage in the research I was still uncertain as to what this would require. 
The Rio Declaration states that: "The right to development must be fulfilled so as to 
equitably meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations" (Ministry for the Environment 1993:4). But the question remains: what is 
meant by 'development'; and is effective development in a country like Fiji capable of 
delivering ecological sustainability? Is poverty really the problem, or is it affluence? 
3.5.4 THE QUESTION OF SCALE AND EXTERNAL FORCES 
Vunivia is one single catchment in a little country in the vast Pacific ocean. If Vunivia 
was sucked into a huge hole in the earth tomorrow, very little would happen in Suva, 
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or in Los Angeles. The impact of Vunivia on the rest of the planet is minute. But the 
impacts of the rest of the world on Vunivia are great indeed. In fact, external influences 
on Vunivia are so great that to ignore them would be severely parochial and highly 
misleading. The same can be said for Fiji in general. What Fiji is today is very much 
a function of what is and has been happening in many other countries for many decades 
(even centuries). The Fiji economy is enormously influenced by external factors as is 
the Fiji political situation (see Crocombe and Ali 1985). The American civil war in the 
mid 1860s helped to provide the market space for one of Fiji's first agriculturally based 
export industries - cotton. The Franco-Prussian war that followed soon after helped to 
end it contributing to the conversion to sugar (Howard and Durutalo 1987). The land 
wars in AotearoalNew Zealand during the 1860s influenced the present day land tenure 
situation in Fiji, as Fiji's first Governor (Arthur Gordon, who had been posted in 
AotearoaiNew Zealand) did not want the Fijians to suffer the same injustices that the 
Maori had sustained in losing their land (Campbell 1989). International commodity price 
fluctuations hold the present day Fiji economy by a string as if it were a puppet (see 
Fairbairn 1985; Howard and Durutalo 1987). 
Not only is Vunivia not isolated spatially, but the issue of indigenous forest conservation 
must fit within a national framework of planning in general as mentioned earlier. Forest 
conservation stands along side many other different issues of concern in Fiji today. And 
many of them are interrelated. This situates the Vunivia forests in a broad spatial and 
conceptual space. And so, indigenous forest conservation in rural Fiji is not a process 
that can be undertaken in isolation. Fiji's economy is inextricably linked to international 
markets and agreements, which means that any domestic activities that involve 
redirecting the development process must take account of these international influences 
(see Crocombe and Ali 1985; Neemia 1986). It is in this domain that one finds 
numerous obstacles to effective environmental management. 
International economic relations are so often overlooked by proponents of environmental 
protection programmes. However, some of the principal causes of environmental 
degradation lie in the international realm. Many of the world's poorer countries (often 
called 'developing countries') are, for various historical reasons, locked into a position 
of international economic subordination by larger, economically stronger countries. To 
understand this one needs to look into the historical circumstances that led to the 
establishment of Pacific Island economies. The economic infrastructure that was 
established in these small island states was designed to facilitate the removal of raw 
materials produced in the islands at low cost and to transport these commodities to 
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markets in the metropolitan homelands (Howard and Durutalo 1987). The economies of 
Pacific Island countries were involved in trade through the colonial era with the colonial 
metropolitan states, under terms dictated by the latter. Political independence of Island 
nations over the last few decades has done little to change this (Hau'ofa 1987). 
Moreover, colonial withdrawal left behind state bureaucracies and administrative 
infrastructures that were often unsustainable in relation to local resources which, in turn, 
tied the newly independent Island economies further to external economic powers for 
budgetary assistance (Bertram 1987). 
Although most Pacific Island nations, including Fiji, are now politically independent, as 
suggested above, their governments have little control over their economies (Sevele 
1987; Fairbairn 1985). The economic legacies of the colonial era live on in the CUlTent 
economic order of the Pacific region and perpetuate patterns of colonial hegemony. The 
subordinated economies of Pacific Island nations are still heavily dependant on aid 
inputs and market outlets supplied and regulated by developed nations outside the region 
(Sevele 1987). Australia, Great Britain, and New Zealand, for example, maintain a 
trading relationship with Island nations that preserves a trade balance in favour of these 
larger countries and perpetuates their economic dominance in the Pacific. For example, 
New Zealand sent to the Pacific over $NZ441 million in exports in 1989 but bought 
back from the Pacific only $NZ154 million. In the same year New Zealand spent $NZ88 
million in aid on the Pacific (South Pacific Policy Review Group 1990). This created 
a $NZ200 million trade deficit in New Zealand's favour in a single trading year. Such 
deficits tend to be financed through loans, and loans have to be repaid. 
Aid has also been the subject of much criticism from within the Pacific. The way 'aid' 
is manipulated by donor countries tends to reinforce the dependency of Island economies 
on the donor economies. For example, aid is often used as a means of opening market 
opportunities for manufactured goods produced in the donor countries; aid projects 
create a demand for expertise that is not available in the recipient country; aid projects 
often involve high operating costs in order to be successful (Sevele 1987). 
Problems with aid combine with direct and indirect protectionism in the markets of 
larger core nations leaving the Pacific Island countries in a weak international trading 
position (Neemia 1986; Fairbairn 1985; Larmour 1985; Sevele 1987). Because of this, 
trading agreements and economic development agencies were established following 
moves to political independence by Island states during last few decades (Neemia 1986). 
Such agencies and agreements include the South Pacific Forum, South Pacific Bureau 
60 
for Economic Cooperation, South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement, the 
Forum Fisheries Agency, and the Pacific Forum Line. Some of these structures were 
designed specifically to increase the bargaining power of Pacific Island nations vis-a-vis 
their trading relationship with larger core nations involved in Pacific trade. 
Strategic manoeuvres in relation to international trade have not enabled Pacific island 
economies to become liberated from the subordinated positions they found themselves 
in when they embarked on political independence. Freeing up world trade will not help 
this either. Island nations such as Fiji are still heavily dependant on the exploitation of 
their natural resources in order to finance their debt servicing, government bureaucracies 
and their development programmes, as they lack a strong manufacturing base32 and 
export markets to receive manufactured products. 
Many of the pressures endured by national economies in the Pacific are manifested at 
the sectoral level, as economic sectors are orientated towards the generation of foreign 
exchange. CUlTently Fiji supports 6 principal economic sectors including agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry, tourism, mineral resources, and manufacturing and commerce (Fiji 
Government 1990). Fiji's forest sector has recently moved from a phase of exotic 
plantation establishment and research to one of harvesting and processing for export. In 
1989 the Fiji Forest Sector accounted for 1.5% ofGDP (Chang 1991), which is expected 
to rise to a target of 15% GDP by the year 2,000 (Fiji Government 1990). This process 
of growth in the forest sector, in itself, is not without its problems, as a recent 
independent review of the forest sector pointed out. A number of specific constraints to 
successful export led growth in the forest sector have been identified, which include:-
Long standing timber trade relationships in the Pacific Basin region will be 
severely dislocated as the softwood surplus from the New Zealand, Chilean and 
Australian plantations come on stream to an increasing degree from the mid 
1990's. 
Competition in the traditional markets for general purpose and utility timbers 
will correspondingly intensify and become almost entirely a matter of price. 
It will become increasingly disadvantageous for Fiji to continue in its traditional 
role as a producer of mainly light construction and mass to medium quality 
furniture grades of timber. 
(Leslie 1988:2) 
3Fiji, in the last 20 years has made inroads into developing a manufacturing sector, 
which has recently involved the establishment of tax free zones to attract foreign 
investment in manufacturing (Fiji Government 1990). 
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The pressures on the Fiji Government to provide the finance for debt servicing and 
development programmes within such an economic climate are shared across all sectors 
with natural resource exploitation being one of the most important forms of industrial 
activity. What this means for the indigenous forests of Fiji is that they are under great 
pressure to provide income for the Government. In the short term there will always be 
markets for the sale of unprocessed timber products arising from Fiji's exotic and 
indigenous sources. However, Fiji's ability to service this kind of market in a on-going 
fashion is questionable given the small size of the forest resource base (Byron 1988). 
The political will within the Fiji Government for any large scale allocation of natural 
forest for conservation purposes is likely to be low in the light of such pressures on all 
natural resources. One could argue, for example, that almost every government in the 
world is under great pressure to generate the maximum possible returns from their 
natural resources. This may be true but it does not hide the fact that there are far less 
options currently available to the Fiji Government compared with countries supporting 
stronger economies. 
Due to the nature of the economic pressures on the Fiji economy, the Fiji Government 
is unlikely to allow large areas of rural Fiji (such as natural forests) to be placed outside 
the reach of development that is capable of generating foreign exchange. Large scale 
forestry operations often involve the employment of foreign capital, the generation of 
company and employees taxes and investment in plant and roading infrastructures that 
are likely to be very attractive to the Government Treasury. 
On the other hand, if Fiji establishes an export led forest product manufacturing 
industry, either from natural or plantation sources, the timber volume required for such 
activity would be less than that required for the sale of raw materials. The Fiji 
Government would then be given more breathing space to plan for resource allocations 
for conservation purposes. A small scale manufacturing industry will also be needed in 
order to support small scale community development projects involving the use of low 
impact logging techniques. An alternative would be the location of niche markets for 
high priced naturally grown indigenous timber. This would help to conserve extensive 
indigenous forest resources that are unlikely to ever be placed into protected areas 
(remembering that just under half of Fiji's total land surface remains under some form 
of forest cover with the vast majority of this comprising of indigenous forest). These are 
the kinds of strategies facing environmental protection advocates wishing to take an 
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adequate (yet uncritical) account of the international economic realities that hold the Fiji 
economy at ransom. 
Even if a community development option were to be pursued as a means of gaining the 
protection of the forests of Vunivia, there are a number of potential constraints to this 
process. These constraints include:-
I. Small scale developments that involve the landowners as the principal 
beneficiaries of economic activity may not appear to be of great benefit to the 
Govemment which would prefer to allocate land to forms of development that 
could more directly provide foreign exchange (e.g. large scale industrial 
operations ). 
2. Economies of scale make the industrial processing and the export of timber 
generated through small scale community development programmes difficult. 
This is due to the logistics of extraction and transportation of low timber 
volumes from isolated parts of the country. Low volumes of timber involved in 
such operations are also unlikely to be capable of reliably servicing the demands 
of existing export markets. This becomes an important factor if large scale 
indigenous industrial timber extraction is substituted by numerous small scale 
operations. 
Small scale community development in forestry involving the extraction Qf indigenous 
timbers could be channelled into a local timber processing and manufacturing industry 
such as furniture making. However, a number of problems are likely to arise with this 
approach. These include:-
1. If undertaken in many parts of Fiji, the local market for furniture and other 
manufactured products is likely to become flooded, leading to a drop in prices 
and eventually dissatisfied landowners who are unable to earn an income from 
their small scale operations. 
2. Any moves to channel timber processing and forest product manufacturing into 
an export market will meet problems faced by any manufacturing industry 
attempting to expOlt from Fiji to foreign buyers outside the Pacific Islands 
region. This includes:-
A. The lack of suitable local infrastructure and expertise; 
B. Distance from any potential foreign markets; 
C. The difficulty in gaining secured access to foreign markets for 
manufactured products likely to be produced in these nations; 
D. In order to be competitive in such an economic climate the costs of 
production would have to be very low, forcing real wages down in that 
particular industry, thus creating further social problems associated with 
such manufacturing efforts. Fiji's garment manufacturing industry has 
been facing such social problems since it began. 
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Even if community development in Vunivia did not involve forestry at all, but instead 
focused on alternatives to timber extraction, it would still become entangled in the basic 
problems associated with any form of development in a South Pacific island economy. 
Any moves towards combining development with conservation are thus riddled with 
economic and political difficulties. Such issues have been an on-going concern for many 
involved in the international development debate. Fiji and Pacific Island examples of this 
debate can be seen in Ravuvu (1987b, 1988), Hau'ofa (1987), Trask (1987), Sevele 
(1987), Shand (1985), Haas (1985), Neemia (1986), Bellam (1981), and Howard and 
Durutalo (1987). 
This general problem was recognised by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development. Much of their 1987 report concentrates on international economic issues, 
highlighting economic inequities that have substantial irnpacts on the environment. The 
Commission identified some of the principal international economic causes of current 
phases of environmental degradation in developing countries, which include the 
following:-
A deterioration of the terms of trade between developing and developed 
countries, 
The rising burden of debt servicing in developing countries, 
A stagnation of aid flows from developed countries, 
Growing protectionism in developed market economies, 
An increase in the cost of foreign borrowing. 
(The World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) 
In recognising the close connections between environmental protection and the process 
of development in general, the ] 992 Rio Declaration stated that: In order to achieve 
sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the 
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it" (Ministry for the 
Environment 1993:5). The Rio Declaration is thus a wish-list for reorienting the global 
economy into such a form that development is able to be sustained. The critics of the 
existing economic climate mentioned above are also concerned about the distribution of 
development and its riches. But is it all going to contribute to, or contradict ecological 
su stainability ? 
3.6 AGAINST THE TIDE 
Although many attempts are being made to improve the nature of the development 
process, in order to bring it in line with social and ecological realities, this is happening 
amidst a massive international movement in the opposite direction. The kind of gains 
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sought in the Earth Summit, and the Pacific island critics of the existing economic 
landscape, are being precisely contradicted by the GATT process. Daly and Goodland 
(1992) have outlined a number of basic problems with international deregulation or 
"free" trade as being sought in the GATT negotiations. They show that global economic 
integration by means of free trade will favour a privileged minority at the expense of 
the majority in both developed and developing countries. Global economic integration 
through GATT will move in the opposite direction to the concerns of many of the critics 
of the existing economic situation in island economies. 
If markets were perfect, and capital were immobile internationally, then 
unregulated trade in products would be to the advantage of all nations. But with 
prices that commonly do not reflect social and environmental costs, and with 
highly mobile capital, unregulated trade can be harmful to nations (Daly and 
Goodland 1992:2). 
One of the major problems with the free market model is the assumption of capital 
immobility between countries. If this were true, international free trade would lead to 
the distribution of global production in accordance with the. principle of comparative 
advantage4, which is 'theoretically' beneficial to all trading partners. 
This model of international trade differs from that of Adam Smith, who earlier argued 
that countries will only export products they produce more efficiently (in an absolute 
sense) than other countries. Under the Ricardian model of comparative advantage (which 
is supported in GATT), a country will be able to trade internationally, even when their 
absolute efficiency is lower than that of all other countries. However, one assumption 
underlying this model is that the two countries in our example, remain separate as two 
economies. David Ricardo, who developed the theory of comparative advantage, pointed 
out, that if capital is able to move across national boundaries, then it tends to move from 
4The principle of comparative advantage argues for specialisation of production in 
different countries, producing mutual benefit. For example, assume two countries (e.g. 
England and the United states), produce the same two products (e.g. wheat and cloth), but 
England produces cloth cheaper (in units of production cost) than the US. Meanwhile, the 
US produces wheat comparatively cheaper (in units of production cost) than England. 
Under the classical Ricardian principle of comparative advantage, both countries will 
benefit if they each specialise in producing the product which is, for them, relatively 
cheaper to produce, and trade with each other in the product they don't produce cheaply. 
In this fashion, a country will tend to export the commodity whose cost (relative to another 
commodity) is lower than it is in the country it trades with. Both countries will be better 
off with specialisation and trade. If there are no differences in comparative cost of 
production there will be no incentive for trade, as each domestic economy will be able to 
produce each product at relatively the same cost (see Heller 1968; Laffer and Miles 1982). 
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a situation of comparative advantage (which fosters trade even when the absolute 
efficiency of a producing country, for all products, is lower than all other trading 
countries) to absolute advantage (where only absolute efficiency dictates trade in 
products), as would be the case in a domestic economy (see Daly 1992). GATT is 
attempting to create a global economy that is effectively the same as a single (very 
large) domestic economy. This being the case, there will be no meaning in the notion 
of comparative advantage, as it will all be one economy and capital will freely move 
between what had been separate economic nations. This is exacerbated by the activities 
of transnational companies which do most of the trading. Furthermore, countries do not 
trade with each other - companies do. 
Daly and Goodland (1992) pointed out, that if capital is not free to move across national 
boundaries then the principle of comparative advantage holds true. However, 
The current celebrants of global economic integration are frequently arguing for 
the erasure of national boundaries (free movement of goods and capital) on the 
basis of a doctrine (comparative advantage) whose validity presupposes the 
existence of those national boundaries! (ibid.: 13). 
Already doing their best to contradict the assumption of capital immobility and the 
principle of comparative advantage are transnational corporations, with the top 500 of 
them now controlling over 70% of world trade (Lang and Heines 1993). Furthermore, 
40% of world trade is conducted within transnational companies (i.e. trading with 
themselves). This makes a laughing-stock out of the entire free market assumption in 
relation to prices. The market is not dictating price in international trade - transnational 
corporations set the prices to suit themselves. The activities of transnational corporations 
also makes a mockery of national boundaries and the fallacy of capital immobility. This 
is one of the biggest theoretical and practical contradictions in the entire GATT 
programme and it is a huge environmental threat to every country in the world. GATT 
cannot even be supported in economic theory. It amounts to a massive game of 
international manipulation by transnational corporations, seeking to secure their 
aspirations of economic absolutism. If free trade were to succeed under GATT, the 
supreme dominance of transnational companies will serve to transfonn the term 'free' 
into: 'freedom of the biggest economic powers to dominate global resource consumption, 
without any regard for social or environmental issues that might stand in the way of 
corporate profits'. 
One of the biggest threats to small economies like Fiji is the loss of capital through the 
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trading practices of transnational companies operating in that country. Transnational 
companies are able to manoeuvre capital from one country to another in such a way that 
corporate profits are made in the countries with the lowest taxation rates. This is 
achieved by understating the value of raw materials extracted from the source country 
(thus evading taxes in the producer country) and then selling the raw materials at full 
prices in impOlting countries (that have low tax rates). This practice, although 
predominantly illegal (Daly and Goodland 1992), is well known as 'transfer pricing', but 
because of its illegality there are few figures able to substantiate the practice with firm 
evidence. 
One way of achieving this in the logging industry for example, is for a logging company 
in country A (e.g. Fiji) to sell its undervalued timber to an importing company located 
in a tax haven (in country B, e.g. Vanuatu), where the importing company and the 
logging company are both subsidiaries of the same parent company (located in country 
C, e.g. Australia). The importing company (in country B) then sells its supply of timber 
at its full price to another country (country D, e.g. Japan) thus making its profits on the 
second sale in the tax haven. 
Such practices can easily be obscured by poor (andlor creative) accounting of timber 
volumes in the source country, which is able to be attributed to inadequate management 
and accountability of local staff within the company. If such a company operates a 
transfer pricing scheme it is able to mn at a public 'loss' in the supply country and thus 
avoid the payment of company taxes. The only public contributions that such a company 
makes to the local economy are employee wages, employee taxes, consumption of fuel 
resources (e.g. oil, diesel and electricity) and infrastmcture such as roading and plant, 
whilst transforming valuable resources into capital in another country. The capital value 
of the natural resources are siphoned off and never contribute to the local economy. The 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has shown that this has been happening in Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea. Log prices in Indonesia were shown to be undervalued by 40%, and 
Papua New Guinea by 10%, even when the standard domestic price in no way reflects 
the costs of production, and the environmental costs relating to extraction (Daly and 
Goodland 1992). 
In spite of these kinds of problems the moves to free up the global economy are getting 
stronger by the year, taking humanity further and further away from any hope of 
ecological sustainability. 
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3.7 IN SEARCH OF A NEW FRAMEWORK 
I developed the environmental management proposal presented in this chapter as a 
means of contributing to the debate concerning ecological sustainability, at a time in 
which the issue of ecological sustainability remained (for me) substantially under-
theorised. The proposal rides on the assumption that ecological sustainability and 
environmental management are the same. I also remained convinced that community 
development underpinned the meaning of ecological sustainability. My critique of these 
standpoints in this and later chapters is not designed to ridicule environmental 
management or community development as such, as many important gains can be made 
for society and the landscape through socially orientated environmental management of 
the form presented in this chapter. However, the meaning of ecological sustainability 
needed further work, particularly in the conceptual sphere. 
Following the preparation of the proposal developed above, I began to realise that 
environmental degradation was inextricably linked with injustices in the social domain. 
I could see deforestation and the degradation of village life both arising from a common 
source - the existing economic system. Social and environmental flaws in this economic 
and political system led me to conclude that environmental protection must be linked 
with social justice if it is to succeed even in the medium term (i.e. a time horizon of 
years or decades). This amounted to a move from a purely technical approach to one 
that was explicitly social in its orientation and took a more critical view of economic 
theory and practice. 
Viewing the social situation from an uninformed position in relation to social theOlY 
(toward the end of the first year of the research programme) led the thesis into a 
perspective that loosely aligned itself to neo-Keynsianism (i.e. welfare economics). This 
was supported by an exposure to literature on economic geography (e.g. Knox and 
Agnew 1989; Wallerstein 1974), resource economics (e.g. Randall 1987; Repetto and 
Gillis 1988), externalities and discount rates (e.g. Perrings 1987; Baumol 1972; Ayres 
and Kneese 1989), development economics (e.g. Schumacher 1972; Repetto 1984; 
Sundrum 1983), macroeconomics (e.g. Daly 1991; Gowdy 1991), environmental 
economics (Daly 1973; Henderson 1978; Perrings 1987; Georgescu-Rogen 1976; el 
Sarafy 1991; Goodland 1992), and social forestry and development (e.g. Griffin 1988; 
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rves and Pitt 1988; Tilling 1989). 
The employment of ecological economic tools for environmental protection advocacy 
can provide many strong arguments in favour of major reforms in the structure and 
functioning of economic systems that interact with natural landscapes. Peters et al (1989) 
had shown that in most cases, the value of non-wood forest products extracted from 
Amazonian rainforest exceeded the timber value from an equivalent area of tropical 
rainforest by three and a half times. Odum (1988, 1989) looked into the application of 
energy transformation 'budgets' in relation to the use or abuse of natural systems as part 
of the standing capital in a domestic economy. A system of macroeconomic resource 
valuation based on ecological energetics in transformation (emergy or energy memory) 
provided a sophisticated means of justifying the adjustment of existing forms of resource 
valuation on the basis of the energy input in their natural production. 
Perrings (1987) reconceptualises economics in general, in relation to thermodynamic and 
system principles, combined with econometrics, to expose a plethora of contradictions 
in much neo-classical economic theory and practice. Whereas the major multi-sector 
models of economic growth developed by Neumann, Leontief, and Solow-Samuelson 
are constructed on the basis of a description of the physical conditions of production, 
Perrings developed an alternative model where the assumptions are global and take 
account of thermodynamic principles. This takes the form of a limited growth-rate model 
tending toward a steady state (similar to that of Daly 1973), where the assumption 
underlying the physical rate of growth of the closed global system (in relation to mass) 
is zero. This leads to the principle that no subsystem (such as an economic system) can 
expand indefinitely in a finite world. This model sets up a significant challenge to 
logistic growth models developed in neo-classical economic theory which are based on 
the misconception that subsystems are able to expand indefinitely (Perrings 1987). Such 
views of the naive axioms that underlie neo-classical economics are common in the 
ecological economic literature (e.g. McAllister 1990; Peet 1992; Weissermann 1990). 
Some of the alternative economic literature argues for a more effective system of 
valuation, accounting, and distribution as a means of moving modern societies away 
from the deepening social and ecological crisis of the late 20th century. Much of this 
amounts to an improvement in the economic position of the economically under-
privileged. Others, however, are arguing that our attention must be focused not on 
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improving the lot of the 'lower classes', but reducing the affluent positions of the 'upper 
classes'. Improving the position of the lower end of the economic scale, whilst leaving 
the affluent to continue their rate of consumption will increase the overall 
unsustainability of any economic system (see Meadows et al 1992, for example). This 
is because the problem of unsustainability is not poverty but affluence (Trainer 1985, 
1992), as it is driven by the overconsumption of local and global resources. Some 
theorists have argued that the global economic system has already exceeded the limits 
of its own sustain ability (Meadows et al 1992; Goodland 1992). 
The realisation that affluence and not poverty is the problem shifts an analysis away 
from conservative approaches, that do little more than apologise for the affluent life 
styles of the world's rich. The flaws of this perspective are not only economic but also 
social. Such approaches often argue that assigning appropriate property rights to 
environmental goods and services, and the market will take care of the environment. 
Scarcity will increase prices, leading to lower consumption, the location of alternative 
resources and research into alternative technologies. Appropriate natural resource 
accounting techniques can then be employed to account for the loss of environmental 
capital, which can be plugged into cost-benefit analyses which can ensure sustainability. 
One of the biggest problems with this approach relate to the assumptions that underlie 
the meaning of a 'cost' and a 'benefit'. Also, such forms of accounting rely on 
microeconomic techniques and assumptions. But environmental goods and services are 
often macroeconomic in character (see Daly 1991), and frequently do not come any 
where near a market. Environmental degradation is very often manifest at time scales 
beyond that monitored in microeconomic production functions, and as such, lie outside 
the reach of the economic system. Because of this, they are often called 'externalities' -
external to the economy, but not external to the biosphere or the landscape. Pen'ings 
(1987) has suggested that the very existence of externalities is an indication of the innate 
flaws in the axioms that underlie economic theory and practice. 
Another problem with the free market approach is its assumption that every person on 
the planet is born into an equal position of opportunity to gain access to resources for 
self improvement as defined in a free market model. This first rIdes on an assumption 
that all people are innately equivalent in terms of their psychological character - we are 
supposedly all varieties of natural economic consumers. Even the definition of 
'economics' in text books reinforces this. For example, according to one text, 'economics' 
"is the study of man's efforts to satisfy his seemingly unlimited, competing wants 
through the use of the limited, relatively scarce resources of nature" (Brown and Wolf 
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1971 :520). Another text book (Hirshleifer 1984) says that economics "is a science 
designed to explain the real world". Which world are they talking about: the biosphere 
or that subsystem of the biosphere - the economy? 
In neo-classical economics, human nature is defined according to a sophisticated set of 
stories concocted over the last few centuries, that tell us that we are all naturally 
competitive, selfish, individuals, who tend to move away from pain and towards pleasure 
(see Wiser 1983; Curtis 1981b; Galbraith 1987 for examples of those views of human 
nature held by theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, Mill, and 
Malthus; see also appendix 1). This is a natural law they tell us, this is what we are and 
we have no choice in the matter. We are natural consumers of economic goods and 
services (which give us pleasure), and we dislike parting with our money (which gives 
us pain) - we are 'economic man' (see Capra 1982; and Ferber and Nelson 1993 for a 
counter argument). The reduction of our humanness to this vulgar definition acts as a 
self fulfilling prophecy. The members of a society driven on the basis of such a 
definition of human nature are coerced into believing it, as indeed their life has no 
meaning outside this definition, as far as the economic system is concerned. The 
education system that rural Fijians are working so hard to send their children into, will 
teach them the meaning of their life in this 'real world' of the modern economy. 
Such a view has been challenged in a variety of ways depending on the depth of the 
critique. Schumacher (1973), Daly and Cobb (1989); and Peet (1992) look into the social 
aspects of economic systems and develop creative alternatives to the existing economic 
paradigm that takes account of the community dimension. Trainer (1985; 1989; 1992) 
pursues a similar path to an analysis of the existing form of economics in the modern 
world and argues for substantial shift in our definition of the meaning of humanness 
seeking a realisation of the community dimension of human life. 
Addressing the broader social issues of environmental management was central to the 
concerns of the thesis, but a major obstruction was met. This obstruction was the social 
epistemology employed, which served as a viewfinder in terms of a social analysis and 
as a basis for defining social goals. What are these social goals and are they likely to 
bring Fiji any closer to ecological sustainability? If the goals are achieved there may be 
a substantial improvement in the environmental and the social condition of Fiji but, at 
the end of the day ecological sustainability may still lie out of reach. In fact, it could 
transpire that the changes made in accordance with the achievement of these social goals 
may keep ecological sustainability as far from reach as it was in the previous situation. 
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This is because the changes made may not be the kinds of changes that ecological 
sustainability demands. Ecological sustainability may end up being something quite 
different from what we first thought. In other words, if the concept of ecological' 
sustainability remains under-theorised, an analysis may lead to creative alternatives that 
are incapable of achieving the stated task. There are already many examples of creative 
alternatives to the existing social and economic situation in Fiji. But which one (if any) 
is capable of delivering ecological sustainability? 
Neo-Keynsian approaches are critical of free market capitalism from within another 
corner of capitalism. It sets out in search of a creative alternative that remains 
conservative in relation to capitalism in general, but critical of the form of capitalism 
that has developed in Fiji and the global economy. In other words, it argues that 
capitalism in general is capable of delivering ecological sustainability but only if it is 
substantially reoriented into a socially just and ecologically benign form. This approach 
appears prima facie to represent an exciting challenge to the status quo as it highlights 
many flaws in the existing socio-economic landscape which manifest themselves in 
places like Vunivia, in the form of underdevelopment and environmental degradation. 
Those seeking a framework for criticism of the existing economic system may squirm 
with excitement with their new found ability to criticize the way Fiji as a nation is 
currently being run, and the way it is being manipulated by larger economies in the 
global economic system. Such criticism will tend to find many allies in the party 
political sphere in other bastions of neo-Keynsianism. Such views are common in the 
Fiji Labour Party, and the Fiji Trade Union movement (see Lal 1986). Finding such 
allies is satisfying for the environmental critic, as there is much opportunity to integrate 
a neo-Keynsian form of ecological economics with a social form of welfare economics 
and frame a powerful and coherent political message that can easily be pushed at the 
parliamentary level. 
The first conceptual break in this thesis involved the movement from an innately 
conservative technical approach to one which was openly critical of the existing 
economic system. My perspective did become aligned to neo-Keynsianism for a brief 
time, until a social analysis of the Vunivia catchment was conducted (to be described 
in the following chapter). This led to the second conceptual break which moved beyond 
an approach that remained conservative to a capitalist framework. At that point I was 
able to ask a number of far reaching questions. 
What happens if we are able to throw capitalism out and start again? Are we then able 
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to construct an ecologically sustainable socio-economic way of life? This might be true, 
but where would we start? If we are able to step outside capitalism and into the political 
and economic wilderness, we might be able to come up with a creative alternative that 
does not carry with it the clumsy unsustainable baggage that capitalism demands. But 
what would the basis be? Out here are the Marxists for example. What can we learn 
from them? Can Marxism give us a hand, or will it give us a different set of problems? 
Perhaps we could use some Marxian ideas (like dialectics) and embellish them with 
other wisdom from non-Marxist traditions? 
The neo-Marxists with their psychological, and sociological tools have developed a very 
sophisticated theoretical framework for understanding social reality, particularly in 
relation to alienation. They are also responding to a late 20th century world and not a 
19th century one. Can these models be used for ecological sustainability too? Perhaps 
some of them are vastly useful. But then again we must ask the question - what cultural 
baggage do the neo-Marxists carry with them, and is it a baggage that will obstruct 
ecological sustainability? What about feminist theory in all its diversity, what might it 
have to offer? After all there is a growing ecofeminist movement. What can we learn 
from their critique of modem patriarchal society, and do they offer us any insights that 
may help us in our quest? 
What about postmodern theorists, what are they saying about the structure of modern 
society that might illuminate ecological problems with modernity in general? After all, 
even the most radical modernist theory will be supported by the foundations of 
modernity and its ideals which were constructed largely during the Enlightenment? What 
about these Enlightenment ideals themselves, are they ecologically sustainable? What 
about indigenous cultures, what have they got to teach us? What about the Maori, the 
Sioux, the Hopi, and the Yarralin people of Australia. What about the Fijian people and 
their pre-modern culture, what about them? 
In the midst of all this confusion I began to realise that ecological sustainability was 
really about the social and cultural conception of basic values, the context of the use of 
resources, political and interpersonal discourse, rationality, and language. To do justice 
to this realisation I needed take another look at the Vunivia situation with these ideas 
in mind. But the trouble was that I did not have a sufficient theoretical viewfinder with 
which to gaze at that peaceful, forested landscape, with its rivers, coastline, and villages. 
But in returning to Vunivia and looking a little closer at its social character I began to 
see just what kind of viewfinder I was going to need. Lets revisit Vunivia. 
73 
CHAPTER 4 - A SOCIAL APPROACH 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
We are seeking to uncover the meaning of ecological sustainability. We know that it is 
a social issue, but what kind of social world would be necessary for ecological 
sustainability to be possible? This is a big question. In this chapter we look into the 
social character of the Vunivia landscape, its social history, local resource use, and the 
attitudes of local people concerning their lives in this landscape. In addition to this I add 
my own reflections concerning economic development in this area and the local situation 
generally, as revealed from my experiences in this catchment. 
A prescription for social change becomes necessary which allows an ecologically 
sustainable community to develop. But at this point we must consider just what kind of 
social change is warranted and how it might be able to come about. Do the local people 
want it? What do they want? Why do they want these things? Is their own condition a 
product of a false consciousness, a misconception of their own condition, which makes 
them have these wants? If it is a misconception, how did it come about? Have they been 
coerced, and if so, how did it happen? In the following pages I invite you to meet the 
people of Vunivia, and learn about their lives, and how their social and cultural situation 
can help us gain an insight into human ecology. 
4.2 SOCIAL METHODOLOGY 
The benefits of gathering social survey information in the Vunivia catchment were 
primarily two-fold. First was the ability to gain an insight into the social dimension of 
an environmental situation. Secondly, there was an opportunity to reflect on the 
sociological aspects of my own research methodology and its ability to adequately 
address the social dimension of ecological sustainability. 
The formal PhD field research programme began with a seven day visit to Vunivia in 
September 1990, which was part of a two month visit to Fiji. This trip to Fiji was 
designed to serve as an introduction to the study, where I would familiarise myself with 
the issues which I then thought would need to be addressed in the thesis. My second 
research field trip to Fiji was from June 1991 until the end of December of the same 
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year. During this trip I spent three weeks in Vunivia. My third formal field trip to Fiji 
was from April to July 1992, where I visited Vunivia for one month (April). 
The social research in Vunivia took the form of a rapid rural appraisal (RRA) survey 
modeled on the method of Conway and McCracken (1990). The appraisal was conducted 
in the form of semi-structured interviews with local people in each village or settlement. 
Interviews were generally held in the Bauan dialect of the Fijian language, although 
sometimes the local Dogotuki dialect was prefelTed by the local people. I had an 
interpreter but was also able to join in with some of the discussions through my own 
understanding of the Bauan dialect. Because the populations of the settlements were 
small and often had the general structure of an extended family, interviews tended to be 
conducted with the settlement community, rather than on an individual house-hold basis. 
Although originally designed to follow a general structure (in response to a list of 
questions), many of the interviews tended to become lengthy unstructured discussions. 
The topic of discussion sometimes wandered away from the specific questions. However, 
such wandering discussions tended to raise issues that were important to local people 
issues I had not anticipated. These informal aspects of the interviews were a valuable 
research tool. 
4.2.1 OVERVIEW OF RRA STRUCTURE 
The RRA methodology was split into two components. The first is an Exploratory RRA, 
designed to give the researcher a background understanding of the situation under 
investigation. This allows the researcher to formulate more specific hypotheses to be 
tested in a follow up Topical RRA. The second component is the Topical RRA which 
is more specific than an Exploratory RRA, and is likely to reveal more about the 
situation in question than the Exploratory RRA. 
1. Exploratory RRA (national, regional and local perspectives) 
This was undertaken in 1990 and consisted of:-
A. Secondary data review (background reading) 
B. Semi-structured interviews 
C. Direct observation (locally in Vunivia) 
D. Develop a conceptual model 
E. Formulate a set of questionsl hypotheses 
F. Formulate a plan for the following Topical RRA 
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2. Topical RRA (predominantly national and local perspectives) 
This formed the subject of the 1991 field trip involving:-
A. Secondary data review (background reading) 
B. Semi-structured interviews 
C. Direct observation 
D. Local participation model 
E. Develop a conceptual model 
F. Formulate a detailed hypothesis/ conclusions 
The Exploratory RRA was carried out in 1990, the results of which formed the basis of 
the technical synthesis presented in chapter 3 above. The 1991 and 1992 field trips to 
Fiji involved the execution of the Topical RRA. A set of socio-geographical 
investigations was prepared, resulting from the findings of the 1990 Exploratory RRA 
and the background reading mentioned above. 
Topical RRA survey was divided into 8 formal sub-sections. These were:-
1. Basic census data (already presented in chapter 3). 
2. General indication of sources of income and costs for each settlement. 
3. Background information relating to the history of the mataqali. 
4. Information concerning existing and recent historical land use patterns. 
5. Villagers' personal accounts of previous development operations in the 
catchment. 
6. Local aspirations in relation to development i.e. development needs and 
wants (personal and collective perspectives). 
7. My own observations of local community structure and leadership. 
8. A vegetation analysis for purposes of ecosystem classification, and 
evaluation 1. 
4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 MATAQALI HISTORY 
The landowners2 of the Vunivia catchment can be separated into two main groups: those 
whose families have lived in the catchment for most of the 20th century; and those who 
IThe vegetation survey was conducted and data collected from the vegetation 
communities around the catchment. However, the research subsequently changed in focus 
in such a way that the vegetation analysis became redundant. I did not analyze the data as 
it was irrelevant to my study as it later developed. I will explain this below. 
2Not all of the people living in the settlements at Vunivia are owners of the Vunivia 
land. Landowners at Vunivia are only those direct descendants of the Namako kinship 
group. People who have married into the Namako kinship group may maintain title to their 
own land in some other part of Fiji, and hence be landowners, but not to the Vunivia land. 
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came to the area in the 1980s. They are all landowners, but there are major differences. 
All of the landowners have no long ranging ancestral ties to the land they live on, 
except for one or two families. This is because the mataqali Namako land was allocated 
to this mataqali earlier this century as part of a land exchange. This exchange was 
associated with a process of land ownership rationalisation organised by the colonial 
government. 
To further complicate things, the mataqali Namako was formerly a yavusa (see figure 
4.1), where the current tokatoka within the mataqali formerly held mataqali status. What 
was the yavusa Namako was reduced to a mataqali during the land rationalisation 
process. However, at this time the provincial boundaries were being drawn up, and the 
land held by the (then) yavusa lay on both sides of the provincial divide 
(between Cakadrove and Macuata). A land exchange was organised where the people 
of the yavusa Namako (owning land that lay predominantly in what became the Macuata 
province) relinquished land that came to lie on the Cakadrove side, whilst gaining land 
formally owned by a yavusa located in Cakadrove. This exchange was with the people 
of Tawake, a village situated at the base of Udu point near the northern end of Natewa 
Bay. The land that the Namak03 people inherited in this exchange was much larger than 
the land they relinquished. This new land lay to the north and east of the Vunivia Levu 
river stretching to the ridge line separating the Kedra catchment from that of Lagi. 
According to Karalo (the rightful heir to the chiefdom of the current mataqali Namako), 
a revolt occurred some 200-300 years ago which resulted in the abandonment of the 
original village. This led to the dispersal of the Namako people to different palis of the 
region. The people of (then) mataqali Namako, and Naqara went to live on Namukulau 
Island (situated to the west of Vunivia along the Macuata coast). The Bulu people went 
to N avetau village situated in what became the Cakadrove province. During this time 
there were no Namako people living on their own land. The first Namako people to 
return to the Vunivia area were Karalo's grandparents, probably near the turn of the 
century. This family came to live at what is now Kedra (pronounced Kendra) Village. 
This land is outside the original land holding of the Namako people, situated on the land 
gifted by the Tawaki people in the land exchange. 
3To avoid confusion, when referring to the kinship structure that was the yavusa 
Namako (now the mataqali Namako) the name 'Namako' will be underlined. When 
referring to the tokatoka Namako, the name 'Namako' will not be underlined. 
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FIGURE 4.1 KINSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE MATAQALI NAMAKO 
(19th century) (present) 
Namako .............................. yavusa ............... mataqali 
Namako Naqara Bulu ..... mataqali .................. tokatoka 
Traditional Fijian social organisation was (and still is) based on a hierarchy running 
from the family through to the confederation. At the bottom of this scale is the tokatoka 
(extended family). A number of tokatoka make up a mataqali, which is the current 
Fijian land owning unit. A mataqali may vary in population from a few individuals to 
a few hundred, depending on historical circumstances. A number of mataqali together 
form a yavusa which commonly forms the basis of a village population. In other words, 
a village commonly consists of one yavusa made up of a number of mataqali (often 3-
5), where each mataqali is made up of a small number of tokatoka. Different yavusa in 
a particular area form a vanua, and allegiances of vanua form a matanitu or 
confederation. At the village level one is commonly dealing with mataqali and tokatoka 
(see Bayliss-Smith et al 1988). 
The Naqara people returned to the land from Namukulau Island in subsequent years, and 
came to live at Kedra. Only one family from the tokatoka Bulu came to live at Vunivia, 
while the rest remained at Navetau village. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the 
rest of the Bulu people migrated to the Vunivia catchment from Navetau. They all 
originally settled at Kedra village, which became quite a busy place. Kedra is situated 
some two hours walk from the current position of the main road. However, when the 
balance of the Bulu people first arrived there was no road at all. As soon as the road 
came (1986) many of the B ul u people migrated from Kedra to the main road to establish 
what are now the various settlements (see figure 3.2). This migration was influenced by 
a number of factors. One was that Navetau village, where they came from is situated 
beside a main road, and the Bulu people were familiar with a roadside lifestyle, with its 
accessibility to markets and transport. The tokatoka Naqara, and tokatoka Namako 
people, however, had not lived by a road, and most of them were content to remain 
either at Kedra village or to move to other settlements near the coast. One family of this 
remaining group (tokatoka Namako) did eventually migrate to live at the roadside. This 
is Karalo's family. Karalo's circumstances are, however, different from the other people 
of the original Kedra villagers, as Karalo had lived for many years in Suva working as 
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a civil servant, and his family were familiar with a lifestyle that afforded easy 
accessibility to markets and towns. 
As mentioned in chapter 3 there is another basis for dividing the ~~~ people into 
two groups: religion. The original Kedra families (tokatoka Naqara, and Namako) are 
all Catholic, whereas the Bulu 'immigrants' are composed of a mixture of non-Catholic 
religions which they brought from Navetau (Methodist, Every Home, Assembly of God, 
and Seventh Day Adventist). As such, what is now the mataqali Namako is divided 
quite strongly into two major groups. This division is very real, particularly in relation 
to development, the use of local resources, and the organisation of local finances. 
4.3.2 PREVIOUS DEVELOPMENTS 
The following is essentially a summary of the content of discussions held with local 
people at Vunivia concerning previous development projects and the problems associated 
with them. I spoke to many different people about this topic as a way to gain an insight 
into the way in which development had actually happened in the catchment from the 
perspective of the local people. It also helps to shed light on tBe, relationship they have 
with their landscape. 
The following short history of development at Vunivia begins with the an-ivaI of the 
Bulu people from Navetau Village. The population at Kedra village had increased 
significantly (about a four-fold increase), and as such, there was an increase in the 
labour force of the Village. There are a number of different projects worth noting, but 
each of them have happened fairly recently (i.e. since 1980). Prior to this date life in 
Vunivia was very quiet with few people living in the area. The only significant place 
of human settlement was Kedra village and the only people living there were those from 
the tokatoka Namako, and Naqara, and the one family from the tokatoka Bulu (about 
5 families in total). When the tokatoka Bulu people an-ived at the village, with them 
came a need to feed a lot more people from the land around the village. A number of 
different projects were organised in subsequent years, leaving behind a checkered history 
of economic development: 
One of the first 'development' projects was organised (or at least motivated) by a man 
from the tokatoka Bulu, who was a member of the first Bulu family to settle in Vunivia. 
His name is Akuila. This 'development' project was essentially a campaign to 1. clean 
up the village, and 2. to intensify farming in the area and to use this as a means of 
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raising money from the sale of cash crops. At this stage the only access out of the 
catchment was by boat along the coast, up the Nasavu river, to the road end. From there 
a bus would take people to Labasa town and the market. This campaign succeeded iri 
raising the intensity of farming for a short time, and helped the villagers contribute to 
their formal obligations (tribute) to the provincial Fijian administration (this is standard 
practice). However, the villagers soon lost interest and it led to nothing of significance. 
The reason for this was probably due to the fact that the villagers at Kedra were already 
satisfied with their lifestyle and did not have any substantial need to increase their 
income. At this stage in the recent history of Vunivia the local people are likely to have 
lived in what some have called 'subsistence affluence' (Knapman 1987). There were 
plentiful local resources including a rich inshore fishery, fertile farm land, forest 
products, and wild pigs for example. 
4.3.2.1 LOGGING 
A year or more following the decline of the first 'development' project, Akuila convinced 
the villagers to organise a soli, which is a fund raising festival held in a village. In order 
to finance the setting up of the soli Akuila suggested that they log some of their forest. 
He had negotiated with Fiji Forest Industries (FFI), which held a concession over their 
forest endowment, to have a barge delivered to the Vunivia river. This logging project 
was carried out by many of the young men of the village, although they were mostly the 
new arrivals from the tokatoka Bulu. They had no machinery apart from chainsaws, and 
the logs were hauled by the young men with the help of cattle. One barge was filled 
with logs4. The villagers had no idea of the value of the timber that was taken to the 
mill as they trusted Akuila to take care of their interests. 
On returning from the mill, Akuila distributed mosquito nets and blankets to the young 
men who were involved in the logging operation. No money was given for the 
organisation of the soli. On the day of the soli Akuila brought a large amount of food 
as a contribution. The soli raised $1,300. The money was banked by a member of the 
tokatoka Namako - Serupepeli. Firstly, Akuila borrowed $500, and gave $400 to the 
young men who worked on the logging operation and they spent the money on a holiday 
to Kia island. Meanwhile the logging operation was continuing. The young men were 
now asking for wages for their labour, so Akuila took the remaining $400 and paid 
wages. 
~he actual number of logs is unknown but some villagers suggest more than 100. 
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Over the succeeding months, a total of six barges were loaded with logs on the Vunivia 
ri ver. From the sale of the timber from the six barges Akuila bought roofing iron for 
three houses and built himself a big house in which he and his family currently dwell. 
The total amount raised from this logging operation remains unknown to the Namako 
people, apart from Akuila. The logging continued for some years, but only Akuila's 
family were involved. 
4.3.2.2 RI CE 
The next development project at Vunivia was a rice project, also initiated by Akuila in 
the mid 1980s. Near to Kedra village is an area of swamp land which was used for the 
rice project. Akuila approached the Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) claiming to 
have a large area of swamp land capable of sustaining a profitable rice growing 
operation. MPI arranged for two peace corps workers (volunteers from the United 
States) to assist with the establishment of the rice project. These volunteers lived at the 
village for two years. The ostensible purpose of the rice project was to finance a housing 
project for the Village. In the early to mid 1980s the Fiji Government made an effOlt 
towards establishing a basis for rice self-sufficiency. This programme is likely to have 
been influenced by these broader developments (Overton and Ali 1989). 
Akuila used income from logging to purchase rice farming machinery and the seeds for 
a rice crop. He then brought the local people together to work on the rice project as he 
had done for the logging. The first harvest was at the end of the first year. The villagers 
ate the crop rather than selling it. They had two harvests in the second year with two 
sales. Akuila sold the first harvest and kept the money, giving $20 to one villager (Joiti, 
of the same tokatoka) who had helped to take the harvest to the market. Akuila also sold 
the second harvest, this time keeping all of the money (none of the other villagers know 
how much this was). The housing project never eventuated and rice project was 
abandoned. 
Akuila was confronted after the second sale in a meeting at the village. His younger 
brother threatened to beat him up. The meeting was very tense but nothing was done. 
The same younger brother was interviewed on my last field trip and defended his 
brother's actions in relation to the rice project. He said that the rest of the villagers had 
shown little interest in the rice project and because of this his brother was justified in 
keeping the money, as Akuila had, after all, done most of the work in organising it. 
According to Akuila's brother most of the money generated from the rice project was 
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used on the logging operation now being conducted only by Akuila and his brother. 
According to Akuila he decided that because of the lack of unity in the village, further 
community projects would suffer the same fate, so he dismantled his house and 
reconstructed it at the road side in its current location in the Newtown settlement. He 
continued logging on his own for a number of years as there was, according to him, no 
community support for his initiatives. 
4.3.2.3 COCOA 
There is currently a cocoa growing project in operation within the catchment although 
it does not have a happy story to telL When the cocoa idea was first put forward (in 
1985) there was no road into the catchment. However, some of the tokatoka Bulu people 
decided to set it up. They had asked for assistance from MPI but had been declined 
(pa111y because there was no road). The first attempt at establishing a cocoa project took 
two years but soon failed. The local people blamed a lack of government assistance and 
an insufficient level of local expertise. An area of forest was cleared for the planting of 
cocoa seedlings. No wages were paid to those who put effort into the establishment of 
this project. A further difficulty was struck when the road did finally arrive in 1986. The 
cocoa plantation lay in the path of the road, and so, when the road was built the young 
plantation was annihilated. The only benefit gained from this project was the 
compensation they received from the government for the loss of their cocoa plantation 
due to the govemment road. 
A second attempt was made at establishing a cocoa project in 1987, this time with the 
assistance of MPI, which arranged for a field officer to help the landowners with the 
establishment and running of the project. This is not a collective mataqali project as it 
was established on the basis of ownership by local shareholders (all members of the 
mataqali were invited to buy shares but not all of them accepted). Most of the 
shareholders are members of the tokatoka Bulu. The project is essentially a partnership 
with the government. The original plan was for the government (through MPI) to assist 
in the running of the project until the landowners were able to manage it themselves. 
The project was established from a government loan, which was to be paid back by the 
landowners as the project generated its own profits. The plan was for the government 
to deduct a proportion of the profits until the loan was paid off. There was no 
arrangement for any of the income from the project to go to the mataqali in generaL 
The project is being run on land that has been leased from the mataqali by those 
involved in the project. The amount that had been loaned from the government by 1992 
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was $70,000, a debt shared by all shareholders in the project. 
This project has had many problems from the beginning and is causing a great deal of 
division within the mataqali. Firstly, the project was originally proposed as a collective 
mataqali project which was to use local resources to contribute to community 
development in the mataqali as a whole. It since became apparent to non-shareholders 
that the project was designed to benefit only those with a share holding. However, there 
have also been many problems amongst the shareholders themselves. The debt is seen 
as a major problem, as the shareholders did not foresee that they would initiate a self-
help project and then immediately plunge into the biggest debt they had ever dreamed 
of. The MPI project manager was earning wages and living in a house built as part of 
the project infrastructure. When the shareholders learned of the size of their debt they 
decided to work without wages, because to pay themselves wages would increase their 
debt. There had not yet been a successful harvest. Because they were prepared to work 
for free they believed that the project manager ought to do so as well, as his wages were 
also adding to their debt. The project manager (assigned by MPI) refused to work for 
free, and as a consequence, was chased away from the catchment by the shareholders. 
To add to these problems was the inability of the project to generate an income at all, 
as the cocoa kept getting eaten by rats and parrots. It just so happens that the Vunivia 
catchment supports a very rich avifauna, which is one of the attractions of the area for 
conservation purposes. The shareholders have been attempting to gain a gun licence to 
shoot the parrots but have not yet succeeded. As such, there are many frustrations 
amongst the local people concerning the cocoa project. There is also little sympathy for 
them by non-shareholders as it is not their concern. 
The cocoa project seems to be merely another chapter in the on-going saga of 
development failures in Vunivia. But it has not been for any lack of trying by the local 
people. 
4.3.2.4 VUNIVIA FINANCES 
The financial woes of Vunivia do not stop with the occasional failed project. It is also 
complicated by the way mataqali affairs are being organised in general, leading to the 
issue of leadership which will be discussed below. An example of dissent within the 
mataqali in relation to finances can be demonstrated with the handling of timber royalty 
money that had been accumulating over recent years. Fiji Forest Industries (FFI) had 
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been logging the area with the assistance of Akuila, who had secured himself and his 
brother positions as logging contractors. Timber royalties accruing to the mataqali as a 
whole had been accumulating in a bank account, but the local people had no idea how 
much this amounted to. 
In 1986 the mataqali decided to look at their bank account, finding it to have a balance 
of $36,000 of accumulated royalties. The trustees for the bank account were all from the 
tokatoka Bulu. One member of this tokatoka was a policeman who lived in the Labasa 
township. He borrowed $10,000 without consent from the mataqali, but gained consent 
from the trustees. This was supposedly to enable him to attend a training course of some 
form in England. He was to pay it back after returning from his trip. The trustees did 
not inform the mataqali about this loan. The policeman used the loan to start a local 
business. The loan was never repaid. 
A mataqali meeting was held in 1987 where the rest of the mataqali discovered that 
they had lost $10,000. At this meeting the trustees revealed the story of the policeman 
in Labasa, although this was well after the event. Upon learning of this 'loan', the rest 
of the mataqali decided to share the remaining money out equally to all members of the 
mataqali. This was not a standard practice but was canied out to prevent the trustees 
from abusing their position further. 
These events, together with the previous episodes concerning the logging, rice and cocoa 
projects, have generated a great deal of dissent within the mataqali. There is a lot of 
distrust, particularly a distrust of tokatoka BuIu people by those of the tokatoka Naqara 
and Namako. Most of the problems relate to the activities of the tokatoka Bulu people, 
who themselves are recent atTivals to the catchment. There is little in the way of unity 
within the mataqali as a whole. Some mataqali members suspect a conspiracy by the 
tokatoka Bulu people. For example, one man (who I will not name) suspects that the 
conspiracy has been happening ever since the Bulu people anived. He believes that the 
confrontation between Akuila and his younger brother (both members of the tokatoka 
Bulu) at a village meeting concerning the disappearance of the profits from the rice 
harvest was staged. This would lead the rest of the mataqali members to assume that 
there was infighting within the tokatoka Bulu, thus covering over a conspiracy. He also 
believes that the loan of $10,000 to the Labasa policeman was possibly for the 
establishment of a business for the tokatoka Bulu, which is why the rest of the mataqali 
were never informed at the time. Whether or not there is or was a conspiracy is beside 
the point, as what remains important for this research is that there is suspicion and 
84 
disunity among the members of this community. This leads to the question of leadership. 
4.3.3 LEADERSHIP 
The leadership structure in Vunivia is quite different to what might be expected in a 
rural Fijian community. Under the traditional Fijian structure of leadership a mataqali 
is represented by a chief (the turaga-ni-mataqali). The mataqali Namako has a chief in 
name but not in practice. The official chief lives in Labasa and does not function 
effectively as a chief for the Namako people. According to the traditional leadership 
structure, the tokatoka Namako is the chiefly tokatoka. This relates back to the days 
prior to the change in status from a yavusa to a mataqali. At that time the mataqali 
(now tokatoka) Namako was the chiefly mataqali, and as such, the lineage of chiefs 
would normally be a member of this kinship group. The mataqali (now tokatoka) Naqara 
played the traditional role of hete (priest), and the mataqali (now tokatoka) Bulu played 
the role of mata-ni-vanua (spokes-person for the chief). These traditional roles still hold 
true today, and because of this, the tokatoka Namako is still the chiefly group. The 
existing (non-functional) chief is the head of this tokatoka. Since the chief left the 
catchment in the late 1980s the local people have been trying to restore the chiefly 
position, either by succeeding in bringing the rightful chief back to the land, or by 
installing another chief5, 
The existing chief has no intention of returning to the land, which is well known by the 
local people. Because of this, there is a leadership struggle going on in the catchment. 
Should the chief step down, the position should go to the person who rightfully stands 
to inherit it. Some of the division amongst the landowners relate to this question. At the 
time of the field research, Akuila was playing the role of a defacto chief, and it is well 
known that he is attempting to gain the formal title. However, Akuila is not a member 
of the chiefly tokatoka. He is a member of the tokatoka Bulu (mata-ni-vanua). 
So, we have Akuila contesting the leadership of the mataqali on the grounds that he is 
the most appropriate candidate, due to his organisational and leadership skills. He also 
claims that the tokatoka Bulu has the traditional authority to appoint the chief. This is 
only partly true. The mata-ni-vanua (a role held by the tokatoka Bulu) is instructed to 
5There is a turaga-ni-koro (government sanctioned village administrator) at Kedra 
village, but because only a small proportion of the mataqali actually lives at this village 
the position carries little weight and little in the way of mataqali organisation is currently 
conducted through this person. 
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appoint the chief once the chief has been chosen by the chiefly group (tokatoka 
Namako). If the existing chief does stand down, the rightful heir is a man by the name 
of Karalo (mentioned earlier). The second in line for the chiefdom is Serupepeli, who, 
although a rightful mataqali member, is part Chinese. He maintains his rightful 
membership of the mataqali even though his father was not a tribal landowner (Le. he 
was a Chinese man) This is because his mother was a landowner and he was an 
illegitimate child. Under these circumstances a person inherits a position in their 
mother's mataqali. 
However, the fact that Serupepeli is part Chinese has caused tension in the mataqali, 
particularly from the tokatoka Bulu, and Akuila. The claim is that Serupepeli is not a 
true Fijian and therefore should have no claim at all in mataqali affairs, and certainly 
not as a chief. This racial tension in Vunivia is a small scale example of a massive issue 
in contemporary Fijian politics at the national level. Who is, and who is not a Fijian is 
a big question today. But the trouble with this question is that it is being argued on the 
basis of race and not culture, thus fuelling an enormous political storm which bottoms 
out in the politics of race, and racist nationalism. Vunivia is not free from these 
nationally felt tensions, many of which were accelerated by the coups of 1987, and the 
racist nationalism that has followed. 
4.3.4 APPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT? 
With Akuila we have an enigma. He is either a selfish, manipUlative, cruel and callous 
creature, who will use the greater limits of his wit to expropriate the riches from the 
land and the labour of his cousins for personal greed; or he is simply a motivated person 
who is genuinely attempting to make development happen in Vunivia, even if this means 
sacrificing a few of its trees here and there. Certainly there is a lot of resentment 
towards him from other members of the mataqali. He may have been blatantly 
defrauding the local people. But there is also the possibility that in his genuine efforts 
to kick-start the community he was met with indifference and a general lack of support. 
After all, the community development projects he orchestrated did fail, but not 
necessarily from any premeditated malicious intentions, but perhaps simply because the 
model of development employed by Akuila was an inappropriate one. He was 
constrained by the options available to him. There was little outside support available; 
there was little in the way of alternative options; there was perhaps little in the way of 
'motivation' in the local people. They did not want to do what he wanted them to do. 
Perhaps they were lazy? What Akuila was doing was perhaps all he could have done 
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given the limitations and the economic framework he had to work in. In the failure of 
the projects, it is quite conceivable that Akuila became a convenient scape goat for 
many of the problems in the mataqali. 
But here we come face to face with a central issue in the entire development debate in 
Fiji. An issue that had frustrated many expatriate entrepreneurs, and the former colonial 
government for decades concerned the involvement of Fijian people in modern 
development. The traditional communal system and the general disposition of many 
Fijian people towards the prospect of working in a capitalist economic framework, was 
an obstruction to effective capitalist penetration (Knapman 1987; McNaught 1982; 
Goneyali 1975). One of the problems for the planter economy of the late 19th century 
was a lack of cheap labour. The Fijian people have not been forced off their land and 
into wage labour, as commonly happened in many settler economies, because the first 
Governor (Arthur Gordon) secured Fijian ownership of land soon after the 1874 deed 
of cession. This served to forestall major opposition to colonial rule. Because the 
majority of Fijians stilI held their land, many of them had no need to work in the 
plantations. It was this lack of labour that led to the importation of Indian indentured 
labourers that began in 1879 (see Campbell 1989; Scar 1984). In the 1950s the colonial 
government commissioned a report by Spate (1959) to review the problems of 
development in Fiji at the time. Spate argued that the rural Fijian people would be far 
better off if they abandoned the traditional communal way of life and transformed into 
small holder peasant farmers who worked for themselves. He, and the government 
encouraged the abandonment of communal aspects of traditional life in favour of a 
modern individualistic existence, which would help rural Fijians become involved in the 
development process and would facilitate the penetration of capitalism into the rural Fiji 
landscape (see Lasaqa 1980). 
For example, one of the obstructions to the generation of savings In rural Fijian 
communities was the tendency for Fijians to give their belongings away, including their 
money. Those that worked and raised an income were often asked to give it away by 
other Fijians in a system of reciprocal exchange known as kerekere and in the financing 
of communal festivals such as weddings, funerals, and births. In the traditional Fijian 
community, ownership of specific items did not usually remain exclusive. Indeed, 
property rights were generally communal (see Nayacakalou 1978; Ravuvu 1983; 1987a; 
1988). This system forms part of an economy of share and care. However, in the case 
of money, it is easy for one person to earn money and then pass much (or most) of it 
on to other people who may not be earning money. Spate (1959:6) patronised the Fijian 
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way to death by telling us all that "vaka Viti [the Fijian way] was designed, beautifully 
designed, to do quite other things than those now demanded of the Fijians". Demanded? 
. By who? By the capitalists and their apologists. Rural Fijian people could not save their 
money and accumulate the riches that the economy was capable of delivering if they 
kept sharing with each other in a communal life style, and spending it on extravagances 
such as funerals and weddings (Lasaqa 1980). Such "beautifully designed" practices 
were to be wiped clean from modern Fiji which would not tolerate such unproductive 
behaviour. After all, the colonial administration needed to generate taxes in order to 
finance its civil service which was to spend this revenue on sustaining this economic 
system. To get these potential workers into the economy there needed to be a social 
transformation away from the communal mode of existence. 
Many Fijians subsequently adopted a less communal style of living, known as galala 
(free from communal obligations) (see Overton 1988, 1992). This transformation in the 
social structure of rural Fiji has served to tear the fabric of the traditional Fijian 
community, which was held together by the interwoven threads of traditional Fijian 
culture, including rituals, language, meaning, the role of people in the community, 
kinship, political organisation, and economic production (see Ravuvu 1987 a, 1988; 
Nayacakalou 1978 for example). The trouble was that this social structure was not an 
'efficient' social formula for purposes of Western styled economic production, where the 
establishment of this form of production was effectively the raison d'etre of the colonial 
administration (McNaught 1982; Knapman 1987; Howard and Durutalo 1987). 
By fostering the removal of individual Fijian families from their traditional communal 
society, the development process would benefit, and supposedly the Fijian people also. 
This is because, of course, they would have higher incomes, and would be able to pay 
taxes and buy consumer goods thus contributing to economic growth. But the cultural 
and ecological cost of this transformation was very dear. The traditional community 
social structure was based on reciprocity, and mutual care, organised through a system 
of social interaction that fostered social unity. The new way forward, however, was 
impeded by these structures, which were seen as a hinderance to the transformation of 
Fiji into a modern nation. Even the last remaining vestiges of Fijian communal life are 
being slandered by modern on-lookers, Fijian and non-Fijian alike. Brown (1989) 
informs us that communal land ownership has been a major impediment to agricultural 
investment and growth. 
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The activities of the Fiji Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) reinforces this. The Native 
Land Trust Act (1940) section 4 (1) states that: "The control of all native land [83% of 
Fiji's land surface] shall be vested in the Board and all such land shall be administered 
by the Board for the benefit of the Fijian owners". However, the interpretation of: "for 
the benefit of the Fijian owners", is currently one that falls into line with productive 
expansion at the expense of communal impediments to this expansion. The mission of 
the NLTB is primarily economic development, not the welfare of the Fijian people or 
the health of the Vanua (land). One only needs to look at the annual reports to see this 
emphasis on development. The 1986 annual report6 provides a good example: "[The 
NLTB] administers 82.9 per cent of Fiji's land owned by the Fijian people and at the 
same time promotes the development of the nation .... The Wailada Industrial estate which 
was once a swamp area is now a base for many businesses ... The NLTB has also 
promoted the development of a forestry industry on Fijian land. It is involved with [Le. 
as a 33% shareholder] Fiji Forest Industries Group7 which is processing timber .... The 
NLTB also played a major role in the growth of the pine industry ... the Monasavu Hydro 
Project, the Seaqaqa, Uluisavou and Yalavou agricultural projects .... In tourism, the 
NLTB has been at the forefronL .. " (NLTB 1986:2). What about the Fijian people, and 
more importantly, what about the Vanua? 
The spirit under which the NL TB was originally set up with the help of Ratu Sukuna 
certainly did not place this emphasis on industrial economic development. The concern 
was with the welfare of the Fijian people. In 1940 Ratu Sukuna addressed the 
Legislative Council in the following way: 
I have some sympathy knowing that there have been occasions when Fijians 
have felt that their interests have been insufficiently considered; occasions when 
they have thought that those interests have been unduly sacrificed; occasions 
when they have felt that the Government has been perverse and has acted against 
their true interests. Such feelings produce doubt and suspicion (Ratu Sukuna 
1940). 
This is undoubtedly how many Fijians feel today about the NLTB. Ratu Sukuna (1940) 
goes on to say that if the Legislative council enact the Native Land Trust Bill "it will 
be a monument of trust in British rule, of confidence in its honesty, and of hopes for the 
6The annual reports carry the title 'Vanua', but the activities of this extremely powerful 
institution completely contradict the meaning of this word. See chapters 6, 8, and 9. 
7This is the company that was logging the Vunivia forests initially with the help of 
Akuila, but against the will of most of the landowners. 
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future .. " The Bill was enacted but the activities of the Native Land Trust Board in recent 
decades has rendered meaningless the word 'Trust'. It was for this very reason that the 
1987 Bravadra Government planned to reform the Native Land Trust Board, in order to 
reassert the spirit of trust which originally inspired Ratu Sukuna to establish such a Trust 
Board for the Fijian people (see Bravadra 1990). 
The current assumption which underpins the activities of the NLTB is that economic 
growth will lead to the enhancement of the welfare of the Fijian people and the health 
of the land. However, the very process of economic development, under the existing 
model of industrial expansion, creates conditions that directly conflict with many of the 
traditional Fijian social structures that formed the basis of communal welfare. They also 
demand that the Vanua be conceptually destroyed, and then used as an instrument of 
industrial capitalism. A paradox? 
In the process of dismantling this communal social system, the colonial administration, 
and later the independent government and the Native Land Trust Board, together with 
the business interests they serve, sent the Fijian culture further and further away from 
the kind of lifestyle that could achieve a sustainable coexistence with the rest of Nature. 
One of the reasons for this also relates to the economic expectations of village people 
themselves. 
4.3.5 CONTRADICTING COMMUNITY 
When people are living in a nurturing social environment they have a great deal of 
social riches. The extended family structure fosters a sharing in many of the day to day 
activities such as child care, farming, and general welfare. The ties the people are able 
to maintain with their landscape through the recreation of symbolic relationships by 
means of ritual and myth, enable a sense of belonging to be sustained. This is a 
belonging to both the social and the ecological community. Such a sense of belonging 
gives meaning to social life, and it fosters an existential contentment. To belong is a 
crucial ingredient in the cultivation of happiness, as one is 'at home' in the world. In this 
situation, the materialistic expectations of individuals tends to be smaller than in cases 
of social disintegration, as people have what they need in a cultural, social, and 
psychological sense. However, once communal societies are splintered into fragments, 
many of the nurturing aspects social life are unable to be sustained. People soon lose 
their sense of belonging, as the community is unable to provide the kinds of social, and 
psychological support that was possible in a communal social setting. This leads to an 
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estrangement from the world, a psychological vacuum, that needs to be filled by 
something. It needs to be filled as the loss of belonging leads to anxiety, which in turn 
can lead to a form of neurosis. 
This anxiety can be addressed in many ways. It can be cured by returning to a 
community life capable of providing the innate social needs of human beings, or it can 
be suppressed by feeding the individual with countless psychological distractions such 
as material possessions - hence fostering an inverted form of surrogate belonging. 
Instead of a person belonging to a place or a community, they come to possess their 
own belongings, and guard them carefully. The latter condition has been the 'normal' 
condition of much of Western culture for many centuries, and because of this it appears 
to Westerners to be the 'natural way' of any society. Indeed, Western philosophy is 
riddled with countless stories that serve to legitimate this fallacy. This individualism is 
what modern life is based upon. Modern life is really an unfortunate psychological and 
ecological mistake (for examples of psychologicalliterature supporting this overview see 
Fromm 1991, 1988; Wilber 1983; and Maslow 1971. This issue will be expanded upon 
in later chapters). 
This modern psychological condition migrated to Fiji in the 19th century, and the Fijian 
people have been coerced into adopting it since that time. This coercion is not an 
organised conspiracy. I call it an unconscious conspiracy of delusion. Individualism, and 
the social assumptions of competitive selection, which contradict a sense of belonging 
to a community, gradually became ingrained in the very foundations of modern life 
through its repeated use and its apparent success in Europe. It crept into the very 
structure of the economic system and was supported by the content and the style of 
modern political systems (see appendix I for a further explanation of this). 
The traditional Fijian social world was not socially or psychologically individualistic. 
And yet all people in Fiji, regardless of race, are being forced to agree with this model 
as the only true one. The economic model that Akuila used in Vunivia was one that cut 
against the grain of traditional Fijian life and there was resistance to it: perhaps not a 
conscious resistance but an unwillingness to placate to his way of doing things. And y'et 
Akuila was only doing what the colonial administration, and the current Fijian 
government had asked all Fijians to do. Get into development and do it fast. 
Government policies concerning rural development in Fiji are generally orientated to 
raise the income of the local people (see Fiji Government 1986, 1990). But what about 
their broader social needs? Raising the income of rural Fijians according to the standard 
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model of social reality supported by the Fiji government, presupposes the validity of a 
social and psychological model of human societies that (a) is highly questionable, and 
(b) would tear down the most ecologically sustainable aspects of traditional Fijian life. 
Akuila represents a product of a successfully transformed modern Fijian culture. If 
community development is to work according to Akuila's model, it will require that the 
rest of the Vunivia people comply with the social structure and the social expectations 
that such a form of economic production demands. However, this also serves to steer 
these people away from the possibility of an ecologically sustainable life. So, what is 
it to be, development or not. Economic production or not? Progress or not? These 
questions necessitate a deeper inquiry into the meaning of these accepted words. It also 
takes us back to the issue of leadership in Vunivia. 
4.3.6 LEADING FIJI WHITHER? 
The leadership struggle in Vunivia is a small scale example of what is happening to Fiji 
at a national level. Not only are the local people in the rural landscape being 
manipulated by forces from outside their land (the logging concession held over their 
land was something they never consented to), but they are being encouraged by their 
own people into changing more and more into a modern existence, whether by design 
or by default, often in the name of tradition. Akuila's claim to the leadership of this 
mataqali is based on an appeal to tradition, viz. the claim that the tokatoka Bulu has the 
authority to appoint the chief of this mataqali. This would amount to the utilisation of 
a veneer of tradition to secure his dominant position in the local social and economic 
hierarchy. 
This is an affront to tradition itself, as it pretends that the past can only be used as an 
excuse for social and economic domination. But Fiji's past also has traditions that move 
in the opposite direction of domination and coercion. And I believe that a more critical 
viewing of the meaning of Fijian culture needs to be undertaken by Fijian people before 
they embrace the hegemonic systems of selective privilege that currently masquerade as 
tradition (as is the case with a great deal of Fijian racist nationalism). However, in 
addition to this, a critical viewing of Fijian culture is also needed before the political 
Left in Fiji throw all of tradition out as a useless dinosaur of domination. This is 
because there is much in Fijian culture that can be used to save Fiji from the forms of 
social and environmental deterioration that has plagued Fiji for many centuries. 
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But before we can do this we need to understand what kind of social and economic 
world rural Fijians are finding themselves in. What are their personal ideas concerning 
development and land use. Their own ideas concerning their own condition will help to 
point to what kind of analysis is necessary in order to see how ecological sustainability 
might become possible. Are the local people of Vunivia busy fending off modernity in 
the name of tradition? Are they attempting to resist the structures of social and 
economic domination disguised as 'development' which threatens to dismantle their last 
remaining hopes of self determination? 
To answer these questions we need to meet the local people. To understand the 
perceived needs of these people it will be useful to first gain a brief overview of their 
costs of living and their means of supporting this. I will then summarise the results of 
discussions held with the Vunivia people concerning their current and future needs and 
aspirations. 
4.3.7 INCOME AND COSTS 
I attempted to gather information on costs and income to give an accurate account of 
the local economy. I struck many difficulties in this domain as 1. local people do not 
generally keep a good record of their income and spending; and 2. their income and 
costs vary greatly from month to month and from year to year. The variation in their 
income and expenditure depends on a number of factors including the specific financial 
needs at anyone time. To conduct an accurate financial survey would necessitate a 
monitoring of the local economy over a period of years. In some years a family will 
earn very little whilst in others they will earn a great deal more, perhaps because they 
are raising money for a specific purpose such as the financing of a house. This is very 
common in rural Fiji (see Belshaw 1964). 
Because of this, any data collected during a rapid rural appraisal can only give a very 
cursory glance at the local economy. Because of the high degree of variation from 
month to month and year to year I will only treat my data as inventory, and 
introductory. I did not run any statistical analyses of the data as to do so would 
necessitate a more robust sample set for it to be meaningful. 
The information gathered was designed to give an indication of the kinds of costs faced 
by local people at Vunivia. A number of different households were questioned 
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concerning their basic costs and income. These results are estimates only, especially for 
costs. The people tended to be more sure about their income than their expenses. There 
are a number of major discrepancies between costs and income, with the former 
sometimes grossly exceeding the latter. This may have been partly due to the desire of 
local people to indicate that their life was difficult financially or simply because they 
were only guessing when giving answers. The interviews were held with families which 
were sometimes spread between a small number of different houses. Where two samples 
have come from the same settlement, an indication has been made of the different 
households. Some of the settlements are very small and amount to only a few houses 
in total shared by one extended family. 
Costs tended to be separated into 6 general categories including school costs, church, 
official tribute payments to the different tiers of the Fijian administration (denoted below 
by the term 'Tribute'), informal community obligations (Community), general living costs 
including transport (General), and leases. Income tended to fall into 5 general categories 
including wages, cash crop/harvest (Cash), self employment (Self), royalties, and 
remi ttances. 
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FIGURE 4.3 COSTS AND INCOME FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN VUNIVIA 
NEWTOWN (Household # 1) 
COSTS 
School $1 A~O/year 
Church 1,100 " 
Tribute 350 " 
General 6,700 " 
TOTAL 9,550/year 
INCOME 
Self $ 6,000 " 
Cash 1,000 " 
Royalty 150 " 
TOTAL 7,150/year 
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As can be seen from the above survey, costs and income vary considerably from family 
to family or between settlements, but a few trends can be detected even from such an 
incomplete data set. A great deal of local spending is related to the financing of 
schooling for children, and the costs of church funding. The day to day living costs are 
also a significant expense for some families. 
Low incomes do not necessarily reflect a lack of opportunity to raise income levels, but 
instead commonly reflects the immediate needs of the family group as mentioned earlier. 
In fact, a lower income may, in some cases, indicate that the particular family is very 
well off, as they may have little need for cash at all, due to a low financial burden. 
However, few families are able to live in this fashion, as there are basic costs that few 
families can avoid. This includes the costs associated with official tribute, and schooling 
for children and teenagers. Also there is an expectation for many families to provide 
funding for church projects. These costs are difficult to avoid and tend to tie even very 
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isolated rural Fijian communities to the need to undertake cash earning activities. 
4.3.8 NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS 
Almost every household of the mataqali was interviewed concerning their needs and 
aspirations as families and as a community. It tended to focus on the kinds of immediate 
and long term needs as the local people saw them. The concerns of local people 
generally related to economic development. 
Most households interviewed stated that their costs of living were increasing. Their 
means of financing this were increasing in some cases, whilst in others little in the way 
of improvement in their economic position was happening. The most important needs 
for most families was the financing of housing. The standards of housing in the 
catchment were variable, but not unlike many other rural Fijian communities. Most of 
the houses were constructed from a combination of corrugated iron, and wood, with 
some traditional houses still being built and used. Electricity was a common item on 
their wish list, although piped water was a more immediate need. 
Another perceived need in the area was an improvement in transport. Cash crops were, 
for many, a major source of income. However, there were difficulties in getting their 
produce to the market, as the local public bus was generally their only link with this 
market. This placed restrictions on the types of crop grown in the area. Those crops that 
could sustain the journey to Labasa (some 4 hours away) were robust root crops that did 
not bruise easily. Some farmers suggested that diversity in local cash cropping was 
hindered by this transport problem. 
Many of the interviews were conducted in groups, sometimes with ten or more people 
(men, women and children). I noticed that the men tended to do most of the talking, and 
the responses to my questions were often those of the men on behalf of the entire group. 
In one settlement (Nukusere) I decided to hold a women's meeting concerning the 
development needs of the community (I did not attend this meeting). In group 
discussions at Nukusere settlement with men and women present, the highest priority 
was housing improvements. The women's meeting, however, came up with a different 
result - piped water was more important than better housing. This probably relates to the 
fact that the women are engaged in most of the household tasks of cleaning, bathing 
children, and cooking, and as such, an improvement in housing would not alter their 
lives very much. It is common for the needs of women to be overlooked in rural 
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· development programmes in the Pacific and has been the subject of a number of 
different studies (Chung 1991; Va'a and Teaiwa 1988; Amratlal et al 1975; Tongamoa 
1988). 
All people saw economic development as necessary and valuable to village life. The 
increasing costs of living generally coincided with increasing expectations for living a 
more modern lifestyle. There were many modern consumer item that the local people 
n~eded or wanted. Development was very welcome, and although they had suffered a 
number of development failures the local people were seeking an improvement in their 
socio-economic condition along the lines of an increase in the modernisation of their 
lifestyles. 
Prior to the arrival of the road in 1986, the local people (who were living predominantly 
at Kedra village) participated less in activities associated with income generation than 
they do now. Since the arrival of the main road (although still some 2 hours walk from 
some settlements) there has been a notable increase in cropping and harvesting of local 
resources (e.g. fish and crabs) for cash. The increase in cash cropping, in combination 
with the migration of many families from the village to road-side settlements, has 
contributed to an increase in the clearance of forest land for gardens. This is likely to 
be exacerbated by population increases. 
As can be seen in the census information presented in chapter 3 (figure 3.4) the 
popUlation structure shows an expanding popUlation with many young children, and a 
high proportion of teenagers which will soon move into child rearing age groups. The 
popUlation of the mataqali is likely to increase considerably over the coming years 
(unless migration acts as a counter-balance), and this will place increasing pressure on 
local resources. New settlements are likely to be established, and existing settlements 
are likely to grow in size. If the existing patterns of land use continue, there will 
probably be a steady increase in the clearance of forest for gardens both near the main 
road and at the coast. A move towards an ecologically sustainable community will need 
to be capable of addressing this problem. However, as part of this equation, the source 
of unsustainable influences must be adequately identified, because in many cases, the 
local people are not solely responsible for their treatment of their local resources. 
It was made quite clear that any form of development in the area would need to satisfy 
the local economy at two levels. There was a recognised need for general infrastructural 
improvements such as electricity, piped water, housing, and transport, but there was also 
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a strong emphasis on the access to cash flows that would be capable of improving the 
day to day lives of people, in terms of their on-going consumption of modem goods and 
services. In the eyes of local people, any development that improved some of the 
infrastructure but failed to raise the income of local people would not gain very much 
support. Most of the local people regarded an increase in income as the most important 
thing that development could deliver. This may be a reflection of the existing social 
character of the local popUlation. 
All of the local people live in a galala situation, as individual peasant farmers where 
each household or family forms an autonomous economic unit (see Overton 1988). This 
was also true for those living at Kedra village. Because of this, many of the economic 
aspirations of local people revolved around the individual household needs of different 
families. Because the settlements were widely dispersed geographically, it would be 
difficult to cater for community needs in a collective fashion. Piped water, for example, 
would need to be organised for each settlement, rather than a single water scheme as 
would be the case for a single village. The same was true for electricity. As such, the 
focus of each settlement was on their own localised needs and not the general needs of 
the mataqali as a whole. 
This reinforced my conception of the mataqali as thoroughly fragmented, where a very 
low sense of unity existed. This made the area appear very similar to many other 
modem rural landscapes where individual farms are the basis for social and economic 
life, as would be the case in a modern farming community in a country like 
AotearoalNew Zealand, for example. The Vunivia catchment had many similarities to 
a modern Western example, even in terms of economic geography. The place ofVunivia 
on the periphery of the Pacific regional economy, is quite similar to economically 
depressed rural communities in Aotearoa/New Zealand, which are situated in a marginal 
position in the domestic economy. The economic relationship between periphery and 
core (although over-simplified) is quite similar in both countries. An example of this 
similarity can be seen when comparing a depressed economic region such as the West 
Coast of the South Island of Aotearoa/New Zealand, with Vanua Levu in Fiji. Both 
areas are the source of raw materials for the economic core, and both areas are suffering 
social problems in relation to environmental protection of their landscapes. Local people 
are seeking economic development on their own terms but are often unable to get it, 
even though they live near to rich supplies of natural resources. Such a view of the 
economic geography of rural Fiji has also been noted by Sofer (1985a, 1985b, 1988), 
Bayliss-Smith et al (1988), however, have cautioned the over-use of this model 
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demonstrating that parts of rural Fiji have been become a "pampered periphery" through 
Government efforts at subsidising rural development. This may be true for some areas 
such as Taveuni, parts of Lau, Cakadrove, Tailevu, and Rewa for example, but north 
eastern Macuata is located further out in the political and economic wilderness. On the 
periphery certainly, but not necessarily pampered. 
This led me to realise that the consequences of modernity were well established in rural 
Fiji, and that Vunivia was situated in a very modern economic landscape. It also meant 
that this catchment was an example of what was becoming a very common situation in 
that country. Spate had won in Vunivia. The place was socially fragmented, the unifying 
strength of tradition was long gone, and the area was well on the way to modern 
economic salvation, if only the local people could rise to the development occasion. But 
development in a place like Vunivia tended to mean the sale of cheap raw materials and 
the purchase of expensive manufactured goods. The balance of such trade would always 
run against the local people as they would always be holding the thin end of the 
development wedge. Even the logging operations in Vunivia were unable to make any 
significant changes to the living conditions of the local people. Development had not 
delivered, even though the local people had tried to make it happen. 
The arguments of some might be that the people of Vunivia are insufficiently 
modernised to be capable of making development work in that landscape (e.g. Tukai 
1988; Goneyali 1975; Vusoniwailala 1985). A conservation and community development 
programme could be organised to achieve this. Training programmes organised through 
government grants, aid programmes, and extension services could facilitate the rising to 
fame of 'Vunivia the development success' within a planning framework similar to that 
described in the national environmental management proposal in chapter 3. But is this 
ecologically sustainable? Is poverty really the problem. Are the Vunivia people 'poor'? 
Is the dominant modern economic development model the only option? Are there 
alternatives? Are they pragmatic? Remember, we are talking about ecological 
sustainability, not a brief historical moment of 'sustained economic development'. 
Development itself might be one of the major problems. 
What is the task of an environmental manager who is interested in fostering ecological 
sustainabiIity? Effective environmental management will need to include the catering for 
local needs and aspirations. But are these needs and aspirations compatible with 
ecological sustainabiIity? Or do they harbour the very seeds of unsustainability that has 
led to the ecological crisis in the modern world? 
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4.3.9 VEGETATION ANALYSIS - SCIENCE AND ETHICS 
Many of the environmental problems in Vunivia relate to modern Western influences, 
particularly in relation to development, the desire for cash, and the desire for resources 
that may generate this cash. Environmental management is also a modern Western 
discipline, and because of this it is important that the modern concept of management 
be included in this analysis. In chapter 2 I suggested that ecological sustainability and 
environmental management were not necessarily the same thing. I went so far as to 
suggest that environmental management may be capable of working against ecological 
sustainability. How so? 
As mentioned earlier in relation to methodology, I conducted a vegetation analysis in 
Vunivia, and I also collected vegetation data from other parts of Fiji. The national data 
set I collected was part of a national vegetation inventory, under the auspices of the 
National Environment Management Project. My original intention was to use the 
national data (with the permission of the NEMP) to form a backdrop to the specific data 
collected at Vunivia. In this way I could show the uniqueness of the forests of Vunivia 
as a basis for environmental valuation. However, this assumption had a major conceptual 
flaw which related to the question of environmental valuation and environmental ethics. 
During the course of the research programme I came to understand ethics a little better 
as will become apparent in Part m. The understanding I gained led me to realise that 
a vegetation analysis was not necessarily an appropriate basis for determining the value 
of the Vunivia forests for purposes of conservation if ecological sustainability was at 
stake. The social aspects of valuation needed to be explicit. Value is a subjective human 
constlUCt. It cannot be scientifically ordained, it must be socially negotiated, and this 
process of negotiation is a political activity. If I continued to pursue the scientific basis 
for environmental valuation of the Vunivia forests I would be asking that value be 
determined outside the political process. 
However, even science and management take place within the context of a social and 
political domain, even if scientists believe that they are somehow above politics (there 
is a substantial literature on the sociology of science, some of which will be discussed 
in chapter 5 to follow). If environmental value is determined by science, and employed 
in management in the absence of an explicit attempt at engaging in a process of political 
discourse, it will sustain a political character by default which may turn out to be an 
unjust form of politics, and could work against the entire possibility of ecological 
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sustainability. The political character of many different forms of modern management 
systems (environmental, corporate, social) is, totalitarian. If an elite group of people 
(scientists) employ a model determined by an elite form of discourse (science), as a 
basis for determining the cultural value of a natural area (e.g on the basis of the 
assumed value of biodiversity), it will not differ in type from many other forms of 
totalitarian political systems. Local people may be instructed to follow a management 
programme (which has a social and political character), which has been designed in the 
absence of any discussion or negotiation with these people on the question of value. I 
moved the research into this domain in chapter 3 when suggesting that a broad basis for 
environmental valuation needed to be built into a management programme. However, 
I did not sufficiently develop the social and political aspects of this process. This 
became one of the main tasks of the thesis and will be developed in later chapters. 
The value of the Vunivia forests was not something that I could determine all by myself 
with the aid of science and a vegetation survey. These forests are part of the lives of the 
Vunivia people. They have a relationship with these forests which is based upon their 
own set of values. These values need to be incorporated into the process environmental 
valuation, even if they are values that would cause the logging of the forests. Asking the 
local people to participate in the process of environmental valuation does not begin and 
end with the way local people want to use the resource. On-going discussion may reveal 
that the local people do not need to log their forests to gain access to the values they 
seek. They may seek cash for example, but do not realise that there are many 
possibilities for achieving this without having to cut the forests down. Why do they need 
cash? They may need to buy consumer goods to satisfy their aspirations for a modern 
lifestyle. Why do they seek a modern lifestyle? They may have been led to believe that 
this is the only way to happiness. But there are many ways of gaining the quality of life 
that many people seek, and for Fijian people there is much to choose from within their 
own culture that can be employed to achieve this. This is not coercion, it is merely 
discussion and negotiation. It is part of the process of determining the value of a forest. 
In ethical terms, many types of modern environmental management unwittingly become 
forms of neo-fascism, in spite of the best intentions of environmental managers. A 
counter argument might be that the various forces behind environmental degradation use 
totalitarian political structures, and to stand back and attempt to do things gracefully will 
give these forces a free reign. As such, a heavy handed environmental management style 
is justified. It may be true that totalitarian political styles are being used to damage 
society and the environment. But this is not a licence to continue to use these political 
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structures in defence of Nature. To do so would be using fire to fight fire. What this 
points to is the totalitarian nature of our modern culture. And culture is where the source 
of many of our environmental problems lie. To use 'heavy handed' totalitarian political 
styles to protect the environment may be good for environmental management (what 
ever that is), but it can never contribute to ecological sustainability. This is because 
totalitarian structures themselves are innately alienating, oppressive, and unsustainable. 
They cannot be sustained indefinitely which is what ecological sustainability demands. 
I believe that neo-fascism, even in the form of benevolently inspired environmental 
management (which allows an elite group to dictate social actions), will pose a major 
obstruction to ecological sustainabiIity, and I will attempt to make this clear in the 
chapters that follow. In fact totalitarianism itself lies at the very heart of the problem of 
unsustainability. This will gradually become obvious in later chapters. 
Upon realising the totalitarian political character of the management system I was 
suppOlting, through the adoption of my vegetation analysis as a basis for valuation, I had 
no choice but to drop the analysis altogether. This is not to say that a vegetation analysis 
was not useful. It is. It would help to provide useful information on the character of the 
vegetation in the catchment. This information could be used in the process of negotiation 
and education with local people, but could not dictate the political process. There needed 
to be dialogue, as environmental education needs to be a two way undertaking. The local 
people may have many things to teach outsiders about the value of their landscape, but 
can only do this if they are given a hearing. If given such a hearing local people could 
inform environmental managers about important issues relating to land use that may not 
be obvious to outsiders. 
My priority was to undertake an exploration of the social and political dimensions of 
ecological sustainability, and because of this I needed to spend my energies and time 
focusing on social and political issues. In this way I would eventually be able to locate 
an appropriate social framework, within which a vegetation analysis could fit. But until 
this social framework was developed I needed to put a vegetation analysis aside. This 
is because the development of an appropriate social framework capable of delivering 
ecological sustainability was not a trivial undertaking, as the following chapters will 
testify. 
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4.4 REFLECTIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS 
Part of this exploration of the social dimension involved a process of reflection that was 
able to pry into deeper concerns that may not be immediately apparent. One of these 
concerns related to the perspective of local people and the legitimacy of their own view 
of their own reality. 
I had a suspicion. I suspected that there was more to the Vunivia story than the 
perspective of the local people themselves. It is a great step to be able to respect the 
local people enough to listen to them and be told, in their own words, what their 
condition is, and how they would like it to be. But there is a possibility that their own 
view of their own reality is the result of some form of ideological manipulation. These 
are strong words, and they sound like a return to the sinister conspiracy idea raised a 
little earlier. It isa conspiracy of sorts, and it is socially and environmentally sinister, 
but it is not necessarily a conscious conspiracy. I called it an unconscious conspiracy 
of delusion. But it is coercion no less, a coercion that many of us have been taught not 
to question. This coercion is the absorption of a world view within a culture that tells 
us that free market capitalism is the only way reality can be. We have no choice, we are 
locked into this economic regime and it is the best and only way to freedom and 
happiness. It is an economic regime that has been slowly developing over the last 3-4 
centuries and it is a great achievement of humanity. So we are told in the newspapers, 
on the television, in the schools, on radio, in books, magazines, and universities. 
The people of Vunivia have been led to believe it too. They have been taught not to 
question it, as to do so is to be very silly, dirty and primitive. These were my gut 
feelings, and yet I did not seem to be justified in saying such things in any formal 
research framework. But I was to discover that many other people have come to similar 
conclusions about the social condition of people all over the world. Moreover, I 
discovered that quite a substantial social theoretical tradition has developed that is 
capable of deciphering this kind of scenario. 
I will discuss these forms of social theory in chapter 5 to follow, but introduce the ideas 
here to indicate that the analysis to follow in later chapters will take such issues 
seriously. They are central to the whole debate concerning ecological sustainability, as 
they concern the ecological character of some of our deepest prejudices. Prejudices that 
we have been spoon-fed as children in our Western culture, through the meanings 
behind our language and the basic assumptions that have helped to shape our world 
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view. A world view that migrated to Fiji in the 19th century. A world view that teaches 
us to see Nature as something that is separate from ourselves, to see Nature as an 
instrument of a human economy. To understand the word 'free' as synonymous with 'free 
market'. To see the self as completely autonomous and divorced from the rest of reality. 
To see the body as separate from the mind. To see humanity as higher than all other 
beings. To see Nature as a machine. To see human nature as innately selfish and 
competitive. To see men as superior to women. To see men as natural leaders. To see 
reason as a masculine trait. To see intuition and emotion as feminine and inferior to 
rational thought. All of these assumptions directly or indirectly obstruct the possibility 
of ecological sustainability. 
But is there anyone behind this conspiracy? Who controls what we know and believe? 
Who determines what is true and what is false? Who votes for our laws? Who educates 
us as members of a modern culture? Who writes the newspaper articles and edits them? 
Who takes heed of the mass media? Who participates in and serves the capitalist 
economy? Who are the evil ones, the enemy? Can we isolate them and be rid of these 
infidels? Think again. The enemies of Nature can not be identified by the suits they 
wear, or quirks of their hand-shake. They cannot be isolated as a 'Them'. Instead it is 
really us. It is our culture, a culture we are happy to defend, and we are all in it 
together. We are all responsible as the landscape responds to our collective deeds. If we 
think that we are doing our bit for ecological sustainability by doing it all by ourselves 
we have failed to realise that we are still members of a society, and it is the ecological 
character of our society that matters at the end of the day. We are not alone. Whether 
we like it or not we share our landscape with the industrialists. The landscape cannot 
recognise you or me as 'the sustainable ones'. It does not care if we sustain the vanity 
that goes with environmental self righteousness. The message that reads 'unsustainable' 
is something we all carry in our pockets and pocket sulus. Hiding from it will not do. 
And how did it all get this way? We in the West established a basis for legitimating a 
cultural model, founded upon philosophies that underpin our systems of law, of political 
organisation, and of economic production. These conceptions became ingrained in our 
common-sense world view and imprinted into our culture through language and the 
meaning behind words in language. Some people support this culture by contributing to 
its design, others simply play along to someone else's tune. Are we free in a Western 
democracy? Has democracy ever been practised? Pre-modern Fijians participated in a 
culture that at times was violent and at others was peacefuL Some forms of this culture 
were ecologically unsustainable, others were not. But now it has all merged into one -
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modem Fiji. And this culture in all its diversity shares many traits of a Western origin. 
But the origin is of little importance. The fact that Fiji is now a modern culture is what 
matters. And here in the condition of modem Fiji is an unsustainable culture -
irrespective of race. This modem culture needs to be transformed if we are still 
interested in ecological sustainability. 
This is certainly a radical tum of events. How could I possibly substantiate it all, and 
is there a way out? Well, this is the task of the following chapters. And there I will 
demonstrate the depth of our problems concerning ecological sustainability, and at the 
end of it describe what kind of things will be needed in order to achieve this condition. 
In the mean time I will continue to show why there needs to be such a critical tum and 
what form the analysis will need to take in the coming chapters. 
4.4.1 A WAKENING TO MODERN FIJI 
The time is long past where those who are friends of Pacific Islanders and 
islands and those who are enemies can be sorted out on the basis of their genes 
or skin colours: there are plenty of "insiders", many with Swiss bank accounts, 
busily selling their forests, their minerals, their fish - the lives and environments 
of their village cousins and their own children and grandchildren - to foreign 
interests .. " (Keesing 1991: 168). 
Fiji has come of age. But what is this age that has become modern Fiji? What kind of 
society speaks these rolling languages, and where are they all going? These kinds of 
questions toss back and forth in the minds of many people involved in contemporary 
debates concerning Island life, from the emerging women's movement to 
conservationists. All are trying to make things better. But what is it that they are trying 
to make better, and what does 'better' really imply? My own romanticism about Fijian 
society has been long shattered and in the shifting sands of the resulting confusion I was 
forced to reorient my thinking in relation to environmental issues in Fiji. Not wanting 
to succumb to the market driven diatribe that taints so much of the debate concerning 
the 'development' of natural resources, I suddenly lost forever what had seemed to be 
a robust counter argument viz.: the need to cater for the needs of local people as they 
defined these needs, as a means of restructuring a Fijian society into an ecologically 
sustainable form. By supporting this view I unwittingly voted in favour of a number of 
assumptions including the popular meaning 'development', 'freedom', 'progress', 'wealth', 
and 'happiness'. Through the course of this thesis I plan to look closely into what these 
meanings might be as I believe that they have a great deal to do with the ecology of a 
culture. A critical review of the meaning of these words also has penetrating 
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consequences for contemporary political debate in Fiji. 
Are the Fijian people still there defending tradition in the face of so much rampant 
colonialism? One can be excused for holding such a utopian view of Fijian society if 
one has never set foot in a Fijian village. I'm sure that many tourists who have 'spent 
time with the locals' over a few drinks at the bar after the traditional dance show has 
finished, will marvel at how wonderful this culture is with all of its tradition so intact. 
But whoever ventures beyond that thin facade of pseudo-traditionalism transmutated into 
a handicraft and culture industry will be confronted by many perhaps unforseen 
contradictions. Another Fiji is to be found there. A Fiji that has lost its 'purity'. But one 
must ask the question - did it ever have this purity? 
Many of the current debates concerning 'culture' and 'environment' are little more that 
window-dressed versions of ideologies that seek to preserve a variety of privileges either 
in the name of vaka Viti (Fijian tradition), vakatoroicakitaki (progress; development), 
or even conservation. Fijians are asked to submit their honour to the Fijian chiefly 
system irrespective of what this 'traditional' system does to their welfare or their 
environment. The chiefly system has been used in a variety of ways, by a significant 
proportion of the chiefly elite, to secure their social, political and economic privileges 
in a sturdy social binding deemed legitimate by virtue of it having the appearance of 
'tradition' - remember Akuila. It is true that in the past social and economic hierarchies 
did exist in Fijian culture, but they were far from universal, and can hardly be used as 
an excuse for the injustices that are thrown about today. Injustices inflicted on Fijians 
by others Fijians. 
Is tribal warfare and expansionist political hegemony the only legitimate model for 
traditional Fijian society? It would be a little like contemporary Germans claiming that 
genocide is OK because they did it in the 1930s. The past can never legitimate the 
present. A culture must be forever re-negotiated and recreated by it members, by 
reinterpreting history in relation to destiny where history becomes part of an evolving 
mythology. This does not throw the past away at all, it simply acknowledges that the 
relationship between past, present and future is dynamic. In the past the landscape has 
been used and abused by many different people from different cultures. But our records 
and memories of such abuse are not a licence to continue to do so. And in Fijian culture 
there are many elements worthy of reinterpretation that may indeed show us how to 
avoid environmental and social violence. But as part of this process of interpretation we 
must respect the myths that we have, enough to seek to understand them as their 
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meanings were originally intended. Their meanings may not apply any longer as the 
landscape may be very different now from when they were interpreted in previous ages. 
But we must seek to understand them all the same, even if only to know precisely what 
we are throwing out. 
Many different cultures have meaningful myths. I believe that in some of these myths 
we can find a means of moral instruction of how to be. Of how to be ecologically 
sustainable. But to achieve this we must realise that myths are not always used as they 
were intended. They are often misinterpreted and misconstrued in order to serve a 
variety of purposes. Abraham sacrificed Issac, and in Nazi Germany many more of 
Abraham's children were slaughtered because they were 'dirty' according to a particular 
mythology (Caputo 1993). In Fiji a similar thing happened with the massacres and 
cannibalism of the 19th century and before. Is this the way to social justice and 
ecological sustainability? I think not, and I'm sure that there would have been (and still 
are) many, many Fijians who would agree. Tradition is diverse. Pre-modern Fijian 
society was diverse too. To blindly stereo-type the entire Fijian people upon the basis 
of a single variant would be racism to a great degree. And yet many people are claiming 
that pre-modern Fijian society was a model that we need to preserve. Which model are 
they referring to? We must realise that there was, and is, more than one Fiji. 
But the other side of this coin asks that tradition all be thrown out, and that Fiji be 
modernised to the maximum. Many eco-evangelists rush to the Pacific much like the 
Christians did over a century ago, on a mission to convert these fallen savages to an 
ecologically sustainable life (as if such a condition has been achieved in their own 
country), through the saving grace of environmental management as defined by modern 
science. They are assisted by local 'educated' Fijians who have been taught to see their 
own culture as backward and in need of a great injection of modern progress. Progress? 
From what? To where? The application of modern science is supposed to save the day, 
to clean up the mess, to bring us all home to management. The intentions of 
environmental scientists are not malicious, but they must be careful not to ask a culture 
to conform to their scientific model of how the world ought to be. What model are they 
talking about? A European version of Bauan hegemony under the guise of science? 
Because, there is science and there is science. We must be very careful how quickly we 
submit to a framework for cultural change, and I ask the Fijian people to do the same. 
We must look closely into the culture we have and the alternative offered in the name 
of environmental salvation, lest we leap out of the frying pan and into the fire. What do 
people think they mean when they use this word 'sustain ability' and who do they think 
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they are talking to? 
4.4.2 THE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 
What about traditional wisdom? Indigenous knowledge may turn out to be vitaL But we 
must know what we are looking for when we turn to indigenous knowledge and we 
must be sure we know how to use it. 
The gathering of traditional knowledge is perhaps a vital link in this cultural equation. 
But at the same time we must never forget what is causing our problems in the first 
place. Traditional agricultural practices can be reawakened, along with traditional forms 
of resource management. But we must be careful not to think that traditional wisdom 
will alone save the day. Clarke (1994) suggests that indigenous knowledge has much to 
offer but it is not a miracle fix. He rightly suggests that focusing too much on the old 
ways of Pacific peoples may divert our attentions from the broader questions relating 
to the context of their use. The ecological success of many forms of traditional wisdom 
frequently depends on their application within the context of a traditional world. Do we 
think that we can now simply use age-old techniques of agricultural management to set 
us on the path to a modern form of ecological grace? 
When one looks into these traditional technologies, as Clarke did, many of the 
techniques are indeed management techniques, and in this sense do not necessarily differ 
all that dramatically from modern scientific equivalents. So, did the techniques of island 
antiquity create ecological sustainability in the past? No. The techniques are techniques. 
What is crucial to ecological sustainability is the world in which these techniques are 
used. By 'world' I mean the world view - the culture, including the economy and the 
linguistic, conceptual, social and psychological attributes that form the basis of value. 
To use traditional techniques successfully, we need to use them in a traditional world 
context (see Waddell 1977). The intricate dalo gardens of pre-modern Rewa, if plugged 
into a capitalist economic framework will not be able to be used in the same ways as 
in the past. The dalo gardens of the past were not situated on the edge of a bottomless 
market that would buy every root as soon as it came out of the ground. But this is the 
world in which these dalo are now cultivated. The economic context is very different. 
Yaqona was not grown as a cash crop in days of old. It was grown for the local 
consumption of chiefs. And even now, Fijians in many parts of the rural landscape 
would never be capable of drinking the volumes of yaqona that are now planted and 
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harvested from their own land. Where does it all go now? - to the market where 
everyone will buy it and drink it, not just chiefs. It is a very different world. Many crops 
are now grown for sale - not for food, and the volume of produce that now comes off 
the land to cater for the needs of a single family is far in excess of what it would have 
been in the pre-modern past. Even in Vunivia the area of land now used for agriculture 
is far greater than what was cultivated prior to the arrival of the road. The road brought 
access to the market for the sale of cash crops, and now much of the land is used to 
produce crops for sale. I am referring to the area of land used by families that always 
lived in the catchment (as opposed to the consequences of the influx of the tokatoka 
Bulu people). 
This increase in the area of land used for cropping is not simply a function of popUlation 
density, although population density does contribute to the increase. The same is true 
for environmental degradation in general. It is not merely a function of population, 
which means that solving the worlds population problems will not necessarily solve our 
environmental problems as some would have us believe. An extensive international 
family planning programme will not save us from ecological ruin. In global terms the 
population debate is a massive red herring which serves to divert our attention from the 
real social and economic causes of our environmental depravity. It also helps people in 
the highly developed countries to wallow in a deluded smugness, as they can sit back 
and blame the worlds poor for both the environmental and overpopulation problems, as 
Malthus did in the early 19th century. 
Yes, population is partly to blame and I agree with Keyfitz (1990) that we do have a 
major problem. But I disagree with his solution which I believe covers over the cause. 
He tells us that: 
the question each country must face, then, is how to attain a sufficient pace of 
economic development without destroying the environment ... most less developed 
nations are aware that the pace of development would be faster and the 
destruction of the environment slower if their populations were to increase more 
slowly than they do today. Not all of them have the same capacity to formulate 
and implement policies that will put that knowledge to use (Keyfitz 1990:72). 
Keyfitz has the cart before the horse. His argument is upside down. He implies that 
economic development is what we must placate to. Instead we need less development 
and need to stop calling these countries "less developed". 
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A far more important issue is the social and economic systems of selective privilege and 
greed, that create a global culture of domination that causes both environmental 
degradation and poverty. Also, as Waddell (1977) has pointed out, we need to look more 
closely into the distribution of population changes in the modern world which has 
become increasingly urbanised. Environmental and social degeneration are both 
symptoms, not causes, of injustice. When one looks a little further into the problem of 
overpopUlation one finds an interesting story waiting to be told. Why do poor people 
have big families? Perhaps they need an education, and some good family planning 
advice. "I bet a lot of them are Catholics'" some people might whisper. It is well known 
that increasing the health and socio-economic condition of poor families helps to reduce 
both the death and the birth rate thereby lowering the overall population growth rate. 
This can only come about through the breaking of the cycle of poverty and 
environmental degradation (United Nations 1990). As Meadows et al (1992:26-7) have 
pointed out: 
The growth rate of a population is equal to its fertility minus its mortality. Of 
course human fertility and mortality are not at all constant. They depend upon 
economic, environmental, and demographic factors such as income, education, 
health care, family planning technologies, religion, pollution and the population's 
age structure. 
Blaming the poor is the oldest and most treacherous trick in the book. The world's 
environmental problems relate more crucially to the intensity of the use of resources for 
the provision of goods and services that are fed into an economic system that has an 
insatiable appetite and an unbalanced ledger. For example, poor countries have an 
entirely different set of opportunities in relation to economic development than rich 
ones, and this in turn can influence their population structure. Rich countries tend to 
have a relatively long history of capital accumulation compared with 'developing 
countries'. Because of this, capital is more readily available for rich populations to 
multiply their capital, save and invest for the future without having to impoverish the 
present. In so called 'developing countries' investable surplus is much lower due to its 
absorption by foreign investors, debt repayments, and the highly disproportionate luxury 
of local elites. The local popUlation does not benefit, from development and remains 
poor, perpetuating the pattern of popUlation growth rates that are fostered by 
impoverished standards of living (Meadows et al 1992). 
Children bring security to the poor who have little else. These populations are not only 
estranged from the modern process of development but they have often lost much of 
their traditional social structure, which in the past was capable of providing the kind of 
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social security of any well functioning communal society (Goldsmith 1978). Population 
growth increases poverty, and poverty increases population growth. But how do we 
break the cycle? With condoms, or with a reorientation of our economy? Contraception 
and family planning may work for those poor families that do not need the security of 
children. But for those that do need that security, those whose traditional communal 
social structure is gone, and who are impoverished by the inequitable economic system 
itself - they will not use them, even if they were free. To do so would help them 
become even poorer. 
In Vunivia we have many of these very same ingredients: a fragmented rural population 
that is increasing; underdevelopment; poor living standards; and, estrangement from 
traditional communal social structures. Vunivia has a collection of peasant farmers living 
an isolated life in an attempt to use the land as a means to buy them a lifestyle that their 
education system and the media tells them they should aspire to. School fees, electricity, 
appliances, piped water, transport, housing, packaged food, better clothes, better 
furniture, better this, better that. In Vunivia, however, the consequences of a change in 
lifestyle are more visible, as their income comes directly off the land, and changes in 
their income are reflected locally and immediately. People of highly developed countries 
do not reap their riches from their own land. It often comes from foreign shores - like 
Fiji. Japan has managed to protect so much of its own forests, whilst it annihilates those 
forested landscapes of South East Asia to satisfy its insatiable thirst for timber (Nectoux 
and Kuroda 1989). 
People living in a modem urban lifestyle consume resources that are supplied from far 
away, and so it is easy for us all to forget just how much of the earths resources we use 
up as a matter of course. This serves to lead people into the misguided mind-set that 
there is no environmental problem with their consumption of resources. After all, the 
daily onslaught of media advertising is telling us all to buy more and more. "I shop 
therefore I am" has become a modem dictum (Gablik 1991). To use 'sustainable' 
techniques, such as those on display at the traditional wisdom gala, we need to use them 
in a sustainable world. Changing our techniques will not deliver ecological sustainability 
- we must change our world. 
Clarke (1994) and Waddell (1977, 1994) have recognised this and have been trying to 
remind us of the expansive gulf that lies between sustainability and where most of us 
currently stand. Many people engaged in the sustainability debate have failed to realise 
the significance of the enormous differences between the modem and the pre-modem 
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world, in terms of their economic, social, cultural, psychological and environment al 
context. Many advocates of sustainability are wondering how we can use these amazing 
tools, old and new, for sustainability. But, any knowledge can be a valuable tool, this 
is what knowledge is - a tool. We must begin to look far more critically, not at the tool, 
but the world of the hand that holds it. 
The Fijian way of the Vanua, the Maori concept of Papatuanuku (Hopa 1990) and the 
ecological spirituality of the Sioux in North America (Storm 1972) are examples of pre-
modern realisations of the kind of life that Arne Naess' deep ecology (Naess 1989), and 
James Lovelock's Gaia concept (Lovelock 1987) point to. The land for many Fijians, 
Maori and Sioux was a living realm where the past, present and future came together 
in a spiritual coalescence of people and place, rather than being merely a dead 
instrument of an economy. This traditional wisdom is more than merely a tool or a 
technique, it is a way of life, a life philosophy, a living mythology. 
4.5 REVISITING MODERN VUNIVIA 
"What is the biggest overall drain on your finances", I ask one villager. "School fees", 
is the reply. It is common for rural Fijians to fear the cost of having a family due to the 
burden that school fees place on a household economy, where cash is not easy to come 
by. What has this got to do with ecological sustainability? The land and coastal 
resources are used to finance many different activities in rural Fijian communities, 
among them include housing, household amenities, transport, food, fuel, machinery, 
clothes, and school fees. There are many day to day costs of living even in the semi-
subsistence lifestyles of rural communities like Vunivia, but there are also costs that go 
beyond the daily pattern of consumption. Costs concerned with community projects such 
as the building of a new church (Vunivia has five different religions), or a community 
development project can be substantial. All of these costs come back to the land, as this 
may be the only source of income. Where these costs are high, the pressure on the land 
increases. But what lies a little more hidden in this equation are the changing patterns 
of land use, the changing expectations and aspirations of local people in terms of life 
style and culture, the changing context of social and political organisation, the changing 
of meaning of words in language, the changing nature of external pressures on rural 
resources, and the changing technologies that may be employed as a means to these 
ends. 
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Many Fijians desperately want a place on the escalator of modern development. The 
cultural vertigo experienced when first stepping onto this trajectory has been felt by 
many Fijians in past decades. As such, an increasing number of contemporary Fijians 
will not experience such a transformation. They have grown cash crops to pay for an 
education that has taught them to believe that 'development' is the normal state of 
affairs. Development will bring riches, and development will deliver happiness, nicely 
packaged for their convenience. So what? Development is happening every where, all 
over the world and has been for centuries, it is a natural condition, this is what being 
human is all about...Isn't it?? 
Development is one of the most over-used words in countries like Fiji. It has gained 
almost religion status. It is even there in the subtitle of the nation - a developing 
country. It dominates the national political sphere, government planning, monetalY 
policy, aid and international relations. The Fiji government does all it can for this thing 
called 'development', and as Luckett (1987) has pointed out; "Fiji's annual budget is 
specifically designed as one of the instruments used by the government for putting its 
development program into practice" (ibid.:5). Behind the need for school fees in Vunivia 
is a demand for 'development'. But what about this 'development'; can it really do what 
it claims to be capable of, and at the same time can it also be called sustainable? 
The issue of sustainable development is one of the biggest in the world today. Many 
different industries are trying to prove their ability to be 'sustainable', because 
'sustainability' is now a trendy word, and the need for development has long been 
accepted as universally true. "Development needs to be sustainable", people are saying, 
and then it will all be safe and just. As if a 'sustainable' epilogue to the volumous 
development story is sufficient for the sustainable life. But development. What is so 
universally true about this idea, and can ecological sustainability have anything to do 
with sustainable development? I will show in subsequent chapters that the word 
'development' and its meaning is best deleted if we want to come to an understanding 
of ecological sustainability. To insist that ecological sustainability must include 
'development' is to set an analysis in conceptual concrete where the only thing able to 
be sustained is delusion. 
In 1986 the road came to Vunivia, and with it the great expectations of the fruits of 
development. The arrival of the road had significant impact on life for the people of 
Vunivia. The mataqali Namako is a fragmented rural community with little of tradition 
remaining in terms of their actual economy. It has developed into a cash cropping 
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economy of small rural settlements hanging by a thread to the periphery of the Pacific 
regional economy. And yet their gaze is focused on the promise of riches and the good 
life that development is supposed to bririg. But development has tended dissipate like 
a cloud formation that forever evaporates as it approaches. But the sight of it is enough 
to whet their appetites and so, the promise of development is what they live for. 
Forests can be used for development, and the mataqali Namako people have been happy 
to watch them fall to the ground to the sound of chainsaws and heavy machinery. The 
local people clear and burn their forest to make room for more cash crop gardens with 
little regard for the lowland dry zone forest, the uniqueness of which so touched my 
heart. "What about their innate love for the Vanua?" I kept thinking. "What about the 
irretrievable damage that is being inflicted on their landscape? Surely there is wisdom 
here to see beyond this." But the opposite seemed to be true. The ruthless neglect that 
the Vanua seemed to be subjected to horrified me, as I had hoped that the rural Fijian 
people with all their tradition would mimic those people I had read about in so many 
environmental magazines. But romanticism does not help much when you are there at 
the 'scene of the crime', when you go with a landowner to who invites you to watch him 
set fire to his forest. But what can you do? What is it all about? 
'A knee jerk reaction might be to try to awaken the local people to the injustice they are 
inflicting on the good earth, and explain how the greenhouse effect demands their 
attention. But one soon realises that such 'advice' is patronising, naive, and way off the 
mark. You are talking to the wrong people if you are asking the locals to stop wrecking 
their landscape. "Ecological sustainability, what is that" they reply. You could try 
window-dressing your story in their language lie na kena taqomaki na Vanua" and they 
still look at you in bewilderment. "What does this foreigner thing he is doing coming 
here and asking that we stop doing things the way we want to. Furthermore, his culture 
is the one that came here a little over a century ago and converted us all to Christianity 
and then modernity. Is he asking us to turn around and go back?" It begins to sound like 
a massive practical joke that took a century and a half to tell. "Be modern your people 
say. Change our whole way of life to one that is underwritten by modernity. Then ask 
us not to do what your people are doing all over the world. Make up your mind". 
I was caught up in this kind of double bind, although I was not asking the people of 
Vunivia to do anything. I was attempting to learn about their situation so that I might 
begin to understand' what life is like for a rural Fijian community living out on the 
margin ,of an economy that does not care. I went to Vunivia for this PhD to learn. And 
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in the process I discovered many different things. I realised that people out there in the 
rural landscape do want development to come their way. I learned that in spite of the 
promises that development makes, it rarely delivers, and 'in the process breeds a 
pessimism in rural Fijian communities about their own abilities as people and as a 
culture. They begin to think in the wake of all their development failures that they are 
failing badly as a people. 
In Vunivia I learned about the pressures on rural resources from outside interests. I 
learned that the local people were far from unified and mutually suppoltive. Indeed there 
were many antagonisms between local people, people of the same kinship group, people 
of the same community. Colonisation was not reserved for outsiders, it was being carried 
out in this catchment by the landowners themselves against each other. I also learned 
that the mataqali were already significantly modernised even if it was not obvious at 
first. Tradition, in terms of the actual use of resources, was a long way away. And in 
this I learned about the magnitude of ecological sustainability. It is not as simple as I 
first thought, but still worth pursuing. However, to do so meant that I would need to 
reconstitute my research methodology entirely, as the. non-critical approach was 
incapable of taking me very far. What I needed were tools that would facilitate a deep 
and far reaching inquiry into culture. 
4.6 SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
The interaction between the social dynamic and the ecological dynamic is an interaction 
that is of central concern to this research. The social realities that affected the 
relationship between the people of Vunivia and their landscape was the main target for 
my case study of this catchment. I wanted to understand this relationship to see how it 
might be able to become compatible, ecologically sustainable. The question that kept 
returning to my mind was whether or not the existing cultural setting was capable of 
achieving an ecologically sustainable existence. In other words, is ecological 
sustainability a social issue, or is it really deeper, Le. cultural. If it is only a social issue 
then it could conceivably be achieved without too much of a radical change in the 
foundations of the way people think and the way they recreate their world through 
language. It may necessitate a major social revolution, especially in regard to the type 
of economic system being used, but it could be achieved without a major overhaul of 
language and the cultural meaning of life. 
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A significant social transformation could then be planned and implemented. It might 
involve the fostering of community, it might be a form of socialism, a green socialism. 
If this were true then there would be much in the way of existing tools for social change 
that could be employed in order to bring about such a transformation to an ecologically 
sustainable society. It may involve the reorientation of economic value systems, much 
of which is being conducted in the discipline of ecological economics. Economics could 
become scientific at long last instead of merely a sophisticated system of exchange 
founded upon gross and naive assumptions that serve to legitimate greed. Economists 
could be informed by the knowledge gained by ecologists and physicists. Economics 
could comply with the laws of thermodynamics instead of blatantly contradicting them. 
We could have an 'economics. as if people mattered' as Schumacher (1973) had 
suggested. We could value our resources in terms of the costs of their natural production 
instead of merely the costs of their extraction. Value could be socially and scientifically 
determined, instead of set by the whims of the market. Value in exchange would not 
contradict value in use. 
The original ideals of the cultural ancestors could be reawakened and reasserted. In 
Western culture we could look to the great Western thinkers like Socrates, Aristotle, 
Descartes, Newton, Kant, Marx, Russel, Popper, and Hawking for guidance, instead of 
merely making it up as we went along. In modern life we could look to the ideals that 
underpinned the modern project which rose from the ruins of the medieval world. A 
project where science was able to inform society of how we ought to live as Francis 
Bacon dreamed in his utopian novel 'The New Organon'. We could aspire to a project 
that was able to recover the spirit of true democracy. The serenity of reason might then 
be able to mediate our political debates, rather than the illogical political tyranny that 
has so characterised the 20th century. In" the Fijian context the ideals of their cultural 
ancestors could be re-awakened and traditional wisdom could be part and parcel of 
resource management. In this way Fijian life could become an integration of the old and 
the new to help to shape a society that cared for the land and used its resources sensibly 
and rationally. 
This is a big task, but is it ecologically sustainable?? I seek to demonstrate that, 
attractive as it is, such a social utopia would not carry any society to ecological 
sustainability. The reason for this will become apparent as the following chapters unfold. 
But it relates to the assumptions and ideals of these ancestors, and a series of debates 
that these precursors of modernity have been having with a lesser known assemblage of 
Western cultural predecessors - a heritage that has consistently been covered over. 
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4.6.1 THE NEED FOR FURTHER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the process of investigating the local situation at Vunivia I discovered the 
consequences of modernity in relation to the community structure, economic production, 
local needs and aspirations, and the acceptance of the existing development model. I 
began to realise that the condition of the local people was a product of a social and 
cultural transfonnation that has taken these people a long way from pre-modern times. 
As such, their own view of their own reality was clouded by a false consciousness. This 
false consciousness concerning their own condition is the product of the dominance of 
the European social structure, the knowledge systems that legitimate it, the economic 
system that underlies it, and the political structures that SUppOIt it. It amounts to the 
successful usurping of the Fijian culture by a modern Western world view. Furthermore, 
this world view itself is anti-ecological, and modern Westerners too have grown to 
accept it as a natural human condition. In this way, many Westerners have also become 
victims of a false consciousness that rural Fijians are finding themselves in today, 
although this process took longer in the West than it did in Fiji. 
This suspicion of coercion needed to be investigated further, as it became obvious that 
the world view of modern Fiji, and other modern countries, was a very substantial 
obstruction to ecological sustainability for a number of reasons. There is the assumption 
of the autonomous individual which seeks out a selfish existence amidst a social 
backdrop of competitive selection. Another assumption is that humanity'S place separate 
from and above Nature. There is the assumption that individualistic material wealth 
based on instrumental reason underlies the meaning of happiness. There is the 
assumption of the validity of capitalism as an economic system capable of being 
sustainable. There is also the assumption of the universal nature of Western rationality, 
which is supposedly capable of solving all of the worlds problems through modern 
science. All of these things stand in the way of ecological sustainability as an adaptive 
relationship between culture and landscape. 
These suspicions necessitated a more sophisticated analysis that was capable of 
analysing' the assumptions that fOlm the basis of some of the deepest prejudices in the 
modern world. This included the need to critique:- (a) the basis of the dominant modern 
model of social reality (social ontology); (b) the basis of modern systems of knowledge 
which legitimated the assumptions described above (social and natural science); (c) the 
basis of modern rationality which claims to be universal (philosophy); (d) the notion of 
the self in relation to the assumption of autonomy (psychology); (e) the linguistic basis 
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of the formation of a world view (mythology), and; (f) the relationship between all of 
the above to the ecological character of a culture. 
This leads to the need to identify an appropriate methodology capable of conducting 
such an analysis. To do this I must review existing epistemologies (means of gaining 
knowledge) and either adopt an appropriate one, or develop a new one. I end up doing 
a little of both and in the process identify an approach which I call 'transcendental 
cultural ecology'. 
This process of identifying and developing an epistemology will be undertaken through 
the course of chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Part III to follow. The refinement of the 
epistemology simultaneously serves the purpose of defining a framework for positing 
our question concerning ecological sustainability. This is because the development of 
this methodology is also able to be employed along the way in the form of analysis, thus 
gradually uncovering more and more about the meaning of ecological sustainability. As 
mentioned in chapter 2: a speculative problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. 
It is the framing of the question that is all important, and this comes about through 
relentless questioning, until our questioning folds back upon itself at the limits of our 
ability to ask. But what are we asking? We are asking about the meaning of the 
landscape. A meaning that is being rapidly lost in modern Fiji - even in Vunivia. 
If Nietzsche's madman (from The Gay Science) were a Fijian, and were to run through 
the forested tracks of Vunivia, he would arrive at Kedra village, walk around the village 
green calling out, "Sa evei na yalo ni Vanua? Sa evei na yalo ni Vanua?" (Where is the 
spirit of the land? Where is the spirit of the land?). The people of the village would look 
at him strangely, wondering where this madman had come from. One villager replies 
"Baleta? Sa yali na Vanua?" (Why? Is the land lost?), and they aU laugh. But then the 
madman would look at them again and morosely pronounce: "Rogoci au - sa mate na 
Vanua. Keimami sa labata na Vanua" (Listen to me - the land is dead. We have 
murdered the land). But they misunderstand him and their laughter continues. Shaking 
his head, he then says, "[sa, e rui totoZo na noqu lako maio Kemuni sa bera ni vakarau 
mo ni rogoca na noqu vasa", (Oh dear, I come too soon. You are not yet ready to hear 
my message). Because indeed, the spirit of the Fijian culture, held in the life-breath of 
the land, has long since died in many parts of Fiji, but few Fijians realise this. I intend 
to demonstrate in the remaining chapters that it is the very spirit of the land, that lies 
at the heart of the question of ecological sustainability. 
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PART III 
ECOLOGY AS SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS, AND BEYOND 
Through the course of Part II it became obvious that much of the current environmental 
problems in Fiji are a product of social conditions. Because of this I agree with 
Bookchin (1986), Fox (1990), Plumwood (1992), and Wright (1992) that the solving of 
environmental problems are dependant on social changes that are capable of removing 
oppression from the dominant modern mind-set. This call for a removal of the source 
of cultural domination in modernity is also a central theme in ecofeminism (Daly 1978; 
King 1989; Merchant 1980, 1990; Salleh 1992, 1993; Plant 1989). However, in 
analysing these modern social conditions, as they currently exist, one must not assume 
that they can all be reduced to a single story line, such as a class struggle (Steel 1990; 
Peters 1991). The problems of modernity are being expressed in many different ways 
and must be addressed in a fashion that takes adequate account of this diversity in what 
has been called a politics of difference (e.g. the work of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, 
see Best and Kellner 1991; Cheney 1989a). 
Environmental issues are not necessarily more or less important that other struggles such 
as indigenous rights, gender, race, or class issues. They exist on a spectrum and are 
often thoroughly intenelated (Peters 1991). Gains made in one area e.g. indigenous 
rights, without sufficiently dealing with others e.g. environment, may serve to undermine 
those very gains. There needs to be a recognition of the different identities of different 
social concerns (including the environment), together with a sense of unity capable of 
bringing these concerns into a coherent frarnework for cultural change (Mathews 1992). 
Moreover, achieving the forms of egalitarianism sought in so many different interest 
groups demands a substantial shift in the social and political character of the dominant 
modern culture itself (Young 1990; Best and Keller 1991). Such changes in the 
dominant modern culture of most capitalist countries will also facilitate egalitarianism 
in other directions including the relationship with the landscape (Bookchin 1986; Naess 
1989). Social concerns in all their diversity, must get a hearing along side environmental 
concerns if ecological sustainability is to become possible (Birkeland 1992), because we 
are talking about a cultural condition, a collective relationship with landscape. This 
relationship will outwardly reflect internal relationships within a social community (see 
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Adair and Howell 1989). If these internal social conditions are unjust, they can hardly 
be sustained. 
In this chapter I will explore different approaches to the question of social reality and 
social transformation in relation to the landscape. This involves the reviewing of 
different viewfinders (social theories) in the process of constructing one that is capable 
of seeing what ecological sustain ability might look like without it being an illusion. I 
believe that theoretical frameworks that serve to legitimate capitalism and/or industrial 
socialism fail to see what ecological sustainability is, and furthermore, are incapable of 
delivering any society into an ecologically sustainable field of existence. This is not to 
say that Marxism is completely without merit. Neither does it imply that notions of 
freedom should be discarded. Instead I seek to search widely from different traditions, 
learn from their wisdom, and avoid their mistakes. 
The problems associated with the structure and social contradictions of capitalism has 
been the subject of heated debate (and even the occasional revolution) over the last few 
centuries. Marxism, however, was only one wave of a growing movement which could 
recognise the social oppression inherent in capitalism (see Wiser 1983 for example). The 
creative alternatives arising out of the various critiques of capitalism were also varied. 
However, few of these creative alternatives fully addressed the contradictory ecological 
character of capitalism. The ecological contradictions of capitalism lie not only in the 
structure of this economic paradigm, but in the very fabric of Western culture in general. 
'Developmentl , implies 'progress' and 'progress' implies historicism, and linear time2• 
Modern development also implies that the land is separate from humanity and that the 
landscape is a passive sUiface full of resources which can be employed for the benefit 
of humanity. Development is utilitarian as it places value on resources in a instrumental 
fashion, in terms of their ability to be transformed into benefits for the human 
lThe word 'development' has only been in common usage in its current form since 
the 1950s (see Nandy 1988 for example). 'Progress' was an idea invented during the 
Enlightenment (see Wiser 1983; Peters 1991; Doherty et al 1992) based on the 
historicism of the time which has since become entrenched in the minds of Westerners 
and modern people of non-European races. These words are reified through their role 
in language in modern life. I will explain this linguistic phenomenon in later chapters. 
2 An account of the relation of conceptions of time to historicism can be found in 
many of the works of Heidegger, specifically Heidegger (1962, 1977, 1985). See also 
Heine (1985), and Dostal (1993). 
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community. Some forms of environmentalism make the same mistake of seeing the 
landscape as merely a natural factory of goods and services (Fox 1990; Birch 1992; 
Naess 1989). The dominant Western mind-set also assumes that reason is the basis for 
truth (Best and Kellner 1991; Graham et al 1992; Kenney 1991; Lyotard 1984), and in 
some cases believes that truth can be discovered through one particular form of 
knowledge - science (Habermas 1975; Carr and Kemmis 1986; Connolly and Keutner 
1988). Another major assumption of the dominant Western world view is the assumption 
that the individual, autonomous self or ego-self is real (Fromm 1988; Jung 1959; 
Maslow 1971; Fox 1990; Sutich 1976; Thetford and Walsh 1985; Walsh and Vaughan 
1980). It is individualistic. Western rationality sustains a notion of property lights made 
possible by this notion of individualism (Lerner 1986). Property rights are extended to 
the land which is owned by people as opposed to people belonging to the land (Shields 
1992). It also sees Nature as something separate from humanity - an alienated 'other' 
(Daly 1978; Plant 1989; Merchant 1980; Salleh 1990; King 1989). 
Because of this, an environmental programme that sought to bring on ecological 
sustainability, through even the most egalitarian form of modern development, would 
carry with it all of the above mentioned cultural baggage. This baggage, I believe, is 
precisely what stands in the way of ecological sustain ability . It is the underlying 
rationality of modern culture which is ecologically dysfunctional. What is needed for 
ecological sustainability to become possible is a fundamental metamorphosis of the very 
basis of this entire cultural system, a cultural system that set up shop in Fiji nearly two 
centuries ago. This view is shared by many theorists in the environmental debate, 
particularly those involved at a more philosophical level including, deep ecologists (e.g. 
Naess 1988; Devall 1990, Fox 1990, Zimmerman 1983), social ecologists (e.g. Bookchin 
1986), ecofeminists (e.g. Daly 1978; Merchant 1980; Griffin 1978; Salleh 1993; and 
King 1981), postmodern environmental theorists (e.g. Cheney 1989a; Hallman 1991; 
Frodeman 1992; Kenney 1991; Shields 1992; Griffin 1988), spilitual ecologists (e.g. 
Radford-Reuther 1988, 1989; Birch 1984; Hein 1984; White 1967; and Nollman 1990), 
and scientists (e.g. Sheldrake 1991; Waddington 1977; Prigogine 1979; Davies 1987; 
Capra 1982; Lorenz 1987; and Bohm 1980). 
Some critiques of modern culture, developed during the last three centuries since the 
industrial revolution, may not have been recognised as worthy of consideration in terms 
of social change. This is because their complaint was not with economics but culture in 
general. Aspects of the Romantic movement, arising in the wake of the Enlightenment 
is an example, where a rebirth of art and even mysticism in the basis of modern culture 
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was sought. The poetry, plays, and novels of Goethe are an example of this, as were the 
post-impressionist paintings of Cezanne (Honour and Flemming 1982), and the 
symbolism of Runge, Carus, Friedrich, Gauguin, and Baudelaire (Cassou 1979). In 
addition to this was the poetry of Wordsworth (Blyth 1942), Stefan George, Walt 
Whitman, the operas of Wagner (Cassou 1979), and the theology of Keirkegaard 
(Kaufmann 1992). The philosophical works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Thoreau 
, 
are another example (see Thoreau 1980; Nietzsche 1969, 1973, 1967; Schopenhauer 
1965,1966; Hallman 1991 for example). These people recognised fundamental flaws in 
the Western world view in general, on the basis of morality and rationality, on the loss 
of spirituality and connection with the landscape. 
In the twentieth century a number of theoretical schools have emerged that carry a 
similar message including existentialism, feminism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
critical theory, and postmodernism. This is a continuation of the line of argument 
initiated by those of previous centuries, particularly in response to specific problems 
with modernity in its current form. There is the philosophy of Bergson, Whitehead, 
Heidegger, Lyotard, Foucault, the linguistics ofWittgenstein, Chomsky, and DelTida, the 
social theory of Gadamer, Habermas, Winch, Rorty, feminist theory in the wake of de 
Beauvois and ecofeminism, and some forms of the ecology movement, such as social 
and deep ecology. In the light of these critical movements, the task of the remaining 
chapters is to a. undertake a critique of the ecology of culture in modern Fiji; b. develop 
a creative alternative which might be capable of bringing us to an understanding of 
ecological sustainability; and, c. shed light on a possible prescription for cultural change 
that may be capable of bringing ecological sustainability into being. It is perhaps useful 
to view a quote from Nietzsche at this stage to show what form of analysis is to follow 
in the coming chapters. 
If we look about us today, with eyes refreshed and fortified by the spectacle of 
the [ancient] Greeks, we shall see how the insatiable zest for knowledge, 
prefigured in Socrates, has been transformed into tragic resignation and the need 
for art; ... At this point we find ourselves, not without trepidation, knocking at the 
gates of present and future. Will this dialectic inversion lead to ever new 
configurations of genius, above all. t9 that of Socrates as the practitioner of 
music? Will the all-encompassing net of art (whether under the name of religion 
or science) be woven ever more tightly and delicately? Or will it be torn to 
shreds by the restless and barbaric activities of our present day? Deeply 
concerned, yet not unhopeful, we stand aside for a little while as spectators 
privileged to witness these tremendous struggles and transitions. Alas, it is the 
spell inherent in such battles that he who watches them must also fight them 
(Nietzsche 1956:95-96). 
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In chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 I will attempt to clarify all aspects of this quote that I wish 
to focus on. The preceding chapters have remained concerned with the first part of the 
first sentence "If we look about us today, rt. They have made it possible to ask deeper 
questions which leads to the next part viz. " .. with eyes refreshed and fortified by the 
spectacle of the [ancient] Greeks ... " What I hope to achieve in chapter 5 is a 
demonstration of the need to take an historical glance over our shoulder and view inter 
alia our Greek heritage which pervades so much of modern life, a modern life which 
also exists in Fiji. Chapter 6 will begin to unravel the next part: " ... we shall see how the 
insatiable zest for knowledge, prefigured ill Socrates, has transformed into tragic 
resignation and the need for art; ... The cultural and ecological implications of the 
heritage of the Greeks in the rationality of modernity is called into question. 
This will be followed in chapter 7 by an inquiry into the ecological dialectics of reason 
and intuition, of science and art: "At this point we find ourselves, not without 
trepidation, knocking at the gates ofprf!sent and future. Will this dialectic inversion lead 
to ever new configurations of genius, above all to that of Socrates as the practitioner 
of music? Will the all-encompassing net of art (whether under the name of religion or 
science) be woven ever more tightly and delicately? Or will it be torn to shreds by the 
restless and barbaric activities of our present day? Chapter 8 looks into the possibilities 
of, not a "dialectic inversion" as suggested here by Nietzsche but, a renewed dialectical 
balance between knowledge and intuition. A key aspect of this lies in the next sentence 
from Nietzsche: "Deeply concerned, yet not unhopeful, we stand aside for a little while 
as spectators privileged to witness these tremendous struggles and transitions. Alas, it 
is the spell inherent ill such battles that he [sic] who watches them must also fight 
them." This helps to point to the necessity of personal involvement in the process of 
achieving ecological sustainability which will be discussed in chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 completes the process by moving from culture once more to ecology where 
the various threads gathered in previous chapters is finally woven into a fabric called 
'transcendental cultural ecology". It is at this pojnt that the question concerning 
ecological sustainability is finally posited as it is only at this point that I have the 
sufficient grounds to do so. 
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CHAPTER 5 - BECOMING CRITICAL 
The task of chapter 5 is primarily two-fold:-
1. To lay the foundations for a critical social analysis. This involves a critique of 
the heritage of empiricist (positivist) science, which is simultaneously a critique 
of the dominant form of rationality in the West since the 17th century. This 
critique brings us. to the point at which alternative forms of rationality can be 
introduced; 
2. Alternative forms of rationality that have developed in the social science in 
response to the failings of positivism are introduced, and reviewed. This serves 
as an introduction to the postmodern approach to be undertaken for the 
remainder of the thesis. 
5.1 THE DIALECTICS OF ALIENATION 
The need for an account of the intellectual and cultural heritage of modernity sterns from 
a need to demonstrate the cultural character of what may seem to many as a natural or 
even universal state of affairs. It allows modern science to be seen as developing in 
parallel with other intellectual traditions such as political and moral philosophy, 
economics, and the institutions that SUppOlt them which, in their aggregate, have helped 
to shape the meaning of modern life. Modernity plays a substantial role in setting the 
context for the relationship between society and landscape in Fiji today, and has done 
over the last 150 years. The social, political and economic events of Europe and their 
cultural consequences have so greatly influenced events in Fiji that to ignore them in a 
critical analysis of a society in that landscape would ignore a crucial aspect of the 
ecology of that society. 
Modernity, as influenced by modern science and its political and economic offspring 
(see appendix 1), must trace a significant part of its heritage to late medieval influences 
(Doherty et al 1992; Oldroyd 1986; Lyotard 1984). One prominent figure was Francis 
Bacon. Although Bacon claimed to be starting his scientific project from a clean slate 
(Wiser 1983), he inherited the cultural milieu of the West which reaches back to the 
ancient Greeks (see Kenney 1991 for example). These cultural influences shaped by 
ancestral figures, penetrate the consciousness of practitioners of modern culture -
including its scientists, as Heidegger (1977) reminds us. The modern Western world 
view was not a spontaneous natural event emerging deterministically from natural laws 
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of human nature as thought by Hobbes3, Locke and later Turgot, and Comte (see Curtis 
1981 b; Oldroyd 1986; Dunn 1984; Wiser 1983, and appendix 1) but have been 
historically constructed by people. 
The philosophical assumptions made by the ancestors of modernity are critiqued in the 
following chapters in relation to human ecology. Philosophy andior science do not 
necessarily drive a culture but they can and do serve to legitimate certain forms of 
cultural life which become so common that they are reified as unquestionable norms 
(Habermas 1975; Kuhn 1970; Feyerabend 1981; Lyotard 1984). It is these 
'unquestionable' norms of modern culture that I wish to question in relation to ecological 
sustainability. I do this because I believe that some of these fundamental truisms are 
responsible for obstructing human evolution in relation to landscape. 
5.1.1 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 
This exercise in cultural critique is not merely a critique of modernity or Western 
culture, but is a means of opening a critical cultural analysis which unravels what any 
culture may need to do in order to achieve a condition of ecological sustainability in any 
landscape. Modernity provides a very useful model, because it embodies perhaps the 
most unsustainable culture the planet has ever seen. Furthermore, I contend that it is not 
the particular form of modernity that is at fault, but rather modernity itself. 
By inspecting the anatomy of this meta-culture, in relation to its ecological character, 
we might be able to gain a view of what it takes to achieve ecological sustainability. I 
believe that modernity is able to help uncover just what to avoid if ecological 
sustainability is sought. What we now witness is merely the inevitable consequences of 
an unsustainable prescIiption for cultural life, an unfolding of an ecologically 
dysfunctional cultural formula which was being defined by the Greeks some 2,500 years 
ago. 
An advanced stage in the evolution of this meta-culture is what we see before us in the 
rule of modern technology (Heidegger 1977). Furtliermore, the way this technology has 
developed, in parallel with a social system ingrained with structures of political 
domination, has brought humanity to the point of being capable of annihilating life on 
3In the introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes begins by telling us that (according to 
him) the body is merely a machine - "For what is the heart but a spring; and the nerves, 
but so many strings ... " (see Cahn 1977). 
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the planet with nuclear weapons. This is an ecological and evolutionary situation of 
massive proportions. It is not an accident. It is the reality of modern technology, But as 
Heidegger (1977) warns, technology itself is not to blame. The problem lies in the 
culture that enslaves itself and others to the essence of domination where technology and 
people become resources that serve the interests of an economic system. This 
domination underlies the human ecology of contemporary life in modern countries, 
including Fiji. A domination which takes humanity further away from ecological 
sustainability than it has ever ventured. 
What we have is a dialectic4• The more unsustainable the cultural system, the easier it 
is to see what ecological sustainability means. The manifestations of an unsustainable 
way of life in the global environmental crisis, serve to demonstrate the deep structural 
flaws in a culture. The flaws dialectically come home to roost, and facilitate the 
overcoming of the flawed cultural system. This is very similar to the Marxist view of 
the social character of capitalism (see Bottomore and Rubel 1961; Marx 1967; Giddens 
1980; Bilton et al 1986). The oppressive social character of capitalism, if left unchecked, 
serves to dialectically create the very agents of its own downfall - the proletariate. The 
same is true for the ecosystems of the eaIth. An ecologically dysfunctional culture, if 
left unchecked, will dialectically create the conditions that make its downfall inevitable 
(see Goldsmith 1988; Bahro 19845), This is precisely what is happening with modernity. 
The dysfunctional ecological character of this cultural system is furnishing the planet 
with environmental and social conditions which will serve to bring it to the point of 
collapse6• Such a collapse is predicted by many different brands of environmental 
4A 'dialectic' is an interplay between two opposites. Dialectical rationality, as a 
means of understanding holism and non-linear causality will be explained further at the 
end of this chapter. 
5Whereas some theorists such as Grundmann (1991) and Levins and Lewontin 
(1985) support a Marxist approach to environmental problems, Bahro (1984) along with 
many others, argues that Marxism itself is insufficient as a theoretical basis for 
understanding the ecological problems of modern life (see Perrings 1987; Waddington 
1977; Henderson 1978). But rather than discarding the massive contribution of Marx, 
Bahro describes Marxism as a valuable quarry from which many useful theories can still 
be gained. Similarly Waddington (1977) argues for the employment of dialectics but not 
the materialism of Marxism. 
6Meadows et al (1992:275) define 'collapse' as "An uncontrolled decline in a 
popUlation or economy when the popUlation or economy overshoots the sustainable 
limits to its environment and in the process reduces or erodes those limits. Collapse is 
especially likely to occur when there are positive loops of erosion, so that a degradation 
of the environment sets in motion processes that degrade it further". 
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theorist including Ehrlich (1968), Lovelock (1987), Meadows et al (1992). Such a 
collapse is already a possibility when we consider the nuclear situation we are in (see 
Capra 1982). The Hegelean and Marxist dialectic is a valuable tool in coming to 
understand this, only I do not see it in the same historicist light, and certainly not in the 
. materialism of Marx. 
5.1.2 A MODERN CONDITION 
What I believe we are witnessing is the product of alienation, an idea which I will spend 
the next 4 chapters explaining. We are observing the consequences of the alienation of 
subject from object, subject from subject, humanity from landscape, knowledge from 
intuition, science from alt, man from woman. My task is to explain what I mean by this. 
But first I must prepare the ground in order to do so. I will do this by first introducing 
positivism, and then showing why and how different alternatives have been developed. 
This genealogy of positivism will begin with the rise of modern science from the ruins 
of the Medieval world. Some critiques of positivism trace their genealogy back to this 
point and develop a creative alternative which is still modern - simply a different 
modern possibility. Examples of this can be seen in the hermeneutics of Gadamer 
(1975), Geertz 1973, and Ricoeur (1973, 1981), the critical theory of Horkheimer (1974), 
Habermas (1971, 1975), Fay (1987), and Outhwaite (1987). In some cases these radical 
modern theoretical developments sought to re-address the philosophical and social 
aspirations which emerged from the Enlightenment (late 18th century) and bring them 
to a fruition which has yet to be fully realised (e.g. Habermas 1983; Giddens 1990). 
Some of these theoretical frameworks seek the fulfilment of Enlightenment ideals such 
as progress, democracy, and liberty thus completing the modern project. 
However, some critiques of positivism go far deeper by questioning even the basis of 
Western rationality, inherited by people like Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, which were 
revised in the subsequent centuries, particularly during the Enlightenment. Later 
incarnations of this form of rationality was also inherited by those who critiqued 
positivism and established radical creative alternatives within the modern framework. 
These modern alternatives are also critiqued by postmodern theorists who reject the basis 
of modernity itself, the Enlightenment ideals (or at least their means), and their deeper 
heritage in that runs back to the ancient Greeks (e.g. Kenney 1991; Foucault 1982; 
Heidegger 1962, 1959, 1975; Pfeffer 1972). I present an account of this heritage as it 
developed since the fall of Medieval Europe in relation to the rise of capitalism in 
appendix 1. The context of my own critique of modern Western culture draws upon the 
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analysis of the basis of modernity developed by postmodern theorists. The reason for 
this stems from my interest in the ecology of culture and culturally detennined standards 
of rationality in' relation to the human relationship with landscape. I believe that forms 
of postmodern theOIY provide (as yet) the most effective forms of cultural critique 
necessary for an understanding of ecological sustainability and providing a framework 
for an ethics of ecological responsibility. 
My critique of culture at this level enables a focus on 'generic' cultural tendencies with 
regard to language as opposed to specific manifestations of these general tendencies. By 
'generic'I mean a broad cultural lineage (meta-culture) that shares a common basis for 
rationality but which may have different specific tendencies within that general rational 
grouping. An example could be given as the specific differences between different forms 
of modern culture, such as the cultural differences between modern Fijian culture and 
modern Japanese culture. They share a common rational basis in modernity, although 
their particular manifestations are quite different (see Gunn 1992 for a similar account 
of Japanese culture). The culture of modernity lends meaning to cultural life in modern 
Japan and modern Fiji in terms of their economy, for example. Japan is a capitalist 
nation (a modern phenomenon based on modern ways of thinking about land and 
resources), and so too is Fiji. The Fiji economy, however, is quite different in the 
particular form which capitalism has taken in that countlY as a product of its position 
in the global economy and effects from local influences (see Fairbairn 1985, 1987; 
Neemia 1986; Howard and Durutalo 1987; MacNaught 1982; Knapman 1987). Another 
example of a generic cultural grouping may be cited in the meta-cultural group of pre-
modern Polynesian cultures which, although specifically (i.e. locally) distinct, they share 
a common rationality and language structure (Grace 1959; Geraghty 1983). These 
generic groupings have a generic ecological character as the standards of rationality 
which underlies meaning in language will be recreated in cultural life and have material 
influences on their surroundings. A modern industrial culture will have a generically 
different relationship with its ecological surroundings than a pre-modern Polynesian 
culture. The rate and type of resource use and its impact on the landscape is one 
example (Weaver 1992b). This is due to the cultural context of social life. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, some theorists have suggested that the differences between 
pre-modern Pacific Island cultures and modern industrial cultures are not different in 
type from each other (differing only in degree), and do not differ in type in relation to 
their environmental impacts (e.g. Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Brookfield and Overton 
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1988; Clarke 19887). This implies that they are of the same generic grouping and have 
a similar ecological character. I tend to disagree with this conclusion as indicated earlier. 
I do not suggest that all pre-modern Pacific cultures were all ecologically sustainable, 
but instead seek to show how some pre-modern cultures may have been capable of 
ecological sustainability, whilst others were positively unsustainable. 
I will endeavour to explain this theory of ecological sustainability in the following 
chapters, and eventually arrive at a conclusion in relation to language groups depicted 
in a politico-linguistic taxonomy. This taxonomy will serve to organise a cultural theory 
of ecological sustain ability in relation to linguistic systems. Before launching into an 
analysis of culture it will be useful to briefly explore the forms of modern science that 
have greatly influenced modern ways of coming to have knowledge (i.e. epistemologies) 
about social reality. This will serve to introduce the dominant form of modern scientific 
rationality, a rationality which has crept into the common sense world view of many 
modern cultures. This will be followed by a brief review of alternative epistemologies 
based on alternative conceptions of social reality (ontology). 
The overview of alternative forms of social science will focus primarily on those which 
have emerged as a reaction to positivism, but which tend to remain loyal to the modern 
projectS in general. They embody dramatic advances in social thinking since the late 
19th centmy and have introduced social science to a valuable set of epistemological 
frameworks enabling social understanding to move beyond the tunnel-vision of 
positivism. Such frameworks include the recognition of the need to adequately account 
for subjectivity in the social reality being studied and the necessaty subjectivity in the 
methods of study. This opens social epistemologies to notions of intersubjectivity. 
7These authors are not necessarily defending the eXIStIng industrial status quo. 
Instead, I merely seek to point out that there are major differences in the overall 
ecological character of the rational context of cultural life of tribal societies in the 
Pacific, compared with that of modernity. Here the capacity for environmental damage 
is far higher in an industrial society compared with a tribal society, and it is not merely 
a function of the scale of these societies. I also acknowledge that Clarke in particular, 
is well aware of the substantial ecological differences between the pre-modem tribal 
cultures and the modern West (e.g. Clarke 1994). However, a reading of his earlier work 
did not make this point as explicit as it is in his more recent works. The same is true 
for John Overton (e.g. Overton 1993). 
8By 'modern project' I refer to the ideals of modernity as generally defined during 
the Enlightenment These ideals include a commitment to a rational basis for legitimate 
knowledge, individualistic liberty, the achievement of universal human progress, and a 
scientifically (as opposed to a mythically) defined culture. 
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Understanding intersubjectivity extends to the need to take account of the subjective 
perceptive experience of scientist and the social group studied. 
This introduces the notion of hermeneutics, phenomenology and self reflection as part 
of a social methodology. Such self reflection may include reflection on the contingent 
cultural inheritance of the scientist, in terms of their own rationality as a viewfinder, and 
the way that the structure of the viewfinder might influence their findings. The world 
the social scientist sees is a product of their cultural and social inheritance, a product 
of language. This is also true for the people of the societies under investigation. This 
leads to the need to furnish social understanding with open discourse and conversation 
as a means of interpreting the intersubjectivity of scientist and community. It also 
removes the social scientist from an elite position (where the scientist assumes that they 
have a privileged access to truth), to one of group learning where understanding comes 
about through discourse, and is determined socially. This leads to the notion of social 
praxis and action research where theory and practice interact in a dialectical fashion, as 
opposed to theory dominating practice. 
The perspective developed in this thesis does not discard the advances made in these 
radical modernist social theories and must not be regarded as a thoroughly polemical 
position in relation to modernist social science. It simply takes the critique further then 
they are generally prepared to go in the direction of relativism in relation to truth, the 
limitations of language and the positive role of non-rational 'knowledge', such as 
intuition and instinct. I will present my own theoretical critique in chapters 6, 7, 8, and 
9 which may be regarded as reconstructive9 postmodernism. 
The dominant Western 'world view' has become so thoroughly institutionalised in the 
late 20th centUlY, that a review of contemporary modern life in Fiji would be 
impoverished if an overview of such thinking was overlooked. Because a central theme 
9Th ere are two major forms of postmodernism. One is deconstructive and the other 
reconstructive. The former argues against any form of general theory about anything, 
even against the possibility of mythologies. Deconstructive postmodernism (which I 
reject) takes us as far as nihilism but no further. Reconstructive postmodernism employs 
deconstruction as a tool to clear away the foundations of modernity and its influence in 
the West, followed by a reconstruction of both theories (some general), and a way of 
life that does have meaning (i.e. is not nihilist). A number of reconstructive postmodern 
theorists are developing a new basis for reawakening mythical culture, and some can be 
characterised by the call for a reenchantment of life in general - hence the title of this 
thesis. See Gablik (1991), and Griffin et al (1989) for examples of reconstructive 
postmodernism and the way it differs from deconstructive varieties. 
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in this thesis is the social component of environmental concerns, a view of the roots of 
the dominant institutionalised social structure is imperative. Such conceptions of society 
are carried" into the environmental arena through both economic and environmental 
policy and planning. 
The backdrop to this entire debate lies in the structure and functioning of capitalism as 
a political economy. The philosophies and theories that explicitly legitimate this form 
of political economy are inspected in appendix 1. In this chapter I will overview broader 
developments in social thinking, some of which are philosophically conservative, others 
thoroughly radical and revolutionary. One philosophically conservative approach, which 
underlies the practice of much of modern science (including the 'science' of economics), 
is positi vism. 
5.2 POSITIVISM 
Positivism is a term first used by Auguste Comte (1788-1857) and refers to a particular 
movement within the empiricist scientific tradition (Carr and Kemmis 1986; Bilton et 
al 1986). This school of thought recognises two basic models for legitimate knowledge -
(a) the empirical sciences, and (b) logic and mathematics (Bernstein 1976). It fits 
squarely into the tradition of modern epistemology which seeks to insulate fact from 
value, a desire that reaches at least as far back as Francis Bacon (see Wiser 1983; Curtis 
1981; Oldroyd 1986). 
In more general terms, Outhwaite (1987) has identified at least three variants of the 
positivist view existing in modern scientific thought. The first comes from Comte's work 
of the early 19th century, the second from the Vienna Circle (1920s), and the third from 
what has been regarded as the 'standard view' in the philosophy of empiricist science 
from the middle of the 20th century encompassing the empiricism of Carnap and 
Popper. 
Auguste Comte developed an epistemology for the social sciences stressing the use of 
methodologies borrowed from the natural and physical sciences. He espoused a faith in 
the power of positivist science as a way of understanding, predicting and controlling 
society in order to improve it (Bilton et al 1986). For Comte positive knowledge (as 
opposed to metaphysics and theology) embraces a methodologically unified and 
hierarchical conception of science which derives causal laws from empirical data. Comte 
treated the various sciences as existing in a natural hierarchy moving from mathematics 
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(the foundation), moving upward through astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and 
finally sociology (Oldroyd 1986). In his first major work 'Course In Positive Philosophy' 
he laid out a methodology for a positive approach where:-
knowledge must be founded on experimentation; 
knowledge must be constructed from evidence available to the human 
senses and gathered empirically; 
truth cannot be revealed through abstract speculation; 
the laws which govern all events are available to observation; 
laws can be formulated and tested for validity; 
such a method is universally applicable to the natural and social sciences 
(Bilton et al 1986). 
Those scientists sustaining the positivist line of thought, along with economists such as 
Malthus, and Spencer (Galbraith 1987), also contributed to what was to become social 
Darwinism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Worsley 1992). As a predecessor 
of such views, Comte saw humans as progressing along an evolutionary trajectory 
similar to that described by Voltaire, Turgot, and the French physiocrats of the late 18th 
century (see appendix 1). In relation to this trajectory, Comte described three stages of 
human intellectual evolution which are strikingly similar to ,that of the French 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Turgot (see Wiser 1983). 
1. The theological phase dominated by mythology; 
2. The Metaphysical phase leading towards a scientific view. Here truth 
through reason is revealed and leads to a stage where the intellectual elite 
are able to rule and dominate social life. Such a view was reinforced by 
Comte's notion of a hierarchy if the sciences leading from physics 
through chemistry to biology and sociology. The latter sciences are built 
upon the laws of the former ones. 
3. The positivist scientific phase 
Although Marx and Engels held a degree of contempt for Comte's social doctrine 
(Bottomore and Rubel 1961) they did share his desire for a discovery of 'natural laws' 
of human social development (Outhwaite 1987). Durkheim also pursued the positivist 
view in his attempt to establish sociology as a respected academic discipline where 
functionalism was popularised. 
According to Bilton et al (1986) Comte's work was inspirational at a time in which two 
schools of sociological thought were in vogue. One is the classical conservatist tradition 
of the likes of Edmund Burke (1729-1797), the other the classical liberalists such as 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). The conservatist view 
holds that the key to human happiness lies in a hierarchy of social control mediated by 
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a strong government. The liberalist view advocates unrestrained competition between 
individuals in the tradition of laissez faire from the likes of Turgot and Adam Smith. 
The latter see too much government as harmful .to society. It is interesting to note that 
Spencer, who coined the term 'survival of the fittest' was an influential figure in the 
work of Charles Darwin (see Darwin 1958: 125, 275). 
The Vienna Circle of the 1920s was a philosophical movement initiated by Moritz 
Schlick (1882-1936) who saw Comte's work as metaphysical and therefore in need of 
modification. Prominent members of this intellectual movement include mathematician 
Kurt Godel, sociologist Otto Neuath, and logician Rudolf Carnap. It was from this Circle 
that the term 'logical positivism' was coined. The group claimed to have developed a 
unified science based on the union of logic and the epistemology of empiricism which 
served to eliminate all forms of metaphysics (Oldroyd 1986). This group promoted the 
view that propositions that could not be tested were literally meaningless according to 
their 'principle of verifiability'. Here the meaning of a proposition is equivalent to the 
method of verification. They also developed Comte's hierarchy of the sciences into a 
form in which even the social sciences could be analyzed in terms of physics. They saw 
the hermeneutic notion of 'meaning underlying social action' as a legacy of metaphysics 
and therefore invalid in science (Outhwaite 1987). The principle of verification also 
rules out all forms of ethical propositions regarding them as meaningless. 
Although the Vienna Circle venerate empiricism as hallowed in positivist science they 
were, according to Bhaskar (1975), unable to circumvent the 'problem of induction'. In 
the tradition of Hume and the law-explanation orthodoxy all we can observe is the 
constant conjunction of events, which is all we need to know for science to be possible 
(Bhaskar 1986). The problem of induction has been used by realists such as Bhaskar 
(1975) and Outhwaite (1987) to refute the epistemology of positivism whilst maintaining 
a scientific discourse. 
The third of Outhwaite's variants of positivism - the 'standard view' is that held by 
Popper, Hempel, Camap, and NagellO. Here the social sciences were seen to be deficient 
in terms of laws and explanation. Those supporting the standard view sought to remedy 
this by providing such laws, so that explanations could be deduced. This may have 
arisen from a desire to shed an inferiority complex suffered by the social sciences in 
IOpopper and Carnap may themselves disagree that their respective forms of 
empiricism are the same (see Hooker 1987 for example). 
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relation to their cousins in the natural sciences, which functionalism sought to achieve. 
Developments in the social sciences that moved along these lines include neo-classical 
economics and psychology, where methods used gained scientific virtue by being 
quantitative (supposedly value neutral) rather than qualitative (Outhwaite 1987). 
5.2.1 FUNCTIONALISM 
A prominent positivist in the social sciences was Durkheim (1858-1917), whose work 
set the context for much of modern sociological thinking since the late 19th century. A 
more recent legacy of Durkheim is functionalism (Bilton et al 1986). Functionalism as 
initiated by Durkheim embodied a reaction to the conflict orientated social theories of 
Marx and Weber, and the atomistic market model of Spencer (Worsley 1992). Spencer, 
who developed a conception of sociology based on the psychology of the autonomous 
individual (like Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and Mill), saw society as merely the sum of 
the actions and relations of individuals in an atomist social outlook. Durkheim argued 
strongly that it was not that simple, and set out to develop a distinct science of 
sociology that took account of emergent features ll of social reality (Worsley 1992). 
Whereas the social atomists argued that the individual was 'prior' to society (preceding 
society), Durkheim argued the reverse that the individual is a social product (Cuff et 
al 1990). 
Although Durkheim's social ontology was a significant improvement on the 
individualistic ideas of the Enlightenment, it remains loyal to the Newtonian conception 
of science modified for application to the social domain. In focusing on 
interconnectedness and emergent features in the functioning social domain it becomes 
a form of social ecology - hence functionalism. The positivism in Durkheim's work lies 
in his conception of sociology as a science of objective social facts, corresponding to 
a complex social reality that functions according to causal laws, where such 'facts' have 
a solidity beyond the individual will, similar to the objects of the natural [Newtonian] 
world (Giddens 1992). Here we get a departure from atomism and notions of 
'enlightened self interest' that sustains laissez jaire, but reductionism, and empiricism 
remains, which provides an insufficient theoretical viewfinder for understanding the 
intersubjectivity of social life in the landscape. 
llEmergent features are those features of a system that are manifest only by means 
of the completeness of the whole. The parts cannot independently produce such features. 
Recognition of emergent features is common in systems ecology. 
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5.3 OBJECTIONS TO POSITIVISM 
Positivism and Cartesian reductionism have come under increasing criticism in recent 
decades, pmticularly from the social sciences (see Adorno et al 1976 for a good example 
of this debate). In Germany during the 1950s the hermeneutic critique (interpretive 
social analysis) began to have an impact on the methodological debate in the social 
sciences (Bernstein 1976). According to Bleicher (1980) hermeneutics developed into 
a method which set a foundation for repelling the intrusion of positivist thinking into the 
social domain. The German interpretive school was influenced by the work of Weber, 
Dilthy, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Another intellectual movement that emerged as a 
critic of the positivist approach was the Frankfurt School of critical theory (The 
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 1973; Bleicher 1980; Carr and Kemis 1986; Fay 
1987). Some objections to positivism focus on perceived flaws in the way it is used in 
practice, such as its application to the social sciences (e.g. hermeneutics and critical 
theory). Other objections, however, highlight flaws in the epistemology of positivism, 
arguing that it is inadequate even in relation to the natural sciences. The realist critique 
of positivism is an example (see Bhaskar 1975; Churchland 1979; Leplin 1984; 
McMullin 1984; Outhwaite 1987; Hooker 1987; Aronson 1984 for example). An account 
of transcendental realism (which I subscribe to) as developed by Bhaskar is presented 
in appendix 2. 
5.3.1 THE SOCIAL SIDE OF KNOWLEDGE 
The positivist line of thinking ignores the contention of many social theorists that 
subjective social and historical factors have played a central role in the history of 
philosophy and the production of knowledge (Kuhn 1970; Habermas 1968; 1975; Wright 
1992; Carr and Kemmis 1986). A notable critic of the epistemology of the positivist 
approach was Kuhn (1970). He has since been joined by many others including 
Feyerabend, Bhaskar, McLoughlin, Outhwaite in the philosophy of science, Prigogine, 
Griffin, Keller, Sheldrake, Bohm, Davies, and Lorenz in the 'natural' sciences, Lyotard, 
Woodiwiss, Deleuze in postmodern theory, to name a few. Kuhn (1970) suggested that 
knowledge can be more accurately understood in psychological and sociological terms. 
He argues that the positivist tradition assumes that scientific knowledge continually 
grows and accumulates, rather than proceeding in a series of steps involving paradigm 
shifts. Kuhn (1970) identifies three principle stages in the development of scientific 
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know ledge 12: 
1. Pre-scientific stage where ideas and methods are disorganised. Following 
this people involved in inquiry become socialised into a community and 
adhere to an agreed common paradigm. 
2. A scientific phase follows with the production of organised theories 
within a paradigm. This becomes seen as 'normal science' or puzzle 
sol ving. Problems are defined in terms of the accepted paradigm. 
Anomalies arise which lead towards a paradigm shift. Debates over 
fundamental issues eventually lead to the adoption of a new paradigm. 
3. The stage of the new paradigm. This is supported by an initial minority 
but gradually develops through conversions into a 'normal' situation. Here 
reality is interpreted in a new way and problem solving becomes defined 
by the new scientific world view. 
A political issue arises here as a new paradigm must be expedient to the existing norms 
of society in some way. If new views are not sufficiently expedient they may fail (at 
least initially) to contribute to a change in the 'normal' situation regardless of their 
validity (see Mulkay 1991; Aronowitz 1988). Unacceptable paradigms can easily become 
pushed to the periphery of the scientific community if they challenge any of the 
privileges of the scientific elite. The validity of the new paradigm is socially denied thus 
reinforcing the conservatism of socially determined truth. Science in practice can' 
become ideological, in the sense that it involves the protection of theories that serve the 
privileges of that community and the privileges accruing to those benefiting from such 
forms of science (see Habermas 1968; Mulkay 1979, 1991; Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 
1983; Lyotard 1984; Cozzens and Gieryn 1990; Wright 1992, for example). 
Observations tend to be dependant on accepted theories and interpreted according to 
such theories (Carr and Kemmis 1986). Radical theories which allow radical 
interpretations to be made from the same observations may not be allowed to enter into 
the mainstream of accepted science. This is because radical interpretations of the same 
observations challenge the adequacy of the theoretical foundations of the status quo (see 
Rouse 1987; Cozzens and Gieryn 1990; Mulkay 1979; Nandy 1988; Wynne and Mayer 
1993 for example), Mulkay (1991) has shown the difficulty with publishing alternative 
views in mainstream scientific journals. When 'leaders' in the field are invited to referee 
12n should be noted that Kuhn (1977) modified some of the details of his theories 
concerning the dynamics of paradigms in response to a variety of criticisms following 
the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, although these changes do not 
affect the issues raised in this thesis. 
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such papers they can easily be rejected, or accepted if challenging views are sufficiently 
'watered down'. This indirectly serves to protect the dominant paradigm from outside 
challenges, which frequently must produce 'alternative' journals to reach the public eye. 
This essentially amounts to a form of scientific censorship. The controversial and 
revolutionary work of Rupert Sheldrake (1981) is a good example of this. The editorial 
of the journal Nature' ran a brief critique of Sheldrake's work entitled 'A book for 
burning?', saying that after reading 'A New Science of Life' "many readers will be left 
with the impression that Sheldrake has succeeded in finding a place for magic within 
scientific discussion II (see Sheldrake 1981: 11). Obviously Sheldrake's book did challenge 
the existing status quo so expertly that it roused the old guard into launching an attack 
on his work. This is very common in contemporaty science, where character 
assassinations are 'run of the mill' in the scientific literature. 
Kuhn's view, which has since inspired many in the field of sociology of science, is that 
all knowledge is an expression of a commitment to a particular paradigm. Because there 
are no neutral criteria for measuring the correctness-of any particular paradigm against 
another (as Wittgenstein showed in relation to language games in general), knowledge 
cannot be objective, universal or value neutral. Instead it is inherently subjective, context 
dependant, normative and political (Kuhn 1970). Such a view is reminiscent of 
Nietzsche in the 19th century. Kuhn, like Habermas (1968), asserts that different 
vocabularies serve different purposes in different ways. He argues strongly for a revision 
of the "epistemological viewpoint that has most often guided Western philosophy for 
three centuries" referring to positivist rationality that claims value neutrality (Kuhn 
1970:120). 
5.3.2 SELF REFLECTION IN SCIENCE 
O'Hear (1989:210) appeals to our common sense by reminding us that "science, being 
part of the culture produced by human beings, cannot remain immune from other 
cultural and ideological influences". All research is undertaken from within the 
subjective context of social communities, which is something we must take account of 
when conducting research, as our social and cultural assumptions are likely to influence 
the context of the problems we set ourselves and the way we interpret our results (see 
Levins and Lewontin 1985; Mulkay 1979; Bhaskar 1978; and Lyotard 1984). Contrary 
to the views of positivists, scientific knowledge must be recognised as socially 
determined (Gaston 1978; Pickering 1992). 
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O'Hear (1989) throws a conservative towel into the sociology of science debate by 
arguing that the various critical commentators on scientific rationality (such as Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, and Habermas) "rarely turn their analytical weapons upon themselves". But 
this acknowledgement of the inherent social and subjective character of science is one 
outcome of the kind of critical self reflection so necessary in all forms of science. The 
turning of analytical weapons upon one's own work is precisely what it means to be 
critical. This kind of self reflection is what made Kuhn's discoveries possible. 
A scientific paradigm is often unquestionably inherited by researchers via their education 
system. These theoretical frameworks are informed by an array of belief systems and 
values. These values are not always explicit in the theories but they shape the context 
of theorising. The research paradigm informs researchers to make decisions about (a) 
what constitutes a valid research problem, (b) what kind of knowledge is appropriate and 
relevant for use in the research, and (c) the method used in research to obtain such 
knowledge (Carr and Kemmis 1986). But the subjective character of the paradigm itself 
can be apprehended by any scientist, once they begin to realise that their work and their 
education takes place within a culture and a social structure that is not universal. 
This is one of the principle reasons for the imippropriateness of many forms 
environmental research which ignore the social character of environmental science itself. 
Those forms of environmental science that assume value neutrality, and are conducted 
in a positivist fashion are in danger of providing a source of legitimation for 
manipUlative and coercive forms of social control under the guise of 'management'. It 
also tends to lead to politically conservative research that reinforces the socio-political 
status quo. This can happen, for example, when an environmental problem is 
scientifically reviewed from a technical (supposedly value neutral) perspective, when in 
fact the problem is explicitly social and political (and value laden). 
Such politically expedient forms of research frequently avoid undertaking an adequate 
critical inspection of the political or cultural system itself, which may comprise the 
principle source of the problem (as is the case with unsustainability in Fiji). In the 
process, this form of research serves to divert the attention of environmental agencies 
into the implementation of 'red hen'ing' management goals, instead of addressing the real 
problems at the source. Environmental agencies frequently refer to 'ecological 
sustainability' whilst devising research programmes that look closely at irrelevant aspects 
of cultural life, irrelevant in relation to the question of ecological sustainability. These 
'irrelevant' issues may be very relevant for environmental management, but 
139 
environmental management and ecological sustainability are not the same thing. 
Environmental management problems of this form (which are not addressing ecological 
sustainability) might include water pollution in an urban setting, soil erosion in relation 
to agricultural practices, or indigenous forest loss in relation to the activities of the 
logging industry. These issues are not irrelevant as environmental concerns, but they are 
irrelevant to the question of ecological sustainability. This is because they are merely 
symptoms of unsustainability, the source of which lies far deeper in the foundations of 
the cultural system itself. 
To be capable of addressing the issue of ecological sustainability a research programme 
must be capable of critically reviewing the context of a social setting, because it is 
possible that the context of social life is at odds with the ecological character of a 
landscape. Aspects of the context of social life that need to be critically reviewed 
include the basis of value, the means and structure of economic production, the 
distribution of benefits of production, the political framework for social interaction, the 
basis for the legitimation of knowledge, and the linguistic framework for 
communication. All of these things contribute to the way a society interacts with their 
ecological surroundings. 
In order to conduct such forms of critical social analysis the research must be able to 
venture into areas that are politically delicate. If political and social diplomacy dictates 
a research agenda then little in the way of critical analysis is possible. Furthermore, such 
research cannot hope to be 'objective' as it is not dealing with an objective reality, but 
a subjective social world, underpinned by subjective cultural norms. For this reason, 
positivist science is out of the question if we are attempting to address the issue of 
ecological sustainability without reducing it to a false question. Instead, a form of 
interpretation that is capable of dealing with intersubjectivity in the social domain is 
needed. 
Hermeneutic social theory has made valuable steps in this direction. For hermeneutics, 
social reality does not exist independently of the observer. It is a subjective reality 
constructed and sustained through the meanings and actIons of individuals (both observer 
and observed) shaped by social norms. The appropriateness of positivist methods in 
social research is strongly rejected by many in the hermeneutic and critical theory 
traditions:-
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Positivist theories, by failing to recognise the importance of the interpretations 
and meanings that individuals employ to make their reality intelligible, fail to 
identify the phenomena to be explained. In consequence, the kinds of theories 
that are produced are often trivial and useless, even through they may appear to 
be sophisticated and elaborate (Carr and Kemis 1986: 103). 
We have arrived at a point at which a review of social science is possible as we have 
begun to isolate what is needed in a social theory in relation to ecological sustainability. 
Also, with the help of appendix 1, we have traced a genealogy of the dominant Western 
world view which provides the underlying context for social life in the modern world. 
This is not to say that all social actions in modern life follow the dominant model, 
although social actions which do follow this model are common and deemed legitimate 
by the dominant paradigm that supports the existing social and political situation. Such 
actions include the motivations of local people in modern societies for capitalist fonTIs 
of economic development, as with the landowners in Vunivia. Other such actions include 
the modern economic development process, and many forms of science, including 
environmental science, and management. 
5.4 UNDERSTANDING SUBJECTIVITY 
Our world is a social world and our world view, and thus our relationship with our 
surroundings, is a reflection of this social world. Levins and Lewontin (1985) for 
example, suggest that aspects of ecological and evolutionary theory comprise an 
expression of social conditions and social philosophy13. Some of the social sciences have 
focused on intersubjectivity as the normal condition in social life and social science. The 
idea of the objects of study being only objects (as opposed to subjects) is to be called 
into question in this thesis in relation to the practice of ecology in general and cultural 
ecology in particular. Objects are acted upon by subjects, have no free will or creativity, 
and are determined by external conditions imposed upon them by subjects (see Birch 
and Cobb 1981). The separation (alienation) of subject and object was a major 
13Notable in this regard are Darwin's ideas of competition, histiography, and survival 
of the fittest (the latter of which is consistent with liberalist social theory popular at the 
time of writing the Origin of Species). Thomas Malthus and Herbert Spencer were 
primarily interested in human social conditions, but it was Darwin that applied these 
ideas to the rest of Nature (Weber 1990). Malthus was preoccupied with the incongruous 
relationship between population growth and the ability of production to sustain it. 
Spencer concluded that the stronger pass the test of survival which leads to social and 
cultural progress. Darwin modified these ideas through the employment of competitive 
selection in nature and as such these 'laws' were applied with vigour in the social 
Darwinism of Tille, Ploettz, Gumplowicz, and Schallmayer for example (Weber 1990). 
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underculTent in the philosophy of Hegel (see Wiser 1983). 
Subjects are indeterminate, and have free will and creativity (Kenney 1991, and Fromm 
1991 give good examples of the problem of determinism). Subjects have intrinsic value 
as subjective beings where the source of their creativity does not lie solely outside their 
being. Objects are devoid of intrinsic value and creative will. The assumption that 
something or someone is an object implies that they have no intrinsic value, or creative 
free will. It implies that they are determined by external forces over which they have 
no creative influence (see Fromm 1991). However, as Hegel has pointed out, we must 
learn to "dissolve the opposition of a frozen sUbjectivity and objectivity and comprehend 
the origin of the intellectual and real world as a becoming, we must understand their 
being as a product, as a form of producing" (cited in Feyerabend 1981 :74). 
The notion of intersubjectivity has been well developed in the some of the social 
sciences including phenomenology, hermeneutics, ethnomethodology, critical theory, 
critical social science, and postmodernism. Because of this heritage the possibility of 
employing notions of intersubjectivity, instead of objectivity, in cultural ecology is 
explored. However, in order to do this it is appropriate to first consider the way these 
social sciences have theoretically and philosophically dealt with intersubjectivity in 
social life. 
The remainder of this chapter will focus primarily on reviewing different traditions in 
the social sciences that will help to form the basis for the type of analysis to be 
developed in subsequent chapters. 
5.5 NEW MOVEMENTS IN SOCIAL THEORY 
Challenges to the dominance of positivist approaches to science in general and social 
science in particular have become prominent since the 1960s. Germany has provided a 
strong focus point for a revival of classical social theory and philosophy with the 
schools of hermeneutics and critical theory. In France following the student uprising of 
1968, poststructuralist theory has emerged as a significant intellectual force (Best and 
Kellner 1991). Poststructuralism provides a framework for postmodern theory and 
postmodern philosophy which focuses inter alia on the political structures that underlie 
linguistic systems of knowledge, ethics, and power (Sarup 1989). 
Hermeneutics, and critical theory each differ in their critique of the positivist view and 
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subsequently develop different creative alternatives. Hermeneutics and critical theory 
both saw the social sciences as separate from the natural sciences, where the techniques 
of the latter were regarded as inappropriate for the former. Some forms of realism, 
however, challenge the epistemology of positivisrn in general, even as a means of 
understanding natural and physical reality. The following sections will explore the 
arguments of each of these different intellectual traditions. 
The challenge put up by postmodernism runs far deeper into the fabric of Western 
culture, where some of the deepest assumptions and prejudices of modernity are rejected. 
Rather than merely refute the epistemological claims of positivism, postmodernism 
launches into a direct critical examination of the entire modern cultural framework. As 
such, postmodernism tends to explore far more than the foundations of positivism and 
empiricism, but seeks out the very foundations of modern culture in general. This 
critique commonly extends back to the Greeks and the beginnings of the rationality 
which underlies Western civilisation. 
Postmodern linguistic theory and textual analysis frame all forms of knowledge 
(including scientific and philosophical knowledge) as 'narratives' which may seek 
legitimation in a variety of ways. Such narratives or discourses sometimes appeal to 
deep rooted assumptions of Western rationality, such as the possibility of universal 
theories, and universal truth. The credibility of such universals (called meta-narratives 
by postmodernists) are called into question in the postmodern critique. One example is 
the postmodern rejection of the notion of truth as framed in the modernist setting where 
all forms of knowledge are context dependant. As such, no epistemology is free to 
exercise an independent (totally detached or objective) critique of any phenomenon (see 
Seidman and Wagner] 992). 
As laid out in chapter 2, my task is to develop a form of understanding which is able 
to shed light on the simultaneity of social and ecological reality. What is required is a 
form of naturalism. 'Naturalism' here refers to a theoretical methodology which studies 
both social and non-social reality under the same epistemological banner. This is 
precisely what positivism claimed to have achieved through the employment of 
objective, quantitative techniques in both the physical and the social sciences (Outhwaite 
1987). I seek to develop a methodology capable of uncovering meaning in social and 
ecological reality by focusing on intersubjectivity as a form of non-positivist naturalism 
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similar to that developed by Bhaskar (1979)14. Such a possibility has been considered 
by Roy Bhaskar who has developed a theory of science called 'transcendental realism' 
(see Bhaskar 1975,1979,1981,1986). Here the criticisms of positivism put 'forward by 
critical theory and hermeneutics are shared by a transcendental realist framework 
(Outhwaite 1987). Furthermore, Woodiwis (1990) has shown that transcendental realism 
is compatible with forms of postmodern theory. 
In this thesis I adopt the broad framework of transcendental realism but differ in some 
ways from the approach of Bhaskar, particularly in relation to the question of truth and 
its definition. As part of the approach to the theoretical developments of subsequent 
chapters I will present a summary of different theoretical schools (some already 
mentioned) which provide valuable material. I also present them in order to show why 
my theoretical perspective might differ. One of the reasons for this difference is that my 
perspective is postmodern. However, to demonstrate why it differs from a radical 
modern framework, I must first show what constitutes a modern view. By introducing 
the arguments of hermeneutics, critical theory, dialectical materialism we can move well 
beyond the constraints of positivism, to a point at which a postmodern perspective can 
be framed. Of central concern is the need to develop a theory and practice capable of 
apprehending the simultaneity of social and ecologiGal--aspects of landscape, whilst 
acknowledging the limitations of knowledge and language, but also accepting the value 
of intuition, instinct, and creativity. 
5.5.1 HERMENEUTICS 
As mentioned in chapter 2 the term 'hern1eneutics' comes from the Greek god Hermes, 
a messenger from the gods to mortals. Underlying the meaning of this term is 
'understanding' through 'interpretation', For this reason hermeneutics as used in the social 
sciences is often called 'interpretive social science' (see Gibbons 1987). This tradition 
seeks to replace positivist notions of explanation, prediction and control with interpretive 
notions of understanding, meaning and action (Carr and Kemmis 1986). Those that have 
contributed to the interpretive school include the late 19th and early 20th century works 
of Droysen, Dilthey, Windelband; Rickert, and Max Weber, with more recent 
contributions from Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, Apel, Schultz, Berger and 
Luckman, Taylor, Lukes, Winch, Fay, Geertz, and Connolly. Arising primarily from 
14See appendix 2 for an account of naturalism developed under the framework of 
transcendental realism. 
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European philosophy (mainly Germany), hermeneutics is often regarded as part of the 
tradition of 'continental philosophy'. 
This new form of sociology moved away from the positivist functionalism of Durkheim 
towards the idea of a social reality that possesses an intrinsic structure that is constituted 
and sustained through the interpretive actions of individual social actors (Ricoeur 1981). 
Weber (1990) suggests that all social inquiry is concerned with the interpretation of 
subjective social actions. 
Hermeneutics makes a distinction between social action and mere behaviour. The latter 
is a physical phenomenon while the former is the result of social subjective motives. 
Social actions are unintelligible unless the meaning behind such actions is understood 
by both the actors and interpreters. Observing behaviour without investigating the 
meaning behind actions cannot provide an accurate interpretation of the significance of 
the actions. The same action may be the result of a number of different motivations by 
the actor. For example, Fijian villagers migrate from an isolated village to roadside 
settlements. This is observable social behaviour but cannot be adequately interpreted and 
understood until the motives behind the migration has been revealed. Their migration 
could be interpreted as the realisation of a socio-cultural transformation, or the people 
may have lived at a roadside location prior to the study in another part of Fiji. The two 
situations have very different implications for understanding the social character of rural 
Fijian life. Thus the understanding of subjective meaning is a central PaIt of any social 
research. 
In spite of the subjective meanings, the social actions also have material preconditions 
and material consequences. Understanding the material dimensions of social life is an 
important part of an environmental research programme concerned with the relationship 
between a social group and their physical environment. The subjective meaning behind 
actions are embedded in cultural conditions. Different cultures will have different actions 
for similar purposes, and will have different meanings for similar actions. The social 
character of actions implies that actions arise from the network of meanings that are 
inherited by the actors from their history and the existing social! cultural context of life. 
Meaning therefore can be socially predetermined. Thus, another task for interpretive 
social science is to understand the social and cultural context of life for the actors 
through their social rules. This is what I was trying to do in Vunivia, although I did not 
have a sufficient theoretical basis for doing so at the time of the field research itself. 
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If social actions are interpreted in the positivist fashion, actions are reduced to physical 
behaviour which is studied empirically and interpreted statistically. In these 
circumstances physical behaviour is deprived of its intended meanin"g and substituted for 
causal explanations derived from a positivist conception of causal law. For example, 
poor rural farmers are said to cause deforestation in Fiji. This explanation becomes 
accepted as a truism in management circles l5 in spite of the fact that it takes no account 
of the subjective meaning that underlies the social and economic actions of the rural 
farmers. A common causal explanation given is the selfish and ignorant motives of the 
rural poor (e.g. see Tavaiqia 1988). Such an explanation eclipses issues such as the 
social, economic and political conditions that place rural farmers into a situation where 
they have little choice but to clear forest to make a living. 
At least two branches have been identified in the hermeneutic approach to social 
science. One is the hermeneutics of recovery (Caputo 1986) the other is called a 
hermeneutic of suspicion by Ricoeur (Dreyfus 1987). The former is concerned with the 
recovery of the original meanings of local social actions as interpreted by the social 
actors themselves and not merely that of the scientist. These meanings underlie the 
social actions, and serve furnish an inquiry with a locally specific context, rather than 
merely assuming that all social actions are attributable to hypothetical causal laws. 
Uncovering these meanings can come about through exercising a hermeneutic ofrespect 
for the localised interpretation of local reality. This is what was happening in the 
informal aspects of my interviews in Vunivia, although at the time I was unable to 
substantiate the value of such information, as I had not had sufficient exposure to social 
theories such as hermeneutics. A standard practice in exercising a hermeneutic of respect 
might involve the engagement of unstructured discourse with a local community in a 
local language, without the observer assuming that the meaning of social life being 
studied is self evident. 
The hermeneutic of suspicion, which could be regarded as a neo-Marxist approach, 
insists that the self understanding of social actors is often clouded by a false 
consciousness (see Westphal 1986; Hekman 1986; Ricoeur 1981). In chapter 4 I did 
have quite a suspicion that a false consciousness was a possibility in terms of the local 
ISFor example the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (Food and Agriculture Organisation 
1985) attributes deforestation to the poverty of the rural poor. The key note address to 
the 2nd (Fiji) National Conservation Congress (1988) by the Fiji Minister for Forests, 
and the paper given by the Conservator of Forests both held the same view (see Yabaki 
1988; and Tavaiqia 1988). 
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interpretation of local reality. It became clear to me that understanding the motives 
behind actions may only uncover part of the interpretive picture, as the very motivations 
of local people may indeed be shaped by historical, economic, cultural and psychological 
factors. This situation is expected and accounted for in a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Chapter 4 begins to look like it is no longer a practice in search of a theOlY. 
In the Vunivia situation, for example, the local people aspired to a certain social and 
economic condition which, they believe, wil1 be delivered through veivakatoroicakitaki 
(development). This underlying motivation is itself a social product of the very 
economic system that enslaves their labour and their resources. Their quality of life is 
supposed to be enhanced through an increase in their material wealth, mediated by their 
monetary income, and furnished through savings. This assumption is held by most 
people of modern capitalist nations and serves to ensure that all people (rich or poor) 
remain subservient to the economic system in general (see Fromm 1991 for example), 
As shown in the Marxist critique of capitalism, many of the motivations of workers in 
a capitalist economy are shaped by a false consciousness dliven by the pedagogical 
(educational) processes that serve the economic system itself (see Freire 1972; Freire and 
Faunders 1989; and Gibbons 1987 for example). Here the assumption is that a higher 
quality of life will come about the more closely one is tied to the capitalist system. For 
Marxism, one of the crucial tasks in the process of transforming society from capitalist 
to socialist is the awakening of workers to this false consciousness. Once this is 
achieved, an informed labour force will participate in a political process which is 
designed to emancipate them from social subordination. Similarly, the notion of false 
consciousness underlies the project of psycho-analysis where, for Freud, the patient is 
only able to overcome their condition of neurosis if they become aware that their 
psychological condition is influenced by their libido (see Dreyfus 1987; and Kaufmann 
1980b). 
Another notion in hermeneutics is that of the hermeneutic circle. As alluded to in 
chapter 2, the hermeneutic circle involves the repeated revisiting of a text or social 
situation where the parts (i.e. details) are reconceptualised in terms of an understanding 
gained of the whole (i.e the overall situation) (Wachterhauser 1986). In turn the whole 
is better understood in the light of understanding gained from a more informed view of 
the parts. For example, as you watch a movie for the first time, the individual scenes 
will have a degree of meaning on the first viewing, but once the entire movie has been 
watched the individual scenes gain more clarity (in retrospect) as their place in the 
147 
overall storyline becomes apparent. Watching the same movie a second and third time 
gives the observer more and more understanding of both the parts and the whole. 
5.5.1.1 HERMENEUTICS AND SYSTEMS THEORY 
Hermeneutics and the intersubjective social epistemologies developed in the social 
sciences have also found their way into systems theory. Systems theory is a fairly recent 
tradition within the framework of Western science having emerged primarily during the 
20th century following the effOlts of Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1940s on biological 
systems (Koestler and Smythies 1969). According to Weiss (1969) it was developed as 
a means of "stepping back from the canvas" of scientific analysis of complex reality. 
The systems view has emerged as a central conceptual figure in the biological sciences 
in general and ecology in particular. Systems thinking has now pervaded many 
disciplines including engineering, sociology, physics, chemistty, geography, management 
science, political science, and economics for example (Checkland 1981). 
The criticism of positivism by hermeneutic theorists is shared by Checkland (1981, 
1982), who demonstrated how general systems theory had evolved into a positivist (hard 
systems) framework that did not take adequate account of the subjective character of 
social reality. The traditional use of systems theory in the physical and management 
sciences has generally focused on defining a problem in terms of making a choice 
between alternative means for a given known end. They have since been termed 'hard 
systems'. Engineers, for example, frequently use the hard systems framework. Hard 
systems thinking is dependant on defining the system in question and its objectives. This 
framework has been applied in social fields including public policy and planning but 
tends to rely on a functionalist (positivist) social epistemology. However, it soon became 
evident among some systems practitioners that the context of hard systems methodology 
was inappropriate for solving social problems. 
A radical departure from the'hard systems approach in the social sciences is seen in the 
work of Checkland who developed the concept of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This conceptual framework for social systems methodology 
focuses on the notion of human activity systems (as opposed to natural or designed 
systems) as the basis for dealing with social problems. The perceived problem is defined 
in terms of structure and process and their interrelation as opposed to hard systems 
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terms. According to Checkland this helps to avoid the standardising of social problems 
common in the hard systems approach. As a result of debate and discourse the social 
actors can agree to some changes in their social condition. Such changes then serve as 
the new definition of the problem in an on-going learning process. 
For Checkland, the hard systems idea that there is a problem to be solved needs to be 
replaced by a dialectical debate - the notion of problem solving as an on-going process 
of action and reflection (praxis). For example, the establishment of a development 
programme in rural Fiji (such as community based agro-forestry) is a 'problem' that does 
not have a well defined beginning or end. The programme cannot simply be 
implemented on day 1 and forgotten about. There will be on-going problems that need 
to be solved by the social actors in the community (villagers) and the outsiders 
(government extension officers) that are there to assist them. A model for solving these 
problems is that of on-going critical action and reflection through open discourse. For 
Checkland, learning from the methodology creates the methodology. It is an on-going 
learning process where the people of the community in question, and the outsiders there 
to assist them, must participate in the process defined by the methodology. 
5.5.1.2 THE UNIVERSALITY OF HERMENEUTICS 
A long standing debate in hermeneutic theory revolves around the universality of the 
hermeneutic method (see Hekman 1986: 129-138). Whereas Gadamer argued for the 
universality of the hermeneutic method, Habermas (1987) claimed that a coherent 
rational critique is possible and necessary. Gadamer contended that rational explanations 
must always be grounded in a constant dialogue with past tradition (Norris 1985). In 
other words hermeneutic understanding claims to have a naturally derived privileged 
position in relation with rational critique. This is because (according to Gadamer) there 
can be no breaking out of the hermeneutic circle as rational critiques are themselves 
interpretations grounded in subjective meanings that the theorist devises as to what 
constitutes valid interpretation. Habermas (a critical theorist), however, defends his 
position in criticising the hermeneutic claim to universality by asserting that 
hermeneutics without rational critique cannot adequately account for ideological 
manipUlation and false consciousness of the interpreter (Habermas 1987). Here the 
values of interpreters are always open to rational critique. 
Some of the critics of the hermeneutic approach claim that it over-emphasizes the way 
people think rather than the way they act. In situations of conflict the hermeneutic 
149 
approach tends to focus on the need for changes in the way people think about their 
reality and less on changing the actions (Carr and Kemmis 1986; Habermas 1987; 
Outhwaite 1987; Fay 1987). 
The short comings of the hermeneutics of recovery, in the absence of a critique of false 
consciousness, are highlighted with the concerns of the hermeneutics of suspicion as 
developed by Ricoeur (1973). Here the actual functioning of social life does not 
correspond with participant's understanding of it, and therefore, recovering the intentions 
of the participants alone will not reveal the social realities that are hidden from them. 
The hermeneutics of suspicion goes some way to remedy this by revealing that the 
context of social life is shaped by ideology or religion, for example. The claim of the 
hermeneutics of suspicion is that the social actors can be liberated from oppressive 
situations by becoming conscious of the hidden constraints to their emancipation. 
However, although these techniques do provide valuable contributions to critique, there 
are shortcomings (according to critical theorists) concerning the process of social 
transfonnation itself. Concern for a theOlY of social transformation and liberation can 
be seen in the work of Habermas and Frier, who both emphasise the importance of 
interpersonal relations and social and political discourse (see McCarthy 1978; Freire 
1972). 
5.5.2 CRITICAL THEORY 
Critical theOlY has emerged as an alternative to the positivist approach that expands on 
the hermeneutic tradition and has been called critical hermeneutics by some (e,g. 
Outhwaite 1987). It rejects the empiricist/positivist notions of objectivity, truth, and 
rationality and in particular the domination of instrumental reason 16 (Held 1980). 
Accordingly, it accepts the need for an interpretive approach which encompasses ways 
of distinguishing ideologically distOlted interpretations from those that are not. It claims 
to provide a means of overcoming the problems associated with distorted self 
understanding and false consciousness by exposing the social order of both the actors 
and the interpretel:s (Fay 1987). Critical theory can be divided into two main branches. 
One revolves around the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (Horkheimer, Adorno, 
16Instrumental reason denotes a form of rationality that serves the instrumental goals 
of the dominant political economic order of capitalism. Science becomes a servant to 
an economic and political system (see appendix I for an account of the parallel 
development of modern instrumental scientific reasoning and the rise of capitalism). 
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Marcuse, Fromm) sometimes referred to as 'the Frankfurt School'. The second branch 
comes with the work of Jurgen Habermas who moved the critical theory framework into 
critical social science (Held 1980). I will refer to both branches as 'critical theorists'. 
The critical theorists tend to agree that all knowledge is historically conditioned and that 
truth claims can be rationally judged independently of immediate social interests. The 
latter assumption allows for a notion of false consciousness to be employed, as the 
source of truth may lie outside the understanding of the social actors (i.e the people 
under study) themselves. The identification of this 'truth' however, remains an issue of 
some debate, particularly for postmodern theorists who argue that no rational framework 
can claim to have access to universal truths of any form (see Graham et al 1992). 
The early German critical theorists (e.g. Adorno, Horkheimer) believed that positivist 
science had become an ideology (as later shown by Kuhn 1970) - a culturally 
constructed and socially supported dogma, unquestioned by its practitioners and used 
universally to explain all of reality (Carr and Kemmis 1986; Gebhardt 1978). Rationality 
had been transformed into conforming with instrumental thinking (Horkheimer 1974), 
ethics had been removed from scientific practice, and thus science had lost its creative 
and evaluative scope (Bernstein 1976). Critical theorists wished to retain the rigour of 
modern science in its application to social reality, but use it within a context recovered 
from classical philosophy where qualities and values inherent in human life are central 
(Held 1980). This amounted to an appeal to reawaken some of the Enlightenment ideals 
and the philosophy that supported it (e.g the influence of Kant). The notion of critique, 
for example, draws on the work of Kant concerning the limitations of knowledge, Hegel 
in relation to the spirit, Marx in relation to class and history, Freud in terms of 
psychology, and Weber in relation to understanding (Held 1980). In the process, social 
science (transformed into a framework underwritten by critical theory) maintains a 
privileged position in society as a means of gaining legitimate knowledge about social 
life grounded in rational critique. Postmodern theorists ask that all forms of 'science' 
(including critical theory) step down from their privileged positions as a means of 
gaining legitimate knowledge (see Lyotard 1984). 
5.5.2.1 HABERMAS AND CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Habermas developed a theory of knowledge that was critical of modern scientific 
epistemology in two ways. According to Habermas (1968) modern science offered only 
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one kind of knowledge among many. For this reason, science could not legitimately be 
used to define the standards with which to measure knowledge. Also, different kinds of 
knowledge are shaped by the particular human interests they serve. For Habermas, 
knowledge cannot be produced objectively from neutral observation as was the hope in 
positivism. Instead knowledge is the product of human activity motivated by particular 
needs and interests. In this view Habermas does not deny that science is useful for doing 
things like building bridges but does reject any claims to the universality of scientific 
knowledge. This embodies a movement in the direction of accepting the innate context-
dependency and relative nature of knowledge which was taken much further by 
postmodern theorists (see Brown 1992). 
In relation to hermeneutics, Habermas suggested that the interpretive approach was 
incomplete. In particular he insists that context of social life must be critically 
questioned and re-questioned. Here he brings in an emancipatory dimension where 
practical communication can only be realised once alienating conditions have been 
removed - only then will the meaning of dialogue not be clouded by false consciousness 
and oppression (Habermas 1987). Critical social science as developed by Habermas, is 
essentially concerned with developing ways to create these emancipatory conditions 
(Carr and Kemmis 1986). 
Along similar lines to Marx, Habermas argues for critique as a prerequisite condition 
in social praxis. According to Marx we must carry out "relentless criticism of all 
existing conditions, relentless in the sense that the criticism is not afraid of its findings 
and just as little afraid of conflict with the powers that be" Marx (1967). To the Marxian 
call for critique of ideology Habermas (and some other critical theorists such as Adorno) 
adds the methodology of (Freudian) psychoanalysis - self reflection. In this way the 
social actors, through critical self reflection, are able to perceive the distorted nature of 
their consciousness as manipulated by ideology. 
5.5.2.2 THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE 
The aspect of critical theory that I wish to focus on is that of interpersonal and inter-
group communication as a political phenomenon. Freire (1972) has shown that 
interpersonal communication is both political and educational. Where a political structure 
fosters a coercive communicative (educational) process (through the employment of a 
political style that excludes some of the participants - women for example) the pedagogy 
is alienating and innately oppressive. People cannot be emancipated by proxy. They can 
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only become free if they are also emancipated from those who claim to represent them. 
Only then can a true democracy come about. And only then can the all members of a 
society get a hearing, including minorities. The minorities must get a hearing if social 
change in the direction of ecological sustainability is to be socially just. For any 
environmental protection effort to be socially sustainable, it must be socially just. There 
is no such thing as a benevolent dictatorship when ecological sustainability is at stake. 
According to Habermas, speech is simply communication which implies the following 
of norms. 'Discourse', as used by Habermas, allows the norms implicit in speech to be 
questioned. Both Habermas and Freire hold the view that the conditions of ideal 
communication represent the pre-requisite conditions for the ideal life, as decisions made 
in a socially just fashion become the basis for socially just actions. This does not 
necessarily guarantee that oppressive and alienating decisions will not be made by a 
social group, but it will guarantee that the decisions made within such a group will not 
obstruct the possibility of true participatory democracy. The emphasis has shifted from 
the end to the means and in this regard, Western social theory begins to move into a 
framework that is similar to the pre-modern Fijian styles of political discourse 17 • 
This form of socio-political discourse also lends itself to the formation of political 
structures capable of freeing environmental protection agencies from their socially and 
culturally naive standpoint. One of the principle criticisms of the environmental 
movement from parts of the social justice movement is its dominating (often inherently 
patriarchal) political structure (see Daly 1978; Plant 1989; Birkeland 1992 for example). 
Extra-parliamentary political struggles are a common feature of modern cultures (Peters 
1991) including Fiji, and the environmental movement is a pre-eminent figure. 
Furthermore, the diversity of different interests does not lend itself to a single form of 
representation such as a class struggle which tended to dominate extra-parliamentary 
protest prior to the 1950s (see Peters 1991; Steel 1990; Graham et al 1992). Instead of 
a unified majority there is a diverse array of minorities including those standing for 
indigenous rights, environmental protection, feminism, labour relations, development 
equity, and health for example. These apparently different interests tend to overlap in 
17There are many different forms of political discourse in pre-modern Fijian society 
depending on the context. Some were despotic, others egalitarian. Within a kinship 
group open political discourse was commonly conducted with strict protocols of chiefly 
conduct. Emphasis was, and still is, placed on oratory presentations that enabled 
speakers uninterrupted access to speech acts with discussions held over lengthy periods. 
Many hours and sometimes days were taken over political decisions. See Ravuvu 
(1987b, 1991) and Nayacakalou (1975, 1978) for examples of pre-modern Fijian politics. 
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many cases. This juxtaposition IS sometimes mutually reinforcing, but often 
contradictOlY· 
For effective representation of these diverse interests there must be an adequate political 
style capable of giving each group a hearing, and capable of fostering the understanding 
between different interests. Styles of communication between different interest groups 
will often affect the way they interact politically. A good example of differences in 
political style can be seen in Fijian bose (village council) on one hand, and the European 
structure of rules of order on the other. The former political style tends to (but not 
always) place emphasis on the means of open discussion as a process of building 
consensus in a local community. Rules of order, however, places emphasis on 
representation of certain constituencies (which act as a power base); 'efficiency' in the 
speed of decision making; and the goals of paiticular interests. Such predetermined goals 
are pushed through the political process by means of lobbying, in order to gain a 
majority when a motion is put to a vote (see Estes 1989). 
The internal political structures of an interest group (e.g. a village council) will tend to 
affect the style of their political interaction with other outside groups (e.g. an 
environmental protection agency such as the Fiji Environment Unit, or a non-
government group). Should the internal political style be open to coercion by a dominant 
group, as is the case with rules of order (Estes 1989) and liberalist democracy generally, 
then inter-group communication will also tend to follow coercive lines (see Habermas 
1985; Mouffe 1988 for critiques of the modern democratic process). This is because 
inter-group communication will often be modeled on internal political structures as a 
political culture. In modern group situations, rules of order is a very common political 
structure, which is used for organising communication within groups and between 
groups in the process of negotiation. The use rules of order is becoming more and more 
common in Fiji even in village situations. In Vunivia, for example, rules of order are 
being employed in mataqali meetings where a particular unified majority is capable of 
dominating the political process. 
The tokatoka Bulu people numerically dominate the Vunivia population, and have tended 
to push for a majority voting system (similar to rules of order) in local political 
organisation in Vunivia. This serves to perpetuate the dominance of the Bulu people in 
that landscape. This form of political structure, including liberalist democracy, has been 
criticised by Ravuvu (1991) for its coercive character and its ability to serve the interests 
of the majority (although Ravuvu fails to differentiate between liberalism and consensus 
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forms of democracy). 
Decisions concerning the health and future of the landscape are far from trivial and 
should never be rushed through any political agenda. Furthermore, social issues (which 
are also non-trivial) must get a hearing in any environmental decision making process. 
People and the social communities they participate in are part of the landscape. 
Furthermore, conservation efforts must be socially sustainable (i.e. socially just) if they 
are to be part of the equation of ecological sustainability. In a participatory democracy 
the focus is on a just process irrespective of the goals of any particular interest. The 
political style of critical social science (to be elaborated on in pages to follow) moves 
to a participatory democracy by means of open, uncoerced discourse as a pre-requisite 
to communicative action, which takes into account language styles that obstruct such 
discourse. 
Oppressive forms of communication, in terms of style and content, within any social 
movement contain the seeds for further oppression even if they achieve their short term 
political goals. For example, an environmental protection programme that oppresses a 
social group as a by-product of its management success is an alienating form of 
environmental management (e.g. Weaver 1993). The social injustices contained within 
such a programme will work against the on-going success and sustainability of the 
programme, as it becomes politically and socially unstable and socially unsustainable 
(see chapter 4). The kind of analysis offered by Habermas and the Frankfurt school 
allows the focus of social change to shift from the end to the means. This does not 
discard the end, but forces people to realise that the end and the means are inextricably 
linked. 
Free and open discourse is sought as a first step in critical social science. This is an 
important aspect of the process of consensus building for social questions such as the 
causes and possible solutions of indigenous forest loss in Fiji. Part of the process of 
reaching true consensus requires critical discourse and open communication so that the 
situation can be critically assessed in spite of ideological views. Consensus is important 
as it demands that the concerns of all parties are heard and incorporated into action. This 
is the kind of radical democracy offered by Giddens (1990) under a radical modem 
framework. This is similar to what Habermas (1983) claims is possible if the modern 
project is able to be completed. Without this form of communication in, the search for 
answers to social questions, effective solutions cannot be found. For this reason the 
method or means is just as important as the content of any study as the method will 
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determine what is and what is not revealed. 
To highlight this view it is worth quoting McCarthy (1975) in fu11:-
The velY act of participating in the discourse, of attempting discursively to come 
to an agreement about the truth of a problematic statement or the correctness of 
a problematic norm, carries with it the supposition that a genuine agreement is 
possible. If we do not suppose that a justified consensus were possible and could 
in some way be distinguished from a false consciousness, then the very meaning 
of discourse, indeed of speech, would be called into question. In attempting to 
come to a 'rational' decision about such matters, we must suppose that the 
outcome of our discussion will be the result simply of the force of the better 
argument and not of accidental or systematic constraints on discussion. 
Habermas' thesis is that the structure (of communication) is free from constraint 
only when for all participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to 
select and employ speech acts, when there is an effective equality of chances to 
assume dialogue roles ... The conditions of the ideal speech situation must ensure 
discussion which is free from all constraints of domination .... (McCarthy 1975: 
xvii). 
Critical social science, as developed by Habermas, seeks to move beyond the critique 
and transformation of consciousness as developed in critical theOlY. It uses critique to 
inform the social actors which is used to transform their consciousness, followed by a 
transformation in social actions. Such a transformation will be necessary if a society is 
to be capable of transforming from an unsustainable to a sustainable form. Critical social 
science moves beyond critique to critical praxis. It requires the integration of theory and 
practice in the dialectical process of reflective enlightenment and political struggle 
carried out by groups for the purposes of their own emancipation. In a Marxist 
revolution people are informed and led by the use of slogans on their behalf by 
revolutionary leaders. In Habermas' view, as with Frier, people must also be liberated 
from those who claim to represent them. This does not mean social chaos, it is 
participatory democracy. The liberation theology movement in Latin America also uses 
this approach (Radford-Reuther 1988). 
The relationship between theory and practice becomes central to this form of social 
science. Theory must not dominate practice but both theory and practice must be able 
to inform each other. One does not precede the other. In the mediation of theory and 
practice Habermas identifies three principle functions in which each step leads to the 
next:-
1. The formation of critical theories which stand up to open discourse -
statements arising from open discourse and consensus; 
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2. The organisation of enlightenment which transforms the consciousness of 
social actors - authentic insights. This is the learning process of a group 
and is thus is a social and political activity. Participants must aim at 
understanding rather than have ideas forced upon them. Each person 
should have an equal opportunity to question or affirm the validity of 
what is discussed. 
3. The selection of appropriate strategies for social change - prudent 
decisions. The solutions to tactical questions are developed. (Carr and 
Kemmis 1986). 
5.5.2.3 CRITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
The break from hard systems by Checkland was a significant step in the building of a 
steadfast systems epistemology for social reality. However, subsequent movements in 
systems thinking seek to build on the soft systems idea by building on aspects of social 
theory left out in Checkland's work. Flood and Ulrich (1990) call for a shift from 
systems science to systems rationality. The latter term refers to a critical (Kantian) 
rationality. In this sense they move from a hermeneutic perspective to one that aligns 
itself to critical theory. The depatture of Checkland from the hard systems (positivist) 
framework is regarded by Flood and Ulrich as the first 'epistemological break' in 
systems theOlY. They call for a 'second epistemological break' that accommodates the 
advances on hermeneutics made by the critical theorists. 
Their ideal is a merging of sociological and systems epistemologies where issues such 
as the emancipation of people from domination by people or machines, false 
consciousness or structural material, historical or cultural constraints to understanding 
are built into the systems framework. Both Flood and Ulrich (1990) and Checkland 
(1981) acknowledge that one of the major problems for systems theory and systems 
practice is that there is often a conflict between the rationality of systems design and the 
irrationality of social reality. It is for this reason that they see the positivist instrumental 
control methods arising from hard systems theory as inappropriate for use in the social 
realm. The principle of being critical (as seen also in critical social science, 
hermeneutics, and postmodernism) is the quality of remaining self reflective with regard 
to the general methodologies and their particular applications. 
5.5.2.4 CRITICISM OF CRITICAL THEORY 
Some of the criticisms to the work of Habermas may anse from those in the 
hermeneutic tradition who reject some of Habermas' criticisms of the interpretive 
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method. Indeed, Habermas' work could be defined as a development within the rubric 
of the hermeneutics of suspicion as it tends to build upon existing techniques used in 
that field (Gibbons 19"87). Criticism of a more fundamental nature come from 
postmodern social theorists that reject that standards of rationality of modernity itself, 
of which critical social science is merely one breed of modernist thought. In this regard, 
the style and content of discourse itself may not need to be rational if it is to be truly 
egalitarian. 
If legitimate discourse must be rational, then communication must be mediated by a 
form of linguistic coherence that is grounded in the rules of the language game itself -
reason. However, an important aspect of ethical instruction that should be taken account 
of, is intuition, and instinct. This is particularly true considering the way in which 
people come to understand a landscape through intangible forms of 'knowledge' which 
amounts to a spiritual connection with place. The source of coherence of these forms 
of communication, or 'knowing' will not lie in the rules of spoken language and, 
therefore, are unlikely to be rational. But they are important and they are coherent and 
should not be shut out from the process of discourse simply because they are not 
rationaL I will develop these ideas to some considerable length in chapters to follow, but 
it is here that my perspective takes leave of even radical modernisrn and becomes 
postmodern. 
Some of the most fundamental criticisms of critical theory and critical social science 
come from poststructuralism and postmodernism. Here the debate does not concern 
particular issues within critical social science but revolves around the rationality that 
forms that very basis of modern social science itself. There are many differing positions 
held in what might be labelled 'postmodern theory'. Included in this diverse tradition are 
postmodern tendencies in feminist theory (e.g. Fraser and Nicholson 1988; Flax 1990), 
linguistics and literary criticism (Wittgenstein, Derrida), philosophy (Nietzsche, 
Heidegger), social theory (Foucault, Vattimo, Baudrillard, Deleuze, Guttari). This thesis 
falls into the broad framework of postmodern, but as mentioned earlier, is by no means 
in agreement with all forms of postmodern theory. 
The postmodern school of thought is a diverse array of social theorists, literary critics, 
linguists and philosophers (see Tarnas 1991). What tends to distinguish the postmodem 
tradition from that of the radical modern perspectives is inter alia a rejection of the 
primacy of binary logic, a perspectivistic (i.e. relativist) theory of truth, the rejection of 
universal theories, the rejection of reason as the basis for truth, a rejection of 
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historicism, a rejection of the individual social actor as the locus of meaning and 
understanding (this also applies to authors), and a rejection of knowledge as the sole 
basis for social organisation and ethics (see Lyotard 1984; Doherty et al 1992; Peters 
1991; Best and Kellner 1991). If the postmodern condition rejects so much, what might 
it accept? It accepts localised identity, an acceptance of difference in terms of social and 
political perspectives which cannot be reduced to a single issue such as a class struggle. 
Some forms of postmodern theory accept intuition as a legitimate form of understanding, 
and as part of this accepts the limitations of language in disclosing the source of 
meaning in social life IS. 
I will not go into any detail concermng a review of the postmodern and post-
metaphysical theoretical and philosophical perspectives, as this will come about through 
the course of the following chapters. What will follow is a brief over- view of dialectical 
reasoning which is included here because it forms a pivotal conceptual tool for the 
remaining chapters of the thesis. 
5.5.3 DIALECTICAL REASONING 
Dialectics is a way of thinking holistically. It is an epistemological tool - a way of 
coming to have knowledge about an interconnected reality. If I were to suggest that an 
apple was not a single thing l9, but an accumulation of little things, and if this were true, 
we could explain20 the reality of the apple in terms of the bits. We have two possibilities 
concerning reality (i.e. ontological possibilities) - 1. the apple is made up of bits, where 
the bits exist prior to the whole and come together to form the whole; and 2. the apple 
is not reducible to its bits, because it has characteristics that exist only by virtue of it 
being a whole (emergent properties), and to conceptually dismantle the apple into bits 
would paint a false picture of the reality. 
The way reality is like determines whether our statements are correct or not, irrespective 
18As mentioned earlier, postmodern theory is not a single group, and remain divided 
on many issues. The differences between deconstructive and reconstructive postmodern 
theorists will become important when debating what constitutes a legitimate form of 
political discourse. If deconstructive postmodernists reject all mythologies, then they are 
unlikely to agree with the prescliption I develop in this thesis. 
I~his is a statement about what reality is really like - it is an ontological statement. 
2<This notion of 'explanation' is a statement concerning a means of coming to have 
knowledge about reality - an epistemological statement. 
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of whether our statements are logical. As such, our knowledge must be based on an 
understanding of the reality - at least a basic understanding. For example, if a certain 
type of reality were simply not possible then a form of knowledge that assumed such 
a type would be a delusion - even if the theory was supremely logical. In the above 
example we have at least two possibilities in terms of reality - the apple is made of bits 
(and can be understood as such); and the apple is a whole entity (and cannot be 
understood in terms of a 'bit theory'). 
If the apple were a whole (which I believe it is) then the 'bit theory' (reductionism) 
would be sensible but not COlTect. Instead I need to employ a way of thinking (other 
than reductionism) that is capable of letting my mind hold onto the general structure of 
the reality and hence be correct. One such way is dialectics. Dialectical reasoning is a 
means of knowing about holistic reality. It is an epistemology - a way of thinking. It is 
a way of thinking that can make sense out of apparent paradox. This is because a 
paradox may only be a contradiction if we are using an inappropriate form of thinking. 
Reductionism, which uses a theory of linear causation, cannot make sense out of the 
question - "which comes first, the chicken or the egg?" But dialectics can. Indeed it is 
not a paradox if dialectics is used. 
Dialectics has been a feature of rationality in Western civilisation since the pre-Socratic 
Greeks, but has never featured prominently due to the dominance of linear thinking and 
reductionism. Dialectics has featured in the West in theology (e.g. Thomas Aquinas, 
Meister Eckhart, St John), philosophy (e.g. Heraclitus, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Sartre), and social theory (e.g. Marx, Weber, Gadamer, Habermas). It is also being used 
more prominently in contemporary modern and postmodern social theory, and more 
recently with the dialectical biology of Levins and Lewontin (1985) and Sheldrake 
(1981). It has also been a common feature in quantum physics since Niels Bohr used it 
to deal with the contradictions thrown up by relativity, and quantum theory of Einstein, 
although Einstein himself rejected Bohr's dialectical turn. 
Asia metaphysics and mysticism is riddled with dialectical thinking (e.g. Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Taoism). It is also evident in pre-modern tribal rationality such as Fijian2!, 
and native American cultures (see Campbell 1986, 1988). I will introduce dialectics by 
21The notion of the Vanua can best be understood dialectally. The ontology of the 
Vanua is holistic where parts and the whole thoroughly interpenetrate each other. 
Attempts to understand the Vanua (Le. epistemologically) in a non-dialectical fashion 
will lead to misconceptions. 
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tracing a brief overview of its use in the modern West beginning in earnest with Hegel. 
Georg Hegel (1770-1831) was a German idealist and a contemporary of Kant (also a 
German idealist). Prominent amongst his works include his Phenomenology of Mind 
(1807) Science of Logic (1816), Philosophy of Right (1821), and Philosophy of History 
(1837) (see Wiser 1983; Tamas 1991), The idealism of the time focused on the 
distinction between reality as it appeared to the human mind and how it really was. For 
Hegel tensions and contradictions appear to humans from a human perspective. But 
when this perspective is expanded to include a comprehensive whole the meaning of 
reality is able to be understood. Hegel suggested that this can be achieved through a 
condition of absolute consciousness. This achievement of comprehension is seen by 
Hegel as an historical condition which evolves through time. History is portrayed by 
Hegel as the march of human consciousness towards an end of history in absolute 
consciousness (enlightenment). The material world is explained as a manifestation of a 
transcendent spiritual realm. 
At the healt of the spiritual realm is God who, being comprised of pure consciousness 
(pure SUbject) is unable to know itself. Thus God created the world through an act of 
self-externalisation and in this way is able to know itself as an object. This created the 
separation of object and subject where the object is alienated from the subject. Thus the 
material world is alienated as the 'other'. This established the dialectical relationship 
between object and subject, between the material and spiritual world. In order to 
understand this dialectical relationship one must employ dialectical rationality where two 
opposites (SUbject/object, material/spiritual) are one and the same. 
With Hegel, as it was with Meister Eckhart in the 13th century, the achievement of 
spiritual unity with the divine come about through a process of negation (Eckhart called 
it 'detachment'). For Hegel spiritual self discovery begins with the negation of the ego-
self through a process of contemplation. Once this is achieved it is followed by the 
further negation of this negation of the self. This negation of negation leads to absolute 
affirmation in the absolute spirit. This spirit is detached from the ego-self but sustains 
identity as a unique being that is not alienated from the absolute Spirit or God. This is 
very similar to the negative way of Zen Buddhism which also employs a double 
negation. The main difference (apart from differences in practice) is that for Zen the 
result of a negation of a negation in relation to the self is an affirmation of absolute 
nothingness (as opposed to the affirmation of absolute spirit) (see Abe 1985 for 
example). 
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The young Karl Marx (1818-1883) was greatly inspired by Hegelian philosophy 
particularly concerning dialectics. However, influenced by Feuerbach he rejected the 
idealism of Hegel and went on to develop dialectical materialism as opposed to 
dialectical idealism (Schacht 1971). In the early writings of Marx the notion of 
wholeness survives, as does the concept of alienation. But Marx shifts the emphasis of 
alienation from a spiritual condition to a material one where people are alienated from 
their humanness within the material world. For Marx the notion of God is taken from 
Feurebach where God is nothing more than "the divinised essence of man" and man 
created God in his own image (Schacht 1971 :68). Marx thus reduces all of reality to the 
material world and offers no possibility of a reality that exists beyond the human ability 
to perceive it. 
Whereas Hegel saw history as the evolution of the consciousness of God, Marx saw 
history as an alienated material human struggle which he calls the "real histOlY of man" 
(see Bottomore and Rubel 1961). For Marx, humanity has never realised its human 
condition and lives as an alienated animal (Wiser 1983). Alienation is therefore, 
examined by Marx as a social and not a spiritual phenomenon. The realisation of a truly 
human condition for Marx is an existence in a non-alienated social world - communism. 
Here the contradictions of alienated social life are resolved through the endurance of 
social conditions that embraced the interconnectedness of social reality by means of 
establishing a collective ownership of the means of production (Mandel 1983). 
Capitalism, which SUppOltS the ownership of the means of production by an elite group, 
is, in Marx's view, incapable of bringing about a truly human condition. What will result 
from the continuation of capitalist production, where value is determined by the market 
(as opposed to socially determined), and the means or production remains in private 
ownership, is the inevitable dialectical product of an alienating social system. This 
dialectica122 product of an alienating economic system is the proletariate (the working 
class) which will grow to the point of being capable of bringing about its own 
emancipation by means of a social and political revolution. 
22The proletariate is a dialectical product of capitalism because it is inherent in the 
character of capitalism to produce such a class. They are one and the same thing - which 
came first, capitalism or the proletariate? It is a silly question, like the chicken and the 
egg, because they are merely two sides of the same coin. 
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5.5.3.1 DIALECTICS IN BIOLOGY 
The idea of an interconnected reality understood through dialectics, although expressed 
in Marx's writings was extended to biology by Engels who wrote the Dialectics of 
Nature in 188023. Here dialectical reasoning is employed as a meta-theory in biology 
thus contributing to the debate on biological and evolutionary theory. More recently the 
dialectical approach to the biological sciences has arisen in response to calls for an 
alternative epistemological framework for the practice of ecology than that offered by 
the Cartesian paradigm as with the work of Levins and Lewontin (1985). 
In terms of ecology, dialectics can be seen in the conception of a plant or animal in 
relation to its environment. Under such a view (which I support) a tree and its 
environment are aspects of the same whole. They interpenetrate each other in such a 
way that they do not exist in a linear causal relationship but instead in a dialectical 
relationship. The tree is a unique being but only as part of the ecosystem which it lives 
in. Changes in the tree are also changes in the ecosystem. 
Levins and Lewontin (1985) are strong suppOlters of the dialectical approach to biology 
and have developed a dialectical materialist viewpoint as a reaction against reductionism. 
The ontological commitments of the Cartesian reductionist paradigm is described as 
'alienating'. This is because parts are conceptually separated from wholes and reified as 
things in isolation. This establishes an epistemological system that rides on the 
assumption that parts are prior to the whole, and come together to make up the whole. 
Levins and Lewontin argue that such a view of biological science is a vestige of the 
socially constructed paradigm of Cartesian and Newtonian science, which they reject. 
The Cartesian and Newtonian paradigm is also being refuted in quantum physics (see 
Bohm 1980; Davies and Gribbin 1991; Capra 1975, 1982; Zohar 1989; Zukav 1979, for 
example), and in other forms of biology (Bergson 1911; Sheldrake 1981, 1991; 
Waddington 1977 for example). Principles of the dialectical view as Levins and 
Lewontin use it in biology can be summarised:-
23Dialectical reasoning in relation to biology and the concept of Nature was used 
prior to this time in the West by Spinoza (see Delahunty 1985), and later Goethe (see 
Reed 1984). The difference with Engels was his employment of materialism (whereas 
Spinoza and Goethe were transcendentalists), and in this way the work of Engels aligns 
itself more closely to formal modern scientific thinking. Spinoza and Goethe developed 
more complete theories and my work is closer to theirs than to the materialist dialectics 
of Engels, but their work (and indeed mine too) may be regarded as less 'scientific' from 
the perspective of empiricism. 
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A whole is a relation of heterogenous parts that have no prior 
independent existence; 
The properties of parts have no prior alienated existence but are acquired 
by being parts of a particular whole; 
The interpenetration of parts and wholes is a consequence of the 
interchangeability of subject and object, of cause and effect; 
Change is a characteristic of all systems and all aspects of systems. 
The Darwinian approach to ecology and evolution is called into question in the work of 
Levins and Lewontin. Under a dialectical materialist view Darwin's theory of evolution 
by natural selection is valid up to a point, as it uses real material forces among real 
existing objects, mixed with a theory of change as opposed to stasis. But Levins and 
Lewontin (1985) disagree with Darwin's notion of adaptation which they assert is purely 
Cartesian. There have been other challenges to the Darwinian view of adaptation from 
biologists who disagree with the mechanistic process that underlies the Darwinian and 
neo-Darwinian model. Examples include the theoretical works of Bergson, Waddington, 
Sheldrake and Lorenz. These criticisms must not be seen as a total rejection of the 
Darwinian framework but merely a reorientation of some aspects of the evolutionary 
story. For example, the non-materialist theories of Sheldrake do not deny that some 
(even many) forms of evolutionary change are purely mechanistic. He only asserts that 
evolution is not only of this form and that other possibilities are credible and evidence 
does exist for such alternatives24, 
Adaptation becomes a central theme in later chapters of this thesis and it is worth 
focusing on it briefly here. I assert that ecological sustainability concerns an adaptive 
relationship between culture and landscape. As such, the type of adaptive process I refer 
to needs clarification. I use a dialectical epistemology (theory of knowledge) because 
I SUppOlt an holistic ontology (theory of reality). This dialectical and holistic view spills 
over into the realm of causation, and because of this, any theory of causal relationships 
(such as adaptation) must not contradict my ontology. If it did my theory of ecological 
sustain ability would be inconsistent. For Darwin organisms adapt to a changing 
environment which poses problems that they solve through evolution. However, Levins 
and Lewontin (1985) claim that Darwin separates the organism from the environment 
24For example, experiments with fruit flies have demonstrated the possibility of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics (i.e. in line with the general contention of Lamark 
although different in palticular details) which cannot possibly be accounted for in a 
purely mechanistic genetic model (see Sheldrake 1981). This does not serve as evidence 
that rejects the mechanistic model, it only shows that more than one process in the 
adaptive process possible. 
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thus alienating the organism. "It is the organism as the alienated object of external forces 
that marks off the Cartesianism of Darwin from the dialectical view of organism and 
environment..." (Levins and Lewontin 1985:5). Darwin's mechanism of evolution can be 
conceptualised into three parts:-
1. Individuals within a species vary in physiology, morphology, and 
behaviour - the principle of variation; 
2. Offspring resemble their parents on the average more than they resemble 
unrelated individuals - the principle of heredity; 
3. Different variants leave different numbers of offspring the principle of 
natural selection. 
The problem the Levins and Lewontin have with Darwin's theory is how selection takes 
place and enables adaptation to occur. In a dialectical view the individual and the 
ecosystem of which it is a part both co-evolve simultaneously. This is because the part 
(organism) and whole (ecosystem) are not existentially independent but instead are 
interconnected. Any changes in the individual and the ecosystem are co-dependant and 
simultaneous. This view of causation is a major theme in Buddhism where the co-
dependence of causality in an holistic (as opposed to atomistic) reality is called pratitya 
samutpada (see Macy 1989; Abe 1985; and Ross 1993 for example). 
Under a dialectical framework the organism is not regarded as being inserted into a 
given passive environment as implied in the Darwinian view. Organisms modify their 
environment depleting resources, excreting wastes, attracting 
predators/parasites/companions, and create micro and macro-environments. Organisms 
respond to their environment where changes in their environment cause changes in the 
functional life of the organism. If organisms respond to their environment, then the 
environment may be read through the organism, and units of environment can be 
measured in units of phenotype. The opposite is also true as the character of the 
environment responds to the character of the organism. The way in which an organism 
modifies its environment depends pattly on its genotype. Some environmental responses 
enhance the survival of some genotypes more than others, and therefore, the 
environment selects the patterns of its own modification (Levins and Lewontin 1985). 
The theoretical developments of later chapters, in relation to human ecology and 
adaptation, will draw on this dialectical view of biology and ecology. Where my 
dialectics differs from Levins and Lewontin is that my ontology is not materialist but 
transcendental. This view will be explained in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 - THE ECOLOGY OF CULTURE 
Having passed through a re-shuffling of the priorities of a research methodology we are 
able to readdress the issue of ecological sustainability in an evolving process of 
theoretical development. Throughout the course of the following 4 chapters I will 
prepare the ground for framing my question concerning ecological sustain ability in 
general, and in relation to the Vunivia catchment in Fiji in particular. In preparing this 
ground I will set out to explore the issue of culture and of cultural adaptation to an ever 
changing landscape. Chapter 6 re-introduces the questions of rationality, language, 
ethics, metaphysics, and adaptation. In so doing it establishes a framework for what will 
be explored in chapters 7, 8, and 9. 
Recognition of the international character of the forces of unsustainability point to the 
need for an international focus for critique. This demands a critique of the ecology of 
modernity. Such a critique encompasses an investigation into standards of rationality, 
world view, language, psychology and religion. This leads to the need for a critical 
inspection of the ecological character of the foundations of modern culture. This 
involves an exploration of the conceptual, psychological and existential underpinnings 
of modern life. 
A definition of ecological sustainability begins to emerge as an adaptive relationship 
between people and place. The notion of the 'autobiography of the landscape' is 
introduced as a defining term for ecological sustainability. However, in order to uncover 
the meaning of this notion a number of conceptual obstacles will need to be cleared 
away. I believe that some of these obstacles lie in the very fundamental assumptions of 
Western rationality. In the process I will explore the domain of moral philosophy and 
ethics and build a framework for a creative alternative to be presented in chapters 8, and 
9. 
6.1 THEORISING WITH A HAMMER 
To recognise and understand the kind of cultural dynamic that is capable of living in 
harmony with Nature we must clear away many obstructions. Such a clearing away is 
a process of deconstruction. A hammer can be used to destroy and to build. In this 
chapter I do both. With the help of a number of postmodern philosophers I will 
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deconstruct and then rebuild a metaphysical basis for addressing the question of 
ecological sustainability. Part of this process involves a passage through nihilism which 
amounts to a metaphysical cleansing, In chapters 6 and 7· we will explore the 
possibilities of employing nihilism in a positive conceptual fashion in the reconstruction 
of a basis for understanding ecological sustainability. In chapter 8 we will look at what 
nihilism can do for us existentially and psychologically, 
This exercise helps us to wipe clean the slate of knowledge and begin afresh much as 
Francis Bacon claimed to have done in the 17th century (Wiser 1983). The difference 
is that Bacon was heralding in a new epistemology, which guided Western culture from 
the confusion and prejudice of medieval superstition to another tradition of knowledge 
capable of harbouring an equivalent set of prejudices under the banner of the absolute 
primacy of truth via reason. The deterministic undercurrent remained the same - the 
same characters were still on the stage, except they had merely changed their costumes 
from ecclesiastical robes to the plaid jackets of natural philosophers and the starched 
white trench coats of the emerging scientific guild. The chancellors of knowledge were 
no longer priests and the landed aristocracy that supported them, but were replaced by 
the bourgeoisie and their philosophical sycophants. 
God was expelled from epistemology and in God's place a faith in the absolute rule of 
natural law was instilled in Western culture. This faith in the permanence of natural law, 
according to Newton and Descartes (who saw themselves as God's barristers), was 
substantiated in the claim that they were originally drafted by God anyway (see Capra 
1982). This faith in permanence (previously that of God's determinism) kept Western 
culture tied to the never ending search for the one and only, rock solid, all-determining 
foundation of the entire universe and a similar steadfast rationality to match it (see 
Kenney 1991), But all that is solid melts into air (Berman 1988), and to paraphrase a 
zen poem: "The morning glory which blooms for an hour, differs not at heart from the 
[mountain], which [stands] for [millions of years]" (cited in Watts 1957). Taking this 
possibility seriously - that, as Heraclitus said: "all things fow" (Kahn 1979), provides 
a significantly different loom (standard of rationality) with which to weave a story 
(knowledge about the world). This becomes a rationality of becoming, of flux, of 
process (see Prigogine 1979). It is not merely a ploy to steal the keystones from the 
superstructure of Western rationality thus toppling it for the sake of enteltainment. It 
forms the basis for a cultural revolution that is necessary if the meaning of ecological 
sustainability is to be understood and made possible. 
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The key to the 'success' of modern Western culture is reason, and so, humanity creates 
a conception of the entire universe in its own image. If this is not a monumental case 
of cultural egocentric idolatry I don't know what is. But because the basis of Western 
knowledge is grounded in a sophisticated system of rules and predicates, it takes on the 
appearance of wisdom able to describe reality as it really is. But this first implies that 
reality is indeed logical, and secondly that knowledge is able to match it 'word' for 
'word'. The opening words of Faust in Goethe's play of the same name, arrests this 
precise issue when the hero declares his discontentment with the primacy of reason in 
Western culture:-
Law, medicine, philosophy 
And even - worse luck - theology 
I've studied with passionate resolution, 
I've learned, alas! from top to bottom; 
And stand here now, poor fool that I am, 
No wiser than I was before. 
(Faust Part 1:21) 
In this game of catching reality with words (metaphysics) we forget that the earth 
existed before humans evolved and before they began to do philosophy (see Outhwaite 
1987). It also exists when we are not thinking and doing philosophy, and thus exists in 
spite of language. It also exists beyond human sensory experience and is, in that respect, 
necessarily unknowable (see Bhaskar 1975, 1978, 1986; Outhwaite 1987; Wright 1992). 
If philosophers andlor scientists think that reason alone is able to uncover the 'truth' of 
reality they must find a way of transcending these substantial obstacles. One way is to 
say that "we do not yet have all the answers, but given enough time we will", or "we 
know (or nearly know) all that we need to know in order to construct the perfect world 
(such as an ecologically sustainable culture)". This grotesque over-confidence in the 
abilities of human knowledge prevents so many members of modernity from realising 
that there is so much more to it than this. And furthermore, much of it will remain a 
mystery. 
However, an over-confident view was reified with the assumption that because God is 
reasonable, God created a reasonable universe and also blessed humanity with the joyful 
gift of an intellect that mirrored it perfectly - hence the rationalism of Descartes and 
Newton. Alternatively, with God's creative capacity ridiculed beyond redemption, Nature 
instead spontaneously evolved in a reasonable fashion, and conveniently constructed 
itself on the foundations of mathematics, which we humans can employ to unlock its 
secrets - hence the empiricism of many of the world's modern scientists. But what if 
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evolution itself were to be a constant creative (and hence indeterminate) process? And, 
furthermore, what if mathematics, logic and reason, are merely a human faculty 
(Schopenhauer 1965; Heidegger 1959, 1992; Whitehead 1929, 1930; Caputo 1978), 
where they comprise merely the rules of language in which we humans might employ 
in our humble attempts to organise our thoughts? Also, if they are really only the rules 
of language and have only internal coherence, then many different forms of 
mathematics, logic and reason are possible, housed in different cultures that sustain 
different standards of rationality. Should this be true then the foundations of the 
universalist claims of Western metaphysics begin to wobble. 
What this means for epistemology in general, and a theory of ecological sustainability 
in particular, is certainly profound, as it demands that only a coherent perspectivistic 
interpretation of the world around us is possible. It also shows that this coherence need 
not necessarily be grounded in the rules of language (e.g. logic) but could be based on 
experiences beyond the reach of language and its rules, and thus be illogical. 
"Sounds like nihilism" I can hear you thinking .... that's right, it is precisely that. 
However, it is only nihilism at the level of language and the level of knowledge about 
the world. It does not imply that knowledge is not possible, that 'anything goes', or that 
there is absolutely no meaning to existence (and hence no possibility of a theory or 
condition of ecological sustainability). It only shows that knowledge, any knowledge, 
is necessarily subjective. Reality, which also resides outside the reach of language is still 
there - the sun still comes up in the morning even if we humans have decided to call 
it the 'moon'. Language is not all of reality, it is only our way of creating a coherent 
conscious world. This argument lies at the heart of much postmodern philosophy, and 
lends itself to a thoroughly radical approach to our place in Nature and our ability to 
have certain knowledge of any form. It does not throw out the baby with the bath-water 
as ontology, epistemology and language are still with us. So too are things like quantum 
mechanics, ecological theory, social theory, cultural anthropology, art, poetry, sculpture, 
dance, fishing, throwing a ball with children in the park. All this is still there - only in 
a different way. Such a view does not deny the world, it only demands that we begin 
to view it in a different and less conceited fashion. All this does is give us a different 
viewfinder with which to interpret the world. I intend to show that this kind of 
viewfinder facilitates far more coherence concerning the issue of ecological sustainability 
than the sophisticated sophisms of modernity. 
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In this chapter, instead of asking "how can this or that form of knowledge be 
legitimated?" I ask instead: "what forms of knowledge are possible?". This leaves the 
way open for ascertaining what kinds of epistemological formulas (as a form of inquiry) 
are appropriate for an investigation into ecological sustainability in any landscape. It 
also, simultaneously, sheds light on the means of gaining knowledge from a landscape 
as pmt of a cultural equation of ecological sustainability. The outcome of this exercise 
conducted through the remaining chapters is 1. a methodology called transcendental 
cultural ecology; 2. a theory of ecological sustainability; and 3. a prescription for 
cultural change that is capable of bringing about an ecologically sustainable existence. 
6.2 STEPPING INTO CULTURE 
Culture is not a thing, but a name we might give to processes and tendencies which may 
be recognisable according to certain features. But what features might distinguish a 
'culture' from a 'society', or merely the niche of another animal species? The term 
'culture' sometimes brings to people's minds notions of ethnic dance, music, various 
forms of art of a particular generic style for example. But culture is more than this. 
Culture is a confluence of many different influences that come from within and outside 
a human community. Furthermore a culture may have a variety of internal tendencies 
and forms called sub-cultures and societies. But one important characterising feature of 
culture is language (see Whorf 1956; Wittgenstein 1953). Wittgenstein showed that logic 
is the rules of language, where a language operating according to a set of rules is a 
language game. Each language game has its own rules and has its own truths. One 
language game cannot be the judge of another as neither can claim to be only way of 
uttering meaningful statements. They only maintain internal coherence. Philosophy 
becomes the linguistic means of untangling different languages games (Wittgenstein 
1953). Because of this, Wittgenstein claims that philosophy leaves the world as it found 
it because all it can do is organise our thoughts. In his later work Wittgenstein's thinking 
becomes unphilosophical in the sense that he is attempting (like Heidegger) to identify 
the very impulse of philosophizing itself (Edwards 1982). 
Different societies may exist within the same culture by acting out their social 
relationships within a single language or a similar standard of rationality or world view. 
Modernity for example can be seen as a meta-culture in the sense that there are many 
different languages in the modern cultural condition but a common thread of rationality 
tends to underlie the modern condition. This may be regarded as a 'genus' where the 
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particular expreSSIon of forms of rationality and language are 'species' within that 
'genusd • 
The character of a culture is influenced by internal and external factors. Internal factors 
are those that arise from within a culture. Some are conceptual, such as world view, 
language, and ethics. Other internal factors are non-conceptual such as intuitions, 
instincts, and feelings. External influences that contribute to the shape of culture include 
such things as climate, topography, and resources for example. A culture is an of these 
things as opposed to merely one or other. But the question might then be asked "what 
of these ingredients differentiates culture from simply the biological character of any 
animal species?" Animals have all of these ingredients bar one - language as a set of 
symbolic signs (see Whorf 1956). This condition is not different in type from other 
animals but merely one of degree, as it is possible that symbolic language may evolve 
in non-human animals (if it is not already here). If other animals do develop a symbolic 
language they may be said to have the possibility of culture. 
It is important, at this stage, to recognise the difference between culture and race. Race 
is not, by definition, synonymous with culture, although race and culture can and often 
do overlap. Race, for example, may refer to the genetic heritage of a people but culture 
refers to a broader genealogy encompassing social relationships, language, and methods 
of social and political organisation. This may coincide with, but is not determined by 
race. The idea that race and culture are one and the same is a fallacy (see Sanday 1989; 
Norton 1986; Overton and Ward 1989; Sutherland 1989; Linnekin and Poyer 1990; 
Keesing 1989, for example). People from the same race can and do participate in 
different cultures even if they themselves have the impression that because their race 
gives them racial identity it also gives them culture. This is an unfortunate mistake in 
both intellectual and common sense spheres. 
The term 'modernity' is used as opposed to 'Western' culture, because the broader 
cultural character of modernity is shared between many different races. Japan, for 
example, is not racially Western (i.e European) but shares a great many cultural 
lThis notion of rationality as a genus is not merely a biological metaphor according 
to the theoretical framework I will presenting in chapter 9. I focus on the 'deeds' of a 
biological taxa (e.g. species) as a defining feature (as opposed to merely genetic 
heritage). These 'deeds' refer to what is essentially the functional (realised) niche of a 
popUlation - which is greatly influenced by the standard of rationality employed in the 
case of a human community. 
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characteristics with advanced capitalist countries in Europe, for instance. Maintaining 
the notion of 'Western' as opposed to 'modern' serves to obscure the cultural character 
of a nation such as Japan, whose rationality and basis of valuation (as it is practised by 
its dominant capitalist culture) is not different in type from other capitalist countries. 
Furthermore, ecological sustainability is about culture not race. The ecological character 
of your collective relationship with the rest of Nature is influenced more by what you 
do than what you look like. 
6.2.1 RATIONALITY AND WORLD VIEW 
As mentioned above, language and language games are essential ingredients of culture. 
On the question of rationality I wish to focus on the language game and its rules. 
Modern Western culture nurtures the assumption that there is such a thing as a universal 
standard of rationality able to know reality with perfect precision. This faith in the 
existence of a single universal standard underlies the project of modern science and 
modern philosophy. We saw in chapter 5, for example, that the aims of positivism and 
empiricism (manifestations of the modern search for universals) were to establish a 
formula for knowledge of the highest credence able to act as the bench-mark with which 
to measure all other forms of knowledge. However, such a blind faith in the existence 
of a universal standard of rationality rests upon the assumption of the possibility of 
objective knowledge of an objective reality. This points to assumptions that underlie the 
rationality of a culture or sub-culture. 
For example, the assumption of an objective reality, together with an objective 
knowledge about that reality implies an assumption of an ontological condition of a 
'thing in itself (after Kant) determined by the fixed 'laws' of nature or the will of a 
deterministic god. This 'thing in itself is then able to be apprehended, untainted by any 
phenomenon relating to the subject (scientist). This implies that humans are in some way 
able to become detached from the world of existence and look upon reality omnisciently. 
Now, rather than focus on the flaws in this assumption I will instead use it as a way of 
depicting one form of rationality among many others. 
The Fijian culture on the other hand, prior to the arrival of Europeans, developed from 
quite a different basis for knowledge and rationality than the incoming modern 
Europeans. Rather than a deterministic steady state rationality the Fijian genus emerged 
from a rationality of process, similar to that of Heraclitus (5th century b.c. Greek), the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Whitehead, and Heidegger, and the rational 
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undercurrents of Taoism, Buddhism and Hinduism in Asia. As such, the meaning of 
words in the Fijian languages (in their pre-modern form) can only be apprehended if the 
appropriate standard of rationality is employed. 
The meaning of the word Vanua is a good example. This term has been translated into 
English as referring to 'land' or 'region' (Capell 1991). But anyone who is familiar with 
this language will know that the term Vanua actually refers to much more than this, 
encompassing what in English might be termed 'ecosystem', However, in addition to this 
the word Vanua also refers to peoples' genealogical relationships with each other, their 
spiritual connections with place, their social and political organisation, and their 
relationship with other peoples from other regions (Ravuvu 1987; 1988), Other phrases 
using this term, such as [ewe ni Vanua literally translates into 'flesh of the land' but 
actually means 'the people of a particular place'. The connections between social life and 
landscape can also be seen in expressions of chiefly title where 'era na kilakila ga na 
kena qele' literally means 'they know their soil' but in reality means 'they know their 
chief (Kikau 1981). 
The point being made here is that no translation of Fijian language into English can 
capture the meaning as it is intended in the Fijian cultural context without first adopting 
the rationality from which the language gained its original meaning. If 'land' is seen as 
the commodity it is in modern culture then the meaning of the word vanua will not be 
understood even if the speaker learns to use the Fijian language. This is because the 
symbols are of little significance unless the authentic meanings behind those symbols 
are comprehended. Rather than judge the efficacy of different standards of rationality 
vis-a-vis our problem of ecological sustainability I only show how different cultures can 
and do embrace different standards of rationality so that, as Pascal said, what is true on 
one side of the Pyrenees may be false on the other (Outhwaite 1987), 
Another important aspect of rationality as it relates to culture and the question of 
ecological sustainability is the question of spatialisation. This can be described in terms 
of cognitive maps. A cognitive map is a term that describes the conceptualisation of the 
environment as an intricate system of spaces and routes. According to Shields (1992), 
places and spaces "are hypostatised from the world of real space relations to the 
symbolic realm of cultural significations" (ibid.:44). The social context of peoples' 
affiliation to place has been largely ignored in much social theory which tends to leave 
out of a social analysis the subjective and emotional experience of meaning in the 
landscape (see Shields 1992; Cheney 1989a; Soja 1989). Jameson (1984) has suggested 
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that the modernist stance towards social spatialisation is underpinned by the devaluation 
of the social significance of place or the unique emotions, meanings, and attachments 
to places in modem Western culture. One reason for this sterns from the comodification 
of land as a social utility in land tenure. This results in a loss of the sense of belonging 
to a place as the land is divorced from its role as a nurturing realm. The landscape is 
disenchanted through bestowing upon people the capacity to have exclusive property 
rights to land. Where landscape is not made alien and reduced to a commodity, the 
intersubjectivity of people and place is able to be maintained. This allows a sense of 
belonging to develop. 
In spite of the modern scientific ontology of space as a void, people in every day life 
relate to space that is still filled with emotion, meaning, sacred sites, and living history 
(Shields 1992). This expresses a contradiction between the scientific world that is used 
to control Nature and the psychological reality of social life in the landscape. Such 
contradictions serve to alienate people from the world they live in (this also applies to 
scientists) which becomes expressed as an anxiety due to the loss of belonging and 
being alone in the world. This anxiety is suppressed in a variety of ways in modern 
culture, sometimes through further attempts to control Nature through science, and 
sometimes through violence and oppression in more general terms (see Fromm 1988, 
1991). Fijian racist nationalism may be an expression of this waning of a sense of 
belonging and loneliness suffered by many people of modern or modernised cultures the 
world over. I believe that the romantic movement of 19th century Europe was (in part) 
a Western reaction against this alienation from the landscape. 
In much modernist social theory, space is materialised as merely a substrate upon which 
social relations (such as the relations of production) are acted out. Land becomes a 
meaningless object in an economy where the only social value it has is its utility. Such 
forms of social theory ignore the importance of place and landscape in society which 
results from an over-emphasis of social relations over the relationship between humanity 
and the rest of Nature. Ecosystems become inert backdrops to revolutions and 
institutional restructuring, and are completely left out of the modern meaning of a social 
'community'. Shields (1992) reasserts the importance of space and suggests that: 
"[Spatialisation] is a mediator of causality .... because it represents the contingent 
juxtaposition of social and economic forces, forms of social organisation and constraints 
[and opportunities] of the natural world" (lbid.:48). 
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6.2.2 LANGUAGE AND BEYOND 
The role of language in relation to thought, world view and reality has become a central 
component in a number of intellectual disciplines in the 20th century including 
philosophy (e.g. Heidegger, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Rorty, Foucault), social 
theory (e.g. Woodiwis, Gadamer, Adorno, Habermas), anthropology (Levi-Strauss, 
Winch, Lukes, Whorf) , literary criticism (Jameson, Derrida), political science 
(Chomsky), and psychology (Jung, Campbell, Maslowf The predominant (positivist) 
modern scientific view, sees language functioning as a mirror of reality, where scientific 
words are essentially ontological statements that point (with varying degrees of 
precision), to reality as it is disclosed in sense awareness. This view of language has 
become quite firmly established in modern culture as a prevailing cultural paradigm 
(Wilber 1990). This view rides on some very fundamental assumptions concerning the 
relationship between thought, language and 'world'. A good example can be seen in the 
linguistic branch of positivism supported partly by the earlier work of Wittgenstein. 
The various meta-theories of modern empiricist science tend to have a definition or 
theory of language and semantics, in order to set the context for communication of 
scientific ideas, and establish a basis for the judgement of scientific truth. In these 
theories of language, various rules are defined as to what constitutes authentic 
communication and knowledge. In the various empiricist traditions (e.g. classical 
empiricism, logical positivism, neo-classical empiricism, Popperism) for example, the 
theories of language restrict scientific (and therefore legitimate) language to what is 
defined as rational. According to Hooker (1987) positivism3 subscribes to a theory of 
language such that:-
Every empirically significant concept is derived directly from specific sensory 
2For general introductions to these theorists see Naess (1968), Gibbins (1987), Fox 
(1990), Stevens (1990), Ayer (1985), Best and Kellner (1991), Carr and Kemmis (1986). 
3It should be noted that Hooker (1987) does differentiate between the three 
empiricist traditions mentioned above viz. positivism, Carnapian empiricism, and 
Popperism. However the latter two differ in their theory of language only slightly, for 
example according to Hooker (1987:71) Carnapian empiricism states that every 
"cognitively meaningful sentence is a generalised logical function of the class of 
observationally basic sentences" [where] "Every observationally basic sentence is a 
sentence of the positivist language". For Popperism non-logical terms in subjects such 
as ethics, religion, aesthetics, and philosophy are meaningful but they are not regarded 
as empirically meaningful in the science he wishes to delineate. 
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experiences. The remainder of language comprises two disjoint components, the 
logical and the social-emotive; The logical framework [refers to] a conventional 
construct of the human mind, devoid of empirical content...; the social-emotive 
component of language consists of pseudo terms and pseudo sentences which 
serve to arouse emotion but are devoid of empirical content. 
From this is can be said that:-
human beings acquire the empirically significant component of language through 
increasing sensory experience and the operation of the logic-machine mind upon 
the resulting imprinted concepts and acquire the socio-emotive component 
through the non-rational... processes of socialisation in the human community 
(Hooker 1987 :66). 
Thus empiricist science has nothing interesting to say about ethics, aesthetics, religion, 
or metaphysics apart from stating that they are irrational or have no relevance to 
knowledge or truth. Alternative views, however, have existed for centuries (or even 
millennia) both in the West and non-Western countries. An example of a valuable 
contribution to this debate can be found in the work of Benjamin Whorl. Like the latter 
work of Wittgenstein (see Hanfling 1989), Whorl explored the complexities between 
words as symbols and the world we create for ourselves through language4. The 
language-as-a-mirror approach is significantly challenged in Whorl's work, as it is in that 
of the latter Wittgenstein and also Heidegger. In particular, Whorl (1956) shows how 
linguistic systems create different world experiences of a language user. 
To understand this it is useful to differentiate between what Wilber (1990) has called 
'mental' and sub-mental' states. Symbols such as words and their meanings do not create 
the material world, but they do create mental spheres which are themselves symbols. 
According to Wilber (1990) symbols as words reflect (i.e. mirror) a submental symbolic 
world but create the mental world. As such, language does not create the world, it 
creates our world. This differentiation of representative and creative functions of 
language in relation to symbolic spheres of the human intellect helps to expose the 
differences between forms of human knowledge systems. The mirror model is used in 
4This argument runs in opposition to those found in some forms of cognitive socio-
biology (e.g. Weiskrantz 1988) that put up a false argument viz. that philosophers such 
as Wittgenstein and Heidegger suggest that people actually create their entire world 
through language. This arises from a misunderstanding of the work of such philosophers, 
who do not claim that the entire world experience is created through language. Non-
linguistic aspects of thinking are crucial and constant undercurrents of Heidegger's work, 
and one of Wittgenstein's greatest legacies was the emphasis he placed upon the 
limitations of language. 
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empirical-analytic forms of understanding, such as positivism, and is sensible on the 
basis of the assumptions it carries in relation to language. It is still useful but it has 
many limitations. The 'world' creating model acknowledges the role of language in the 
creation of a subjective world experience for a language user in a particular culture. This 
model is employed in hermeneutic and phenomenological frameworks of social 
understanding. 
The problem with positivism is that the scientist denies that the world-creating aspect 
of language exists and instead assumes that language and logical scientific statements 
are able to mirror reality as it is. A more enlightened form of science would 
acknowledge that the world-creating aspect of language exists, and that science is 
practised within this domain. Here, words as symbols are employed to decipher other 
symbols. As Wilber (1990: 195) puts it: 
With empiric [positivist] propositions you are trying to mirror [material reality] 
in symbols so as to better comprehend them. But in the mental world, where 
symbols look at symbols, it is like using one mirror to reflect another mirror 
which reflects the reflection, and so on, in a circle of meaning that you and I 
cocreate whenever we talk. That is the hermeneutic circle. 
It is for this reason that all forms of science need to be embellished with a reflexive 
phenomenological dimension to take adequate account of the complexity of language 
and how it functions. Science participates in the subjective world-creating process of 
linguistic games and for this reason all science should take self reflection seriously. If 
this linguistic issue is ignored science will proceed (as it so often does) to create a 
subjective world experience for scientists, and a scientistic culture, using a language 
game that is ignorant of the innate subjectivity of the human world experience as created 
contingently through language. This will serve to create an alienating world view, 
alienating in the sense that it creates a 'world' that contradicts a major aspect of our 
nature as human beings and contradicts much of what is real in our relationships with 
non-human beings. If science employs a hermeneutical approach to self understanding 
(acknowledging the way symbols engage in discourse with other symbols in mental and 
submental spheres of human cognition) then it will be less likely to fall into the 
alienating trap that has become a signature of modern science. 
On more general terms, language and its rules help to create a symbolic world for the 
culture that uses such a language. Different cultures create different 'worlds' by means 
of different linguistic systems (Wilber 1990; Whorf 1956). Coming to understand this 
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aspect of culture will help to bring an inquiry closer to an understanding of the 
relationship between a culture and the landscape that surrounds it. This latter task is 
precisely the problem being addressed in this thesis. But to do so "We must find out 
more about language!" (Whorf 1956:250). This I will seek to achieve through the course 
of the following chapters. However, culture is more than merely an isolated linguistic 
phenomenon. Culture is not only that which exists within the world of language. It is 
also influenced by phenomena which exist beyond the reach of a linguistic world. This 
includes the biological processes going on in the body, our physiology (which will differ 
from place to place due to differences in environmental conditions), and the overall 
relationship that people have with their ecological surroundings. 
The impact of a culture on a particular landscape is likely to differ from that of another 
culture which creates a different 'world'. For example, a culture that sees the land as a 
commodity with only utility value will treat the land differently from one that sees the 
landscape as alive, as a nurturer of human and non-human life, as an ancestor and a 
guide. The different world view will lead to a different relationship with the landscape 
which will, in turn, affect the human community in terms of the modification of the 
landscape (e.g. resource depletion and pollution). 
The central point conveyed. here is that the landscape is also the culture, as opposed to 
a culture existing on a landscape. The landscape and the culture are one and the same 
thing and they cocreate each other simultaneously. One is not prior to the other. Instead 
they interpenetrate each other in a dialectical fashion. Walk on the sand and the sand 
presents a foot print. Breath the air and the aroma of the forest is taken in. Cut down 
a tree and the forest is modified. What humans do they do with the landscape, and the 
landscape does things to people as well. And it is not merely a one way relationship as 
the changes in the landscape, as said before, influence the human community again. It 
is not merely a feed-back loop - it is a simultaneous dialectical relationship. It is the 
dialectical character of the relationship between a culture and the rest of the landscape 
that needs to remain at the front of our minds when attempting to understand the issue 
of ecological sustainability. 
6.3 THE QUESTION OF CULTURAL ADAPTATION 
I have said earlier (in chapter 2), that I believe ecological sustainability is a 
synchronous, dialectical, relationship of mutual becoming (change). This becoming will 
only be ecologically sustainable if the becoming is harmonious, compatible, apt and 
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hence adaptive. Adaptation is not the modification of one to the other, it is a mutual 
relationship of synchronous change. All adaptation is necessarily co-adaptation as 
mentioned in chapter 5 in relation to dialectical biology. 
In the light of a general theory of adaptation as the dialectical co-adaptive relationship 
between species and surroundings, a cultural special theory will be parasitic upon it 
(unless humans are not an animal species). The task of this thesis is to explain both the 
general and special theory and demonstrate the efficacy of both in relation to ecological 
sustainability. I do this by re-examining the notion of indigenousness and show that it 
does not differ from ecological sustainability - they become synonymous in the synthesis 
I present. This is undertaken largely in chapters 8 and 9. 
In this chapter and in chapter 7 I will establish a metaphysical basis for theoretical 
reconstruction, after deconstructing the existing dominant metatheoretical foundations 
of modern science and moral philosophy. These foundations include atomism, 
reductionism, steady state rationality, determinism, materialism, mechanism, and 
ontological empiricism. I have found (in modern social, cultural and ecological theory) 
no existing coherent theoretical basis for what I seek to achieve - understand ecological 
sustainability (although I have found an altemative basis in other places which I will 
present in chapters 7 and 8). In the modern scientific sphere I have found some that 
come close but they fail in one or other aspect which demands a reassessment of the 
grounds of inquiry. A variety of conceptual imperatives have stared me in the face for 
the entire duration of this research programme. One is the need to completely dissolve 
the humanity/Nature dualism, another is to merge this with a form of holism that does 
not lead to stoicism (to be explained later), and another is the need for an epistemology 
that does not claim to be capable of achieving more than is possible or desirable. 
Critical social SCIence works well apart from its inability to overcome the 
humanity/Nature dualism, and its assumption of the possibility of a rational formula for 
emancipation, stemming from a claim of epistemological universalism, thus assuming 
that the rules of language are more powerful than is possible. The best forms of modern 
ecological theory I have come across move in an appropriate theoretical direction (Le. 
process rationality) but tend to sustain forms of stoic holism (which I reject and will 
explain why in chapter 7) under the banner of modern systems theory. With all due 
respect to ecologists, there is also a tendency towards ontological empiricism, naive 
realism, a correspondence theory of truth (which trivialises ontology), and unqualified 
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epistemic over-confidences. Like critical social science it is also grounded in the 
assumption of the competence of reason as the basis for knowledge6• Dialectical biology 
as developed by Levins and Lewontin (1985) provides a major step in the right direction 
in relation to the need for a dialectical rationality and process, but falls into the same 
empiricist trap as its liberalist enemies. And, like Karl Marx and Adam Smith before 
them, they sustain the materialism that denies so much of what is real outside of 
language and the material domain. 
In other words, I will only be capable of weaving a cohesive garment (theory) once I 
have changed the loom (standard of rationality) by using a metaphorical hammer to 
demolish the foundations of existing theoretical frameworks (a process which began in 
chapter 5). I am then able to reconstruct a creative alternative that is not inconsistent 
with a set of coherent metaphysical assertions. This gives my alternative framework 
coherence and consistency so that any arguments against it must appeal to metaphysical 
differences as opposed to incoherence or inconsistencies. In this process of 
reconstruction I do not discard all of the components of modem epistemology that fall 
in disarray as the modem 100m is dismantled. Some are re-employed in this postmodern 
alternative although it is quite a different loom. 
6.4 THE ECOLOGY AND GEOGRAPHY OF CULTURE 
The Fiji landscape currently supports a number of cultural tendencies. At one end of the 
spectrum lies high modernity which is essentially culturally indistinguishable from high 
modernity in other countries except that the supermarkets will stock a variety of 
different brand names. This cultural group is comprised of people of many different 
races including Fijian, Indian (Indo-Fijian), Chinese, European, and races from other 
Pacific Islands. At another end of the spectrum lie the remnants of Fijian pre-modem 
tribal culture (which is also diverse in itself i.e. with many regional variations) and 
many variances in between. In addition to this, pre-modem Indian cultural influences 
playa significant role for many Indo-Fijians. The population at the last cenSllS in 1986 
50ntological empiricism implies that only what is experienced or experienceable by 
humans is real or relevant. Epistemic over-confidence is when a form of knowledge 
declares that it is capable of knowing far more than is possible, such as declaring that 
you have discovered the truth of something in its totality when such a total knowledge 
is impossible. 
61 do not reject the value of reason, but see 'irrational' forms of knowledge (derived 
from outside the rules of language) as a legitimate means of knowing. 
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complised of 46% indigenous Fijian, 49% Indo-Fijian, with the remaining 5% made up 
of Chinese, other Pacific Islanders, and Europeans (Bureau of Statistics 1989)7. There 
has also been some intermarriage between different racial groups which adds to the 
racial complexity of these islands. However, as suggested above, a break down of the 
Fiji population by race does not tell us much about the actual cultural situation. 
It will be useful to focus briefly on the Fijian culture itself, as this cultural ensemble has 
been a pervasive factor in the relationship between humanity and landscape in that island 
group for many centuries. Fiji was first settled by humans some 3,500 years ago by what 
has been termed an Austronesian culture known to anthropologists as 'Lapita' people. 
Subsequent arrivals of Melanesian peoples have also influenced the racial and cultural 
picture (Campbell 1989; Geraghty 1983). Polynesian and Melanesian influences both 
currently playa significant role in the racial and cultural assemblage of what was to be 
Fijian, although the former has more influence in the east of Fiji and the latter more 
sway in the west (Geraghty 1983). As recently as the mid 19th century for example, 
Tongan influences (Polynesian) comprised a significant social, political and cultural 
ingredient, especially in the south and north east (Routledge 1985). 
With the alTival of Europeans in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries came an altogether 
different culture, and like the incoming Tongans, it traced its cultural heritage from a 
velY different genealogy to that of the Fijians. However, significantly different in this 
European culture (from both Fijian and Tongan) is the dominance of a standard of 
rationality that differs not in degree but in type from the Fijian and Tongan equivalents. 
This rationality of modern Western culture developed as a reaction against medieval 
religious superstition, which, in spite of its best intentions, stripped modernity of the 
possibility of ecological sustainability. This rationality is paralysed by an attachment to 
an underlying condition of permanence. 
In its latter development in a reductionist, scientific world even non-perceivable 
possibilities are ruled out of court and scientific humans are able to know (eventually) 
all of reality (or at least get close). Either rationalism (since Descartes, which is 
anthropocentric), idealism (since Kant - also anthropocentric) or anthropo-realism (since 
7Indians were first brought to Fiji in 1879 by the British as indentured labourers (Lal 
1983). Following the military coup of 1987 large numbers of Indo-Fijians have 
emigrated and the ratio of Indo-Fijian to Fijian has since shifted in favour of the latter 
racial group (Bedford 1989; Watling and Chape 1992). 
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Hume) has dominated the conceptual foundations of the intellectual culture of 
modernity. This also greatly influences the common sense views of people living in a 
culture so inspired and informed by modern science (see Bhaskar 1975, 1979, 1986; 
Outhwaite 1987; Whitehead 1929 for example). They are anthropocentric because if 
humans are not able to have cognitive knowledge about something, then it is said to be 
false. This has led to a disenchantment of Nature where mysteries are deemed 
illegitimate and have been replaced by mere puzzles solvable only through empirically 
verifiable or falsifiable reductionist science (Kuhn 1970; Carr and Kemmis 1986; 
Outhwaite 1987). 
6.4.1 THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 
The Fijian ethos of tribalism is still strong in many villages where ceremony and ritual 
maintains much of its meaning and purpose (Ravuvu 1987a). However, as we saw in 
chapter 4, this culture is already different from pre-colonial times, having transformed 
into a modem version. This is particularly true in relation to economic production and 
resource use. Whereas many pre-modern cultural structures remain, the context of their 
use is significantly changing. The use of resources for the accumulation of cash and 
capital is becoming more important as the basic structure of village economies is 
becoming more and more cash Olientated. Subsistence is being surpassed by cash 
cropping even in the last bastions of pre-modern Fijian culture. For this reason the actual 
culture is very different from what it used to be, even though many of the structures of 
social organisation remain intact. 
Modern Western influences are dominant in Fiji when it comes to rationality and all that 
goes with it, such as morality and economy for example, and the overall relationship 
between humanity and landscape. As with many other Pacific Island countries 
agricultural practices tend to be commercially orientated whether they be small scale 
village farms or industrial plantations (Nayacakalou 1978; Ravuvu 1988; Fairbairn 1987; 
Hau'ofa 1987; Overton 1988 for example). Forest use is still diverse with many non-
wood forest products collected including medicinal plants, pigs and birds as game, wild 
root crops, prawns, eels and fish 'from forested rivers. However a dominant and 
increasingly important use of forest 1aI?-ds is for purposes of commercial timber 
extraction (often followed by commercial agriculture) formally by Europeans and now 
by tribal land owners as well (Thaman 1988; Rabuka and Cabaniuk 1988). 
In terms of cultural hetitage, modern Fiji is thereby supported by an intellectual and a 
182 
common sense tradition shaped by a confluence of Greek philosophy, Christianity, and 
modern science. Thus even in Fiji, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato have contributed much 
(albeit indirectly) to its philosophical outlook including its philosophical ontology. 
Moses, John the Baptist, Jesus, St Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and John 
Calvin among many others8, have contributed greatly to standards of morality and ethics 
through the penetration of Western religious influences9. Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, 
Isaac Newton, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Charles Darwin, for example, have 
helped to shape the form and context of modern science in Fiji evident in education and 
technology. John Locke, Jacques Turgot, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Thomas 
Malthus, David Riccardo, and Karl Marx were among those who merged science with 
politics in the West to set the foundations for modern political and economic theory and 
practice which is alive an well in Fiji's political arena today. Because of European 
colonialism the current modern era in Fiji today relies heavily on Western cultural 
heritage. Tomanivi and Ratu-mai-Bulu lO are still there but are becoming rapidly eclipsed 
by the dominant modern Western influences. This points to the need to examine the 
foundations of modern culture if we are to understand human ecology in present day 
Fiji. 
The need to question the ecology of modernity as a whole also stems from the 
internationalisation of the forces behind unsustainability. If Fiji was an isolated and 
autonomous cultural unit it would suffice to reflect on modernity within Fiji. However, 
over the last 200 years Fiji has been greatly influenced by modern forces that have their 
loci well beyond the sparkling horizons of this 'tropical paradise'. Ecological 
sustainability in Fiji therefore depends velY much on the possibility of ecological 
sustainability on a global scale, or on sustainable isolation. Sustainable isolation is 
8Christianity itself is very diverse, testimony to the many religious arguments (and 
sometimes wars) over the centuries. Different interpretations of the Christian message 
lend themselves to different cultural formations. A good contemporary example is the 
difference between Liberation Theology (Catholic) and Calvinism (Protestant). The 
former is innately socialist and thoroughly rejects the basic assumptions of capitalism, 
whereas the latter is individualistic and has, in some cases, fostered the rise of 
capitalism itself (see Radford:'Reuther 1988; Fromm 1991; and Weber 1958). Some 
forms of Christianity are intrinsically modernist, whilst there is a growing postmodern 
theology movement (e.g. Holland 1989; Griffin 1989; Taylor 1984). 
9Hinduism and Islam are also major religious factors in the Fiji cultural equation. 
However, they tend to be functionally eclipsed by the dominant modern economic 
activities and thereby still influenced greatly by a European cultural model. 
lOoyomanivi and Ratu-mai-bulu are tribal gods (see Ravuvu 1987a). 
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highly improbable if little in the way of cultural change takes place internationally. This 
is evident in the nature of the global economy, particularly in light of more recent 
intensive effOlts at completing the project of global capitalist expansion (predicted by 
Lenin) exemplified in the GATT negotiations in Uruguay. It is for this reason that 
modernity as a whole must be critiqued, because without this any question concerning 
ecological sustainabiIity in Fiji (in the absence of this crucial internationalist perspective) 
will be a false one. 
6.5 TOWARDS A THEORY OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
The notion of cultural adaptation to a constantly changing ecosystem lies at the heart of 
the theory I have developed on ecological sustainability. What will emerge is a notion 
of ecological sustainability that is synonymous with indigenousness II, and expressible 
in a form that I call the 'autobiography of the landscape'. The autobiography is 
articulated through the human community via primordial12 language, inspired by real 
experiences of the landscape (this is discussed fully in chapter 7, 8 and 9). 
The aesthetic (artistic) component of this theory comes through primordial language and 
the experiences that inspire it. The rational component comes in with the recreation of 
that aesthetic creativity through language itself. It becomes reason - a standard of 
rationality comprising the rules of language where those rules are also inspired by the 
landscape itself. I have written a poem to this effect: 
Weaving 
The landscape gave to me a loom 
And bid me to weave a garment true 
III define indigenousness in functionally dynamic (as opposed to phylogenetic) 
terms. It amounts to the ability of any population (human or non-human) to co-adapt 
with the landscape of which it is a part. Such co-adaptation is indigenous if, and only 
if, it exists in a dialectical synchronicity that is able to endure without system collapse. 
This view is able to regard migratory species as indigenous to the ecosystems it visits 
without bending the definition. It all depends on the functional ecological niche of the 
species in question. This will be explained in chapter 9. 
121 draw upon Heidegger's distinction between primordial and derivative language. 
The former is inspired by experiences and may be irrational, the latter comprises 
language operating according to the rules of language, tends to be rational (i.e. 
consistent with these rules), but is not necessarily connected to real experiences (see 
Cheney 1989a; Halliburton 1981). 
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"For who" I asked, as it was not clear 
"For me" it replied, "for me to wear" 
And so I took the threads of my experience 
And lay them together as warp and weft 
And because the threads came from this place 
The pattern to emerge was one of grace 
But why would such a lovely gown 
Be woven by me without a plan? 
And then at last the answer came: 
Both loom and threads came from the land. 
The loom is a metaphor for a standard of rationality and the threads are the experiences 
gained from outside language, which are brought to the loom as the creative inspiration 
for primordial language (which is also the basis of authentic poetry). In this sense 
language embodies both a descriptive and a normative form. The rational form capable 
of fostering ecological sustainability is a rationality of process, providing the back-bone 
of an adaptive language game. 
The specific manifestation of culture in a particular landscape comes through the 
primordial creative linguistic dimension which must be recreated anew in a constant 
process of dialogue with the landscape. This specific linguistic component is recreated 
in a culture as it acts out the language game in social life. The conscious world so 
created through such language and experience is able to be an adaptive world. It is 
capable of moving with the landscape. 
6.6 THE QUESTION OF ETHICS 
For a culture to be capable of acting out an ecologically sustainable existence it must 
be able to exercise a respect for the landscape by fulfilling its ecological responsibilities. 
It must then be able to establish a formula of responsibility that does indeed deliver an 
ecologically sustainable outcome. There are two major obstructions to this process which 
will be dealt with in this chapter. The first is demonstrating that an imperative exists for 
responsibilities to be met (as there are many sophisticated arguments that contradict 
this); the second is to show what form of ethical discourse is indeed consistent with 
ecological sustainability, rather than one that merely claims to be so, and yet obstructs 
it. 
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6.6.1 ON DETERMINISM IN RELATION TO ETHICS 
Determinism obstructs an ecological ethic in a number of ways. Firstly it negates the 
possibility of creative responsibility due to the creative agency lying in a non-human 
agency such as a deterministic deity or a deterministic conception of natural law 
(Kenney 1991; Fromm 1991). Epistemological determinism is the notion that truth is 
universal and is grounded in a set of fixed predicates. This can and does happen in 
relation to logic as a basis for truth in forms of Western metaphysics. Should truth be 
conceived in this fashion there lies no possibility for truth arising from outside the reach 
of logic. Truth is thus determined according to the fixed condition of reason and logic 
which equates with universalism. This rejects non-rational truths and standards of social 
discourse according to one set of criteria as determined by the standard of rationality of 
one language game and culture. Ethnocentrism results. Such universalism argues that a 
single standard of rationality provides privileged access to truth. This is equated with 
the notion of a totalizing discourse - which is totalitarian at the level of knowledge and 
language. Politically it is still totalitarian as all social discourse is both an educational 
and a political act (see Freire 1972)13. 
The ethical formula developed in this thesis asks for the acknowledgement of the 
inability of universal, totalizing discourses to legitimate themselves at the level of 
metaphysics without assuming that language is more powerful than is possible. This will 
be explained in the following chapters. The failure of universal, totalizing discourses to 
furnish themselves with an unquestionable metaphysical basis, in the light of substantial 
challenges to them, demonstrates that any claim to universal privileged access to truth 
must be discarded. Truth as a linguistic notion cannot be equated with any fixed 
correspondence with reality as it is. As such, truth at the level of language and 
knowledge (i.e. epistemology) can only be at best a story, a coherent narrative. Truth 
as a notion arising from outside language (e.g. intuition) can also take the form of 
narrative but not a normative one. It is a different form of truth and can be apprehended 
by many different cultures as it arises from beyond language. 
13The problems with universalism and totalizing privileged discourses will be 
explored and explained through the course of subsequent chapters in relation to the 
question of ethics and moral instruction which may guide social actions. 
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This can lead to notions of universal 'truths 14, that are able to be shared by aU cultures 
due to their relationship with our underlying character as human beings as indicated by 
Lukes (1987). Lukes argued against the notion of absolute relativism in relation to 
meaning. He suggested that some forms of meaning can apply across rational and 
cultural boundaries, where different cultures experience the same reality but name it 
differently. For example, people of any culture can feel 'pain' when they put their 'hand' 
in a 'fire', The reaction in different cultures will be similar irrespective of the language 
they use and the words as symbols they employ to denote what in English we call 'pain', 
'hand', and 'fire'. But another culture can experience the same thing even if their 
language employs utterances such as 'emosi', 'Uga', and 'kama' for the English 
equivalents as is the case with Fijian. 
I believe that this form of 'truth' is the only form able to apply across cultural 
boundaries, as they are not mediated by rationality or language. The locus of their 
meaning lies beyond language. I believe that the same can be said for the meanings 
behind words such as 'love', 'happiness', and 'belonging' for example. The difference is, 
that for such terms to be able to apply across rational boundaries they cannot be defined 
according to linguistic norms. This is because linguistic norms are culturally specific and 
contingent. For such notions to apply universally their meaning must be located in the 
actual feelings themselves, and not in linguistic norms. They can only be descriptive of 
the actual feelings and experiences we have, and in this sense they are necessarily 
metaphOlical, and poetical. These feelings and experiences are beyond value judgements, 
beyond concepts such as 'good' and 'evil', beyond language and logic. If this happens 
then an authentic translation between two different languages can be successful where 
the authentic meaning is carried across. As such two different cultures are capable of 
entering into a dialogue that is not dominated by the meanings of one culture alone. But 
to be capable of this the different cultures must first locate those meanings which are 
common to both cultures irrespective of the language they use to symbolise those 
meanings. 
At the level of language itself, in relation to the internal coherence of a language game, 
all that is possible are relative truths. In other words, if the logic of a language is 
employed to define truth, the truth can only be a relative truth, as the truth only 
14Universal truths are rejected by deconstructivist postmodernists, but are tolerated 
by reconstructivists like myself. Such a 'universal' truth may be regarded as a 'meta-
nalTative' which may differ from place to place but may carry a common ontological 
undercurrent. 
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corresponds to the internal coherence of a language game. For this reason all notions of 
truth, whether they be defined according to the internal coherence of a language game 
(necessarily relative), or are defined in real experiences that lie beyond the reach of 
language, can only be established socially through a process of negotiation if they are 
to be non-oppressive. Any means of determining 'truth' according to a single fixed 
standard (such as logic or science) will be totalitarian in its political character. 
The social consequences of acting out a social life according to such truth (expressed 
ethically as instruction for 'good' behaviour) will be totalitarian and deterministic. This 
leads to forms of stoicism which obstruct the possibility of ecological sustainability. I 
refer to the meaning of stoicism in the classical rather than the colloquial sense. This 
relates to the philosophy of the Stoics of ancient Greece (influenced by Zeno) whose 
project was to protect the Athenian state from barbarian influences. This was achieved 
through the employment of a notion of cosmopolitanism, whereby the people of Athens 
were subjects of the polis of the cosmos (universe) hence cosmopolitan. This notion 
was underwritten by a totalizing form of holism that saw the whole (the cosmos) as able 
to be captured by the universalistic net of the language game. This implies that the 
cosmos is able to be apprehended in its totality by the language game and its rules -
logic, which amounts to a form of cultural solipsism. Such a notion sits firmly within 
the Socratic and Aristotelian tradition that creates a conception of the cosmos in the 
image of the rules of its own language, which is what most of Western philosophy has 
been doing since it began. But as Nietzsche (1973) argued - "is not the Stoa [also] a 
piece of nature?". See Cheney (l989b) and Jonas (1963) for a fuller account of the 
nature of stoicism and its use in Western culture. 
In deterministic (stoic) cultures, social life is conducted through the following of laws 
of moral behaviour, where those laws are determined by an elite discourse (theory). This 
is what is sO wrong with salvational ethical systems including many forms of 
Christianity, which defines 'good' behaviour according to a totalitarian formula. It will 
be necessarily oppressive in spite of its best intentions. It is for this reason that Jesus 
argued (contra Moses) for the pursuit of grace and not merely law, as did Sidatva 
Gautama (Buddha). Grace (like mana) is not grounded in linguistically determined 
codes, but in ones actual behaviour in relation to the divine. For me the divine is 
expressible inter alia as Nature, Evolution, the Landscape, the Vanua, which cannot be 
defined simply according to human knowledge systems. My reasons for this will become 
apparent in chapters to follow, particularly chapter 8. 
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The philosophical views presented in this thesis, which will unfold through the course 
of the following chapters, provides a basis for the coherence of this narrative and 
substantiate the ethical system to be developed in later chapters. This is an ethical 
system which I believe is capable of delivering ecological sustainability simply because 
it dismantles the obstructions to human adaptation. Such obstructions have also covered 
over the meaning of ecological sustainability and obscured it from Western society. It 
has been obscured by this very notion of determinism and its psychological 
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consequences. But how might determinism come about in a cultural rationality? 
Determinism arises out of a search for universals (Fromm 1991), which (I believe) are 
sought by people who harbour anxieties that foster the need for a solid 'thing' to 
psychologically grasp hold of. Alternatively people seek to legitimate their social and 
political actions by appealing to an absolute, universal authority that is supposed to give 
licence to such actions. When no solid, unmoving authority is discovered in Nature 
(because none exists) it must then be invented. The invention is made possible by the 
capacity of reason (i.e. language and its rules) to prove its own internal coherence. This 
formula is then legitimated by a culture that enshrines reason as an unchallenged and 
unquestionable path to authority. The problem is that this absolute authority can never 
be discovered, as all of reality is in a constant state of flux l5 • For even the biggest 
mountains erode, even the brightest stars explode. This is why a universal foundation 
of permanence must be invented. When such an authority is invented the culture moves 
away from the possibility of ecological sustainability. This is because the source of 
ethical instruction, the standard of 'right' behaviour, is grounded in an invented authority, 
instead of something real like the landscape itself. 
This normative authority may take many different forms in different cultures. Examples 
include the Calvinistic conception of the Christian God (see Kenney 1991), fixed natural 
laws (Bhaskar 1978), the nation state (as it was in Nazi Germany), enlightened self 
interest within a free market (Fromm 1991), or the Fijian chiefly system (as it is 
currently portrayed). Each of these expressions of an imaginary authority amounts to an 
all powerful agency outside ourselves to which we must all submit as deterministic 
151 do not completely discard the idea of permanence but redefine it in terms of 
theology where the permanence is a constantly evolving dynamic that underlies the 
adaptive process and forms the basis for aptness, compatibility and hence evolution and 
sustainability. It is not a fixed 'law' of Nature but a constantly moving transcendental (as 
opposed to transcendent) undercurrent of Nature. I will endeavour to explain this in 
chapter 8. 
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fundamentalists. It asks us to forgo our own creativity and free will, where the locus of 
meaning and creativity in our lives is vested in the higher authority. Fundamentalism of 
this form is common amongst those enslaved to deterministic systems such as 
Calvinism, capitalism, Stalinist communism, Nazism, and other forms of totalitarianism 
(see Fromm 1991). 
This submission to an 'other' immediately alienates the individual as an object (when all 
individuals are really subjects), and negates the innate indeterminacy and creativity of 
all beings. It also arouses a psychological condition of perpetual alienation from ones 
true nature as a human being leading to anxiety. Such a condition of anxiety becomes 
ingrained in such deterministic societies where it feels safe to maintain this determinism. 
Fromm (1991) calls this the 'fear of freedom'. But any tramper knows that if you carry 
a burden for long enough you forget that it is there. It becomes safe to keep the burden, 
especially as your apparent meaning of life depends on it. But in casting off such a 
burden people can begin to feel that true freedom is also safe. Modern society is a long 
way from feeling such freedom, simply because a plethora of obstructions stand in the 
way. 
The canonization of reason as the only legitimate form of discourse in a modern culture 
has rendered illegitimate all meaning in ritual, rites of passage, instincts and intuition, 
which have all been neglected in modernity. Where they are able to survive they do so 
in spite of modernity not because of it. The expression of this creativity in a modern 
culture is relegated to the subordinated realm of art. This domain of art is subordinated 
to that of science which is supposed to be more 'real' and have more authority than 
'mere art'. Modern culture has lost sight of the value of art. But the challenge, as 
articulated in the romantic movement in paintings of Cezanne, Runge, Carus, Friedrich, 
Gauguin, and Baudelaire; the poetry of Goethe, George, Blake, Wordsworth, and 
Whitman; and the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Thoreau, Heidegger, and 
Foucault: is to cast off the shackles of modernist predetermination and re-Iearn to 
recreate our culture as a work of art. 
I believe that this challenge can be met without having to discard Western cultural 
heritage. Indeed, it is precisely the non-modern West that is capable of engaging in 
meaningful discourse with pre-modern Fiji in the kind of partnership promised in the 
1874 British Deed of Cession. This does not require any retrogressive step backwards 
through history in the opposite direction of 'progress' as the idea of 'progress' itself is 
a fallacy concocted in the French Enlightenment as an excuse for laissez-faire. Instead 
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it asks for a re-legitimation of the unknown and the unknowable, an acceptance of 
mystery, a mystery which is enchanting. The task of this generation and those to follow 
is to uncover the hidden meanings from within the deeper folds of Western and Fijian 
culture and with it the means of making ecological sustainability possible. To achieve 
this, determinism must first be overcome. 
6.6.2 OVERCOMING DETERMINISM 
Searching around the dark corners of language led people to discover its rules - logic, 
and claim that because they have found the source of linguistic coherence within their 
own language game, they think they have found the answer to the ultimate meaning of 
life. Logic becomes an all empowering authority, a court of justice, established for all 
eternity (see Whitehead 1929; Wittgenstein 1953; Heidegger 1992). Heidegger (1959) 
explains how the fundamental rule of scientific speech is logic, and anyone who speaks 
illogically is unscientific. However, as Heidegger points out, this only demonstrates that 
illogical language is not scientific; but scientific discourse is not the only way of 
speaking, and furthermore, a statement does not have to be scientific or logical in order 
to be true (especially if Nature, of which our statements refer to, is not organised 
according to logic). Speaking about nothing is a good example. To speak about nothing 
we are being illogical. But much of reality is not a thing (as all is interconnected), and 
hence much of reality is no-thing, nothing. To speak about this logically is impossible 
without conceptually destroying what it is you are speaking about. Logic began towards 
the end of the creative phase of Greek philosophy, when thinking was being conducted 
as a formal technique. "Logic arose in the curriculum of the Platonic-Aristotelian 
schools. Logic is an invention of school teachers, not of philosophers" (Heidegger 
1959: 121), and as such, logic "relieves us of the need for any troublesome inquiry into 
the essence of thinking" (ibid.: 120). 
The rules of logic and language appear to be fixed as one uses them in order to find 
them (it is thus a grand tautology). It is a cat that eats its own tail and then pronounces 
that the universe is nothing but cat. Most of Western metaphysics since Socrates has 
behaved quite similar to this metaphorical cat. 
Once the rules of language are explored a little further it will eventually be discovered 
that the rules are indeed what they are - only the rules of language, and that they do 
have coherence and are hence logical. But this is followed by the discovery that the 
language and its rules are not necessarily connected in any way to the independent 
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coherence of reality outside language - e.g. the landscape. The first Western philosopher 
to come to this realisation and pronounce it as a victory for metaphysics was Nietzsche 
in the 19th century (see Nietzsche 1967, 1974; Pfeffer 1972; Simmel 1991; Vattimo 
1988). He was later followed in the early 20th century by Heidegger and Wittgenstein, 
and subsequently by a host of postmodern philosophers such as Foucault, Derrida, and 
Lyotard for example. 
When this discovery is made that reason operates according to its own rules, and that 
these rules are relative (as opposed to absolute), the very foundations of epistemological 
determinism dissolve completely. One is then left in what may at first appear to be a 
meaningless quagmire of nihilism. Now, nihilism is not the end of the story (Pfeffer 
1972). Nihilism at the level of language and reason (i.e. epistemology) only means that 
the slate of the normative world created by language is able to be wiped clean leaving 
nothing - no meaning. Once this is discovered, realised, and accepted, nihilism grabs you 
sternly by the collar, stares you in the face and shouts, "forget determinism!, forget any 
absolute unchanging authority!. .. throw it away!!". And if you do, and keep listening it 
will go on to say, reassuringly, "meaning can and does come from beyond language", 
but to attain it one must release one's tight grip on the rope of reason and determinism. 
Letting go, one is able to fall back to earth, pass through the linguistic silence of 
nihilism, and realise that the world is still there. The prickly feeling of the grass is still 
at the back of your neck as you lie there, even if you have stopped thinking. Descartes 
was wrong. "Cognito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) is not the foundation stone of 
human existence. He would have been better to have said "I think therefore I am letting 
language create my linguistic world" thus realising that we humans also exist when we 
are not thinking. 
In this condition people are able to come to a vivid realisation that they can be at home 
in the wor1d even when there is no solid or permanent authority. They also are able to 
discover the locus of their own creativity, as predetermination by an extra-human agency 
is gone. In the process people also realise that because they do have the capacity for 
indeterminate creative actions they are personally responsible for these actions (see 
Kenney 1991). The same goes for a culture. This sets a thorough-going mandate for 
taking ethics seriously. 
The next task is to establish an appropriate form of ethics that does not slip back into 
determinism via universalism, predetermination, or a fixed steady state condition. 
Because, if the ethical prescription does this it will steer a human community back into 
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the folds of anxiety and the apparent need for its suppression. If this happens the culture 
moves once again away from the landscape, away from the possibility of an adaptive 
relationship, and away from the possibility of ecological sustainability. The cycle of 
determinism (grounded in the search for a universal authority) must remain broken. In 
keeping the cycle of determinism broken, a culture is able to sustain an adaptive 
relationship with the rest of the landscape because the source of ethical instruction is not 
some universal (invented) authority, but Nature in all its changing ways. 
I argue that any detelministic rationality (including modernity) will be incapable of 
achieving ecological sustainability. However, one way of changing this is to explore the 
possibility of flux. Process rationality acknowledges constant change. The 
acknowledgement of constant change, in turn, dissolves the need to search for a solid 
(universal) foundation for truth and reason, as nothing is fixed and no fixed authority 
is possible. Discarding the need for inventing a universal deterministic authority 
dissolves the foundations of oppressive social and political structures that appeal to a 
totalising (universalistic) authority as a basis for their legitimation. This demonstrates 
why totalitarianism of any form cannot be legitimated in ethics. 
Casting off the psychological need for a universal authority (by accepting mystery and 
process) also dissolves a major source of anxiety. In modernity this anxiety is constantly 
suppressed through control and manipUlation (sometimes gained through science) which 
is necessary in order to vindicate the illusion of order and permanence. The overcoming 
of the source of this anxiety makes room for creativity in the vacuum left from the 
departure of predetermination, a predetermination grounded in universals (Zimmerman 
1983; Foltz 1984; Kenney 1991). This creativity acknowledges indeterminacy and free 
will in all beings, thus enabling a re-enchantment of Nature, as indeterminacy allows 
mystery to be accepted as legitimate, and this mystery is enchanting. Nature is no longer 
seen as a thoroughly predictable and mundane Cartesian machine (chaos theory has 
helped to point us in this direction - see Percival 1991). Free will is then able to be 
balanced through the constraints of responsibilities via ethics, as we do have a choice 
in the matter and, therefore, are responsible for our creative actions. 
Ethical instruction comes through moral intuition which is symbolically and 
metaphorically recreated in language, ritual and ceremony. This ethical formula is not 
fixed but, like the rest of Nature, is in a constant state of creative flux as it responds to 
the flux of the landscape. Ethical instruction comes from Nature where Nature expresses 
itself through language. This establishes the possibility for ecological sustainability 
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where a culture and the rest of the landscape are able to recreate themselves in an 
indeterminate dialectical relationship of mutual becoming. 
6.7 ALTERNATIVES OR MORE OF THE SAME? 
Calls for a change in the culture and rationality of modernity are not new. Indeed the 
forms of rationality celebrated in modernity have been argued against for far longer than 
modernity itself. In this sense the debate between Parmenides (permanence) and 
Heraclitus (flux) are still as relevant today as they were then. However, the stakes are 
even higher today as the consequences of a non-process rationality and the expression 
of its inherent flaws have been realised more in this century than ever before, 
particularly in the global environmental crisis we are now experiencing. 
The call for a process form of rationality advocated in this thesis is not a call for a 
single form of this rationality but any rationality that arises in any landscape that is 
capable of authentically describing that landscape. This, of course, leaves the door wide 
open for many different forms of process rationality where different cultures express 
their own creativity in their own way in their own landscape. The ability to express an 
intuition of Nature in cultural discourse can only be captured in a society that sees the 
expression of intuition as a legitimate form of discourse. In this sense we can begin to 
understand what Heidegger was refening to when he suggested that what is questionable 
is sometimes worthy of thought, and what is unthinkable can sometimes be regarded as 
that which thinking is about (Mehta 1987). Similarly, for Snyder (1980) poetry walks 
that edge between what can be said and that which cannot be said, and where the words 
stop they point you in the direction of meanings the lie beyond words. Neuman (1959) 
shows the importance of art and ritual in their ability to foster the unconscious 
acceptance of biopsychic transformations in social life. If such a culture were practised 
in a Western context, then the works of people like Goethe, William Blake and Henry 
Thoreau would be taken seriously, not merely as entertainment, but as part of an ethical 
framework for decision making concerning the society's relationship with the rest of the 
landscape - such as resource use. 
The modern environmental movement of recent decades has pointed to ecological flaws 
in modern Western ways of life revealed as externalities, environmental impacts, 
resource depletion and pollution for example. From this movement has arisen a call for 
radical changes in the relationship between humanity and the rest of Nature expressed 
in a variety of ways. This includes inter alia the promotion of ecological economics 
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(Geogescu-Roegen 1976; Meadows et al 1992; Perrings 1987; Daly 1973,1989,1991), 
building more ecological principles into modern culture (Botkin 1991; Ehrlich 1988; 
Odum 1989), protecting the environment through better management of natural resources 
(Watling and Chape 1992), a balancing of human needs and environmental protection 
within the existing global economic order (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1986), changing the international economic order to smaller 
economies from their position of subordination and exploitation (e.g. Weaver 1992c; and 
Rosenberg 1993), and a greener science (Wynne and Mayer 1993). All of these 
perspectives involve bold attempts of achieving something in the way of improvement 
in the light of the deepening global environmental crisis, but fail in one crucial way -
they ignore the unsustainable character of modernity itself and a fortiori the rationality 
that supports it. 
Wynne and Mayer (1993) for example provide a critique of modern reductionist science, 
its role in policy making and its hegemony in the legitimation of knowledge in modern 
societies. They argue for a greener culture of "good science" where science moves 
towards a more ecological outlook explicitly accommodating the interconnectedness of 
ecosystem functioning. They, like Habermas (1975) also ask that science steps down 
from its privileged position and engages in discourse with other non-scientific groups 
where the inherent uncertainties in science are acknowledged and other forms of rational 
discourse are legitimised. 
I support this view but believe that it falls short of providing an adequate pre-requisite 
for ecological sustainability. Science qua knowledge must step down from its self 
constructed pedestal, but furthermore, knowledge qua discourse must make room for 
other narratives that are not necessarily mediated by knowledge. The expression of 
intuition through language and ritual are necessary PaIts of the process of a re-
enchantment of Nature. This enables the landscape to be 'heard' by people and be 
capable of informing them of how to relate with the landscape in a harmonious fashion. 
This is particularly important if cross-cultural dialogue is able to be conducted 
meaningfully, as mentioned above. This does not suggest that we throw out the baby 
with the bath water, as science and knowledge are valuable in their own right as forms 
of discourse. They should merely engage in conversation along side other narratives so 
that a culture can be informed from as many perspectives as are relevant and possible. 
Truth can then be established in an on-going process of conversation and negotiation. 
White (1967), for example, was an early proponent of the cultural causes of the current 
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environmental crisis who suggested that rationality, world view and religion are pivotal 
in the relationship between a human population and the rest of Nature. Schumacher 
(1973) commented on the environmental consequences of an economy based on 
Buddhism and suggested that such a cultural basis for economic life would foster 
ecological harmony more than modem Western economic structures are capable of 
achieving. Sponsel and Natadecha (1988) reflected on the consequences of capitalist 
modernity on the landscapes of Thailand suggesting that the cultural transformation from 
Buddhist to capitalist had dire repercussions for the landscapes of Thailand in general 
and the forests in particular. Whereas Schumacher, and Sponsel and Natenda explore the 
cultural ecology of a non-Christian religion, White searched within Christianity for an 
ecological ethical alternative capable of achieving the equivalent of ecological grace, and 
found examples in the theology of St Francis (Western) and Byzantine (Eastern 
European) Orthodoxy. The same can be said of the mysticism of Meister Eckhart and 
Thomas Aquinas. 
It is worth exploring these perspectives further to see how this thesis might agree or 
disagree. Hallman (1991) discusses the deep ecological (i.e. process) undercurrents in 
Nietzsche's work of the 19th century (e.g. 'The Will To Power', 'Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra', 'Untimely Meditations', 'Daybreak', 'Beyond Good And Evil', 'The Anti-
Christ') and how this compares with the views of White (1967) and others. Whereas, 
White sees the predominant threads of Western Christian thinking as an inherent 
problem with respect to environmental ethics, I focus on any deterministic doctrine 
grounded in the search for universals. For Nietzsche, such a deterministic doctrine was 
the dominant form of Christianity he experienced in Germany in the 19th century where, 
as Nietzsche's madman declared - "God is dead" and "all of us are his murderers" 
(Nietzsche 1974). As mentioned above, determinism can be expressed in many different 
forms, where a Christian form of predetermination such as Calvinism, is merely one 
manifestation out of many non-process, deterministic and unsustainable possibilities. 
Similarly, process rationality can also be found in a variety of cultural forms. To brand 
Western Christianity as totally devoid of creative possibilities is to misinterpret much 
of Christian theology including the gospels themselves. A notable example is the 
Western Christian mysticism of Thomas Aquinas, Francis of Assisi, and Meister Eckhart 
(see Arraj 1988, Caputo 1978; Mockler 1976; and Cox 1986 for example). 
Many regard Thomistic theology as an Aristotelianization of Christian thought (see 
Wiser 1983). More recent interpretations of Thomistic philosophy (e.g. Arraj 1988) as 
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a form of mysticism (as opposed to rationalism) have revealed that much of what 
Aquinas argues for is in complete agreement with Zen Buddhism which is process 
orientated. In particular, the role of intuition of Nature by means of an equivalent of 
zazen (a form of meditation) is seen as central to the creative realisation of an ethical 
basis for being in the world. For that matter, Pirsig (1974) could have written the same 
book but gave it the title of 'Thomistic Mysticism and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance'. This interpretation is gravely at odds with many other views of Thomistic 
theology and demonstrates the necessity for the employment of a hermeneutic of caution 
when exploring any text. This is not in defence of Christianity, it can defend itself, as 
can any other religion or culture, provided they are understood according to the terms 
in which their authentic meaning was originally captured in language. And here I echo 
Heidegger (1975) with his call for caution when attempting to uncover the 
uncoveredness (Le. truth) of meaning in symbols such as language. 
In this chapter we have deconstructed determinism and left the door wide open for a 
creative response to the question of ethics in general and environmental ethics in 
particular. This remains a central issue in the quest for understanding ecological 
sustain ability, as we have shown how and why a culture, any culture has a contingent 
morality. It can have a morality by default arising from determinism, where the moral 
consequences of determinism are unquestioned and accepted but acted out by the culture 
none the less. Because the basis of determinism is grounded in an appeal to a steady 
state condition, it immediately contradicts the actual indeterminate flux of Nature. This 
indeterminate character of Nature has been well documented in chaos theory (Davies 
1991), quantum physics (Bohm 1980; Capra 1975; Davies and Brown 1986; Davies and 
Gribbon 1991), biology (Waddington 1977; Sheldrake 1981), and chemistry (Prigogine 
1979) for example. But the question remains as to what ethical formula should inherit 
the vacuum left over following the departure of determinism. We need an ethics and we 
need to base this ethics on a set of foundations (if there are any) that will not obstruct 
the possibility of co-adaptation. The task of chapter 7 is to establish such a basis, and 
begin a process of ethical reconstruction. 
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CHAPTER 7 • AN ETHIC OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mOltal 
substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and again gathers; it forms and 
dissolves, and approaches and departs 
(Heraclitus Fragment LI)l. 
In the establishment of an ethic of ecological sustainability we are defining the means 
by which a culture (any culture) may recognise and employ a set of ecological 
instructions to live by. It is a process of uncovering an ecological wisdom. This wisdom 
is not only conceptual, it is also psychological, and existential. It is not sufficient to 
think in an ecologically benign fashion whilst acting contrary to such thought. 
Ecological wisdom must be able to come about even when we are not thinking. It is a 
way of life. People who achieve such a condition may never know it. But the landscape 
cares little for what we know or do not know. It merely responds to what we do. Our 
best intentions might be ecologically dysfunctional. I believe that this is precisely the 
condition of modernity. This being the case we need to deconstruct our best intentions. 
7.1 ON THE BASIS OF ECOLOGICAL MORALITY 
[W]e need a critique of all moral values; the intrinsic worth of these values must, 
first of all, be called in question. To this end we need to know the conditions 
from which those values have sprung and how they have developed and 
changed ... The intrinsic worth of these values was taken for granted as a fact of 
experience and put beyond question ... What if the 'good' [person] represents not 
nearly a retrogression but even a danger, a temptation, a narcotic drug enabling 
the present to live at the expense of the future? ... What if morality should turn 
out to be the danger of dangers? ... (Nietzsche 1956: 155) 
As mentioned previously, once ethics is taken seriously we must establish an appropriate 
ethical formula capable of delivering ecological sustainability. Such a formula must steer 
clear from even the seeds of determinism and the oppression it leads to. In this section 
I explore the basis for ethics which will lead to the possibility of a bioregional narrative 
as a means of reciting the autobiography of the landscape and hence deliver ecological 
sustainability. 
lCited in Kahn (1979). 
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The landscape engages in a relationship with all of the human and non-human 
individuals that make up the biological dimension of place. The actions of one 
individual may be cancelled out by another or be reinforced by another. But the end 
result is the product of the collective deeds of the human and non-human community. 
Goethe asserted, and Iagree, that humanity is its deeds (Reed 1984; Kaufmann 1980a). 
This is not an appeal to some form of materialism, but instead acknowledges that, in 
spite of our best intentions we are what we are through our actions. This is not all that 
we are, as the non-material is also real. 
In other words, the landscape cannot read your mind. If you have kind thoughts towards 
the landscape but still abuse it you cannot claim to be living in an ecologically 
sustainable relationship. And just like the man who says "I love you" as he beats his 
wife, the actions belie the words which do not reflect anything real. They become empty 
husks with no kernel, and I believe that a great deal of environmentalism is of this form. 
The difference lies in the meaning behind words in language and the actions that result. 
But it is also true that our deeds can result from outside language. For example, a 
culture may be engaging in an ecologically sustainable lifestyle but have never heard of 
the term "ecological sustainability" or anything with a similar meaning in their language. 
Also, language does not send our digestive system into action and yet one of the by-
products of this process is flushed down the toilet every day - and hence, engages in a 
physical relationship with the landscape. Conversely, our economy (in modern society) 
is a normative system of exchange that does result from thinking and language. It is 
planned. It does not always go according to plan, testimony to the abysmal failure of the 
free market to deliver the goods of plenty it has been promising for the last three 
centuries. But it is planned all the same. The question remains as to whether a planned 
ethical system, grounded in cognitive understanding and logic is the road to take for 
ethics, or whether the unplanned one is better. I suggest, and hope to make clear in the 
following pages, that the answer should be a combination of both, but more of that later. 
Another question needs to be asked: can environmental ethics be separated from other 
forms of morality, or is environmental ethics simply a flavour in an holistic moral soup. 
In previous chapters I have asserted that environmental concerns cannot be separated 
from those supposedly outside the environmental domain. This is because ecological 
sustainability is about the relationship between humanity and the rest of Nature in a 
particular landscape. This refers to the entire relationship, encompassing all forms of 
resource use, the production of wastes, the physical impacts of people and so on and so 
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fourth. For this reason developing an appropriate basis for environmental ethics cannot 
be separated from ethics in general, even down to the ethics of interpersonal relations 
within a human community. 
In the process of uncoveling such an ethical prescription in the following chapters, I will 
chart a course through the domain of culture, metaphysics, and a post-metaphysical 
sphere. The notion of sustainability as the 'autobiography of the landscape', by means 
of a 'bioregional narrative', precipitates out of this theoretical exercise. The latter term 
was put forward by Cheney (1989), whereas the former is my own. Both of these 
notions conceptually embody a great many, seemingly incompatible, conceptual fields. 
These include, for example, linguistics, intuition, perception, logic, psychology, art, 
science, ontology, epistemology, and mythology. 
7.1.1 THE PRIMORDIAL DIMENSION OF LANGUAGE 
A way of life in a landscape is influenced by opportunities and constraints to human 
activities. As mentioned above, these human activities are motivated in a variety of ways 
including active conceptual planning (executed through language), and passive doing in 
the absence of any cognitive plan as such (outside language). So, language is all 
impOItant for culture, although culture is also more than this. The language ingredient 
influences the way of life of a particular human community in a number of ways. One 
significant way is that is furnishes such a community with a set of opportunities and 
constraints quite different from non-cultural animals. These opportunities and constraints 
are those given by symbolic language. 
Science uses a symbolic language and is, thereby, a cultural activity. The practice of 
science is underwritten by metaphysics. But metaphysics? What might this be and why 
might it be important for purposes of coming to understand ecological sustainability? 
Metaphysics is thinking. It is a type of thinking about reality. It questions the structure 
of reality within and beyond our sensibilities. What must reality be like? In asking 
questions such as this we are thinking. We are using a human faculty to do something -
to think. Now the relationship between thinking and that which thinking is about is an 
important one. It is somewhat like the relationship between a camera (subject) and the 
thing to be photographed (object). Photographers know very well that different lenses 
and filters make different photographs even if the object being photographed does not 
change. The same is true for thinking about the world around us. Employ a particular 
standard of rationality and we are putting on a filter. Discard it for another and we have 
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another rational filter. What we 'see' is different even if the object which is 'looked at' 
remains unchanged. The way we think helps to shape our world, as all of the objects we 
'see' are coloured by the way we do the 'seeing'. 
But thinking - what is this made of? Kant discovered two types of knowledge a priori 
and a posteriori. Heidegger discovered two types of thinking primordial and fallen. They 
are not the same as Kant's discovery but when used together help to explain what 
thinking is about. Another personality is also helpful here - Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein 
showed Western philosophy the way to understanding the relationship between 
linguistics and logic, between language and the world we create for ourselves through 
language. He introduced the concept of the language game which is language working 
to a set of rules (Wittgenstein 1953). 
As mentioned in chapter 6 thinking and language are very closely related, sometimes 
completely interdependent. Sometimes but not always. When thinking is happening 
according to the rules of linguistic coherence it is the language game operating in an 
internally coherent fashion. It is grounded in the internal rules of language - derivative 
of those rules. This form of thinking leads the way to a priori knowledge which happens 
by deduction from linguistic predicates and their meanings. For example, all people are 
mortal; Bob Dylan is a person: Bob Dylan is mOltaL This is deductive reasoning using 
linguistic predicates in the absence of ever having met Bob Dylan. It is a priori. When 
thinking is happening independently of the rules of language it can be grounded in 
experiences outside those rules - primordial. This- is' what Heidegger in his latter works 
means by the word 'thinking' (see Hallibmton 1981; Kockel mans 1972; Dreyfus 1987; 
Dostal 1993). It is necessarily a posteriori in character. These two types of thinking are 
really two types of language, particularly in terms of the source of their inspiration and 
coherence. 
Now, metaphysics employs language in order to make sense of reality for humans. It is 
not merely enteltaining to establish what reality might be like, it is essential for a culture 
that wishes to live in a landscape, and a fortiori a culture that wishes to do this in an 
ecologically sustainable fashion. For cu1tural life to be ecologically sustainable it must 
live with the ever changing process of the landscape. Because culture is recreated 
through language it is all important that the language used and its rules do not contradict 
the ecological processes going on in and around that human community. If it does then 
the culture will exist in a contradictory relationship with the landscape, and hence be 
unable to establish a compatibility, an aptness. The relationship will not be adaptive and 
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cannot be ecologically sustainable. 
For ecological sustainability to be possible a culture must have a linguistic capacity for 
moving with the landscape. This linguistic capacity for on-going cultural adaptation must 
be ingrained in the language game, in the rationality, in the thought patterns of that 
human community. But how might this be achieved? This is where Heidegger's 
differentiation between primordial and fallen language becomes crucial. I mentioned this 
in chapter 6 but elaborate on it here to show the links this theory of thought and 
language has with fundamental ontological assertions to be presented below. Primordial 
language comes through real experiences outside the rules of language. It is empirical 
but not necessarily logical (as logic is merely the internal rules of language). It is these 
experiences, able to be captured in language that give a culture the possibility of 
becoming ecologically sustainable. 
But the question might then be asked - "surely if logic is only the rules of language then 
no absolute truth is possible and hence no absolute true condition of ecological 
sustainability?" This is correct. Truth is perspectivistic not absolute. But this is not to 
say that truth cannot evolve with the landscape as well and hence remain true yet 
constantly changing. How can this be? What is truth? Truth is a fiction that lies on the 
other side of the coin that reads 'false'. I say 'fiction' but do not mean this to interpreted 
as 'wrong'. Fiction simply acknowledges that it can only be, at best, an interpretation. 
This is because truth defined in language is only that language. 'Truth' that arises from 
beyond language is something quite different, and I believe is more real than the 
linguistic form. 
The linguistic form can be the same as the 'truth' arising from outside language, but this 
is dependant on that way language is used in a culture. If a culture uses primordial 
language it is capable of moving with the landscape even if and when the landscape 
changes. The 'truth' so defined primordially moves also. This is a 'truth' beyond true and 
false, beyond fact and fiction, beyond the rules of language. I will call it 'aptness'. It is 
apt and hence adaptive. It is neither true nor false it just is or it isn't, it occurs or it 
doesn't. When it occurs ecological sustainability becomes possible. When it is not able 
to occur ecological sustainability is positively obstructed. How is it obstructed? - when 
a culture does not employ primordial language as the basis for its rationality and 
thinking. Modernity definitely does not do this because modernity has relegated 
irrational thinking to the dunces corner. But primordial language is often irrational as 
it does not necessarily operate according to the rules of language. 
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Such language, and such forms of narrative can be called post-metaphysical, as they 
leave metaphysics behind. Wittgenstein helps to open the door to a post-metaphysical 
epistemology. For Wittgenstein, this non-rational 'knowledge' is attainable through art 
where we are able to apprehend the world sub specie aeterni (see Murdoch 1993). In 
this sense aesthetics and ethics are seen to co-inhabit the same realm beyond the reach 
of language, and are thereby transcendental (Wittgenstein 1922). 
The rules of language and the structure of the language game can arise out of primordial 
language but if and only if the plimordial aspect is fostered in that culture. How is this 
achieved - by experiencing the landscape vividly with perception cleansed of the grit and 
grime of accumulated norms. Such norms include the lUles of language - logic. 
Experience the landscape - don't think about itl This is how it can be achieved by any 
culture, as any culture is capable of turning language off for a while, and this is how it 
is and has been achieved in cultures around the world. But we moderns will find this 
velY difficult to come to terms with as we have inherited a form of thinking and a 
language game that positively obstlUcts it. This is because our language game is 
dominated by universalist discourses grounded in the absolute primacy of reason, and 
has been in this unfortunate condition ever since Socrates and Euripides. But how can 
illogical, primordial language be shown to have legitimacy? - through nihilism. 
Anaxagoras urged Western culture to believe that in the beginning all things were mixed 
together in chaos and then reason came and introduced order (Nietzsche 1956). What 
Anaxagoras failed to comprehend was the possibility and desirability of a cultural 
formula arising out of the coalescence of both reason and irrational creativity. This 
realisation had been made before him by Heraclitus who expressed poetically a 
dialectical world view encompassing a synergy of reason and intuition2 (Needleman and 
Appelbaum 1990; Kahn 1977). The point behind this diversion into thought and intuition 
2It is not surprising that much of the criticism that Heraclitus received came about 
as a result of misunderstandings rather than from genuine and constructive 
disagreements. For example, Heraclitus chose fire as a metaphorical symbol that 
expresses his dialectical views concerning the constant flux of reality. Theophrastus (one 
of the first natural philosophers) was one among many who mistook this for a theory 
of material monism - where all of material reality is derived from fire (Kahn 1979), thus 
placing Heraclitus in the scientific hall of fame as a prize idiot. But it is these very 
misunderstandings that set Western thought (as opposed to Western feelings, 
experiences, and intuition) down a wrong path, a path the West is still confidently 
walking. I will expand upon this line of though in a chapter 7 when we come to the 
process of deconstruction proper. I merely introduce such thoughts here by way of 
introduction, so don't be too concerned if they are difficult to penetrate. 
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and their differences relate to the opportunities and constraints a culture may have in 
acting out an existence in a landscape. Constraints to human cultural activity can come 
from the outside where the landscape places restrictions on cultural possibilities. For . 
example, a fishing culture is unlikely to flourish in the dry desert salt pans of Australia's 
lake Eyre. But constraints to cultural activity can and do come about through internal 
checks and balances such as rationality, world view, language, and ethics. No culture 
is free from such internal influences because all cultures qua culture employ symbolic 
language, which gives its members a cognitive map of the world to navigate with. The 
map is that of language and through language the culturally contingent world comes into 
being for people in that culture (Whorf 1956). 
This must not be confused with any notion of an objective world or reality outside the 
relativism of language. I refer to the 'world' as a subjective, contingent, perspectivistic, 
relative condition. In contradistinction to this I use the word 'reality' or 'Nature' when 
referring to that which lies within and beyond the world of language. If seen in this light 
we can begin to make more sense of mythologies such as: !lIn the beginning was the 
Word [logos; language] and the Word was with God [the underlying essence of 
Nature] ... all things [a 'thing' is a linguistic construct] were made through him3 [language 
gives 'things' names and thus creates them for the conscious linguistic 'world'] (John 
1: 1). The same metaphorical story relating the role of language in the 'creation' of the 
conscious linguistic world is seen in Buddhism, where according to Nan-ch'uan "During 
the period ... before the world was manifested there were no names. The moment the 
Buddha arrives in the world there are names and so we clutch hold of forms" (my 
emphasis, cited in Watts 1957). Similarly in Taoism we have at the opening of the Tao 
Te Ching "The nameless is the origin of heaven and earth; Naming is the mother of ten 
thousand things" (cited in Watts 1957). 
Ecological sustainability is a cultural phenomenon. It is not the fault of the landscape 
that the people of the Vunivia catchment (and Fiji generally) are not leading an 
ecological sustainable existence. Blaming hurricanes for smashing up an otherwise 
sustainable selective logging operation is no excuse. What happened to the natural forest 
that made it so vulnerable to hurricane damage in the first place? Surely hurricanes are 
part of Nature and should be lived with if ecological sustainability is able to unfold. The 
onus is on humanity to live with the rest of Nature not the other way around as it is 
in modernity. Because it is humanity's responsibility to recreate a sustainable life in a 
3'Him' is an unfortunate masculine metaphor that denotes a gender free entity. 
204 
landscape, we must investigate the various obstructions to responsibility that have been 
thrown into the path of sustainability. 
The basic underpinnings of the dominant Western genealogy of morals (which greatly 
influence culture in Fiji) lie in the common sense and philosophical ontology (theories 
about the structure and nature of reality) of what has become modern culture. The basic 
ingredients include atomism (reality is made up of autonomous 'bits'), a non-human 
transcendent creative agency (or no creativity in the· mechanistic model), and the 
assumption of underlying permanence. Nietzsche thrusts a cautionary note before us on 
the question of the Western world view. He tells us that the Western culture "has 
become mendacious and false down to its most fundamental instincts - to the point of 
worshipping the opposite values of those which alone would guarantee its health, its 
future, the lofty right to its future" (Nietzsche 1969:218, his emphasis). 
I agree with Nietzsche here (up to a point) and reject all of the metaphysical 
assumptions described in the above paragraph. However, to set the context for a process 
of ethical deconstruction I will introduce the structures inherited in the modern world 
and indicate their shortcomings, and thus the need to deconstruct them and rebuild a 
different set. 
7.2 MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Western moral philosophy has developed over many centuries with a heritage that 
reaches back to the Greeks, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and localised cultural 
influences. The variety of different traditions portray a great diversity of thought and 
tend to be divided into four principle groups - the deontologists, the utilitarians, the 
existentialists, and the mystics. The deontologists are well represented by Kant, the 
utilitarians by John Stuart Mill, the existentialists by Sartre. The mystics are in 
themselves a diverse group, but can be p0l1rayed, for example, by Christians such as 
Thomas Aquinas, and Meister Eckhart. 
The deontologists argue that morality must be based on a concept of absolute Duty, 
following a code of absolute moral law. A good example of this form of ethics can be 
seen in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The Kantian system rests upon a 
number of underlying assumptions. Firstly, what is crucial and relevant to question of 
morality are the motives behind actions, not the actions themselves, or the consequences 
of motives (Sprigge 1988). Morality has a basis beyond the world of phenomena, in an 
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a priori domain which legislates good will by means of what Kant called the categorical 
imperative. As such, the basis of moral worth lies in an inner reasoning, on the notion 
of the innate good of Reason as a an absolute basis for moral law (Taylor 1976). 
Humans are regarded as autonomous beings, and by viItue of possessing the faculty of 
reason, humans (and not plants or other animals) are absolute autonomous ends (rather 
than means) (Billington 1988). Because the moral imperative is deduced from pure 
reason a morally 'good' end cannot justify the means, as the focus is on the motives 
rather than the consequences of human actions. 
The utilitarians argue that the consequences of moral actions are more important than 
the motives. As such they can be called 'consequentialist' in orientation. The end can 
justify the means. Utilitarianism developed primarily as a philosophical basis for 
substantiating social reforms in England at the height of the industrial revolution. This 
ethical system served to legitimate the social and economic basis of 19th century English 
capitalism. As such, its focus was on defining a morality that was instrumental to 
securing the 'good life' as defined by the growing capitalist parliamentmy movement that 
had succeeded in toppling the English monarchy in English revolution of the late 17th 
centUlY (see Wiser 1983). The 'good life' was defined by the 'greatest happiness 
principle', originally coined by Presbyterian minister and philosopher Francis Hutcheson 
(1694-1747): "action is best, which procures greatest happiness" (Graham 1990). This 
idea was developed further by Jeremy Bentham (who was instrumental in organising 
institutional reforms in Victorian England), and later John Stuart Mill (Curtis 1981). 
This moral system is founded on a number of assumptions which I will spend the 
balance of the thesis refuting. Such assumptions include the notion of natural law in 
relation to human nature, that all humans merely seek pleasure and avoid pain; the 
assumption that happiness can be quantitatively measured and ranked; that happiness is 
grounded in egocentric wants; and that all humans are autonomous individuals existing 
in an alienated field of competitive selection. The hedonistic conception of happiness 
is one of the major flaws, but worse still is its inherent instrumental character. Morality 
is to serve a socia-economic system under this framework. One of the biggest critics of 
this moral system in relation to' human alienation was Marx (see Bottomore and Rubel 
1967), I will not pursue a thorough critique of utilitarianism, but mention to highlight 
its dominance in capitalist countries, and its differences with the deontological 
framework of Kant. Noteworthy is its empirical standpoint as opposed to the a priori 
basis of Kant. 
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Rather than critique the existentialist and mystical camps here I will move on to 
defining an ethics of ecological sustainability in the light of the two traditions mentioned 
above. The reason for this stems from the fact that the ethical system to be developed 
in this thesis arises from a combination of (a form of) existentialism, neo-Marxism, 
feminism, and mysticism. The existentialism is influenced by Heidegger (as opposed to 
Sartre), the neo-Marxist aspect is inspired by Habermas, and Freire, the feminist aspect 
is prompted by de Beauvois, Merchant, Radford-Reuther, and Salleh, and the mystical 
component is influenced by Goethe, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, EchkaIi, and Dogen. The 
various influences contribute to different aspects of the project of achieving ecological 
sustainability which will be explained in the chapter to follow. 
Before I continue I wish to point out (as indicated earlier) that I believe that no moral 
system can add anything to a culture to make ecological sustainability come about. 
Instead, I believe that an ecologically benign moral system is one that removes 
obstructions to sustainability. This is, therefore, a negative approach to morality. I see 
it as being similar to sculpture, where an ecologically sustainable form comes about 
through what is removed rather than what is added. This is because I believe, and intend 
to demonstrate in the following chapters, that the capacity for living an ecologically 
sustainable life is within all of us, only we tend to bury it beneath many layers of 
cultural norms, that build up in ever thickening encrusted residues through the course 
of many centuries. 
7.2.1 ETHICS AND REASON 
I will now undertake a brief critique of the deontological perspective which, unlike 
utilitarianism, is capable of being critical of the existing social and economic system. 
One of the first modern Western philosophers to question the basis of modern moral 
philosophy was Schopenhauer (1788-1860) who scrutinised the metaphysical foundations 
of Kantian ethics. Goethe (who influenced Schopenhauer) also questioned the Western 
moral framework as portrayed by Kant and provides a coherent alternative in his plays, 
paI1icularly Faust. Kant provides an ideal example for a critique of the foundations of 
deontological moral philosophy due to the fastidious and exhaustive employment 'of 
logic in the Kantian system. Kant was a logician par excellence and thereby bestowed 
moral philosophy with a logical tour de force in his ethical project. 
One of the first things that Schopenhauer acknowledges about the foundations of 
Kantian ethics is that they are supremely logical. Although, as Whitehead (1929) has 
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since pointed out, it is the duty of a philosophical critic to witness the coherent nature 
of the argument to be critiqued, as it is not on the grounds of inconsistency that the 
argument is to be fought. The flaws of Kantian ethics lie not in Kant's lack of logical 
proficiency (of which he was well endowed), but in the ontological foundations upon 
which his very logical ethical system was built. 
Kant's discovery of the a priori and a posteriori categories of knowledge were a great 
achievement. However, in his attempts at exegetical illustration of the efficacy of his 
philosophical system he stretches the stOlY line too far. What Kant believed to be the 
ultimate foundation for all knowledge was 'pure reason' (Kant 1907), even though we 
need empirical a posteriori contributions (Oldroyd 1986). He also applied this system 
to the domain of ethics in his book - Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (see 
Kant 1991). It is the assumptions that underlie this work that Schopenhauer ruthlessly 
destroys in his alternative - On the Basis of Morality. 
Schopenhauer's bone of contention was Kant's assumption that ethics can have a basis 
a priori, grounded in the categorical imperative4, and thus be employed according to the 
bed-rock of reason (see Hamlyn 1980). This stems from Kant's belief that morality is 
brought about by an inner reasoning. As Kant reflects - "Two things fill the mind with 
ever-increasing awe, ... the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me" (cited 
in Billington 1988). If reason is solely responsible for the basis of good will, then the 
Kantian system is celiainly robust. But should real experience, or illogical creative 
influences play even a small part in the basis of actions of moral value then the pillars 
of the Kantian system begin to crack. The starting point of Schopenhauer's argument lies 
in the relationship between virtue and the highest happiness. According to Schopenhauer 
the 'ancients' (read Greeks) saw virtue and the highest happiness as synonymous -
eudaemonism. Much of Christian theology then changed the rules and gave the highest 
happiness the meaning of salvation, where virtue became a means to this end (see 
Schopenhauer 1965; Cheney 1989b). The problem arises (also in the case of Kant) in 
4Kant's 'categorical imperative' is an unconditional law of universal instruction and 
can be contrasted with a 'hypothetical imperative'. The latter gives rise to 'prudential' 
reasoning which may not be universal in its application, but changes with regard to the 
context of the situation at hand. This was insufficient for defining the basis of morality 
according to Kant, who reduced hypothetical imperatives to a subordinate position in a 
moral hierarchy. The 'Ought' is an unconditional instruction grounded in an assumed 
metaphysical law. 
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establishing the criteria for what constitutes virtue as this salvational means5• 
It remains questionable as to where the locus of legitimation for standards of vil1ue are 
to be found. Kant develops a philosophy of virtue in his Critique of Practical Reason 
(Kant 1956), establishing a bivalent taxonomy of genuine and adoptive vi11ue. The 
former is grounded in pure reason (hence a priori), forms the basis for the whole of 
morality, is the ground of the categorical imperative, and is regarded as masculine. The 
latter is comprised of feelings and intuitions (a posteriori), is the domain of hypothetical 
imperatives, and is regarded as feminine. Because of this, Kant rejects the empirical (a 
posteriori) aspect of knowledge as unworthy of forming the basis of ethics6• This stems 
also from Kant's proclamation that humans are rational beings. Schopenhauer, on the 
other hand argues strongly that humans are also irrational, and that this irrationality is 
pa11 of what constitutes our humanness. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Whitehead, and Bergson 
would agree. As such, Schopenhauer asserts that the a posteriori empirical dimension 
(which is often irrational) is all important even for the basis of ethics. Schopenhauer 
argues that Kant takes the ontological strength of pure reason too far into what amounts 
to an act of spurious philosophical faith: 
pure reason is, therefore, taken here not as an intellectual faculty of [humanity], 
though it is indeed nothing but this; on the contrary, it is hypostatized [by Kant] 
as something existing by itself, without any authority; and the deplorable 
philosophy of our times can serve as an illustration of the results of that most 
pernicious example and precedent (Schopenhauer 1965:63). 
Arguments that dismantle the primacy of reason as a basis for good will can also be 
found in socia-biology. For example, Lorenz (1966) asserts that compassionate 
behaviour is an integral aspect of the human character, where "all specifically human 
faculties [including moral responsibility] could have evolved only in a being which, 
before the very dawn of conceptual thinking, lived in well organised communities" 
(ibid.:246). As such, compassionate behaviour would have been practised "aeons before 
SIt is interesting to note that some types of radical environmentalism including some 
forms of deep ecology work as salvational systems where the highest happiness (in this 
case biospherical egalitarianism) is mediated with a form of virtue (the deep ecology 
platform). What this does is establish a form of neo-stoicism where laws of virtue are 
installed as predicates to the salvational project (Cheney 1989b). 
6In Kant's system the decision procedure for establishing the criteria of virtue is 
conducted through an appeal to a priori moral imperatives. The actual content of the 
moral decision has an empirical (a posteriori) component which is then judged by the 
a priori system (Kant 1956). 
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[humans] developed conceptual thought and became aware of the consequences of [their] 
actions" (ibid.:246). Similarly, Midgely (1978) has suggested that compassionate 
behaviour is also apparent in non-human animals such as whales and wolves where 
social bonds structure their lives. In support of this view Levy (1984) contends that 
emotions, including compassion, have a long evolutionary history and are not merely 
culturally contingent (i.e. some are innate). Wrangham (1987) also tells us that "shared 
behaviour can be viewed as part of an 'ancestral suit' which, though admittedly 
hypothetical, offers a logical statting point for behavioral reconstruction at any time 
during human evolution" (ibid.:5). Such views are also supported by Wilber (1983) who 
explores the evolution of the human consciousness. 
In the domain of moral philosophy Taylor (1976) suggests that, according to a Kantian 
system of ethics (which is promulgated by reason), "To act immorally is to act contraty 
to Reason; it is to commit a sort of metaphysical blunder.." (ibid.:230). A more recent 
example of the unquestioned faith in logic in relation to ethics can be found in Raphael 
(1994). Intuitionism, as a participant in the game of ethics, has been side-lined by 
Raphael because apparently "it does not meet the needs of a philosophical theOlY, which 
should try to show connections and tie things up in a coherent system" (ibid.:55). It 
seems that in Raphael's view, the job of ethics is to serve philosophy as opposed to the 
other way around. Furthermore, intuitionism may indeed "tie things up in a coherent 
system" but that system may not be logic but Nature itself. 
7.2.1 THE EMPIRICAL IMPERATIVE 
In contrast to the views of Kant, an empirical imperative lies at the heart of 
Schopenhauer's ethical system. He uses this ground of experience for deconstructing the 
existing foundations of modem ethics and as the basis for a process of ethical 
reconstruction. He agrees that the Kantian system is logically robust, but shows how 
these logical foundations are disconnected with the real world. In a similar vein, Taylor 
(1976) suggests that -
Kant's system thus represents the rational, logical conclusion of the natural or 
true morality that was begotten by the Greeks, of the absolute distinction that 
they drew, and that [people] still want to draw. This is the distinction between 
what is ... and what ought to be ... No one has ever suggested that Kant was 
irrationaL. His greatest merit is that he was consistent. He showed [people] what 
sort of metaphysic of morals they must have - if they suppose that morality has 
any metaphysic, or logic and method of its own. He showed what morality must 
be if we suppose it to be something rational and at the same time non-empirical 
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or divorced from psychology, anthropology, or any science of [humanity]" 
(ibid.:23l). 
As such the Kantian style of ethics "may canyon its disputations and make a show in 
the lecture halls, but real life will make it an object of ridicule" (Schopenhauer 
1965:121). Billington (1988) makes a similar comment: "The argument that moral issues 
can be resolved in the court of reason and rationality seems to be falsified by the 
realities of the human situation ... Some of the noblest acts in the histOlY of human 
behaviour have been quite illogical" (ibid.:76). 
Moral philosophy of this form (i.e. established on a purely a priori basis) becomes a 
pantomime for pedants, but contributes little or nothing to the project of ecological 
sustainability. This is because an environmental ethics capable of fostering ecological 
sustainability must be tied to the landscape, and not merely to a sophisticated system of 
rules of language that sits blind-folded in a corner, divorced from reality, playing with 
itself. 
In this regard, personal experience of Nature is pronounced by Goethe's Faust as sure 
way to virtue in a personalised path to self discovelY, of liberation, a way of wisdom:-
If only I might walk upon the mountaintops 
In your beloved light [referring to the moon], 
Soar with spirits through the mountain caverns, 
Wander across the meadows in your twilight 
And, cleansed of all these fumes of learning, 
Wash myself sound again in your dews! 
(Faust Part 1:22) 
What is needed is an ethics that falls into line with the constant flux of Nature in an 
ever-changing landscape. An ethics established only on reason implies a steady state 
somewhere (i.e. is normative to the core). But you will not find this anywhere in Nature. 
The employment of reason (corresponding to the rules of the language game) as the 
foundation for ethics, and hence 'correct behaviour', leads directly to a normative system 
and back to the plethora of anxieties that result. A normative basis for ethics is not 
adaptive as the landscape is constantly changing. The basis must be descriptive and 
evolutionaIY - hence the need for primordial language. This is because Nature, being so 
fond of insolently breaking our invented rules, defies our attempts to place it under the 
commanding voice of reason. Nature consistently ignores the categorical imperative, 
which is probably why Kant put humanity above the rest of Nature, where humans (and 
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not other beings) are the only absolute ends, by virtue of being endowed with the glory 
of reason. But I finnly believe that Kant was very wrong in this respect. We must learn 
or re-Iearn to move with the flow of Nature. This demands that we unmercifully smash 
the moral balTiers between ourselves and other members of the landscape. We must find 
ourselves once again, in Nature. 
Again from Faust:-
Alas, am I still stuck in this jail! [refelTing to the dominance of reason] 
Dank godforsaken hole in the wall 
Where even the dear light of Heaven 
Breaks mournfully through painted glass; 
(Faust, Part 1:23) 
Normative ethical systems lead to the need for manipulating Nature (including human 
society) into line with the normative ideal where non-human beings become mere means 
to our own ends. This asks that reality conform to our model. It sets up a projection of 
how the world ought to be (according to a model in our head) and then engineers an 
outcome deemed 'ethical' by the stoics that legitimate the language and rationality of 
modernity. This is what management does, and an ethical system set upon a priori 
foundations (such as that of Kant) serves to legitimate such management. This is what 
is so wrong with much of modern Western environmentalism. It is the height of self-
righteous idolatly. And here I revisit Nietzsche's scathing attack introduced in chapter 
2: 
Your pride wants to impose your morality, your idea, on nature ... you demand 
that she be nature "according to the Stoa," and you would like all existence to 
exist only after your own image .... And some abysmal arrogance finally still 
inspires you with the insane hope that because you know how to tyrannize 
yourselves - Stoicism is self tyranny - nature, too, lets herself be tyrannized: is 
not the Stoa a piece of nature? (Nietzsche 1973:15-16). 
7.3 INTRODUCING THE BIOREGIONAL NARRATIVE 
One way of establishing a conceptual framework for combining language, landscape and 
culture is through the concept of the bioregional nalTative. This idea has been developed 
by Cheney (l989a; 15?89b) as a means of providing a spatialized and contextual 
component into environmental ethics that recognises the centrality of language to the re-
creation of culture in a particular place. I believe that the bioregional nalTative idea 
presents a coherent framework for:-
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a. dismantling the humanitylNature dualism, 
b. avoiding totalizing and universalistic vehicles of domination, and 
c. providing a theoretical template that enables a politics of difference7 to 
coalesce with a vivid landscape dimension in social discourse and cultural 
evolution through adaptation. 
As shown above, a basis for social and cultural instruction must be capable of fostering 
cultural adaptation to landscape in such a way that it does not, inadveltently, carry seeds 
of domination and/or anxiety, and hence the downfall of its aims. Such domination, at 
the level of language, can be sustained through the reification of privileged8 discourses 
that colonise the minds of those it politically captures (Best and Kneller 1991). The 
political and linguistic alternative that has been richly developed in some forms of 
feminist and post-structuralist theory is that of a non-colonising, non-alienating discourse 
of difference (see Cheney 1989b; Young 1990; Phillips 1993). It is from this perspective 
that a cohesive critical viewing of environmental ethics is made possible in the search 
for sustainable ethical formulae. 
A good example of the value of this non-normative, evolutionary approach can be seen 
in the debate between ecofeminism and deep ecology. Ecofeminist and postmodern 
theory has helped to pinpoint some problems in the otherwise robust ethical standpoint 
of deep ecology. The complaints of ecofeminism lie in the discovery of androcentric and 
totalizing tendencies in the ontological and epistemological cannons of deep ecology 
(Salleh 1984; 1992; 1993). A postmodern view reinforces this by demonstrating the 
existence of a form of neo-stoicism as a subtext beneath the deep ecology platform 
(Cheney 1989b), which can lead to more radical criticism of deep ecology as a form of 
ecofascism (see Salleh 1992; Bessarab 1992). 
In order to introduce the bioregional narrative concept I will first revisit the criteria for 
7The politics of difference refers to the avoidance of universalist political discourse 
that is endemic in modernist theoretical frameworks. The recognition of particularism 
vis-a-vis the local situation is fostered in much postmodern philosophy. This issue 
becomes increasingly important when considering the way a social discourse such as 
ethics, must be capable of being adaptive to a patticular real and unique landscape. This 
issue will be discussed further in chapter 7, and 9. 
8A 'privileged' discourse is one that claims to possess universal coherence and 
thereby be capable of judging other discourses from its 'privileged' position. It will be 
discussed further in chapter 7. 
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an ecologically adaptive (and hence sustainable) culture. As mentioned above, language 
is an all important feature of culture. In introducing Heidegger's distinctions between 
fallen and primordial language I indicated the importance of the primordial component. 
This aspect is grounded in experience of the realm outside language - hence the 
landscape. For this reason it tends to be both poetic and esoteric. It is esoteric as those 
who have not had similar experiences will find it difficult or impossible to understand 
the meaning of statements generated from such experiences. A Zen koan works in a 
similar fashion, where a question (the koan) is put to the zen student by the master. The 
question cannot be answered logically as it asks something from outside language. The 
COlTect answer will not be logical (see Watts 1957; Abe 1981). 
For this ethical situation to succeed in a culture there are a number of conditions that 
must be met. These conditions tend to be obstructed or even overtly prevented in 
modern societies. They include having real experiences beyond the reach of language. 
These experiences happen to us all the time but tend to be ignored or suppressed. 
Secondly, the decision making structures (personal, interpersonal, and large scale) need 
to be thoroughly democratic where no individual is prevented from gaining access to 
speech. Uncoerced, consensus orientated, democratic discourse is vital. This allows the 
experiences of all of the community to be shared and serve to guide the actions of a 
group. Not only must this discourse be democratic in its style, it must also be 
democratic in its content. Legitimate forms of discourse must include non-scientific 
knowledge, and also non-cognitive understanding (that come via primordial language 
and the experiences that precede it). Such political discourse becomes an on-going 
process of negotiation and conversation. 'Truths' are negotiated by the group. There must 
also be an effective framework for extending this democracy to the non-human world, 
where negotiation and conversation is conducted not with people but with the landscape. 
Obstructions to these conditions are rife in modern culture. The reasons for this include 
the primacy given to reason (the rules of language) in social discourse, totalitarian 
political structures arising from universalism (such as the primacy of reason, or the 
primacy of one standard of rationality). Another problem is the lack of appropriate 
mythologies and rituals which foster authentic relationships conducted outside language. 
Modernity does have its own myths (see Campbell 1988), but what it lacks are myths 
that can foster ecological sustainability. 
As mentioned above, I believe one of the most significant by-products of modern life 
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is anxiety. This is because the cultural equation of modernity is unauthentic. I use the 
term 'unauthentic' to refer to non-adaptive - hence incompatible with Nature. This 
incompatibility with Nature includes an incompatibility with our humanness because we 
are pat1 of Nature. As such, unauthenticity is inhuman, alien, and alienating. 
Unauthenticity nurtures anxieties due to the unconscious realisation that what is 
happening is non-adaptive and incompatible with our humanness (see Heidegger 1962). 
This sense of 'wrong' is expressed as a psychological tension - anxiety. As such, one of 
the principle pass-times, and often the primary purpose, in people's lives in modern 
culture is the suppression of these anxieties. For example, there are the egotistic power 
games of domination, the mindless gathering of material wealth as a surrogate for 
happiness, escapism with the aid of things such as television, the leisure industlY, 
holidays, sport9. Chemical addiction to alcohol, nicotine and other drugs is another 
example. These simply help to sweep the symptoms of a non-adaptive (and hence 
unsustainable) culture beneath the carpet as they do not confront the causes of the 
tensions (anxieties) that are motivating such a plethora of psychological diversions 
(Wilber 1983) Many different religions in many different cultures are attempting to help 
people realise the dynamics of this psychological process. 
The suppression of these symptoms of psychological problems is not different in type 
from some forms of environmental management that sweep the symptoms of an 
unsustainable way of life beneath the carpet. Both forms of 'symptom control' serve to 
perpetuate the problem itself by allowing the culture to avoid confronting the causes of 
the problems at the source. And fUlthermore it is a common source - unauthenticity, 
where people are living behind the veil of Maya, in a deluded condition. 
Before launching into the details of my creative alternative to modernity in relation to 
human ecology, I first wish to situate my work in a tradition that gives it a history. This 
also serves to demonstrate that what I am doing in this thesis is not anything new it 
is not a new 'ism'. It has all been said before in many different places. My task is to 
help reveal the meanings behind such a tradition in the midst of so much 
misunderstanding. I present a genealogy of a difference. 
7.4 A GENEALOGY OF A DIFFERENCE 
~ do not suggest that these things are bad in themselves, only the way they are used 
in modern life as a means of suppressing anxieties through escaping from the world and 
distracting the consciousness from the unconscious tensions that are being perpetuated 
by such escapism. 
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The philosophical views that I develop in this thesis, which I regard as integral to the 
project of understanding ecological sustainability, are not put forward merely to 
antagonize those who might disagree with them. They come through personal reflection 
and experience where the mainstream views of many people around me ran a 
contradictory course. In spite of this difference, I refused to relent and thereby move 
back into the fold of the dominant social and cultural machinery of legitimation. This 
refusal has meant losing support from some (generally professional) circles, but gaining 
individuality and the fulfilment that comes with being true to oneself. As such, what you 
encounter in these pages is not a voice from a professional mask, but my very own 
deeply personal views which, like a trout, rises in my professional outlook breaking the 
surface right here where you read. 
In my theoretical explorations I have come across many other thinkers who share similar 
views. In my wanderings in the theoretical wilderness I have managed to uncover a 
healthy, yet ostracised, tradition that has for centuries been banished to the periphery of 
Western thinking. What I present here is a brief assortment of forms of thought from 
this tradition of difference. It comprises a selected genealogy to my work (as not all are 
mentioned), and the various thinkers I refer to embody the ancestral figures of what is 
essentially a counter-cultural movement not afraid to stand and be counted. The cultural 
framework that this genealogy stands in opposition to is that which has culminated in 
modernity, but traces its roots back to ancient Greece. 
7.4.1 APOLLO AND DIONYSUS 
To begin, I wish to return to an allegory introduced in chapter 2 - a dialectical 
relationship that was acted out on the stage in Attic drama in the 5th and 6th century 
b.c. The two principal characters of concern are the two artistic embodiments of the 
spirit of Greek tragedy: Apollo and Dionysus. Dionysus, originating in Thrace and 
Phlygia, is the god of chaos, intuition and instinct, destruction and creativity, feltility 
and productivity, celebrated through intoxication and abandonment (Kenney 1991: 
Pfeffer 1972). Apollo, from Olympus, represents sublimity and form, reason, order, and 
serenity (Pfeffer 1972). Hinduism also has a similar couplet with Vishnu (corresponding 
to Apollo) and Shiva (Dionysus) (Campbell 1988). 
The interplay of these two gods on the tragic stage encapsulated a metaphorical union 
between two opposites similar to the Taoist notion of yin and yang. Sustaining this 
dialectical relationship became expressed in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, 
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which, according to Nietzsche reflected the height of ancient Greek culture (see Raphael 
1959; Nietzsche 1956; Pfeffer 1972; Kenney 1991). This relationship does not give 
primacy of one god over the other but maintains their differing features in a dialectical 
interplay symbolic of the Greek world view at the time. This symbolic theatrical 
dynamic was not to last, as with the arrival of Socratic rationality in the wake of 
Anaxagoras, Parmenides and Democritus, the Greek world view was changing to one 
that rejected this dialectic and gave primacy to reason and order. This new cosmology 
was depicted in the plays of Euripides who was a contemporary of Socrates, and sought 
to capture this new rationality in drama. 
Whereas Sophocles and Aeschylus express the dynamic and dialectical interplay between 
reason and instinct, Euripides on the other hand saw it as his duty to allow reason to 
triumph. For example, Anaxagoras told us that in the beginning all things were mixed 
together; then reason came and introduced order. As such Nietzsche tells us that: 
even as Anaxagoras, with his concept of reason, seems like the first sober 
philosopher in a company of drunkards, so Euripides may have appeared to 
himself as the first rational maker of tragedy. Being of this opinion, Euripides 
had necessarily to reject his less rational peers [and as such] would never have 
endorsed Sophocles' statement about Aeschylus - that this poet was doing the 
right thing, but unconsciously; instead [Euripides] would have claimed that since 
Aeschylus created unconsciously he couldn't help doing the wrong thing 
(Nietzsche 1956: 81). 
And so with Euripides, Apollo begins to take dominance on the stage of drama and in 
the process, sends the spirit of tragedy headlong to its death, And again from Nietzsche lO 
"If the old tragedy was wrecked, aesthetic Socratism is to blame, and to the extent that 
the target of the innovators was the Dionysiac principal of the older art we may call 
Socrates the god's chief opponent..," (ibid.:82). The philosophical works of Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle formed the foundations of modern Western rationality. Should this 
rationality be depicted in drama, Apollo would still be standing firmly in a dominant 
position on the stage. 
It is interesting to note that the first lunar module to touch down on the moon was not 
called 'Dionysus'. And here there is something of a cosmic irony. Had Apollo not been 
so dominant since the 5th century b.c. Western culture might have spent its energies and 
resources on authentically enriching its quality of life, rather than blindly increasing the 
lOSee Pfeffer (1972) and Tejera (1987) for an account of Nietzsche's views on Greek 
thought. 
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quantity of its dross. You see, it is the Apollian influence that has led Western culture 
to what it claims to be its greatest 'successes', but Apollo has also been there to deliver 
its greatest failures. Why Western culture thinks that it needs to venture into outer space 
is beyond me. I think it is because it has forgotten that there will always be a mysterious 
frontier right here on ealih, right here in our own minds. 
In my view Dionysus needs to be brought back to centre stage in order to set the 
dialectic back in motion - a balance between Apollo and Dionysus. This is not an 
iconoclastic Dionysian alternative. Instead what is sought is a new form of conceptual 
equality which emerges spontaneously from the dialectical conflicts and reconciliations 
of reason and intuition, chaos and order, knowledge and feeling, alt and science, female 
and male. 
7.4.2 GOETHE 
The challenge to Apollian dominance in Western culture was taken up by many different 
thinkers who, by the nature of their understanding and passions, tend to be found within 
the realm of 'art'. The Gennan Enlightenment of the late 18th century inspired inter alia 
by the philosophy of Rousseau and Spinoza, and the romantic art of many others, sought 
to recapture in mainstream Western culture the spirit of aesthetics and 'art'. The rise of 
Cartesian and Newtonian science and its flourishing in the French Enlightenment had 
stripped conceptions of reality orits mystery and beauty. Ali was becoming exiled as 
an 'other' to the real world of objective science, economics and industrial technology, 
only to be objectified and placed upon the walls of aristocratic and bourgeois society as 
an aesthetic instrument. The active role of art in the life praxis of Western culture was 
thrown out, and it has become a mere appendage. Preeminent among the Enlightenment 
thinkers that recognised the dire cultural consequences of the loss of an artistic spirit 
was Goethe (1749-1832). 
Most well known as a poet, novelist and play-write, Goethe embodied an inspired 
challenge to the emerging paradigmatic underculTents of modernity. His poetry, novels 
and plays acted as a platform from which to convey a serious message to European 
culture. This message included the dangers concerned with: a. bestowing primacy to 
reason over and above intuition, b. over-estimating the human ability to possess 
knowledge about reality, c. losing sight of the fluidity of reality, and d. the separation 
of humanity from the rest of Nature. The work which most cohesively captures this 
message is his life long project - Faust. 
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In his earlier works, traces of this artistic view of culture emerge in different contexts. 
For example, in his play Iphigenie auf Taw'is Goethe reworks the Euripidean (5th 
century b.c.) plot so that Iphigenie (the Greek Princess of Altemis) is guided by feelings 
(rather than merely reason as is the case with Euripides) in her various decisions that 
determine her own fate. The message from the play stands closer to the thematic 
undercurrents of Aescylean drama which (according to Nietzsche) enhances the true 
spirit of tragedy and re-creates the dialectical essence of pre-Socratic Greek culture. 
According to Reed (1984:57) "Iphigenie traces the victory of humane actions over tragic 
possibilities" . 
Of central importance to the creative success of Goethe was his insistence of 'being 
himself, which included the landscape as an aspect of this self. In Nature he discovers 
his real roots in which he realises the continuity of himself with Nature. As such Goethe 
is not someone writing about Nature from the outside, but someone providing a vivid 
and creative description from within. In this regard he is echoed in the 19th century by 
Thoreau, Emerson, and Whitman across the Atlantic. Goethe emphasises in a number 
of different works the up-welling of creativity from within, which applies not only to 
artistic motivation but also moral inspiration as exemplified in Iphigenie and later Faust. 
Blow at the sparks and try to breed 
A fire out of piles of ashes! 
Children and apes may think it great, 
If that should titillate your gum, 
E ut from heart to heart you will never create 
If from your heart it does not come. 
(Faust, lines 534-45) 
On epistemology Goethe dismantles the dualism between fact and fiction arguing that 
the novel is both. Anything that assumes itself to be only fact is itself a double fiction. 
This theme was later taken up by Nietzsche who declared that facts are precisely what 
we do not have, as instead all knowledge is interpretation, perspectivistic - a fable (e.g. 
The Will To Power, The Gay Science). Such a view leads reason round in a grand 
tautological circle so that it proves itself to be logically consistent but not necessarily 
connected to Nature. This leads to the discovery of nihilism at the level of epistemology 
and forms the basis for theoretical deconstruction. 
The theme of the coalescence of art and Nature is also developed by Goethe, particularly 
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in his theoretical excursions into the natural sciences. According to Reed (1984) 
Goethe's linking of aIt and Nature are more than mere coincidence as both comprise 
aspects of the overall unity of his thinking which focuses on Nature's 'truth' as aptness 
in necessity, and that of a work of art which connects with and represents such 'truth'. 
In a similar vein Cezanne has said that art "is a harmony parallel to Nature" where his 
task was to adapt impressionism to the task of expressing this point (Honour and 
Flemming 1982:545). For Goethe, existence within Nature and human artistic expression 
are influenced by the same creative forces (Kaufmann 1980a,b; Lange 1968). This idea 
is rekindled in the work of Nietzsche, and later Bergson, and Heidegger, and more 
recently in forms of postmodern thinking, aesthetic theOlY, deep ecology, and feminist 
theOlY. This notion of an underlying unity in Nature, surfacing in art and human 
creativity leaves the door open to an artistic theory of human evolution guided by moral 
intuition as a basis for ethical instruction. This idea is not inconsistent with the 
evolutionmy processes of adaptive 'instruction' in the non-human living realm. Goethe 
also uncovers the connections between love, art and Nature as being more than 
metaphoricaL This theme will be further developed in chapter 8. 
On science Goethe presents one of the earliest metaphysical challenges to the emerging 
modern scientific paradigm which was being refined at the time by Kant, who was a 
contemporalY of Goethe. Few people have recognised the coherence of Goethe's 
arguments against Caltesian, Newtonian, and Kantian views of reality and knowledge 
(Kaufman 1980a). Goethe begins with a rejection of atomism that can lead to the kind 
of ontological taxonomies developed by Aristotle, and later Kant. This view argues 
against the tendency of dividing up the world into fragments for purposes of 
categorisation which had been developed to great lengths by Linneaus at the time with 
plant taxonomy. Goethe took seriously the terrain that lay on the taxonomic boundaries 
arguing for an acceptance of continuous variation. This view lends itself to challenges 
of the notion of the 'species' as a fixed ontological unit which instead shows it to be an 
epistemological convenience. 
Such ideas ran against the surging tide of the scientific community which was at pains 
to firm up the foundations of its foundationaIist epistemology, rooted in the assumptions 
of the primacy of reason going back to Socrates and the reification of Aristotelian and 
later Kantian categorisation. Because of this Goethe's scientific views were doomed to 
'failure' in sociological terms notwithstanding their efficacy in relation to the fuzzy and 
fluid character of the real world and humanity's place in it. They can be seen as a 
modem example of HeracIitian rationality inspired by a very personalised experience of 
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Nature as was the case with Heraclitus. Noteworthy in Goethe's agreement with 
Heraclitus is his realisation of the importance of process rather than form, which led to 
a conception of science as the study of morphogenesis - the pattern of morphological 
development as a continuous process (Reed 1984). 
Goethe insisted on a essential unity of humanity and the rest of Nature as mentioned 
above. As part of this project he set out to prove this by demonstrating (along with other 
scientists at the time) the existence of the inter-maxillary bone in the human skull, 
which, in its apparent absence, provided 'proof of the higher position of humanity in 
God's creation. For Goethe this bone vestige provided the 'keystone' of humanity as it 
brings us back down to ealth and places us among the other animals. For Goethe, soul 
and mind are also part of Nature (Kaufmann 1992). These views of an ontological unity 
in relation to humanity's place within Nature were partly influenced by the earlier 
philosophy of Spinoza (Vincent 1987) who even today provides inspiration for radical 
environmentalism such as deep ecology (e.g. Naess, Sessions, Devall). Spinoza, as 
interpreted by Goethe, argued for a transcendental conception of the divine as opposed 
to a transcendent one that required only unquestioning faith (Reed 1984). This 
recognised the possibility of intuitive (mystical) experiences of this divine presence to 
be accessible to people in life, in earthly existence. This brings the notion of the 'fall' 
in Christianity into question (Campbell 1986; 1988) where it is not a permanent loss, 
but a forgetfulness of what lies all around (Heidegger 1959). And as Thomas Aquinas 
suggests his version of the Gospels "The Kingdom of the Father [sic] is spread upon the 
ealth and men [sic] do not see it" (Guillaumont et al 1959). It then falls into line with 
many Asian religious traditions that see the presencing of the divine as not only 
accessible to humanity but personally attainable in life (e.g. Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Taoism). 
Like Bacon before him and Thoreau after him, Goethe emphasises the importance of 
experience of the world in the path to understanding it. But although sustaining an 
empiricist epistemology as I do, Goethe, Thoreau, and I, unlike Bacon, forego an 
empiricist, atomist ontology. As such, Nature must be apprehended as an experience of 
its unity, otherwise 'every separate thing is [in the book of Nature] only a dead letter' 
(Goethe 1784, cited in Reed 1984). Unlike Descartes who invents an a priori 'truth' and 
then exercises a plethora of rationalistic legitimation to defend it, Goethe discovers an 
a posteriori 'truth' and dec1ares that it has efficacy above and beyond some abysmal 
arrogance that claims to be capable of knowing all of reality. This form of empiricism 
was - you guessed it developed fUl1her by Nietzsche who scornfully lifted the age old 
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carpet of Western metaphysics only to discover a festering mass of sophisticated lies. 
Some . have prudently argued that Goethe's view of empiricism plunges into 
anthropocentricism (that nasty pestilence of the Western mind), but do so under the 
assumption that Goethe claims to be capable of capturing all of an objective reality by 
such a method (e.g. Reed 1984). Such a view arises out of a misunderstanding of what 
Goethe implied, as the world Goethe speaks of is a relative, subjective one, not a 
universal objective reality. 
Goethe also planted seeds of feminist thought in some of his work, notably Iphigenie 
auf Taruis. Iphigenie rejects the world of male domination that maintained an on-going 
cycle of violence. Rather than break this cycle through a patriarchal model, she 
challenges the very structures of male domination itself, symbolising an ethical stance 
that takes leave of oppression, irrespective of its legitimation in philosophy. 
As mentioned above the prize of Goethe's work must really be given to Faust, which 
has been called a "phantasmagoria for the theatre of the mind" by Reed (1984:67). 
Embodied in the character of Faust is Goethe's own quest for understanding which, in 
spite of academic prowess, left him still bereft of wisdom. In taking a less travelled path 
to wisdom Faust charts a course via beauty and experience coming in the process to the 
door of self realisation. Faust discloses his conviction that no experience could ever be 
so great that he would want to hold onto it for ever, and declares that if he ever wishes 
to so grasp at the present moment it be the moment that ends his life (see Faust Palt I, 
act IV). And so instead of subscribing to a faith in the transcendence of an after-life, he 
brings transcendence to earth thus announcing the existence of an earthly paradise that 
need only be discovered by people (see Vincent 1987 for example). Its discovery comes 
about, not through reason and philosophy, but through the wisdom gained by attuning 
to ones place in Nature, by listening to intuition and letting such irrational 'knowledge' 
coalesce with reason in a never ending dance. And here, in the underlying message of 
Faust, you get to the core of what I am trying to convey in this thesis. 
Because Goethe's philosophy, instilled in his poetry, novels and plays, represents such 
a complete narrative of the outer and inner world, I use it as a view-finder which is able 
to spot similar philosophical perspectives from within the Western philosophical 
tradition. Looking further back into the folds of this philosophical genealogy I find a 
number of gems shining brightly, otherwise buried beneath centuries of prejUdice and 
misunderstanding. Such gems include Heraclitus, Jesus (as portrayed in some of the 
222 
Christian Gospels - particularly that of John), Thomas Aquinas, Francis of Assisi, 
Meister Eckhatt, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Spinoza, Rousseau, Cezanne, Runge, Carus, 
Baudelaire, George. Many others have joined the ranks including Kierkegaard, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Thoreau, Whitman, Bergson, Whitehead, Jung, Wittgenstein, 
de Beauvoir, Heidegger, Blake, Joyce, Neumann, Fromm, Wordsworth, Waddington, 
Bohr, and Bohm. In more recent years (since the 1970s) there is Campbell, Sheldrake, 
Foucault, Derrida, Zohar, Capra, Prigogine, Griffin, Harding, King, Daly, Bhaskar, 
Woodiwiss, Freire, Habermas, Naess, Fox, Zimmerman, Cheney, Sellah, Radford-
Reuther, Spretnak, Ross, Wilber, and Merchant. We have quite a genealogy here and 
quite a heritage to draw upon. 
7.5 ON SOTERIOLOGY 
One important aspect of this inquiry that has remained either absent, hidden, or 
insufficiently developed in most philosophical discourses in the West is that of to role 
of self realisation in ontological understanding. Philosophy, theorising, and engaging in 
cultural life are all undertaken (whether tacitly or explicitly) within a framework of 
persona] development. Heraclitus went in search of the world and found himself. Goethe 
did the same, as did Schopenhauer after him, Walt Whitman, William Blake, 
Wordsworth, Nietzsche, and Heidegger later still. The point behind this, is that I believe 
conceptual understanding to be inseparable from personal development in terms of self 
realisation for the scientist, philosopher, manager, or the average person in the street. In 
analytical psychology it is called individuation (see Stevens 1990) where the individual 
is able to develop and fulfil its potential as a human being. This process has been of 
particular interest to a number of philosophers over the last two centuries and was 
developed in a variety of ways by Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Jung, 
Alder, Whitehead, Heidegger and Maslow, to name a few. It was also of central 
importance to some notable medieval philosophers and theologians such as Thomas 
Aquinas, Meister EckhaIt, and Francis of Assisi. It underlies the teachings of Jesus, as 
well as Lao Tzu in China (Taoism), and Siddmtha Gautama (Buddha) in India, and 
forms a basic ingredient of Hinduism as well (see Wilber 1983; Ross 1993). 
The importance of self realisation as a practice, however, has not received the attention 
in the West I think it deserves. Asia, on the other hand, has made substantial advances 
in this direction where the emphasis is not so much on philosophy as knowledge, but 
on enlightenment as wisdom. Here it is recognised that conceptual and existential 
dimensions of understanding go hand in hand (see Heine 1985 for example). I introduce 
223 
this notion here in order to indicate that this genealogy of a difference extends into the 
mystical domain, due to the connections between self realisation and conceptual 
understanding. Conceptual understanding is, of course, essential for purposes of 
developing a theory of ecological sustainability. It is also a crucial aspect of a cultural 
praxiology, particularly in relation to the practice component of acting out an authentic 
adaptive social life in the landscape. Remember nihilism, you have to switch language 
off. You cannot think the unthinkable - you can only practice it. This is where 
philosophy ends and mythology and ritual begins. 
It is at this point in the thesis that I finally take leave of the West, and head for 13th 
century Japan. The reason for this is only because I have not found in the West a 
suitable equivalent to what I see as a most satisfactory formula for completing the 
picture I am painting. Dogen (a Zen master of 13th century Japan) gets the final word. 
The entire line of inquiry leads us to a point at which Dogen can begin to make sense 
to us. We nearly got there with Heidegger, but I believe Dogen achieved what 
Heidegger pointed to but never fulfilled. This is similar to the way Heidegger achieved 
what Nietzsche pointed to but also failed to achieve. I do not suggest that Dogen is the 
only one, or even that an equivalent achievement has not been made in the West. Jesus 
achieved it too but did not write a thesis, and as such, I do not have access to his 
teachings apart from that written by others the gospels). 
7.5.1 A QUESTION OF BALANCE 
I introduced the dialectic between Apollo and Dionysus above, in an attempt to pOltray 
a conceptual picture of what I am trying to achieve in this thesis viz. a reinstatement of 
the dialectical balance between these two aspects of culture. Many people may think that 
they have achieved a balanced condition when they explore the boundaries of their 
world and determine a middle path. This can take on the appearance of balance and 
harmony if they have indeed fully explored their world. The problem is, that many 
people have not fully explored their own world in telms of an exploration of the self and 
its relationship with the rest of reality so perceived by that self. For example, people 
who sustain an over-confidence in the capacity of reason to disclose their world, may 
explore the domain of reason and then define a middle path within that realm. This then 
appears to be a balanced path. It is a middle path. But is only in the middle of reason. 
It is a middle path through Apollo's house. But what about Dionysus? Is this aspect of 
reality to be left out of the picture? 
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If the Dionysian aspect were also explored then a middle path would be very different 
from one developed solely within Apollo's territory. The middle path would encompass 
a balance between a much broader'world with much broader horizons. This is essentially 
what I am attempting to do in this piece of work - to show that the Dionysian aspect 
(feelings, intuition, instincts, chaos, creativity, destruction) is a legitimate and real aspect 
of the reality of cultural life; and, that a situation of balance must take into account this 
Dionysian component. I believe that modernity has left Dionysus out, and because of 
this the 'balance' so achieved by well meaning modernists is really quite substantially 
unbalanced. Such an unbalanced basis for cultural life prevents a condition of ecological 
sustainability from becoming possible. 
7.6 DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF NATURE 
Science, speared on by it's energetic notions, approaches irresistibly those outer 
limits where the optimism implicit in logic must collapse... Every nobel and 
gifted [person] has, before reaching the mid point of [their] career, come up 
against some point of the periphery that has decided [their] understanding ... 
When the inquirer, having pushed to the circumference, realises how logic in that 
place curls about it self and bites its own tail, [they are] struck with a new kind 
of perception; a tragic perception, which requires, to make it tolerable, the 
remedy of art (Nietzsche 1956:95). 
The modern project has tended to either do away with metaphysics and replace it with 
positivist science (which itself rests upon hidden metaphysical assumptions), or build 
epistemological frameworks upon explicit metaphysical assertions which provide the 
source of legitimation for the various forms of science that result. This discourse of 
legitimation - called philosophy, amounts to the establishment of a sophisticated set of 
logical predicates that supposedly furnish science with an ultimate and sturdy 
foundation. This exercise in metaphysical legitimation has been going on in the West 
at least since Socrates and particularly since Aristotle. However, maverick thinkers 
throughout the history of Western philosophy have pointed out that such a discourse of 
legitimation is not the end of the story. 
Lyotard (l984:xxiii) states his conceptualisation of modern science in the following 
way:-
Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the yardstick of 
science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to the extent that science 
does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is 
obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then produces a discourse of 
legitimation. 
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Of fundamental interest in this debate is the question of what Nature really might be 
like. After all, if we do not have an adequate understanding of our concept of Nature 
how are we to talk coherently and confidently about ecological sustainability? Earlier 
this century Whitehead confronted this issue of the concept of Nature and its intellectual 
heritage in Western thought. Whitehead (1930:3) asks the question "What is Nature?" 
He goes on to say that:-
Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses. In this sense-
perception we are aware of something which is not thought and which is self-
contained for thought. This property of being self-contained for thought lies at 
the base of natural science. 
Whitehead makes it very clear that for him Nature is not merely that greenery outside 
the window. In relation to the issue of philosophical legitimation Whitehead clearly 
confronts the dominant Western scientific assumptions by questioning the project of 
science and natural philosophy since Aristotle. This he calls the "doctrine of matter" 
grounded upon a "metaphysics of substance" (Whitehead 1929). He suggests that this 
tradition can be best understood by tracing the genealogy of the Greek influences on 
what became modern science. 
According to Whitehead, this influence of Greek philosophy on modem science had 
established a long misconception of the metaphysical status of Nature and natural 
entities. At the level of fundamental ontology Whitehead reflects on the questions that 
the ancient Greeks asked concerning the structure of Nature. 
The answers which their genius gave to this question, and more particularly the 
concepts which underlay the terms in which they frame their answers, have 
determined the unquestioned presuppositions as to time, space and matter which 
have rained in science (Whitehead 1930: 17). 
In this respect Whitehead is in much agreement with Nietzsche, Bergson and Heidegger. 
Concerning the ontology of substance Whitehead suggests that Aristotle's logic qua 
epistemology had profound consequences for his metaphysics qua ontology. In 
Aristotle's logic "the fundamental type of affirmative proposition is the attribution of a 
predicate to a subject". From this epistemological condition Aristotle carries over to the 
ontological realm his search for an ultimate substance which is not predicated by 
anything else. This fits squarely into the tradition of Democritus who invented the 
concept of the 'atom'. As such, Aristotle frames Nature in the image of his own logic. 
Whereas according to Whitehead (1930):-
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The unquestioned acceptance of Aristotelian logic has led to an ingrained 
tendency to postulate a substratum for what ever is disclosed in sense awareness, 
namely, to look below what we are aware of for the substance in the sense of the 
'concrete thing.' This is the origin of the modem scientific concept of matter and 
of ether, namely they are the outcome of this insistent habit of postulation 
(ibid.: 18). 
In response to Aristotelian predication Whitehead makes the comment "Personally, I 
think that predication is a muddled notion confusing many different relations under a 
convenient common fonn of speech." In this regard Whitehead seems to be in 
agreement with Wittgenstein who argued that philosophy is really a game of linguistic 
coherence (see Wittgenstein 1953). Such a concept of Nature as it developed in the 
Aristotelian tradition sets in motion a form of science (as a way of coming to have 
knowledge about Nature) that traces the "fortunes of matter in its adventure through 
space" (Whitehead 1930:20). Because of this Whitehead suggests that the origin of the 
doctrine of matter is the outcome of an uncritical acceptance of space and time as 
external conditions for natural existence. 
Whitehead goes on to critique the scientific doctrine of substance and matter and its 
relationship with the Aristotelian concept of absolute time. Much of science and natural 
philosophy rests on the metaphysical assumption of elementary particles (see Hawking 
1988). Similarly there is an unquestioned assumption that time is unitary and linear. 
Whitehead questions both of these assumptions, criticises them and establishes a creative 
alternative which I have found to be very useful in coming to understand ecological 
sustainability. 
Accordingly "The philosophy of nature took a wrong turn treading its development by 
Greek thought. This erroneous presupposition is vague and fluid in Plato's Timaeus [but 
were then] hardened and made definite [by Aristotle]" thus producing a sophisticated yet 
faulty analysis of the relation between matter and the form of Nature as disclosed in 
sense awareness (Whitehead J 930:24-5). And consequently "when we remove the 
[flawed] metaphysics and start afresh on an unprejudiced survey of nature, a new light 
is thrown on many fundamental concepts which dominate science and guide the process 
of research" (ibid.:25). 
So, we have come to the need to begin afresh in terms of the metaphysical basis for 
undeltaking an inquiry into Nature and the place of humanity in Nature. But how might 
this new start be conducted? By passing through nihilism. 
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7.7 THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF NIHILISM 
In our adventures through a metaphysical landscape we come to the threshold of 
nihilism. Nietzsche brought us here (see Pfeffer 1972; Schutte 1984; and Vattimo 1988). 
Many people of many different cultures are too afraid to go any further as the linguistic 
silence of nihilism requires a casting off of any inclination to grasp hold of knowledge, 
reason and thinking. Anyone who meditates will know what it feels like to 'fall' into the 
realm of linguistic silence. No language, no thought, nothing - nothing? In a state of 
meditation ll or linguistic silence one is still alive, only no thoughts distract the mind and 
hence no normative conscious condition is able to obstruct the flow of intuition and 
perception. So, it is not 'nothing' in the absolute sense, only 'nothing' in terms of 
knowledge and thinking. No-thing is able to exist for the consciousness as a 'thing' is 
a construction of language. In this nothingness the arbitrarily invented divisions between 
what human reason denotes as autonomous 'things' or 'objects' is dismantled, and so 
there is no 'thing' nothing. Abyss, wilderness, silence. 
Now, in the absence of thinking and the condition of 'no-thing', one is unable to sustain 
the linguistic concept of the individual self as an autonomous 'thing' either, as the 
individual self is another invention created by thinking and language. Only with the help 
of language and thinking can you ask the question "who is thinking?". But, Descartes 
was wrong - thinking is not the essence of humanness, as you are still there and 
thoroughly human even when you have managed to switch language and thinking off. 
What happens here is that one becomes unified with the rest of Nature as no arbitraIY 
boundaries lie between the 'me' and the 'not me'. The individual self begins to realise 
its unity with the collective Self. This enables compassion to unfold spontaneously -
compassion as empathy, feeling with the other, suffering with the other, joy with the 
other. The 'other' is no longer an absolute 'other', merely different aspects of the whole -
Nature. 
The whole is not merely the sum of the parts (mechanism), nor is the whole greater than 
the sum of the parts (stoicism) - the whole is in every part. This is a form of holism, but 
not that of modem systems theOlY, It is a holism that does not lead to fascism as stoic 
III do not imply any religious overtones in the use of the term 'meditation', 
Meditation is simply used here to refer to a therapeutic state of consciousness in the 
absence of thoughts. One does not need to be baptised or ordained as a monk to do this 
- anyone can, even atheists, scientists, and philosophers. 
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holism can do. It is a non-totalising form of holism that does not set up shop as a 
privileged discourse, as it does not claim to be able to dictate what the parts do from 
the point Of view of the whole. Indeterminate creativity is in every part. The whole and 
part dialectically interpenetrate each other. The part is the whole, the whole is the part. 
Quantum physicist David Bohm has suggested the hologram as a metaphor that 
describes this condition (Bohm 1980). 
Schopenhauer was one of the first modern Western philosophers to deconstruct the self, 
although Spinoza also did this earlier (see Simmel 1991; Delahunty 1985). As such 
Schopenhauer, and Spinoza before him, began the process of de-centring the ego-self 
in modern Western philosophy and ethics12. These efforts also helped to bridge the gap 
between the philosophies of Asia and Europe, because in Asia the deconstruction of the 
self had been a prominent feature for many centuries. It is in this context that 
Schopenhauer developed his empirical (a posteriori) basis for morality as a creative 
alternative to the a priori system of Kant (see Schopenhauer 1965). Here Schopenhauer 
employs the notion of the 'will to life' as the basis for actions of moral worth, where that 
will is a collective will (Schopenhauer 1966). This is different from Nietzsche's 
individualistic notion of the will-to-power, which was inspired by Schopenhauer's work. 
According to Schopenhauer (and I agree), actions of moral worth are those that are not 
egotistic and selfish. This can only happen when the individualistic self is able to 
identify with the broader Self following the dissolution of the arbitrary boundaries 
between the 'me' and the 'not me'. 
12Schopenhauer's philosophy was similar to forms of Hinduism that equated the 
individual in terms of the whole without acknowledging the uniqueness of the individual 
in itself. This was also a criticism levelled against Hinduism by Buddhism (which 
branched off from Hinduism). In Buddhism (particularly Zen) there needs to be an 
acknowledgement of both unity (interconnectedness) and identity. This is also true for 
much postmodern political theory. Hinduism stops short at the level of 
interconnectedness (as do some forms of Christianity). This amounts to a totalizing 
holism that Zen (and postmodernism) rejects. The apprehension of interconnectedness 
is merely the first stage in a Zen enlightenment, achieved through the negation of the 
autonomous self (employing nihilism in the form of meditation). The second stage 
comes as a result of a negation of the first negation (also by means of meditation), 
where the interconnected whole is also negated along with the autonomous self, leading 
to absolute Nothingness. This absolute Nothingness is an absolute affirmation of the 
existence of unity and identity (see Abe 1985). This process is very similar to the 
process of Christian enlightenment in Heglean philosophy, although Hegel's double 
negation leads to absolute Spirit, as opposed to absolute Nothingness. Schopenhauer was 
a contemporary of Hegel and directed a lot of criticism towards Hegel's work. 
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Schopenhauer demonstrates the difference when referring to so called moral actions that 
are really the result of the egocentric seeking of spiritual rewards (perhaps in an after 
life) through compliance with codified cannons of virtue (as is the case with much 
Christian morality), or the avoidance of penalty where a code of civil or religious law 
dictates what behaviour should or should not happen. For Schopenhauer it is the deeds 
of people in the absence of any law that really tests the moral worth of human actions. 
Following a law is merely the disempowered submission to an authority outside oneself. 
This is what happens in salvational ethical projects where the goal of the highest 
happiness (spiritual salvation in Christianity, biosphereical egalitarianism in deep 
ecology) is mediated by virtue, and where that virtue is constructed on the basis of a set 
of invented predicates (such as Kant's categorical imperative) - stoicism (see 
Schopenhauer 1965; Campbell 1986, 1988; Cheney 1989b; Taylor 1976). 
Using the symbolism of Apollo and Dionysus introduced earlier, a rational moral system 
(e.g. Kant), asks Apollo to determine the basis of moral actions. Apollo is the god of 
reason, order, serenity, and knowledge - (Le. the cultural domain within language and 
thinking). Apollo will give an answer but that answer can only be the best Apollo is 
capable of. In other words, Apollo can only give a reasonable or logical answer to the 
question of ethics in general and environmental ethics in particular. One of the most 
sophisticated logical answer to this question was given by Kant who holds Apollo in the 
highest regard. 
An alternative might be to ask Dionysus - the god of instincts, chaos, intuition, feeling, 
emotion (i.e. the cultural domain which lies beyond language and thinking). Dionysus 
will surely give a different answer, as it will not be logical. It will come from intuition, 
instinct, feelings and illogical or irrational emotions. Which of these two gods should 
we trust? Apollo or Dionysus? The chicken or the egg? Why should we have to choose 
between two things which in reality are inseparable? They are two sides of the same 
dialectical coin. So, like the coin, try spinning it and see what happens. Invite Dionysus 
and Apollo to dance a dialectical dance as Aeschylus and Sophocles did. Set the 
dialectic in motion. Do what Hegel would have done with two opposites - employ the 
thesis (Apollo) and the antithesis (Dionysus) and get a dialectical synthesis (the 
possibility of ecological sustainability). Take the colour blue (Apollo), and the colour 
yellow (Dionysus), spin them very fast, and ... get green. The result is different from both 
parts in isolation. The green ethical alternative (a convenient environmental pun) is 
different from both the blue and the yellow. It is the dialectical product of the never 
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ending dance of Apollo and Dionysus on the metaphorical stage of life's drama. 
Schopenhauer's creative alternative goes some of the way towards this. This is because 
he rightly argues for an empirical basis for ethics. Here feelings and emotions of 
compassion emerge in the wake of the dissolution of the individual self as an 
autonomous absolute. Compassion unfolds spontaneously through the identity of the self 
(being) with the 'other' (other people or the landscape) as kindred and interconnected 
aspects of the Selfl3. The emotional aspect (compassion) arises from the Dionysian 
component. The Apollean aspect (reason) precipitates out of real experiences of 
landscape14, where reality beyond the reach of language is able to enter the linguistic 
domain via primordial language. It is not recreated simply according to the previously 
constructed rules of language, but is recreated afresh each time. If it coincides with the 
rules of language then the rules of the language game are able to coincide with the 
landscape. Primordial language is inspired by real experiences of the landscape such as 
sitting quietly by the river and, as Heidegger suggests, it is really the landscape doing 
the talking through people, as opposed to people talking solely according to their own 
internally coherent rules of a normative language. 
This is what makes ecological sustainability possible as the poetical autobiography of 
the landscape. The landscape speaks through people in this way and thus recites its 
autobiography through a human culture. Music can do the same - it is inspired by real, 
intangible experiences of or in a real place. This is where poetry comes from 
(Heidegger, Whitehead, Goethe, Campbell) and why Blyth (1942) argues that poetry and 
religion are identical, as poetry brings into language that which lies in the realm beyond 
13The term Self with a capital'S' refers to the interconnectedness of the individual 
with the rest of Nature once the false boundary between the 'me' and the 'not me' has 
been dissolved. This is a central theme in deep ecology (see Fox 1990). However, in this 
thesis I take the process of deconstructing the self a step further than deep ecology, and 
this forms the basis of my departure from that branch of eco-philosophy as I understand 
it. Rather than stopping with the identification of the self as Self, I also identify with the 
individual as a unique being in its own right as a unique part of the collective Self, that 
is seen to maintain its own locus of creativity. This is denoted by the term Sself. In the 
conception of self as Self the individual is subordinated to the greater whole, which 
amounts to a totalising cosmology and a stoic form of holism. Such a form of holism 
is totalitarian and is open to criticism as 'ecofascist'. This will be more fully explained 
in chapter 8 where this identity of the Sself becomes crucial. In this way my work is 
able to be differentiated from forms of Christianity, and Asian religions for example, and 
aligned with other specific movements within these traditions. 
14'Landscape' as I use it includes the people of a place. 
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it. It is thereby transcendental, as it unites the conscious and the unconscious world, the 
world created by language and reality which is beyond our sensibilities. This is why art 
is so important for ecological sustainability. Art enables culture to be embellished by far 
more information concerning the ecosystem than is possible in language. Hence the 
postmodern call to recreate ourselves as a work of art. 
The term 'poetical' can refer to at least three things: the poet, the poem, and the subject 
of the poem (Blyth 1942). Each come together in primordial language united by the 
experiences of the poet, and the symbolising of such experiences in language. A culture 
can be sustainable if it is poetical in all three aspects. The 'poem' is primordial language 
itself. The language of such a culture will be poetical. The subject of the poem 
(language) is the landscape. It will not necessarily be recognised as poetic to an outsider 
unless the outsider learns the language game, and more importantly, its meaning. 
Furthermore, such poetry is not merely a form of entertainment, an erotic exercise in 
aesthetics. It is simply the result of a bioregional narrative in action. 
All this has been made possible by nihilism, and we can begin to see that nihilism is 
supremely useful. What else can nihilism do for us? Having accomplished nihilism, we 
are able to begin afresh, as Whitehead suggested, in developing a science in the absence 
of that family of prejudices that tied the shoelaces of modernity together and made it 
stumble about, smashing into Nature evelywhere it went. Nihilism makes fundamental 
ontology come alive. And here we can continue with establishing the basis for a new 
science of ecological sustainability. However, one substantial stone remains unturned in 
our process of deconstruction. This is the question of time. 
7.8 ON THE QUESTION OF TIME 
Then the past is constant 
The future alive in advance 
The moment is eternity 
(Goethe, cited in Vincent 1987) 
What has 'time' got to do with the question of ecological sustainability in Fiji? I believe 
that it is of central impOltance. In chapter 2 I passed briefly over the general definition 
of ecological sustainability and suggested that in most cases there is an implicit or 
explicit reference to time together with the ontological assumptions relating to the nature 
of time. 
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Ecological sustainability means sustaining something. What does 'sustain' imply and 
what is this 'something'? Sustain means to "endure without yielding; withstand; to keep 
up or maintain; keep in effect or being" (Funk and Wagnalls 1975). To endure means 
to continue to be; to last. And to last is to remain in existence; to continue to be. Each 
of these definitions point to what appears to be a temporal condition, something like 
eternity - to continue to be. There is no horizon on the 'to be' aspect, only to continue 
to do so. But what is 'to be'? Shakespeare confronted us with this question many 
centuries ago, and it is not a trivial question. It points to being something, to having a 
character, an existence, to be. But, to be what? - Ecological. Ecological is that 
'something'. But what is ecological? Ecology means that aspect of biology that addresses 
the relationships between organisms and their environment. 'Ecological' is the 
corresponding adjective. To be of this condition - existing in a relationship. But what 
kind of relationship? - A dialectical one. A dialectical relationship between a community 
and its environment - the landscape. The relationship is dialectical because it is holistic. 
The community and the landscape are different aspects of one and the same thing. 
I earlier argued that reality (including Nature) is in a constant state of flux - process. So, 
this means that the dialectical relationship is one of mutual becoming, as the landscape 
and the community are constantly becoming something, constantly changing. But if this 
is to continue to be, there must be some condition that allows or fosters this continuation 
to be. There must be a compatibility, a harmony. Moreover, this compatibility must be 
constantly changing because all is in motion. This compatibility is an aptness, and so 
the relationship must be adaptive. Ecological sustainability is a continuous condition of 
adaptation. This adaptation is co-adaptation as the relationship is dialectical. Thus, 
ecological sustainability is a continuous condition of co-adaptation between a community 
and its environment, between people and the rest of the landscape. Continuous. 
Continuous adaptive change. On-going, sustainable. Never stopping. For ever. But how 
long is this? A week? A year? A hundred years? A million years? See, time comes 
straight back into the spotlight. How long is for ever? Can we get there by waiting? Can 
we get there through management - through stoicism? Is it the same as a very, velY, 
very, very long time? Or perhaps it is not even temporal in the ordinary sense? Perhaps 
eternity is not merely different in degree from a very long time, but different in type? 
If it is different in type what might it be, and how might we understand it and employ 
it in a form of ethical praxis that might guide a culture to a condition of ecological 
sustainability? 
The notion of a very, very, velY long time is underwritten by a major assumption 
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concerning the nature of time itself. It implies that time is linear and unitary. This is not 
surprising considering that the notion of time has been this way, and remained largely 
unchallenged in Western culture since Aristotle. But is it valid and are there other 
possibilities, and are those possibilities relevant to the question of ecological 
sustainability? What I do in this section is question the common Western conception of 
time (which is pmt of the cultural baggage that modernity has carried to Fiji since the 
19th century) in relation to the idea of ecological sustainability. In so doing I hope to 
demonstrate that ecological sustain ability is not different in degree from our current 
actions but different in type. It points to substantial changes in our cultural being, in our 
ecological niche, our eco-culture. 
We are already well on the way to a different standard of rationality with holism, 
process, perspectivism (in relation to truth), and the limitations of knowledge which 
leads to the acceptance of mystery (hence enchantment). The 'time' issue is merely one 
fmther step in essentially the same direction. In fact, according to Bergson, Whitehead, 
Heidegger, and Dogen, we need to fully address the question of time if we are to 
successfully achieve both an authentic ontological understanding of existence, and an 
authentic existential condition in itself. Both are central to my task as I seek to develop 
a theory, and point to a cultural practice. In addressing this question of time and its 
relation to Being I reach the conceptual apogee of this thesis. In so doing, I push to the 
most outer limits of this research and there, precisely there, find a domain where the last 
loose ends of all of the conceptual threads, that have been introduced in earlier chapters, 
are able to be tied together. I also show that historicism is not sensible and notions of 
linear progress are misguided. The question of time is al!w impOltant in relation to the 
soteriological dimension of this theory of ecologicalsustainability. A personalised path 
to ontological understanding and existential belonging is crucially linked to people's 
conception of the time dimension. 
7.8.1 TIME AND CULTURE 
Time is known to me as an abstraction from the passage of events. The 
fundamental fact which renders this abstraction possible as the passing of nature, 
its development, its creative advance, and combined with this fact is another 
characteristic of nature, namely the extensive relation between events. These two 
facts, namely the passage of events and the extension of events over each other, 
are in my opinion the qualities from which time and space originate as 
abstractions (my emphasis, Whitehead 1930:34). 
Time is an enigma. It appears to be so simple at first glance. Past, present, future, time 
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flies, what is the time? time to go, times up, begin, end, origin, now, never. How long 
is 'now'? When is never? Does the past and the future exist, or are they only words in 
language? We use notions of time in every day life largely on the assumption that we 
know what we are referring to, or that if we don't really know it doesn't matter anyway. 
But time? What can this be? And if it does exist, what is its character? Is it linear, 
unitary, able to be counted? Or is it non-linear, non-unitary and impossible to count. 
When we count time are discovering or inventing something? If time were ontologically 
linear and unitary then such counting would be a discovery. But should it not be linear 
or unitary then it can only be an invention. Nature, however, demands that we do not 
simply invent a way of life, but discover a way to be that does not contradict the flux 
of ecosystems, thus allowing such a way to endure. 
A clue to the Fijian conception of time can perhaps be found in the way that time is 
used in common speech. E na gaona e (the time in front) refers to the past. E na 
gaona mai muri (the time coming from refers to the Time is infused with 
human actions, and it is through such actions that time has meaning in Fijian life. If I 
were to travel to another village and you were to go before me, I would say to you 
something like oiko sa [ako e liY..; au na qat yani (you go I will follow ~~,l5, 
you). The same statement helps to show why the past is in front of the future (which 
is coming up from behind). If you go in you will get there before me and hence 
be in the 'past'. If I follow behind you I come after you in the relative 'future', The 
meaning of time is infused with social life and actions. This is quite different from 
modern Western notions of time where it supposedly exists as a pre-existing linear 
treadmill that is constantly 'ticking over'. We walk out of the past and step into the 
future. Time flies. It flowing like a river for us in our modern rationality. It flows in 
spite of us and carried us to our ultimate death. But this notion of a flow of linear time, 
of its passing away, is not a universal notion. It is culturally contingent. It exists in 
modernity for example, but did not exist in pre-modern Fijian culture (and many other 
pre-modern cultures around the world). 
Some would here argue that it is because of our very sophisticated conception of time 
that allows us to progress, because without linear time there is no possibility of a 
trajectory of improvement. Progress? Progress towards what? From where? Linear time 
underlies the modern assumption of historicism that sees evolution as a trajectory of 
progress and improvement. The past leads to the glorious present and the future will 
always be better, faster, bigger, and brighter, welL. so the story goes. But in relation to 
the question of ecological sustainability, is the future always better? It certainly looks 
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as if the opposite were true. This centUlY has seen more environmental destruction than 
perhaps all of previous human history put together. But time underlies it all, as time 
carries us to 'progress'. But what if progress were shown to be an invention, which it 
was - invented during the Enlightenment in the wake of the sophisticated historicism that 
gave capitalism a power injection and Marxism its inception. Both capitalism and 
Marxist socialism ride on this imaginary train of progress made possible with a linear 
and unitary conception of time. But I believe that such a conception of time is flawed, 
and also obstructs the possibility of ecological sustainability. 
Time has fascinated philosophers in the West for centuries (see Zwal1 1976; Wood 
1982). The same is true in Asia. An interesting convergence of Western and Asian ideas 
can be seen in the work of Heidegger, and that of Dogen. Both maintain that the 
problematics of existence and ontological understanding are directly related to 
misconceptions concerning time (Heine 1985). They both disagree with the common 
sense views of most people in their respective cultures, and the philosophical views of 
the dominant metaphysical traditions they participated in. As such, they both establish 
a creative alternative that builds upon their own deconstruction of the views they reject. 
In spite of the velY many similarities between their philosophies they do have some 
subtle yet significant differences which I will allude to later on. 
Heidegger's first major work Sein lind Zeit (Being and Time) set the foundations for 
much of his philosophical eff011s throughout his life. The 20th century has also 
witnessed the philosophies of Bergson and Whitehead who both call into question the 
ontology of time as it is commonly depicted in Western metaphysics and in the common 
sense world view of Western culture. Significant in the works of both Whitehead and 
Bergson is their concentration, at least in part of their work, on biology. Bergson's 
philosophical project as applied to biology emerges with his conception of creative 
evolution and the elan vital (Bergson 1911). Whitehead, on the other hand, focused on 
the biological exegesis of process rationality and showed how this may work in the form 
of a science of process (Whitehead 1929, 1930). According to Heine (1985:164) 
"Whiteheadean process philosophy of the harmonious and dynamic universe of 
prehensive events and developing organisms perhaps posses a significant challenge to 
Heidegger's Dasein-oriented15 approach to the question of time," 
15'Dasein' is Heidegger's term for human being. 
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Rather than focus on their differences, however, I will instead concentrate on where they 
agree in regard to the dominant conception of time in the modern West l6. Bergson, 
Whitehead and Heidegger each agree that the question of time is of crucial significance 
for ontological understanding in general. They also agree that the dominant Western 
notion of time (both philosophical and common sense) is flawed and leads to numerous 
metaphysical misconceptions which, in turn, furnishes science with a defective 
metaphysical basis. It also leads to historiography and historicism. On this note: 
All historiography predicts what is to come from images of the past determined 
by the present. It systematically destroys the future and our historic relation to 
the advent of destiny. Historicism has today not only not been overcome, but is 
only now entering the stage of its expansion and entrenchment (Heidegger 
1975: 17). 
Bergson, along with Heidegger and Whitehead each independently argue that time is not 
ontologically unitary. Bergson, for example, will not allow us to count units of time, as 
no two units of time can exist together for us to operate on them. In order to measure 
time (or think we are measuring it) we must first separate time into countable units. 
Bergson's contention is that in order to count time as the passing of ontological units we 
must first conceptually spatialize the temporal domain. Counting anything first implies 
that what is to be counted exists in space. This also implies a visual image in space of 
what it is we are counting. But for Bergson we dispose of the image after the first group 
of numbers have been counted (Lacey 1989). 
Therefore, the act of counting presupposes the possibility of images even though it may 
not use the images each and every time. When we count things that are not the same 
(and theoretically cannot be regarded as units) we substitute the reality for symbols and 
then we count the symbols. For example, imagine a field where there is a horse, a cow, 
a goat, a dog, and a pig. To count them we must replace the reality of these animals 
(which are ontologically different), with categories which are epistemologically the 
same. We give them numbers and count them as: one, two, three, four, and five. The 
16Because I am focusing my efforts of critique on modernity I will not bring Dogen 
in just here, as Dogen was not concerned with modernity as it did not exist in 13th 
century Japan. Dogen becomes important when we get to the reconstruction of a creative 
alternati ve. 
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unity we give them is the category 'animals', and as such we have counted five animals. 
What Bergson argues is that this concept of having counted five animals has only 
epistemological significance and no ontological credence. It can only be seen as a 
human convenience rather than theory about how the world really is. 
Bergson also argues that the things that we count must exist together before we can 
count them and for this reason he denies that time is able to be counted with out first 
imagining that time is spacial. Hence we do not count ontological units of time, instead 
we count only symbols which are made into units for counting. This can only have 
ontological significance if time is indeed ontologically unitary. This ontological 
assumption is rejected by Bergson, Whitehead and Heidegger. 
The existing theory of time and space, as it was held in Newtonian physics plior to 
relativity theory, states that causal events occupy certain periods of absolute time and 
occupies certain positions of absolute space. For Newton all processes in the physical 
world are grounded in absolute linear time which has no connection with the material 
world. "Absolute, true, and mathematical time ... of itself and by its own nature flows 
uniformly, without regard to anything external" (cited in Capra 1975:63). 
Whitehead admits that this view is pelfect1y logical but logic is not where the problem 
lies. The problem is ontological. Whitehead approaches the question of time from a 
slightly different position concentrating on the ontological significance of space and its 
relation to time. For example:-
The genn of space is to be found in the mutual relations of events within the 
immediate general fact which is all nature now discemab1e, namely within the 
one event which is the totality of present nature. The relations of other events 
to this totality of nature form the texture of time (Whitehead 1930:53). 
But, as Sachs dec1ared:-
The real revolution that came with [the theory of relativity] was the abandonment 
of the idea that the space-time coordinate system has objective significance 
[ontologically]. Instead, relativity theory- implies that the space and time 
coordinate are only the elements of a language that is used by an observer to 
describe [their] environment (Sachs 1969:53). 
For Whitehead, Nature is a process where all we can do to have knowledge about it is 
to use language speculatively to express interrelationships within Nature. Accordingly:-
238 
It is an exhibition of the process of nature that each duration happens and passes. 
The process of nature can also be termed the passage of nature. I definitely 
refrain ... from using the word 'time', since the measurable time of science and 
of civilised life generally merely exhibits some aspects of the more fundamental 
fact of the passage of nature. I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord 
with Bergson, though he uses 'time' for the fundamental fact which I call the 
'passage of nature' (Whitehead 1930:54). 
As such, Whitehead does not suggest that the 'river' of time is not flowing, only that it 
is not flowing prior to, or underneath the passage of Nature in terms of real events. We 
are told by Hegel, for example, that time and history is what humanity has invented in 
order to deal with the finality of death (see Wilber 1983). This can be understood once 
the illuSOlY nature of the autonomous ego-self is apprehended. Only the autonomous 
individual ego-self dies. But if people learn to identify with a greater Self as Sself, then 
the knowledge of on-coming death will no longer be terrifying. This being the case, the 
conception of linear time becomes redundant and people can begin to experience eternity 
in the present moment, thus realising that linear time as an absolute is an illusion and 
is a derivative function of the ego-self. This has been a recurring theme in the 
philosophy of Hegel, Heidegger, the plays of Goethe, and the poetIy of William Blake 
for example. 
Before continuing on the theme of time and overcoming its derivative form it will be 
necessmy to make a brief diversion into the domain of soteriology. This is because the 
apprehension of primordial time is made possible only thorough a soteriological praxis, 
where the ego-self is able to be transcended and the collective Self as Sself is able to 
be apprehended both conceptually and existentially. 
7.8.2 TIME AND ITS RELATION TO SOTERIOLOGY 
Rather than employ relativity theOlY and quantum mechanics to frame a discourse on 
the ontology of time I instead show how the same can be achieved through a process 
of contemplation. The reason for this is that I can show that modern science cannot 
claim to be the only pathway to such forms of understanding, and that any culture that 
does not possess science can achieve the same understanding through by-passing the 
mechanistic world view. 
At this point it will be useful to return to Heidegger and explore the relationship 
between his discourse on time and its relation to Being (the basis of existence), and that 
of Dogen who addresses the same project although from a different perspective. Both 
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Heidegger and Dogen do not rule out the common sense view of derivative time, they 
simply move beyond it. The flawed common sense view of time is not peculiar to 
Western culture, but rather a tendency of many cultures. Both thinkers do not regard this 
common sense view of time as absolutely false, but instead see it as derivative of 
primordial time in its coalescence with the psyche. Such a view is phenomenological 
and soteriological as it argues that the personal development of the observer of time is 
a crucial ingredient in the apprehension of the apparent character of time. Although 
Heidegger and Dogen differ in their views of the structure of primordial time they do 
agree that it must be seen as a fluid, and flexible process inseparable from human 
activities (Heine 1985). The apprehension of the nature of primordial time for both 
thinkers is dependant on discarding notions of permanence, and the autonomous ego-self. 
The conventional views of time are problematic precisely because they have remained 
unquestioned due to their familiarity and their relationship with language. For Heine, 
human activity will be misdirected so long as the question of time remains unexplored 
and flaws in the apprehension of time remain intact. Methodologically, Heidegger and 
Dagen share two significant things in common. They engage in a discourse concerning 
time both ontologically (in terms of metaphysical inquiry), and existentially (in terms 
of a genuine personal encounter with the experience of temporality). Heidegger argues 
that the question of Being (the basis of existence) has been misunderstood in the West 
since the Greeks due (partly) to a misapprehension of primordial time - hence the title 
of his book Being and Time. The time dimension sustained in Western metaphysics, as 
a predicate to all other forms of metaphysical questioning, has been built upon a 
foundation that itself obscures understanding namely - a naive definition of now-time 
(Heidegger 1962). The primordial ground of existence (Being) is posited in the West as 
sharing the same temporal domain as beings (such as. human beings - Dasein). - the 
present. 
The temporality of the ground of existence (Being) is obscured in Western metaphysics 
because Being, as introduced by Aristotle (see Sokolowski 1990), is seen as embedded 
in derivative time, or, lies outside time itself. As Olafson (1993) points out -
The equating of being with presence on the part of the Greeks was faulty 
because they did not have any understanding of the temporal character of being. 
They simply equated presence with the present tense and the Now; and the 
conception of time that was worked out by Aristotle, and that determined the 
course of all subsequent Western thinking about time, construed time as a 
manifold of Nows. As Heidegger tries to show ... this altogether obscures the 
distinctive character of the Now, which is at once a "having been" and an "about 
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to be", and is thus closely bound up with both the past and the future (ibid.: 102-
103). 
Nietzsche attempted to overcome the problem of the temporality of Being by extending 
the present into eternity with his notion of the 'eternal recurrence of the same'. Being is 
transformed into 'becoming', and as such, Nietzsche reverses rather than overcomes the 
Western metaphysical condition in relation to time (Heine 1985). 
As mentioned above, both Heidegger and Dogen attempt to demonstrate that 
metaphysical inquiry based on the assumptions of derivative time arise from deficient 
existential encounters with time in one's own life experience. This suggests that an 
authentic view of temporality (where primordial time is apprehended) can only be gained 
via a process of personalised experience beyond philosophy. A similar thread can be 
traced in Goethe and the way he addresses the question of time in his works, particularly 
Faust (see Vincent ] 987). Like Heidegger after him, Goethe's conception of time is 
radically different to that of the common sense and philosophical view in the West. For 
Goethe, time and existence are thoroughly interdependent, and not totally separate as 
Newton suggested. 
We are all eternal! - My beginning I don't remember, 
I have no calling to come to an end, 
And do not see the end. 
Thus I am eternal, since I am! 
(Goethe - the Prometheus fragment: cited in Vincent 1987:14) 
The relation of Being to eternity is, for Goethe, the same as the relation of the present 
moment to time (Vincent 1987). This is extremely important for the common sense and 
existential apprehension of temporality itself. Heidegger agrees, and so does Dogen (see 
Heine 1985). This points to the central role of soteriology and personalised involvement 
in the process of coming to apprehend one's existence, one's place in the landscape, 
one's sense of belonging. In attempting to hide from the existential impermanence of 
time (with the knowledge of on-coming death), people become ever-more imprisoned 
by their own conception of derivative temporality. Because people fear the apparent 
finality of death they are perpetually anxious which serves to bring'about an apparent 
need for suppressing this anxiety. One way of doing this is to convince oneself (with the 
help of some fOlIDS of religion) that there is immortality in an after-life. Another way 
is to spend one's entire life filling up the mind with distractions so that the quiet 
desperation of their condition is not able to be contemplated. Watch television, make 
endless plans, buy new toys, go on holidays, play more sport, be busy, be successful, 
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be famous, be a star, be the prime minister, work harder, get rich, be modern. 
Although not a problem in themselves, these psychological diversions do not solve the 
problem, they only serve to obscure its source - to cover it over. If the anxiety is not 
addressed at the source it will never be overcome, and a person and their entire culture 
will lead an alienated life - as aliens from their true immediate existence. People spend 
their entire lives making plans for the great 'one day' and fail to actually live now. This 
failure to be able to live out the beauty of the present moment, by failing to see its 
eternity is what makes a culture fail to achieve the highest happiness belonging. This 
belonging is a belonging to the rest of the landscape, a place in the way of the 
landscape, a place in the way of Nature. This is what Goethe was trying to help us 
understand when Faust declared that there is no moment which is so great that he would 
wish to grasp onto it for ever. 
If I ever say to any minute: 
"But wait, wait! You are so fair!" 
Throw me in chains, then; then I'll gladly perish! 
(Goethe: Faust I Act IV). 
For Heidegger, the dominant Western concept of time obstructs an understanding of our 
own existence and our place in time and space (Nature). He calls this the forgetfulness 
of Being. This misapprehension of the time dimension prevents people from existing in 
an authentic existential relationship with their social and ecological sUlToundings. This 
is central for our problem of cultural authenticity in relation to ecological sustainability 
as the latter requires the former. In my view, ecological sustainability is dependant on 
existential and psychological authenticity. It is precisely for this reason that I take the 
question of time so seriously in my explorations concerning ecological sustainability. 
7.8.3 PRIMORDIAL TIME 
The importance of Elisclosing the nature of primordial time, for both Heidegger and 
Dogen, is to show that temporality is fundamentally interrelated with, and inseparable 
from, existence. Time does not precede existence as it is implied in the common sense 
and scientific view of much of modern life. Beings do not exist 'in time' and, as such, 
time is not able to be hypostatized as a framework separate from the passage of Nature, 
as Whitehead suggested. This is implied in Western metaphysics and modern science 
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by carrying over to ontology an unfounded yet sophisticated epistemology of time, 
grounded in an assumption of the existence of a linguistic predicate similar to the atom 
(Le. the indivisible unit of time). McEvoy (1984) noted the way St Augustine was aware 
of the linguistic analogy between the measurement of time and space, which Bergson 
also focused on earlier in the 20th centUly. But the practice of predication must not 
become a philosophical fetish. If it does we will continue to search for real objects in 
Nature (such as the elementary particle) that we have invented as a product of the 
patterns of our own thoughts. 
Instead, we must begin to see time as the inherent dynamism and fluidity of the 
movement of Nature itself. To achieve this realisation time must be de-objectified (i.e. 
no longer conceived of as an 'other'). Achieving this cannot be conducted solely through 
philosophical argument (i.e. within language) but must be accompanied by an experience 
of time uncluttered by misconceptions. Being and time, for Heidegger, are not reducible 
to each other but exist in a dialectical relationship of interpenetration. The disclosure of 
one requires the other as well. This existential disclosure of both Being and primordial 
time together constitute the fundamental ingredients of what Heidegger calls 
'authenticity', where (dialectically), authenticity is essential for the disclosure of 
temporality (Heine 1985). 
An awareness of primordial time allows human beings (Dasein) to realise and experience 
the interconnectedness of reality beyond the individual self. Heidegger, in contrast to 
most of Western theology and metaphysics, does not view time as a gap to be bridged 
in order to understand Being, or as a pre-existing 'surface' onto which 'things' and beings 
are added (see Heidegger 1985). Time and existence are one and the same, as Goethe 
suggests. 
The question remains as to how primordial time might be apprehended by people. Again 
from Goethe: 
Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast, 
And either would be severed (rom its brother; 
The one holds fast with joyous earthly lust 
Onto the world of [humanity] with organs clinging; 
The other soars impassioned from the dust, 
To realms of lofty forebears winging. 
(Goethe cited in Vincent 1987). 
The initial realisation to be made is that there is more to ones existence than the 
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material world of the ego-self. This part of ones existence is real, but it must begin to 
discover its non-ego self as a Sself that has a geography and a temporality beyond the 
autonomous individual. An individual is' an aspect of the landscape, not separate from 
it. Even the mind is part of Nature. The unity with one's surroundings as a broader 
geographical Sselfis able to be conceptually and existentially apprehended once a person 
is rid of a major linguistic illusion - the ego-self. I will go into this further in chapter 
8 to follow. Identity with the landscape is all important. Because, if this is achieved then 
the beginning and the ending of the ego-self becomes a non-issue. There is no need to 
hold onto the illusion of an isolated, autonomous ego-self which has derivative 
temporality only (i.e. it perceives derivative time only). The passing of the present 
moment is no longer a loss of existence and 'one step closer to death', but instead an 
aspect of eternity itself - right here and now. 
To achieve this conceptual and existential condition one must learn how to drive 
nihilism existentially and experience the Nothing. One must be capable of leaving 
language behind and immerse oneself in the silence of nihilism. Nihilism has been 
employed earlier but only conceptually. Authenticity requires more than this. 
Authenticity, which makes ecological sustainability possible, must also be existential and 
thereby extend beyond our thoughts and into the basis of our actions. We wi1l100k into 
the existential aspects of nihilism in chapter 8 to follow. 
Thus shall ye think of all this fleeting world: 
A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream; 
A flash of lightening in a summer cloud, 
A flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream. 
(The Diamond Sutra) 
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CHAPTER 8· THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE LANDSCAPE 
A story draws on relationships in the exterior landscape and projects them onto 
the interior landscape. The purpose of story telling is to achieve harmony 
between the two landscapes, to use all the elements of story syntax, mood, 
figures of speech - in a harmonious way to reproduce the harmony of the land 
in the individual's interior. Inherent in st01Y is the power to reorder a state of 
psychological confusion through contact with the pervasive truth of those 
relationships we call "the land" (Lopez 1989:67-8). 
I have been gradually developing a postmodern approach to cultural ecology which 
amounts to a re-enchantment of Nature. The different postmodern discourses are by no 
means in agreement concerning the creative response to the problems modernity and the 
establishment of a 'counter-hegemonic bloc' called for by some postmodernists (Best and 
Kellner 1991). In paI1icular, there is much disagreement in relation to the constitution 
of the 'self and its role in such a political process. 
As I see it, as it was for Goethe, Walt Whitman, and Thoreau, the self gains identity 
from its place in the landscape. The self is not an autonomous being, but an 
epiphenomenon of Nature. Its essence is contextual, specifically tied to the real 
landscape that surrounds it, where that 'landscape' includes the social dimensions of a 
place. This is a self of 'difference' and a self of 'identity'. Best and Kellner (1991) 
contend that Foucault did not sufficiently clarify the connections between ethics, 
aesthetics, and politics. I believe this can be done by awakening people to the landscape 
dimension of the self. In this way, I am not an essentialist although I do employ the 
term essence. My conception of essence is inseparable from an existential relationship 
with the rest of Nature, a relationship that exists both within and beyond language. 
As mentioned earlier, the style of this research is reconstructive as opposed to simply 
deconstructive. Nihilism is employed as a tool but not the goa1. I use 'silence" as a way 
to deeper meanings, where those meanings are able to come into culture, via language, 
from Nature itself. A form of mysticism is uncovered showing how a 'silent' 
apprehension of Nature can instruct a culture in an ethics of ecological sustainability. 
This is the bioregional narrative, and the bioregional narrative lets the landscape recite 
II use the term 'silence' to metaphorically denote that which lies outside the reach 
of language. Listening to bird song without thinking is listening to the 'silence'. 'Silence' 
as it is used in this chapter is a linguistic 'silence', 
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its autobiography. 
In this chapter the notion of the geography of the self is explored and developed. I do 
this by means of a 'cultural ecology of silence'. In the previous chapter we were 
confronted with the outer limits of language, and there we began to realise that the 
universe was still there, and furthermore, that much of our human experience of reality 
around us lay beyond this point. In this chapter we enter into mysticism and the realm 
of mythology. 
8.1 INTRODUCING THE SILENCE 
The silence I speak of is the 'no-language zone' of linguistic silence the wilderness, the 
abyss. The silence serves two impOltant purposes. The first is epistemological, the 
second is existential, but both arise out of the same silence, the same nihilism. In terms 
of epistemology we can discover that a form of truth can and does lie beyond language, 
beyond logic, beyond good and evil. This truth is the truth of Nature and Nature's 
coherence. It is the ever-changing way of Nature, the way of evolution, and adaptation. 
We will gain an opportunity to listen to the silence, and then we will see where 
primordial language comes from. This primordial language consists of a conversation 
with the landscape2 where adaptation and evolution of culture with the rest of Nature 
becomes possible. Such a conversation is the bioregional narrative where the landscape 
is able to speak and be heard. 
The second purpose of employing silence is existential and relates to personal 
experiences of the landscape, in relation to the soteriological process of self realisation. 
It relates to the apprehension (i.e. discovery) of the geography of the self. This aspect 
of my story is crucial to its overall coherence, and I believe it is also decisive in coming 
to an understanding of the meaning of ecological sustainability. As such, it is also a 
significant part of the process of learning about Nature (i.e. it is also epistemological). 
I call this 'natural learning' or 'wisdom'. Knowledge, made possible by language, adds 
information to our mind. Wisdom, on the other hand, comes through the removal of 
obstlUctions to the flow of Nature's coherence. Knowledge is often an obstruction to 
wisdom. Silence plays a central role in the process of allowing wisdom to rise to the 
surface of our consciousness, as it is through this silence that obstructions to wisdom 
21 use the word 'landscape' to include the people of a place in their geographical 
environment. It also includes their own bodies, intuitions, and feelings. 
246 
are removed. The flow of wisdom will be obstructed if it is made illegitimate in a 
cultural discourse which demands that legitimate knowledge be logical. It will be 
misinterpreted if Nature's messages are blocked by a mistaken conception of the self, 
arising out of a case of mistaken identity. This points to the existential and soteriological 
dimensions of my story. 
If the self is seen as autonomous and/or non-geographical then individuals will fail to 
identify with the landscape as an aspect of the self. This amounts to a massive 
obstruction to an ethics beyond good and evil, an ethics capable of fostering cultural 
evolution with the rest of Nature, an ethics of ecological sustainability. I will attempt 
to demonstrate this in the following pages. 
To help clarify this conceptual exercise, imagine the silence (linguistic nihilism) to be 
a metaphorical river. It is a river of linguistic, and existential nothingness. Rarely do we 
acknowledge the river, and in our refusal to accept its existence we are unable to see 
what lies on the other side. On the other side of this river is where primordial language 
lies, where compassion is at home, where ecological sustainability becomes possible. 
Anyone can point to the other side but to get there one must get wet. There are no shOlt 
cuts. In this chapter I will attempt to show why we must learn to swim, and how we 
might go about this if we are still interested in ecological sustainability. 
8.2 ON THE WAY TO SILENCE 
A culture that recreates itself through language (as all cultures must) may do so according 
to a normative system viz. according to the rules of language (i.e rationally). Modernity 
tries to do this. Here the deeds of the culture are informed by and grounded in the rules of 
the language game, where truth is defined according to those rules (truth is defined 
rationally). Furthermore, this truth is exported from language to the domain beyond the 
reach of language. If reality beyond the ru les of language (e.g. the rest of Nature) does not 
comply with the rules oflinguistic consistency, such a culture may attempt to manipulate 
its environment in order to make it appear to conform with its internal system of linguistic 
rules. This is what Western culture has been doing for many centuries, and particularly 
since Francis Bacon encouraged us to employ science to control Nature (see appendix 1). 
Such a world view will have internal coherence, but internal coherence only. This is 
because a normative culture declares that the predicates for conceptual (linguistic) coherence 
lie in the rules of language and that linguistic coherence so defined comprises the criteria 
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for truth. It is a self-referencing system that uses the intemal rules of a linguistic convention 
to find those rules and declare that they have found the truth of reality. Remember, such 
a view of truth is the same as a cat that eats its own tail and declares that the universe is 
nothing but cat. I will hope to demonstrate below that a culture can establish a system of 
linguistic coherence, where that coherence is based, not on the intemal rules of language 
(e.g. logic or reason), but according to Nature itself. There is method in Nature's madness, 
but this method is not logic. Nature's coherence can be brought into language and hence 
culture, but can only be brought into language through wisdom. Wisdom is poetic, not 
logical. 
o truth of the earth! 0 truth of things l 
I am determined to press the whole way towards you, 
Sound your voice! 
I scale mountains or dive in the sea after you 
(Walt Whitman - Great are the Myths, lines 39-40). 
Truth defined according to logic will determine what is acceptable as cultural behaviour in 
what becomes a normative system of cultural (ethical) instruction (e.g. Kantian ethics). 
Because the culture recreates itself through acting out the language game, the normative 
linguistic system becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing a normative culture. Now, 
this would be fine and dandy, if and only if, reality outside the rules of language was fixed 
and/or logically organised. Such organisation of Nature is supposedly orchestrated by God -
the Mathematician (as quantum physicist J ames Jeans did see Weber 1986), or the logical 
laws of Nature (why people think they must be logical is beyond me). 
Mathematics has epistemological and not ontological credence. Quantum physicist David 
Bohm appeals to our good sense, asking "why should mathematics an invisible, non-
physical sort of thing - be the powerful govemor of matter, which is physical and visible?" 
Instead he tells us "you [will not] find [mathematics] anywhere in matter" because, "we 
don't experience mathematics as a feature of matter. It is just how we think about it. .. we 
may say that it describes matter and that is how things work up to a point, but that does not 
entail that matter is mathematics" (Weber 1986:139,143,146). Kurt Godel and Alan Turing 
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both showed (using the incompleteness theorem devised by Godel3) that it is impossible to 
obtain a consistent and complete axiomatic theory of mathematics and a mechanical truth 
verifying procedure (Chaitin 1991). This does not rubbish mathematics and logic, it merely 
shows that they are human inventions, not discoveries. They fit within the domain of 
know ledge not wisdom. 
Any culture that reifies its inventions by transfelTing them from epistemology to ontology 
will set in motion a normative cultural system. This happens when people assume that the 
precise geometrical shapes and lines they place on their maps are actually equally precise 
in Nature. But they are not. We must not pretend that the map is the landscape. It is only 
a map. I do not suggest that we throw the map out, but we must recognise the difference 
between a map and the landscape. If we confuse the map with the landscape we have 
committed a great fallacy - the epistemic fallacy as Bhaskar (1978) would put it. Because 
a normative linguistic system will contradict the constant flux of Nature it cannot be 
adaptive. It cannot move with the ever-changing patterns of the landscape. Remember - even 
the highest mountains erode, even the brightest stars explode. I call this nOlmative condition 
unauthentic, fallen, unsustainable. Moving with the rest of the changing landscape is what 
makes indigenousness come about. Indigenousness is an adaptive condition. It is 
evolutionmy. A condition that is able to evolve is able to ecologically endure without 
yielding, to continue to be - to be ecologically sustainable. 
Normative, unauthentic and unsustainable cultures will be immediately non-adaptive in 
terms of their underlying ecological character. But this may not become apparent, however, 
due to low population numbers, where environmental responses to non-adaptive cultural 
deeds are essentially masked by the existing background 'noise' of environmental change 
in any landscape. However, the growth of such a culture will eventually bring the non-
adaptive consequences home to roost. These non-adaptive tendencies will be recognised by 
members of that culture (or other cultures) who may also discover that the source of the 
problem lies in language. 
3Kurt Goedel was a member of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, who like 
Wittgenstein (who was also a member for a shOlt time) demonstrated major flaws in the 
underlying assumptions of positivism in relation to the question of truth. 
249 
Another way that the ecological contradictions of an unsustainable culture can be masked 
is if such a culture exports its environmental and social problems. Resource depletion for 
example, can be temporarily ignored through conquest as Rome did all those centuries ago, 
and every capitalist nation has been trying to do since Adam Smith showed them how. But 
these unsustainable contradictions will more effectively come home to roost the more 
successfully a normative linguistic cultural system penetrates to every corner of the planet, 
as is currently being fostered with the GATT negotiations in relation to capitalism. EvelY 
free market capitalist apologist worth their salt will be celebrating the final freeing up of 
the global economy, but they do so in the ignorance of what it will really do to the planet. 
There will be no space left to export the contradictions of capitalism once it has captured 
evelY corner of the eatth. Lenin predicted this earlier this century from the perspective of 
industrial socialism (see Lenin 1978). 
The recognition of non-adaptive cultural systems by members of a culture will tend to give 
rise to counter-cultural movements that seek to overcome unauthenticity and 
unsustainability, even well before the contradictions of a normative cultural system have 
reached their full destructive capacity. Such counter-cultural movements tend to embrace 
forms of mysticism due to their realisation of the need to bring a normative culture to an 
acceptance of meaning arising from outside language (e.g. from intuitions). Such 
movements are often called religious due to their mystical bent. They will be difficult to 
comprehend if the observer fails to realise the significance of the linguistic problems of 
their own culture, and fails to apprehend the meaning of the metaphorical narratives told 
as myth in such movements. 
This is not to say that all counter-cultural movements or religions are indeed moving in the 
right direction in relation to ecological authenticity and adaptiveness. In fact, many are 
simply alternative normative systems, and in this sense they might be counter-cultural but 
just as unsustainable as their cultural enemies. A good example can be seen in the 
salvational projects of many forms of Christianity, which sustain a normative linguistic 
system in defining the criteria for viltue. Here, as said before, virtue stands in the way of 
the highest happiness - salvation, or biospherical egalitarianism in some forms of deep 
ecology. I believe that an eco-cultural movement capable of fostering ecological 
sustainability must be a form of mysticism due to the need to bring into culture information 
about the landscape that lies beyond the reach of language. It must also be a form of 
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eudaemonism - where the highest happiness is synonymous with virtue4 • I will explain this 
further below once we have explored what is meant by the 'highest happiness' and its 
relation to authenticity. 
I believe that the cultural and linguistic viewfinder developed in this thesis (there is more 
to follow) is able to expose the difference between cultures and counter-cultural movements 
that are capable of delivering ecological sustainabiIity, and those that are not. Those that 
are capable are simply those that fail to establish obstructions to eco-cultural adaptability 
and evolution. However, just because such obstructions are absent does not guarantee that 
ecological sustainability will become manifest. You cannot force a horse to drink. But 
normative cultural systems actually prevent such a horse (ecological sustainability) from 
gaining access to water. What we witness is its death in the environmental and social 
degradation that results from unsustainable cultural life. 
I also believe that Nietzsche was right in saying that "God is dead, and we are His 
murderers" (Nietzsche 1974). Nature is dead and we in the West are its executioners. We 
have, for the last two and a half millennia, been strangling Nature ever so SUbtly. We 
strangle it in such a way that we do not see it dying. We take joy in listening to its death 
throes as all good sado-masochists would, as in listening to its cries of pain we witness our 
own pain and suffering. It is a suffering we have been taught to endure by coercive, 
manipulating, dominating, alienating, self-denying, totalitarian linguistic and political 
systems that teach us to love our servitude. And in our gleeful evangelism we parade 
around the planet teaching others to do the same in the name of 'progress' - that insatiable 
god of model11ity, that 'end of the rainbow' we chase but can never grasp. 
As a culture continues to grasp for that solid fixed truth which does not exist, it continues 
to divorce itself from Nature. This is because the way of Nature is flux and its truth is flux 
also. In order to be capable of engaging in an authentic relationship with Nature we must 
let go. We must release our tight-fisted grip on the rope of reason, of the rules of language, 
of logic, and fall back to earth, enabling a realisation that there is meaning and truth beyond 
the rules of internal linguistic coherence. In so doing, a culture can begin to allow 
information to come into language from Nature itself. Such information will not be logical, 
4Not to be confused with hedonism. 
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but it will have coherence. The coherence it has will be a coherence according to Nature -
not to geometry. This is what Cezanne meant when he said that we "must do Poussin over 
again, this time according to nature" (de la Croix and Tandey 1980:783), and to do so we 
"must reflect...The eye is not enough" (Honour and Flemming 1982:545). 
This is why meditation is so crucial to Zen - we must learn how to turn language off and 
simply be without the rules of language, without logic, without reason. This is what 
Angelus Silesius in 13th century Germany was trying to tell us by saying that "The rose is 
without why; it blooms because it blooms; It cares not for itself, asks not if it is seen" 
(cited in Caputo 1978). Meister Eckhart asks us to achieve detachment, and Heidegger asks 
that we let Being be, by listening to the silence. Lets take a closer look at this notion of 
silence. 
8.2.1 THE CULTURAL ECOLOGY OF SILENCE 
The experience of the abysmal nature of our being, of the nothingness of its ground, 
is not necessarily terrifying, as long as one has the appropriate attitude. From the 
perspective of Zen (and something similar is true for Heidegger) the experience of 
the abysmal nothingness of the self and the world is the statting point for 
"salvation". In Dogen's words: "One who falls to the ground gets up with the help 
of it" (Kotoh 1987:205). 
Language, if improperly used, can help to give us a major source of anxiety as we keep 
using language to ask questions like "who am I?" and then inventing an autonomous self 
that is able to answer this question. But the answer is only as good as the question. This 
autonomous self is a linguistic invention, not an intuitive discovery. The self is a linguistic 
mirror. Because we only see the reflection, we are unable to realise that it is, in fact, only 
a reflection of language. To realise this we must take the mirror away. Take language (the 
mirror) away and no reflection can dazzle us. We can begin to see that we are not an 
autonomous self at all. Instead we are really much more than this. We equate the edge of 
'I' with the apparent edge of the skin. The individual body conveniently coincides with a 
linguistic convention. But it is only a coincidence. 
When the mirror is gone the 'I' begins to fill the space beyond the individual body. This 
does not deny the body, only it affirms that the self has a geographical aspect in addition 
to the body. The self has a unity with the landscape where the 'landscape' includes the 
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people of a place. The apprehension off such unity enables an identity with the landscape 
(including other people) as '1'. The landscape is no longer an 'other', but part of the 
collective Self. This identity with the 'other' - the other human and non-human dimensions 
of place, is a source of compassion, a source of ethical instruction that is not grounded in 
a sophisticated system of moral philosophy. It is grounded in the real experiences of 
ordinary people who have had the privilege to overcome the limitations of language. In the 
opening words of Walt Whitman's Song of Myself, published in 1855, he utters: 
I celebrate myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. 
(Song of Myself, lines 1-3) 
In chapter 7 I showed how a logical ethical system could come about, as it did with Kant. 
Such a logical system embodies a quest that seeks a highest happiness in salvation, 
mediated by reason (and hence language) in what became a discourse of 'good' and 'evil'. 
Kant tried to move beyond 'good' and 'evil' by employing pure reason as a metaphysical 
Ought. We are then commanded to follow a standard that supposedly leads to salvation and 
the highest happiness. But the 'good', the 'evil', and pure reason are each inventions of 
language, and so, in spite of the virtuous intentions of so many of the world's moralists our 
condition plunges yet further into confusion, pain and suffering of the psyche (see 
Schopenhauer 1965; Nietzsche 1969; Foucault 1982; Campbell 1986, for example). In the 
words of William Blake: 
I [The] perceptions [of humanity] are not bound by organs of perception; [ we] 
perceive more than sense (tho' ever so accute) can discover. 
II Reason, or the ratio of all that we have already known, is not the same that 
it shall be when we know more ... 
If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic Character the Philosophic & 
Experimental would soon be at the ratio of a11 things5, & stand still, unable 
5This is why Kant argued that a priori reasoning could never increase our knowledge. 
However, unlike Blake, Kant undervalued the illogical, poetic nature of experiences that 
could form the basis for a mystical knowing (i.e. wisdom). The latter was a central project 
of Heidegger, which is why Heidegger would probably have approved of the poetry of 
Blake. 
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to do other than repeat the same dull round over again6. 
Application. [Whoever] sees the Infinite in all things sees [the divine]. 
[Whoever] sees the Ratio [i.e. reason] only sees himself [sic] (Blake 1993). 
Such an ethical system can never be 'at horne' in the landscape - it is lost and in thorough, 
yet quiet desperation, unable to comprehend its identity with the rest of Nature. In so doing, 
a culture breeds a population of egocentric, imaginary autonomous 'selfs', that selfishly hide 
from the apparent finality of death, which mocks their egotistical grasping for permanence 
and immOltality. They imagine that linear, derivative time (also an invention of language) 
is running out on them. Not enough time ... Time flies ... Times up! And in this game of 
hide-and-seek with the divine executioner (another invention) they have neither the 
disposition nor the ability to really live. On the contrary, Thoreau tells us: "I went to the 
woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front the essential facts of life, and see if 
I could not learn what it had to teach, and not when I came to die, discover that I had not 
lived" (Thoreau 1980:66). 
Goethe's Faust had the courage to let go of the world (not denying it), and in doing so 
achieved a creative apprehension of Nature through natural learning, bringing on the 
wisdom he originally went in search of at the beginning of the play. In our selfish modern 
search for absolute answers we hold tightly to reason, as we convince ourselves that truth 
must be logical. But the answer and the question, of course, lie partially in the abyss itself, 
where reason cannot venture, that silence beyond the reach of language where there is no 
reason: all simply is. This is a realm beyond good and evil, beyond language and its rules, 
where the source of our authenticity resides. The source of ethical instructions that make 
ecological sustainability possible. 
A decisive precondition to recognising the importance of silence is the realisation of the 
unity of the individual and the surrounding landscape. For both Heidegger and Zen there 
is no split between the world and the person who observes it: 
The true self is not separated from the world that has become one with it; there is 
neither subject nor object.. .. the world, which had hitherto been rigidified by 
linguistic segmentation, gradually becomes fluid, thereby dissolving the boundaries 
6This is what Nietzsche proclaimed about the inevitable tautological nature of Western 
metaphysics. 
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created by segmentation. The shapes of things which have been sharply 
distinguished from each other subtly lose their sharp definition, and with the 
elimination of distinct boundaries things come mutually to interpenetrate each other. 
(Kotoh 1987:206). 
The silence of the linguistic abyss or 'wilderness' is an ever-changing realm. It is an 
evolving reality, much of which is accessible to all of us only language alone will not get 
you there. If you close your eyes and switch off language, even for a moment to disentangle 
yourself from this text, you are walking in the silence of the wilderness. Taking your pulse 
and feeling its rhythm and strength (but not counting, or timing it) is another example. You 
are taking infOlmation from the landscape, from outside language. Learning to interpret it 
is the next trick, but this can only come from experience from doing it. Chinese medicine 
takes the pulse in this way and is able to procure far more information from part of the 
landscape (i.e. the body) than Western medicine whiCh is so blinded by the need to quantify 
everything (see Capra 1982; Kaptchuk 1983). 
Listening to the landscape requires an acceptance of the mystery that lies beyond the reach 
of language. If it is able to be heard the landscape will provide a culture with a major 
source of infOlmation that fosters ethical instruction. It requires simplicity if it is to be 
revealed. On the contrary, the sophisticated and supreme pedantlY of logically dri ven ethical 
discourses like that of Kant actually serve to obstruct it. An acceptance of mystery and the 
enchantment that enfolds is not possible if a culture cannot let go of logic from time to 
time. The mysticism of which I speak annoys philosophers who see logic as the only source 
of meaning. They contemptuously brand mystics as irrationalists. Logicians are unable to 
penetrate or decipher the coherence of this form of experience of Nature, precisely because 
such coherence comes from Nature - not logic. Nature holds the key to the coherence of 
ecological sustainability, not philosophy. Western philosophers must learn to let go of 
language and its rules. This is why I argue that an essential part of the equation of coming 
to understand ecological sustainability is soteriology - self realisation. 
Allowing Nature to lend meaning to social life on its own terms, provides the opportunity 
for a creative moment to become incarnate in your consciousness, expressed poetically if 
captured in language. This is the poetry of primordial language which makes a bioregional 
narrative possible. This is the hidden order of art (Ehrenzweig 1967). This can be seen in 
the paintings of Cezanne, in the music of Wagner, in the poetry of Blake, Whitman, Goethe, 
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George, and Wordsworth, and in the prose of Thoreau. It can also be seen in crafts, where 
contempormy artisan John McQueen, for example, aligns his aesthetic language with the 
language of Nature, discern able through observation and contemplation. He informs us of 
the source of creativity in his baskets: "Trees as religion/ words making objectsl have a way 
of hardeningl into handles" (Morse 1993). A bioregional narrative is not merely people 
speaking to each other, it is the landscape addressing itself through human language. This 
is why it is autobiographical. 
The silence (linguistic nihilism) is the 'no-language zone' in which any person, from any 
culture can gain a vivid experience of place, of the existential geography of their world. 
This enables an individual of any culture to be able to cast off their delusion of autonomy 
and apprehend their unity with the landscape. In this way the self begins to be defined 
according to its geography. As Kotoh (1987) suggests: 
When the meaning-relations of every day language collapse as a whole, one is 
thrown into an incomprehensible chaos of phenomena without meaning [nihilism]. 
When the ultimate meaning of life fails, what one sees is mere nothingness which 
repels any attempt at rationalisation... the world becomes disconnected from 
language and floats by itself (Kotoh 1987:205). 
In this way, our experience of the world around us in the absence of language is different 
from an experience which is mediated by the overlay of every day language. Such an idea 
was central to the latter thought of Wittgenstein (e.g. see Hanfling 1989), which comes very 
close to Buddhism (see Gudmunsen ] 977). In his first major work Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Wittgenstein states: "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. 
They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical". He then concludes the entire 
philosophical exercise by stating: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence" (Wittgenstein 1922:6.522, 7). But silence is not the end of the story. Experiences 
of the silence can be brought poetically into language (any language) ex post facto through 
primordial language, thus creating language anew from those very experiences. This is the 
'stillness of silence' found in Heidegger's work that underlies his conception of language 
(see Heidegger 1971, 1975b). And from this; "It is silence that hears the echo of stillness 
which constitutes the essence and origin of language" (Kotoh 1987:210). 
In hearing the echo of linguistic stillness (experiences of Nature's coherence outside 
language) people can allow the landscape to enter into culture through the front door. This 
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is because:-
silence cuts into and explodes the network of ordinary language which has 
degenerated into mannerism [normative language]. At the same time it restructures 
and modifies previous meanings in such a way as to create a new form of language. 
Ordinary language can thus be constantly questioned and nourished by silence and 
be reborn as a language capable of describing the life-breath of silence. The thread 
which was cut between reality and language [deconstruction] is then retied through 
this silence [reconstruction]. Silence is the source of language (Kotoh 1987:208). 
In this way people can provide their culture with a basis of ethics which, provides a set of 
moral instructions enabling a co-adaptive relationship with landscape to develop. In such 
a condition a bioregional narrative is set in motion enabling the landscape to recite its 
autobiography. But just how can this be brought about in a culture? Through a form of love. 
Yes, love - that forbidden word. But just what do I mean here by love? What is called 
'love'? And what on earth has it got to do with ecological sustainability? Touchy feely stuff, 
read on ... 
8.3 LOVE? 
Many people get queezy when the word 'love' is used in conversations, especially when it 
is used in a professional forum. People get embarrassed, thinking, "here we go ... a religious 
sem10n, good grief". But love, yes, love - say it - 1..0 .. v .. e. What a word that can evoke 
such discomfort in professional circles. But what can 'love' possibly have do with ecological 
sustainability? Up until now I have been talking about relationships. The relationship 
between people and place, between culture and landscape, between people and people. 
Relationships. Interactions, ethics, compassion, respect, virtue, grace, mana .. .love. It is only 
a small step. The reason why I bring this prohibited word into my story, is to explore its 
meaning, and show why aspects of its meaning are able to shed light on the far-reaching 
coherence of this theory, from the evolutionary process right down to interpersonal relations. 
I hope to show that ecological sustainability can be brought about through a form of love, 
which can be apprehended and experienced by ordinary people. I will show how people can 
participate directly in the process of moving a culture closer to ecological sustainability 
without being ecologists. It brings ecological sustainability down from the dizzy heights of 
philosophy and plants it firmly in the every day experiences of people of any culture in any 
landscape. But before going any further it is necessary to explain just what I mean by love. 
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Love is a word we use to suggest a number of different things but tend to be related to a 
sense of joy. However, there are very different sources of joy, and therefore, joy alone is 
not a sufficient criteria to define love. For example, there is a joy in sadism, but this joy 
is inspired by a delight in the giving pain to someone else. This could be called love, 
because the sadist loves the deed of inflicting pain, like a rapist. But to declare this to be 
synonymous with the love of one's children is a gross misunderstanding of love. This 
example is not as far-fetched as it may first appear. The reason for this stems from what 
makes a sensation of joy possible in sadism. Such joy is only possible if no compassion 
gets in the way, because compassion will make the sadist feel a sense of pain with the 
other. If no compassion is involved it means that the individual (sadist) is thoroughly 
selfish, as the ego-self is totally isolated from any other - hence no compassion. Sadism is 
joyful if, and only if, the individual lives in a totally deluded psychological condition, a 
condition that is incapable of identifying with any 'other'. Many people think that it is good 
to be yourself, and be true to your self. But first you must, must, must, be careful to know 
what that self is. Otherwise, being true to your self (as ego-self) may lead to sadistic 
behaviour even though the selfish sadist thinks that it is really love. Instead it is selfishness, 
and a desire to give this ego-self pleasure. Furnishing the ego-self with such joy is often 
desiring and grasping, as it is motivated by the ego-self which seeks affirmation. The need 
for such affirmation and reinforcement of the ego-self (a linguistic illusion) is often fuelled 
by anxieties relating to a loss of true identity and belonging - partly caused by a failure to 
overcome derivative time and a failure to apprehend the geography of the Self. Lets explore 
the question of 'love' a little further. 
"I love ice-cream" is a sensible statement for many people. It implies an intense desiring, 
a wanting to have, a grasping. Many people use the word 'love' in this way when they say 
"I love you" - meaning I want you intensely. It is a grasping, a desiring, a wanting to have 
possession of. FUlth erm ore , that which seeks possession is only the ego-self (a linguistic 
illusion) because only an isolated, autonomous entity is capable of possessing anything. If 
there is no ego-self, all that can happen in relationships is a belonging to, or a being with 
the 'other' not owning. It is often erotic - erotic meaning an appetite, desiring - eros. "I 
love that painting" often means "I want that painting" it is erotic, not necessarily sexual, 
although sexual desiring can also be erotic. But there are also other meanings that lie hidden 
in the folds of this word 'love'. A valuable starting point is to look to the ancient Greeks 
who formed an important link in the linguistic heritage of the West. 
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What we lump together under the single word 'love' was, for the Greeks, an array of words 
with different meanings and emphasis. There is eros, agape, philia, epithumia, nomos, and 
storge. Phi/ia refers to friendship or kinship - a fraternity with the other. Epithumia is a lust 
or sexual desire. Nomos really has more to do with law but has been used to refer to the 
right action in relation to divine law. Storge is affection between immediate family members 
(see Bratton 1992). Eros, as mentioned above, is infused with value, and seeks to gain 
possession of its object. Attachment. This sometimes, perhaps frequently, happens in some 
religions where people grasp for possession of the divine. This happens a great deal in 
Christianity when people grasp for the saviour, they want immortality, or at least want to 
reserve a window seat in heaven. They grasp for the divine to save them from their 
neurosis, which leads to erotic fundamentalism, and idolatry (see Williams 1978). It is also 
common in interpersonal relationships where one person 'loves' the other, but it is a 
grasping, wanting to take possession of the other. When someone dies, often the grief 
people suffer is a product of their own erotic grasping for the person now dead. Their 
supply of ice-cream labelled 'Paul,7 has dried up, and yet they love ice-cream. Some have 
argued that love can become genuine and authentic when it is transformed by agape (e.g. 
Lewis 1960; Smedes 1978; De Rougemont 1974). 
Agape (pronounced something like 'agapea') is quite different from eros. It refers to a non-
grasping acceptance of what is. Whereas eros is a striving, desiring, wanting goodness, 
agape is unmotivated and spontaneous (Singer 1966). It is the result of detachment, of a 
kind of nonchalance. In theology it is used to refer to an acceptance of the divine presence 
divine will. It is indifferent to value, it just is (Nygren 1957). It is similar to the Zen 
Buddhist notion of rnahakaruna (great compassion) which comes about through the absolute 
negation of the ego-self, thus becoming one with the absolute Mu (Nothingness), enabling 
a unity with the Dharma (way of Nature) (see Abe 1985). In Hinduism a similar meaning 
lies behind the word atman referring to the presencing of Brahman (analogous to God) in 
a person as the true self (Ross 1993). In Taoism, moving with the flow and flux of the Tao 
(see Capra 1976; Campbel 1986, 1988; Watts 1957 for example). Many of the criticisms 
of Christianity from those who sympathise with Asian religions tend to overlook the ~gape 
7Paul was a close friend of mine who died during the write up of this thesis. 
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aspect of forms of Chlistian mysticism which differ from a number of Asian forms of 
mysticism merely in the choice of words as labels for what are really very similar 
meanings. I do not defend Christianity, Christians can do that. What I do defend is the 
meaning behind words such as agape, mahakaruna, and atman, I defend this meaning 
because I believe it is all important to the achievement of ecological sustain ability , which 
I will attempt to explain below. To begin I will return to the question of art. 
8.4 THE WAY OF ART 
A substantial issue raised in postmodernism is the role and place of art in culture, and in 
particular, the way art has been treated in modern bourgeois society (Samp 1989). Burgers 
(1984) has distinguished between two major types of art in terms of its relationship to 
culture. One is art that is central to the life praxis of a culture (sacral and courtly art), the 
other is alienated art which lies outside the life praxis of a culture. The latter condition is 
common in modern societies and has been called bourgeois art by Bergers (1984). In many 
modern cultures art becomes detached from culture as an alienated instrument of 
entertainment. Many postmodern theorists argue that art must be de:"objectified, and brought 
back into the praxis of life including its place in the political and economic sphere. This 
was one of the principle messages of Nietzsche and later Heidegger, both of which have 
greatly influenced postmodern theory (see Vattimo 1988; Samp 1989). 
Goethe expressed the notion that the relationship between art, love and Nature was more 
than an metaphorical one (see Reed 1984). It relates to the unity which underlies each of 
these domains. I believe this unity does exist and can be employed to help explain the 
evolutionary process, particularly as it relates to human evolution and adaptation. But to 
understand this we must first clarify just what we mean by 'art', 'love', and 'Nature'. 
James Joyce (1916) has critiqued the different forms of art appreciation differentiating 
between what he calls 'proper' and 'improper' relationships with the art work. A 'proper' 
relation to an art work is one that takes the art for its aesthetic purpose. 'Aesthetic' rooted 
in the Greek aisthetikos refers to perceiving and feeling (Campbel 1986). Taking the art 
work for what it is aesthetically, is not asking the art do be in the service of any other 
interest. The art just is and the person interacting with the art work does not seek to have 
or use it in any way. It just is. What the art work does to the beholder is a function of the 
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aesthetic connections between the artist, the art work and the viewer. If seen in this way, 
art is doing its own thing. Its meaning lies in letting it be, and letting it do what it does. It 
may give the beholder a sense of 'being there' amidst the emotions that the art work is 
symbolising or expressing. Hence symbolism and expressionism (see Cassou 1979; Richard 
1984). It may capture a fleeting moment in form and colour - hence impressionism (see 
Honour and Flemming 1982). It may arouse deep psychological connections with 
unconscious aspects of the psyche - hence the importance of alt in mythology and ritual 
(see Gablik 1991; Ehrenzweig 1967; Campbell 1986, 1988 for example). 
When the art work is somehow in the service of something other than aesthetic perception, 
either due to the intention of the artist or the disposition of the viewer, Joyce calls it 
'improper'. Such 'improper' rut is using art for purposes of entertainment, ethics, politics, or 
economics. Slogans, propaganda, adveltising are included in this category. What unites these 
improper forms is the arousal of desires (eros) in relation to the art work - to possess the 
art work, or possess what it represents, or to loath or fear it. When art appreciation is 
mediated by eros (desiring) or loathing, Joyce calls it pornographic. All advertising is thus 
pornographic in this sense, and indeed the common meaning of pornography (with its erotic 
sexual connotations) is not different in type from adveltising in terms of it being mediated 
by eros (desiring). Now, what can pornography possibly have to do with ecological 
sustainability? 
I said earlier (with the prompting of Goehte, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault) that we 
must learn to recreate our selves as a work of art (due to the need to reactivate the 
Dionysian aspect of life). As indeterminate beings we are all ipso facto attists, and works 
of art. We are the three-fold dimensions of poetry - the poem, the poet and the object of 
a poem (see Blyth 1942). Problems arise when we fail to realise this, when our language 
game plunges into determinism (cf. chapter 6) andlor a normative framework. When this 
happens we fail to recognise our innate creativity, and the mystery (unknowable aspects) 
of what it is to be, and what it is for the rest of Nature to be. For ecological sustainability 
to become possible we must accept this poetry, by letting our illogical experiences of 
illogical reality come into language through a bioregional narrative which allows the 
landscape to recite its autobiography through us. This can be achieved by recognising the 
unity of alt, love and Nature. 
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We are works of art, and our culture must be artistic8 if it is to do ecological justice to the 
indeterminate character of Nature and our relationships within Nature. Our relationship with 
other works of art (such as other beings or the rest of Nature as a whole) can be apt and 
hence adaptive if it is driven by a form of love. But it must not be driven by eros. If it is, 
it will be pornographic. If so, our love of landscape, our love of Nature, our love of each 
other will be (in spite of our best intentions, and even beyond our realisation) desirous, 
manipulative, coercive, dominating, and alienating. Even though the relationship may be 
joyful and satisfying, it may be an erotic, pornographic joy expressing itself as a form of 
sadism or sado-masochism, as alluded to earlier. The latter condition will not lead to 
ecological sustainability. Heidegger asks us to relearn to let beings be, because if we don't 
our relationship with other beings (including other human beings) will be a power 
relationship which bottoms out in either domination or submission. 
Ecological sustainability demands no submission nor domination in terms of the relationship 
between people and place. It requires a moving with other beings and the rest of Nature. 
Erotic love will obstruct this, as in our erotic grasping, we will crush Nature as an 
instrument of our desires. We have been doing this in the West for many centuries. Such 
desires will be driven by the insatiable thirst of the ego, thus furnishing culture with a self-
referencing system of self-fulfilling selfishness. Such cultural selfishness has reached its (as 
yet) highest point in forms of modern totalitarianism, of which the capitalist new-right is 
a sub-set (i.e. it is totalitarian to the core). The sadism of Nazi concentration camps is now 
being calTied out covertly, indirectly, and unknowingly by business people the world over. 
8.S THE LANDSCAPE SELF 
As said earlier, the autonomous self is an illusion created by language. No being is 
autonomous; we are all epiphenomena of Nature. Letting go of eros is made possible by 
letting go of the autonomous self, thus enabling us to realise our unity with the collective 
Self as Sself, within Nature. This is the source of compassion, of a felling with, suffering 
with, a joy with the other. At this point it will be useful to return briefly to Nietzsche and 
show where this work stands in relation to Nietzsche's ethics. 
8In saying this I do not mean that we should throw science away. We can have both art 
and science which, if combined together, creates something greater than both in isolation. 
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The end was the value of ethics, and I had to fight this issue out almost alone with 
my great teacher Schopenhauer, ... The point at issue [in Nietzsche's book Human all 
too Human] was the value of the non-egotistical instincts, the instincts of 
compassion, self denial, and self sacrifice, which Schopenhauer above ail others had 
consistently gilded, glorified, "transcendentalised" until he came to see them as 
absolute values allowing him to deny life and even himself. Yet it was these very 
same instincts which aroused my suspicion, and that suspicion deepened as time 
went on. It was here, precisely, that I sensed the greatest danger for humanity, its 
sublimest delusion and temptation - leading it whither? into nothingness? . .! began 
to understand that the constantly spreading ethics of pity, which had tainted and 
debilitated even the philosophers, was the most sinister symptom of our sinister 
European civilisation (Nietzsche 1956:153-154). 
This is where Nietzsche and I part company. He heads back into the individualism and 
egotism of the will-to-power, whilst I head for the non-egotistical domain of the will-to-life. 
Nietzsche either mistook Schopenhauer's mysticism for self denial, did not understand 
Buddhism, or simply had too strong a dose of narcissism to wish to let go of the 
autonomous ego-self. I believe, and hope to show in this chapter, that (contra Nietzsche) 
the "most sinister symptom of our most sinister European civilisation" is the ego. 
In the existential process of self realisation the will to life can be cultivated which is 
beyond an indi vidual wilL Once we have passed through the silence of linguistic nihilism 
(which Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger gave to the modern West) and let go of the 
individual autonomous self (constructed through language) we can begin to realise that we 
share our existence with the rest of Nature. As such, we are able to identify with that which 
lies outside our individual self. According to Schopenhauer (1965) this represents a 
metaphysical realisation of the shared unity of the 'I' and the 'not 1'. Heidegger calls it an 
existential confrontation with the nothingness of Being (Caputo 1978). Being (with a capital 
'B ') is that which is no other being, no other thing, no-thing, nothing. This is very similar 
to what Meister Eckhart calls the Godhead. On identifying with the rest of Nature through 
an apprehension of the 'nothing' Schopenhauer comments; 
this presupposes that to a certain extent I have identified myself with the other 
[person or landscape], and in consequence the barrier between the ego and the non-
ego is for the moment abolished; only then do the other [person's, being's] affairs, ... 
need, distress, and suffering, directly become my own .. .! share the suffering in [the 
other], in spite of the fact that [their/its] skin does not enclose my nerves. 
(Schopenbauer 1965: 166) 
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He goes on to say; 
My true inner being exists in every living thing as directly as it makes itself known 
in my self-consciousness only to me. In Sanskrit tat tvam asi (this art thou) is the 
formula, the standing expression, for this knowledge. It is this that bursts forth as 
compassion on which all genuine, i.e. disinterested, virtue therefore depends ... (ibid.: 
210). 
Such a 'this' in the statement (this art thou), is the landscape - the Vanua. This is how the 
ValUta can be reborn in culture in Fiji, and it is ironic that Sanskrit (the ancestor of Hindi) 
is also able to help point the way to a means of attaining ecological sustain ability and 
indigenousness in Fiji. It furnishes such an amusing contradiction where so many egotistical, 
selfish, myopic Fijian racist nationalists think that Fiji's problems are caused by the Indians 
(Indo-Fijians), The Indo-Fijians are framed as false demons that are beaten by angly yet 
ignorant Fijians, frustrated in their loss of belonging which has come with the death of the 
Vanua, the blood of which still stains their very own hands. But who can claim to have 
clean hands? Few if any can. And those who can are those who have let the Va/Ula speak. 
But to do this one must love the Vanua and that love must be agape - not eros. 
In relation to the postmodern call for a rebirth of art in the mainstream of cultural praxis, 
the avant-garde's de-centring of the category of individualistic creativity is a useful concept 
(cf. Marcel Duchamp's ridicule of the artist's signature by signing mass-produced consumer 
items and displaying them as works of art). Here it is not an artistic genius that produces 
works of art, but a complex set of cultural interrelations that become expressed through the 
work of an individual (Sarup 1989). A culture is being creative through particular people 
that have captured meaning in celtain altistic ways. A culture produces art in a similar way 
that an apple tree produces apples. The artist, like the individual branchlet, cannot claim to 
be solely responsible for the creative act. Such a view moves beyond an individualistic 
conception of artistic talent, where the self of the artist acknowledges its unity with the 
collective Self of the culture. 
This is why self realisation, and self reflection is not selfish. Through the soteriological 
process of self realisation, facilitated by self reflection, contemplation, and meditation9, a 
91 believe that travelling also does this, as it achieves a non-attached state of mind. In 
this detached disposition, the doors of perception are cleansed and the landscape can begin 
to be heard. 
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person is able to gradually dissolve the individual self (an illusion of language) and thereby 
come to the realisation of the unity of the individual self with the collective Self as Sself. 
This process is brought about through a process of negation. The first step is to negate the 
autonomous ego-self (self) which leads first to nothingness, followed by an identity of the 
self as Self (Le. as unified with the rest of Nature). The next step is to negate the Self 
(amounting to a double negation) leading to an identity of the Self as Sself (absolute 
Nothingness in Zen; absolute Spirit for Hegel) (see Abe 1985). Christian mystic such as 
Meister Eckhart might have said that a person becomes united with the Godhead through 
this process, as happened to Jesus. Heidegger might have said that Dasein becomes one with 
Being. For a Buddhist the person achieves buddha-hood (enlightenment) by attaining a 
realisation of the dharmakaya (see Wilber 1983). 
I am of the opinion that an ecologically sustainable culture will develop only when the 
equivalent of enlightenment is achieved somewhere in a culture. Essentially, those of a 
culture that are able to achieve a moving with the way of Nature in their own existential 
being, can provide a culture with a valuable source of information. This information comes 
from outside language - from the landscape. When it is brought into a culture, through ritual 
or primordial language, it can inform a human society in terms of ethical instruction that 
can make authenticity, a bioregional narrative, and ecological sustainability possible. 
A culture that remains attached to the linguistic illusions of autonomous appearances is one 
that remains ignorant of the unity between humanity and Nature. Such a culture will sustain 
this illusion by inventing a model of how the world ought to be and attempting to force 
Nature to conform to the model. Where this appears to happen, success is declared. This 
is what Francis Bacon thought his version of science could achieve. This psychological 
condition underlies rationalism, transcendental idealism, and positivism in the modern 
scientific epistemologies. This also applies to radical modernist discourses that supp0l1 
reason in its position of epistemic privilege, such as the hermeneutics of Gadamer, critical 
theory, and critical social science. It also applies to deconstructivist postmodern discourses 
that fail to acknowledge a transcendental ontology (as was the case with Nietzsche and his 
sycophants e.g. Kaufmann), or those who sustain the notion of the autonomous self. In each 
case the condition remains unauthentic. Authenticity can only be achieved through letting 
go of the autonomous self. This can be achieved by awakening to an equivalent of agape. 
Through being true to your nature as a being within Being, beyond good and eviL 
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8.6 ON THE ECOLOGY OF AGAPE 
I said earlier that one of the reasons for bringing love into the story was to show how 
ecological sustainability can be experienced by ordinary people. Ecological sustainability 
is a condition of dialectical adaptiveness between culture and landscape. A moving with the 
constant flux of Nature. This constant process of ever-renewing adaptation is what evolution 
is about. Evolving together is what happens in non-human ecological systems. An organism 
evolves in relation to its ecological surroundings. This is what ecology studies. It is a 
dialectical relationship in the sense that both the organism (or population) and its ecological 
surroundings are beings within Being (see Levins and Lewontin 1985). It is holistic, and 
because Being is that whole which is no other being, the whole is not greater than the sum 
of the pm1s - stoic holism, but instead the whole is in each part. A being (e.g. a fish) and 
the collection of other beings around it (the community or ecosystem) are epiphenomena 
of Nature. They m'e part of one and the same thing. Hence the need to employ dialectical 
reasoning in order to comprehend such a holism. The tree and the rest of the forest are two 
sides of the same conceptual coin. 
The relationship between beings is an evolving relationship, because Nature is in a constant 
state of flux. Achieving a dialectical synchronicity is what happens in the evolutionary 
process. This synchronicity can come about only when a being, according to its nature as 
a being (e.g. a fish), moves with the nature of other beings, which are also existing 
according to their nature. Plants and animals achieve this all the time, as they do not know 
any other way to be. They do not know because that cannot know anything. This is because 
they do not recreate their existence according to the rules of a symbolic language. They do 
not have culture in this way. A tree does not know which way is 'up' as it does not have 
language in order to have knowledge, as knowledge (as opposed to wisdom) is a peculiarity 
of language. The notion 'up' is linguistic. It only has meaning as knowledge within 
language. It is meaningful only in relation to the opposite - 'not up' or 'down'. Meaning for 
each of these words is parasitic on the ability of language to sustain a convention according 
to a set of rules. There is no absolute condition as 'upness' apart from its existence within 
language. 
This is perhaps why language is so amazing. As it can and does enable us to communicate 
and relate with each other in spite of it having no concrete or necessary connection with the 
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world around us. For example, ask a Zen master who she or he is and they might reply "I 
don't know". And the answer would be a coherent and correct answer. But the answer is not 
coherent or correct according to logic. It is coherent according to their being. Even though 
a Zen master may declare that they do not have any ultimate meaning in linguistic terms, 
they still do have meaning as a being, except this meaning is not grounded in the rules of 
language. It is grounded in Nature. In their ecological character. In their being as a being. 
There is such a reality as the 'I am', as beings are not absolutely nothing. They are only no-
thing in terms of no autonomous isolated 'thing'. They are a being within Being. Beings do 
have a character, an essence. This character is the collection of intersubjective relationships 
between the being and every other being it interacts with. This is the Sself. Its character is 
a dialectical product of its place in Nature, where this constantly changing intersubjectivity 
constantly creates a being. This is what Nietzsche means by his "Dionysian world of the 
eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold 
voluptuous delight" (Nietzsche 1967 :550). 
In being true (i.e. consistent) to their subjective character, beings (e.g. fish) are achieving 
a truth to their condition. This is truth. This is where truth lies. All the rest are fables. All 
linguistic 'truths' are necessarily subjective perspectives. Compliance to one's subjective 
character is not a fixed truth but an evolving truth. It is a truth outside the internal rules of 
language, but to distinguish it from linguistic truth I will call it 'Aptness'. 
Aptness is the only aspect of an ecological system that endures. And I believe that this is 
the only aspect of reality that is not able to be called 'flux'. All else, even the land is 
changing. Aptness endures even though everything else in relation to it changes. Aptness 
is not a being, any being, but a dialectical harmony arising out of, and mediating the 
trueness of beings. Aptness is simply the trueness of beings in relation to their character as 
beings. A rose is a rose. It is without why. It just is. It has no reason, nor value. Invaluable. 
It lies beyond good and evil, beyond the rules of language. Aptness, which is the trueness 
of the rose, is not a thing. It is no-thing - nothing. This is the coming into presence of the 
ontological 'Nothing' of what Heidegger calls Being. And here, right here, we have achieved 
a disclosure of the ontological coherence of the dialectical relationship between Apollo and 
Dionysus as a cosmology and a rationality that I believe is able to both comprehend and 
achieve ecological sustainabiIity. This cosmology is one of a unity between flux and 
permanence. We did it earlier in chapters 6 and 7 with language and ethics, but here point 
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to it in its ontological home - Aptness. 
Nietzsche reversed the Western metaphysical tradition (Heine 1985) by ending the 
dominance of Apollo through a celebration of Dionysus, by replacing permanence with flux. 
But here I achieve a result which is neither absolute flux, nor absolute pennanence, but 
instead a product which is bigger than both. Take blue (permanence) and yellow (flux) and 
set them in motion, yielding a dialectical product which is different from both - green. 
Aptness. This is what Taoism is asking people to do with yin and yang. Set them in motion. 
Get Aptness. This is what Heraclitus meant when he said that reality is all about the 
reconciliation of opposites; "Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest 
harmony" (Heraclitus, Fragment 98, in Needleman and Applebaum 1990). The dialectical 
reconciliation of opposites in a cultural rationality allows people to apprehend this Aptness. 
This is because people can begin to see that there is constant flux in the subjective character 
of all beings, of all that is. And yet there is still that which endures and holds the whole 
process together - Aptness. 
Aptness is no-thing, and yet it is the only enduring truth of reality. Aptness is what holds 
ecosystems in an ever-changing, ever-flowing coherence. Some people may call it the 
coming to presence of the divine. It is not the divine itself as the divine (I refer to the 
underlying coherence of Nature) is not a thing. As such, it is no-thing Nothing. But in 
Aptness is the rising to manifestness of the divine influence. It is a little like the way a foot 
print is an indication of the presence of a person but it is not the person as such. Aptness 
is the nothingness of the Tao. Aptness is the Nothing of the Dharma. Brahman underlies 
Aptness. Aptness is the coming to presence of God. Aptness is a non-linguistic truth. God 
is made manifest through this truth. Truth is agape - a detached realness, being true to your 
nature. Agape is a form of love. God is made manifest through love. Full circle, and there 
you have it in a nut-shell. Mysticism as ecology, religion as evolution. 
Be true to your nature. Many different forms of mysticism are grounded in the experience 
of this trueness (see Abe 1985; Watts 1957; Wilber 1983; Cox 1986; Smith 1973; Ross 
1993). When you are hungry eat. When tired - sleep. Taoists say this too - flow with the 
Tao. Buddhists say this, Hindus say it, pre-modern Fijians would have said it be one with 
the way of the Vanua (see Matanitobua 1988). Any culture that lets go of language from 
time to time and listens to the silence, will come to the same realisation in their own way, 
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in their own language, in their own landscape. Be the Va/Uta and let the Vanua be you. This 
art thou - tat tvam asi. This is Aptness. This is the ontological source of an ethics of 
ecological sustain ability . 
Such an Aptness is also what underlies the evolutionary process. If it is not Apt, it is not 
adaptive as adaptation is a process of becoming (modification) in a being and its ecological 
surroundings in accord with Aptness. Adaptation is the constant becoming of beings in 
relation to the way of Nature. If it is not Apt it will not endure, and will not be sustained. 
If it is not adaptive it will not remain compatible with the ecosystem. As such, it will either 
change (adapt; become) and thus regain an Aptness (thus enabling a moving with to 
continue), or, if this is somehow impossible, death (in the case of an individual) or 
extinction will result. Evolution. Natural selection yes, but not by means of a purely 
mechanistic process as is the case with neo-Darwinism (see Sheldrake 1981). For neo-
Darwinism (as an epistemology) to move into a form that is able to apprehend the 
evolutionary process authentically, it must let go of totalising discourses and the unfounded 
faith in the ability of the rules of language to disclose ontological truth. It must let go of 
materialism, mechanism, empirical realism, reductionism, stoic holism, and linear teleology. 
I suggest that it can move into an authentic framework (i.e. an epistemology that is 
compatible with the limitations of language, and able to transcend these limits) if it 
transfonns into a form of dialectical, transcendental realism - eco-mysticism. It then must 
throw out a cOITespondence theory of truth (as is the case with most forms of realism -
which trivialises ontology) and accept that much of reality lies beyond the reach of language 
and is hence mysterious. 
Truth as Aptness is able to be uncovered by people. But to be capable of apprehending this 
truth as Aptness, the person must gain an experience of it. This is because it cannot be 
gained solely through language, as the source of its coherence lies beyond the reach of 
language in Nature itself. The relationship between art love, and Nature crops up again. 
Heidegger believes that we can apprehend this through primordial thinking, which he simply 
calls 'thinking'. This 'thinking' is essentially a mystical experience. For this reason it is 
necessarily poetic hence Heidegger's emphasis on the importance of poetly in its ability 
to bring on the unconcealment of Being (see Heidegger 1959). Kocklemans (1972) tells us 
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that the truth of the way of Nature as 'unconcealment lO, 
comes to pass through poetry in the broad sense. We must appeal to thought in 
order to comprehend what occurs in poetry. Through naming, beings first become 
accessible [to us] as beings; it is the condition necessary for them to be recognised 
and used as determinate beings .. this .. is unconcealment (Kocklemans 1972:76). 
The unconcealment of such a truth is a means of ethical instruction, but not based on 
philosophy. It is based on intuition, emotion, and intangible moods and feelings. Heidegger 
explains that a "mood makes manifest 'how one is and how one is faring'. In this 'how one 
is', having a mood brings Being to its 'There ll ' (Heidegger, cited in Hallibm10n 1981:15). 
Mood discloses our authentic existential condition as opposed to normative mannerisms, 
which Heidegger calls 'idle talk'. The normative condition is what Heidegger calls 'falling'. 
Falling is unauthentic normative communication no longer inspired by Nature, and a culture 
that bases itself on such a normative framework will be an unauthentic non-Apt) culture. 
These normative forms of communication actually obstruct (cover over) the meaning of 
mood in social life. As such, we lose the ability to interpret our feelings. Our authenticity 
as Aptness can be rescued by poetical thinking that bring the 'mood' into cultural life 
through language - primordial language, which is poetry. 
lOIn realism truth tends to function as a correspondence with reality, which is termed 
a 'correspondence theory of truth'. But Heidegger understands just how mysterious reality 
really is and shows that a correspondence theory is unable to disclose truth as the essent of 
a being (what it is). A correspondence theory of truth trivialises ontology, as it implies that 
ontological correctness (the essent of the being) is relatively easy to determine. But for 
Heidegger, this is what differentiates science from metaphysics. Metaphysics is ontology -
a type of thinking that attempts to apprehend the essent of the being, whereas science is 
a means of organising our knowledge (I.e. it is epistemological). Whitehead also holds this 
view. Heidegger as a metaphysician, focuses on ontology as the basis of metaphysical 
inquiry in such a way that ontology is not passed over as something simple. Instead, like 
the Greek poetical thinkers (e.g. Parmenides and Heraclitus) Heidegger regards truth as able 
to come about through the 'unconcealment' of what has been covered over. But to achieve 
this 'unconcealment' one must take leave of metaphysics and enter into mysticism by means 
of primordial language, which is poetic. This is because the essent of the being does not lie 
within language and cannot be defined by language itself. This is why Heidegger argues 
that Western culture sustains a 'forgetfulness' of Being, as Being (the ground of existence) 
has been covered over by normative thought and normative language (see Heidegger 1959, 
1962, 1973), 
!!'Being there' is the translation of Heidegger's term for human being - Dasein. 
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A strikingly similar view was held by Wittgenstein, who argued that what can be said can 
also serve to communicate an ethically powerful insight, even when this is itself unsayable. 
This confirms a poetic basis for ethics but "if only you do not try to utter what is 
unutterable, then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be - unutterably - contained in 
what has been uttered" (Wittgenstein 1967, cited in Edwards 1982:51). Using words to point 
to meanings that are unsayable is what poetry does. Poetry points us to meanings that 
cannot be said. For Wittgenstein poetry is a doctrine that mediates the relationship between 
the will and thought, between mystical experiences and language. 
Heidegger was influenced by 13th century German mystic Meister Eckhart (Caputo 1978). 
In Eckhart we also come face to face with nihilism - the Nothing that Heidegger speaks of. 
Heidegger takes us from modern science and philosophy to a point at which we can begin 
to understand Eckhart. Eckhart and Heidegger take Westerners to the point at which they 
can begin to understand non-Western mythical cultures, and be able to understand Zen (see 
Arraj 1988; Heine 1985; Abe 1985; Caputo 1978; Parkes 1987). 
In relation to the river metaphor mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Heidegger and 
Eckhart take us expertly to the waters edge. The water is nihilism. Eckhart takes us into the 
water. Dogen (a 13th century Zen master) begins at the waters edge and immediately 
teaches us how to swim. "Do not look back, and do not try to touch the bottom", he says 
and appeals to us to have the courage to swim and reach the distant bank. And there we can 
create language anew and our own stories (myths) relating to our own experiences of the 
silence, a silence specific to the landscape we are in. In knowing how to swim we are no 
longer afraid of the water and are happy to return to it constantly, thus enabling language 
to keep on being renewed. Also renewed are our perceptions of the landscape. In the poem 
'The MaITiage of Heaven and Hell' William Blake tells us that "If the doors of perception 
were cleansed, everything would appear to [humanity] as it is infinite". We can clean 
these 'doors' by passing through nihilism. 
8.6.1 ACHIEVING AUTHENTICITY 
Many different cultures might agree on the need to achieve Aptness, but the next aspect of 
the debate arises on the method of achieving it. This is where Heidegger differs from 
Eckhart, and where Eckhart differs from Dogen. Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
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'rescue us from the tautological vortex of Westem metaphysics and take us to a point at 
which we can begin to understand Eckhart, Goethe, Thoreau, Blake, Whitman, and 
Wordsworth. Eckhart takes us a step further, to a point at which we can begin to understand 
Dogen. Goethe is still there, a non-partisan poet. In my view, Dogen and Goethe have a lot 
in common. Goethe points straight to Dogen in the play - Faust (see Blyth 1942). The 
creative inspiration for Goethe's achievements lay in Nature, not in scripture or in language. 
Eckhart agrees that the creative inspiration for cultural 'life must lie in Nature. 
Goethe, Eckhat1, Heidegger, and Dogen let the local landscape tell its own story. Goethe 
does this through poetry and thus linguistically points to a contextual bioregional narrative. 
Dogen (like Jesus) achieved enlightenment and moved into the field himself - a field of 
enlightenment (a realisation of the dharmakaya -existential synchronicity with the way of 
Nature). And here, precisely here, is where I (with great respect) take leave of the West 
This is only because the West has not adequately developed an existential methodology that 
fosters the achievement of this condition, which has been so richly developed in other parts 
of the world, such as many different tribal cultures, and Asia. In the West, if you achieve 
this condition or claim that it is possible you are likely to get bumt at the stake, or at best 
branded as a heretic (as happened to Eckhart); in the tribal world and the East everybody 
celebrates (Watts 1974). 
I believe that this analysis points to the need for Christianity to have a major over-haul if 
it is to remain faithful to the original message of its founder. Jesus never once claimed that 
he was the only Christ (enlightened one) possible, he simply declared that he had 'made it' 
into the field of the way of Nature. In Christianity a mystic can never claim to be the 
Christ. If they do they are heretics of the highest order. But in Buddhism for example, you 
are told even before you begin a mystical path, that you are already the Christ (Buddha), 
only you have not realised it yet (see Suzuki 1969). Mystical training is simply a process 
of helping you realise your innate divinity. Your innate capacity for being thoroughly with 
Nature. In the words of Walt Whitman; 
Divine I am inside and out, and I make holy what ever I touch or am touched 
from; 
The scent of these armpits is aroma finer than prayer, 
This head is more than churches or bibles or creeds. 
(Song of Myself, lines 526-230). 
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A frog cannot ask itself the question "who am I". It exists without reason, without who and 
why, as 'who' and 'why' are inventions of language. That is all they are, and all they can be. 
The only difference between humans and non-human animals is that we, with the help of 
symbolic language, are the only ones (as yet and/or as far as we know) capable of knowing 
it once we have achieved it. We are also the only ones capable of inventing normative 
linguistic systems that divorce us from the way of Nature. When this divorce happens we 
'fall' away from Nature. This is the fall from grace, the expUlsion from paradise (see Wilber 
1983). Taking the Christian story of Genesis literally will lead to gross misunderstandings 12• 
If all humans in a culture achieved such a condition of synchronicity with the way of 
Nature they could not help but live in an ecologically sustainable relationship with the rest 
of Nature in their landscape. Ecological sustainability would simply exist by default, not by 
management. Now I do not think that every person in a culture must achieve such a 
condition of enlightenment for the culture to be an ecologically sustainable one. But I do 
believe that a culture must be informed by the experiences of those in a culture that have 
achieved such a condition through mystical training. These people can provide a valuable 
source of ethical information with regard to the relationship between a human community 
and its ecological surroundings. This ethical information is passed on to other people 
through language and ritual. An enlightened member of a community must be able to 
influence the living language game of the culture, and the living rituals that bring meaning 
into cultural life from beyond the reach of language. 
Furthermore, it is also important that a human community does not simply listen to 
historical messages from someone who was enlightened at a previous time via scripture. 
This is because the landscape they interacted with in the past is not going to remain 
unchanged remember all things flow, the landscape is constantly changing. Someone who 
moved with the flux of Nature 2,000 years ago in Israel will not have any privileged view 
of how to achieve the same condition in Fij i in 1994. There are no tropical forests in Israel, 
12lt should be noted that the Hebrew version of this myth did not specify that the 
archetypical human being was a male. The name 'Adam' formally applied to both the male 
and the female aspects of human being. The original term was 'ha' adam' which translates 
as 'humanity' - not merely the male version. The name 'Adam' has since been appropriated 
by men in the reinterpretation of this myth, that reshaped it to legislate for the dominance 
of male over female (Ryan 1984). 
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but there is one in Vunivia. As such, taking advice from the historical past, in the form of 
an unquestioned adherence to an historical narrative (such as scripture), may not be 
appropriate. The context of any mythical narrative needs to be able to evolve with the 
evolving circumstances of cultural life. There needs to be a constant 'supply' of ecological 
wisdom capable of informing a living culture of its place in the landscape it actually lives 
m. 
This points to two mystical imperatives. The first is the need to recognise that mythical 
narratives, to be authentic, must corne into culture through language or art ex post facto, 
after the event of mystical experiences, and not be used merely as a way towards such 
expe11ences: In this fashion metaphysics, as nan'atives, are a by-product of mystical training 
and not paths towards them. The path towards wisdom is a clearing away of obstructions. 
It is a method of achieving nihilism, capable of cleansing the doors of perception, as 
William Blake alluded to. Metaphysics itself is an obstruction, because it adds material to 
the 'doors' - we draw straight lines on the glass and in the process cover over our view of 
Nature and each other. This is what Heidegger meant when he said that metaphysics must 
corne to an end in order to overcome the forgetfulness of Being (Heidegger 1959; 1973). 
The second mystical imperative is the need to recognise that a condition of enlightenment 
must be passed on from one generation to the next so that it is kept alive, and able to 
remain authentic in its ever-changing. In Buddhism the symbolism of the eternal flame 
points to this. In Christianity there is a tradition that is very similar to Zen. It is known as 
the via Ilegativia - the negative way, which was central to the theology of Meister Eckhart 
(Cox 1986). There is also a similar emphasis in the theology of St John of the Cross (see 
Arraj 1986; Ross 1993). The via negativia uses nihilism in a similar way to Zen. It seeks 
an apprehension of the Nothing by means of negation of the ego-self, followed by a 
negation of the negation. This second negation is crucial, as it transcends totalitarian forms 
of identity where the self is lost in unity with the Self, thus losing its identity and denying 
its own locus of creativity as a unique individual being13. This is what Nietzsche 
complained about in Schopenhauer's philosophy as mentioned earlier. But instead of pushing 
fUliher into nihilism and heading for the second negation (as Meister Eckhati and Hegel 
did), Nietzsche did a 'V' turn and headed back to the ego and the will to power (see Abe 
1985) 
13This corresponds with the call for a recognition of unity with identity in some forms 
of postmodern literature (see Cheney 1989a). 
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But why does Dogen get the last word? Well, it is because I believe that in Zen you will 
find the most effective method of achieving these two mystical imperatives l4• The via 
negativia in Christianity comes velY close, but as yet has not refined its method to such 
lengths as has been achieved in Zen. The same can be said of other religions, such as other 
forms of Mahayana Buddhism, and Vedanta Hinduism (Wilber 1983). The word 'Zen' comes 
from the word 'zazen' which is a method of meditation. It is a well tried method of driving 
nihilism as a basis for clearing away obstructions to wisdom. Many other religions 
(including forms of Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) however, place 
an emphasis on narratives, and scripture to varying degrees. Zen on the other hand is not 
a tradition of stories (see Ross 1993; Abe 1985; Suzuki 1969; Watts 1957 for example). It 
has no scripture. In this way Zen and the via negativia are thoroughly compatible, because 
Zen as a non-linguistic, and non-cultural method can easily be employed in Christianity as 
a means of driving nihilism. This possibility has already been explored by Arraj (1988). In 
fact, such a method I believe would have been encouraged by the person who was the 
founding inspiration for this religion - Yeshua l52 (Jesus) Buddhal6 (Christ). The message 
was grace - not law. Grace is a moving with the flux of Nature. Grace is a posteriori, 
grounded in a transcendental empirical domain and is alive. Law is a priori, normative 
historical and dead. 
You do not have to be a Zen Buddhist or a Christian mystic to turn language and 
conceptual thought off. You do not have to go to China or Japan to listen to the silence of 
your own landscape. Fijians can do this and stay Fijian. They do not need to be converted 
to Buddhism or Christianity to do this, they do not have to read the Diamond Sutra or the 
Bible to do this. Furthermore, I believe that many Fijians were already listening to the 
silence of the Vanua before Europeans came along like some kind of cultural exterminators 
and forced Fijians to burn their culture down. 
14 According to Wilber (1981) Zen has produced more enlightenments (B uddhas, Christs) 
than any other form of religion in history. 
IS'Yeshua' is the way the name 'Jesus' (as an historical person) is likely to have been 
originally pronounced (see Williams 1978). 
16'Buddha' and 'Christ' both mean - 'the enlightened one', and are symbolic titles, not 
historical names. 
275 
A religion must grow from the local soil. If a form of mysticism is allowed to grow from 
the local soil, from its actual landscape, it will have far more chance of achieving ecological 
sustainability in that part of the world, than one which uses stories from other lands (any 
other lands). I see no value in Fijians mimicking the practices of Navajo rituals. Fiji is not 
a deselt (at least not yet), and does not have coyotes. For Westerners who already have their 
Western cultural baggage firmly in place, then mysticism that is window-dressed in 
Christian apparel may be appropriate, as long as they do not keep branding enlightened ones 
as heretics. They will need them to inform them about how to live with Nature in that place 
and to teach the next generation of mystics. I am not suggesting that evelY freak that walks 
around in a loin cloth claiming to embody a manifestation of the Godhead should be 
canonised. But they need to be listened to - because they might be right. 
A cultural methodology that wishes to achieve a condition of ecological sustainability must 
become a form of mysticism. If not, I believe that the evolutionaIY process will remain mis-
understood by scientists and the television viewers who watch Nature programmes. Not only 
will evolution remain misunderstood, but the notion of ecological sustainability will also 
remain covered over. This is obviously not an argument against evolution, and in favour of 
creationism, as if Darwinism and Christian literalism together held the sole franchise to the 
evolution debate. Instead, it is an argument in support of creative evolution in the tradition 
of Bergson, and later Waddington, and Sheldrake (see Bergson 1911; Waddington 1977; 
Sheldrake 1981, 1991). The mystical element is not alone in science as can be seen with 
the work of numerous scientists such as Bohr, Bohm, Davies, Capra, Zohar, Zukav 
(quantum physics), Prigogine (chemistry), and Jung, Maslow, Sutich, Neumann, and 
Campbell in psychology for example. 
We can never prove such a theOlY of ecological sustain ability when measured by the yard-
stick of empiricist science. Instead we can only pick up elements of the mystery as 
empirical evidence disclosed within sense perception and tie them together in such a way 
that a coherence is able to be revealed. Should the source of this coherence actually lie 
beyond the reach of our grasping hands (i.e. outside our sensibilities) we can never prove 
our story right or wrong. I believe that the source of coherence for ecological sustainability 
does lie beyond our sensibilities and sensory capacity, as we humans are limited subjective 
beings. As such, I am not a rationalist (like Descartes and Newton), transcendental idealist 
(like Kant), or an empirical realist (Hume, Comte, Marx, Popper, Carnap). Each of these 
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philosophical camps are anthropocentric. They create the world in their own image - in the 
image of their own ability to have knowledge, and declare that this is all there is to reality 
at large, or declare that this is all that really matters. As a transcendental realist I (like 
Thoreau and Goethe) accept my limitations and do not ask Nature to confOlm with my 
egotistical whims. In the absence of the possibility of lining this story with unconquerable 
proof I refrain from attempting to do so. All I can do is present a story that has an element 
of coherence, and furnish it with evidence to that effect. 
8.6.2 APTNESS, STOICISM AND MODERNITY 
What is not Apt? What does unsustainability, non-adaptiveness, non-indigenousness look 
like? A vegetarian tiger, a fish out of water, is not Aptness. Not sleeping when you are 
tired, eating when you are not hunglY - this is not Aptness. And yet a human culture, such 
as the modern West, enshrines unauthenticity as the most virtuous form of cultural 
existence. This is because, at best, it employs the ground of logic as the basis for 'truth' and 
'right' behaviour. Many of the, radical modernist projects are arguing that the problem lies 
in our inability to act out this logical and reasonable way of life, which was made into a 
coherent cultural ideal in the Enlightenment. Modernity set up shop selling logic as the only 
way to liberty. But forms of postmodern theory have exposed the flaws in this argument 
and seeks to show Western culture that it must throwaway the totalitarian means to the 
Enlightenment ideals, and redirect the ideals themselves. 
The Enlightenment was (sadly) a re-birth of stoicism. This is not to say that the motivations 
behind the Enlightenment project were all necessarily deceitful, as I believe that many of 
them were indeed germane (e.g. Kant, Rousseau, Hegel). Romanticism is a good example. 
I only contend, along with many other postmodern theorists, that the radical modernist 
passage, with its radical (yet reasonable) democracy, will not deliver the rewards they claim 
to be capable of. There is a light at the end of the modernist tunnel, but in emerging from 
the darkness one will soon discover that it is not an ecologically sustainable landscape. We 
will have simply arrived back at where we started - within language, within a totalising 
discourse that asks reality to conform with the rules of our own language game. The reverse 
is what is needed. We need to adapt language to Nature's coherence in spite of our s'toic 
ancestry. I wish to shout - "we need to surpass the limitations of language" if we want 
ecological sustainability. As Thoreau said, modern people have; 
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deliberately chosen the common mode of living because they preferred it to any 
other. Yet they honestly think that there is no choice left. But alert and healthy 
natures remember that the sun rose clear. It is never too late to give up our 
prejudices. (Thoreau 1980: 10). 
8.6.3 THE TRINITY OF ART, LOVE, AND NATURE 
The source of coherence for an authentic story concerning ecological sustainability lies in 
Nature, in Aptness. Living or dying according to Aptness, according to your nature is the 
way to authenticity. It is a true way, it is an ever-changing trueness. This is what I mean 
by 'authentic'. This is why it is unlikely that a successful bioregional narrative will be 
logical. People who are searching for coherence according to logic will fail to understand 
such a linguistic system should they ever stumble across it. This is precisely how and why 
the Australian Aborigines have been so misunderstood by Westerners (see Chatwin 1987). 
There is an example of a bioregional narrative linguistic culture in action. The songlines. 
The dreamlines. The epistemology (i.e. a set of cognitive maps) that derives its meaning 
from the landscape itself. Such a language is poetical. Living poeby. 
Another example can be found in Walt Whitman. His lengthy poem Song of Myself is his 
bioregional narrative. In this poem (as Heidegger and Wittgenstein would approve) he 
points to the unutterable meaning of the mystical origin of poetic inspiration: 
Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess the 
origin of all poems, 
You shall possess the good of the ealth and sun ... and there 
are millions of suns left, 
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand ... nor look 
through the eyes of the dead ... nor feed on the spectres in books, 
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things from me, 
You shall listen to all sides and filter them for your self. 
(Song of Myself, lines 25-29). 
Other places where bioregional narratives have risen to the surface of culture through art 
are the landscape paintings of Cezanne, the poetry of Goethe, George, Blake, Wordsworth, 
the books Walden, and The Main Woods by Thoreau, and Arctic Dreams by Lopez. The list 
goes on, and they have always been there, only they get put aside by modernity to gather 
dust, rather than being used as moments in an evolving code of ethical instruction. Another 
problem is that we do not know how to interpret them. We must learn to see art as the 
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bursting forth into culture of creativity that flows through the artist. We must seek out the 
artist as well as art. They are the ones that have been touched by the way of Nature, not 
the painting or poem. The poem is the footprint, not the foot. The art work carries an 
unutterable message, and this is the source of its aesthetic worth. So we need to maintain 
the spirit of the unity of art, artist, and artistic inspiration. This is the three fold aspects of 
poetry the poem, the poet, and that which the poem points to. 
This is the trinity of Art, Love and Nature. The Nature dimension is Nature in its ever-
changing creative flux, as the source of creative inspiration for the artist. The artist can 
capture this creativity by letting it flow through them, by clearing away obstructions to 
wisdom, and moving with the flux of Nature in what are quintessentially mystical 
experiences. This is achieved by means of detachment made possible by the dissolving of 
the ego-self (negation), thus allowing agape to flow (this is the Love dimension). This 
serves to unlock the door to ones true nature by existentially realising the geography of 
selfhood. This is also compassion - an identity with the other, the landscape. As Heidegger 
puts it: "All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, 
essentially poetryll (cited in HallibUlton 1981:50). The Art dimension is the coming to 
presence in culture of this spontaneous creativity, where it lands on the surface of a cultural 
construct such as language (poetry, or prose), painting, sculpture, or music, and is thereby 
able to become a narrative. Such a nan'ative is the bioregional narrative. Such a narrative 
is an evolving code of ethical instruction. This is an existential and mystical basis for ethics 
as a form of eudaemonism. 
Eudaemonism is where the highest happiness becomes synonymous with virtue. Ecological 
virtue must be synonymous with authenticity (the way of Nature). If we are able to pass 
through the silence of linguistic nihilism we can begin to dissolve the illusionary boundary 
between the 'me' and the 'not me', thus discarding the linguistic illusion of the autonomous 
self or ego. In the absence of an autonomous ego, eros (selfish desiring, wanting to control, 
grasping) is no longer capable of dictating our actions and motivations. This removes a 
substantial obstruction to compassion (a feeling with the 'other'), beyond any invented 
ethical instruction grounded in law. The source of 'instruction' now lies in a discovery of 
our feelings, afeeling with the other - compassion. This is a compassion in relation to any 
'other' being - human or non-human. As Schopenhauer suggested: an action only has moral 
value if it happens in the absence of a predetermined code of instruction (Schopenhauer 
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1965). Acting upon our feelings of compassion does just this. We are not following any 
law, we are simply being true to our nature, as it is in our nature to have this compassion 
because our nature (self) is defined geographically in the landscape as part of the broader 
Self as Sself. 
I do not suggest that this compassion is grounded in any kind of self-denial on behalf of 
the rest of Nature. It simply arises out of a realisation of the existential inclusion of the 
individual with its surroundings. In fact it only works if it is grounded in total and 
unmitigated nonchalance. How can this be so? It is about simply being true to your nature 
once you have discovered what that nature is. Humans have great deal of trouble doing this 
because language and its rules keep getting in the way. If you are a tiger then your 
compassion (as your nature) is best expressed by sleeping a lot in between killing and 
eating other animals; by defecating and providing a micro-environment to microorganisms 
that live in tiger dung. As William Blake provokes us:-
Tyger, tyger burning bright 
In the forests of the night 
What immortal hand or eye 
Could frame thy fealful symmetty 
FUlther in the poem we are invited to wonder; "What the anvil, what dread grasp/ Dare its 
deadly terrors clasp", where these deadly terrors are part of the fealful symmetry of the 
tyger. It slays other animals, and even humans, not out of anger, but as an aspect of its 
symmetly, its nature. Such slaying is compassion in the sense that it is grounded in a 
trueness to its character and a being with the 'other' and allowing the 'other' to be true to 
its character. The will is an aspect of a collective Will to Be. The Will to Be is similar to 
Schopenhauer's notion of the will to life (see Schopenhauer 1966). However, I differentiate 
from it by using the term 'Will to Be' in case I have misunderstood the similarities between 
Schopenhauer's thoughts and my own, and to explicitly recognise the Will to Be as applying 
to a being as Sself. 
The Will to Be, as I see it, is a coalescence of the intersubjectivity of all beings. It is not 
a thing, it is not' a being. That which is no other being Heidegger calls 'Being'. Being 
underlies Nature as the way of Nature - the Will to Be is where the way of Nature is made 
manifest in a being. Nature and the intersubjectivity of all beings in Nature are held 
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together spontaneously by Aptness which is also the Will to Be. It is the coming to 
presence of Being in the relationships between beings. It is the same as agape, because 
agape is what underlies Aptness. 
If I am able to apprehend this presence of Aptness in consciousness, it is a mystical 
experience. It is a existential confirmation of the coherence of my intuitions - mysticism. 
And no culture, community or religion has the sole franchise on mystical experiences. Any 
person from any culture speaking any language can gain a similar experience of the Will 
to Be as disclosed to them in their landscape. 
The source of Aptness as the Will to Be is Being (the ground of existence). Such Aptness 
arises spontaneously out of that which is no other being, and is the source of existential 
ecological coherence in Nature. Be true to your nature. If that demands dying - so be it; 
it is only the ego that is trying to grasp onto the present moment and hide from death. An 
old tree is young soil. The ecological dynamics of grazing animal populations is such that 
the non-Apt are selected out of the population, and or the population is thinned out. A child 
born with no head dies. Keeping it alive for the sake of some invented form of compassion 
is an affront to Nature. It is a denial of the Will to Be. It is not letting beings be. If it is the 
true nature of a non-adaptive being to cease to be, then let it cease to be. Anything else is 
not Aptness and will contradict the evolutionary process, and contradict ecological 
sustainability. Walt Whitman declares: 
Great is life .. and real and mysticaL. wherever and whoever, 
Great is death .. sure as life holds all parts together, death 
holds all palts together, 
Sure as the stars return again after they merge in the light, 
death is great as life. 
(Great are the Myths, lines 65-67) 
For example, predator and prey exist in a dialectical relationship that is true to their 
respective natures. They need each other to be what they are, they are two aspects of the 
same whole, they are beings within Nature. Dialectical rationality in ecology can help to 
reveal this. Nowhere have I ever sugg~sted that death or dying is bad. If death were to stop, 
the planet would rapidly over-flow. Heraclitus tells us "Immortals become mOitals, mortals 
become immOitals; they live in each other's death and die in each other's life (Fragment 66, 
in Needleman and Applebaum 1990). The tiger is exercising its Aptness, its agape by 
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killing every now and Zen. 
8.7 EUDAEMONISM AS AN ECOLOGICAL ETHIC 
Getting back to eudaemonism, I believe that virtue (as authenticity) and the highest 
happiness need to be recognised as synonymous. I described above what I mean by virtue -
it is grounded in moral intuition, in being true to one's nature and authenticity. I also 
believe that this is where the highest happiness lies. The highest happiness is not an orgy. 
It is not erotic, although purely erotic forms of love can be fulfilling (although it might be 
simply pornographic). But it is not the highest form of fulfilment. This is because eros on 
its own is underwritten by desire of the ego (a linguistic illusion), where that desire is never 
able to be satisfied (Wilber 1983)17. The desire (eros) is always there so long as the person 
that seeks the highest happiness is driven by their ego. The ego and eros are a hedonistic 
couplet. 
If, on the other hand a person has discarded the autonomous ego, compassion and agape 
are made possible. It is still love, but not erotic. Erotic love, in the absence of agape, 
obstructs authenticity and hence ecological sustainability. This is because is seeks 
possession of the alienated 'other', as the 'other' remains an object of erotic craving. It is 
pornographic. It does not let beings be. But actions driven by agape being true to your 
nature and letting others be true to theirs, is consistent with Aptness, and the Will to Be, 
and is thereby authentic (hence virtuous). It is not different in type from the Aptness that 
drives the evolutionalY process and hence adaptation - ecological sustainability. This is why 
I believe that the evolutionary process is able be apprehended by people through personal 
mystical experiences mediated by agape. 
How is this the highest happiness? Being true to your character, by discarding unauthentic 
ways of being, is fulfilling. It is 'being at home in the world' - belonging. Not being true 
to your character fosters tensions and anxieties arising out of this ontological condition of 
unauthenticity. Unconsciously you apprehend a sense of 'wrong' which is masked by 
suppressing those anxieties (see Fromm 1988, 1991) - often through appeasing the ego with 
17This is what is so fundamentally wrong with utilitarian ethics, because it is based on 
a hedonistic conception of happiness. It is thus a pornographic doctrine that serves 
capitalism (also pornographic) velY well. 
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erotic gifts by accumulating possessions. This serves to sweep the symptoms of egotism 
beneath the carpet, and helps to avoid solving the problem at its source - realising the 
linguistic illusion. The highest happiness, on the other hand, comes by casting off the source 
of these tensions, by dismantling the ego and apprehending the unity of the individual with 
the geography of the Self as Sself. Achieving such a condition allows you to be held by the 
landscape and contribute to holding it (see Campbell 1986). It is consistent with Aptness, 
with the way of Nature. 
I do not suggest that eros be discarded. No, not at all. This thesis is not advocating some 
kind of self denying fundamentalist ascetism. I only suggest that eros should not dictate the 
morality of our actions. If it does we will continue to ruin the landscape as we have done 
for far too long. Instead we need to reassert the dialectical balance between Apollo and 
Dionysus - not a drug induced Dionysian frenzy, nor a self denying negation of the body. 
What is needed is an affirmation of both body and non-body. The body needs affirmation. 
This is expressed in miistic fashion. The body is a vehicle for expressing a celebration of 
creati vi ty. 
I believe in the flesh and the appetites, 
Seeing learning and feeling are miracles, and each 
pali a tag of me a miracle. 
(Walt Whitman - Song of Myself, lines 524-525) 
But the source of this creativity lies partly beyond the body. If the source of inspiration lies 
only in the body, the celebration will not be spiritual. It will not be the landscape speaking 
through people. It will simply be people conversing with people. As Mercjowski said in the 
late 19th century concerning symbolism: 
symbols must flow naturally and involuntarily from the depths of reality [Nature]. 
If the author invents them artificially to explain some idea or other, [they] transform 
them into dead allegories, which can awaken only disgust as does anything which 
is dead (cited in Cas sou 1979: 156). 
Being held by the world by moving with the landscape (as opposed to against it) is a 
euphoric state. This ecstasy is commonly expressed in art by mtists who capture this 
creative ecstasy in their work (Gablik 1991). It is like going down-stream in a river instead 
of battling against the current. Yet, people can never know what it is like to go down-
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stream until they try. Attempting to explain a 'down-stream' sensation to someone who only 
knows 'up-stream' is like trying to speak to a mongolian in swahili. The 'down-streamer' 
sounds like an· idiot. 
I believe that Aptness can be experienced in interpersonal relationships. Aptness as agape 
is experienced as love. Not erotic love. But love as mutual compatibility and living in 
response to that immaterial compatibility. It is also able to be experienced through 
incompatibility, provided an appropriate response is enacted. It is still being true to one's 
nature, Apt, adaptive, ecologically sustainable. 
To use a very simple metaphor, imagine two magnets. Imagine placing the north end of 
both close together. There is repulsion. Sustaining such a small distance is not Apt. It can 
be forced, held together with string, but this will be artificial - unauthentic. If left to be true, 
a distance will come about until there is no longer repulsion. But to stretch the metaphor 
a little, imagine that the magnets also have attraction at the same end. This attraction needs 
to be balanced by the repulsion. Too close becomes repulsion; beyond a certain critical 
distance it is attraction; beyond a greater distance there is neutrality. Now, the dynamics of 
'atracto-repulsion' are determined by the mutual character of the true nature of both magnets 
(imagine the magnets are people). Some people are compatible as friends but not as a 
malTied couple (or something equivalent) - due to their true nature. Humans are social 
beings, and as such (on the most pm1), there will be a background of attraction. People are 
drawn together. However, as this distance narrows the attraction may become repulsion. 
Some people might be thoroughly compatible (without tensions) at an emotional distance 
of ten meters (a condition of Aptness), but quite incompatible at a distance of ten 
centimetres (these distances are metaphorical). Other people may still be compatible (i.e. 
no tensions, Apt) at ten centimetres but this compatibility is dictated by their true nature in 
an intersubjective relationship. Birds of a feather flock together. 
Tensions only come about when the condition is not Apt. Achieving a condition of Aptness 
in relation to two people (or a network of people) is when the social dynamic is driven by 
agape (non-attachment). I call it synagapeosis - a Apt condition where attracto-repulsion 
is balanced out and the 'distances' are the product of the true nature of the subjects. This 
is the Will to Be working in human relationships. I contend that this condition of 
synagapeosis also occurs in non-human relationships. Spatial pattern in vegetation 
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communities can also be explained according to Aptness (adaptiveness) without ecologists 
having to stretch their imagination very far at all. In fact they have been saying this for 
many years. If a seedling germinates on a micro-site where allelo-chemicals inhibit its 
vigour it is likely to die. For example, a number of AotearoaJNew Zealand tree species such 
as Leptospermum scopariul11, Aristotelia sen'ata, Dacridium cupressinum, Primnopytus 
ferruginea, and Podocarpus totara have leaf properties that inhibit the growth of seedlings 
in this way (see Brockie 1992:53). Similarly, if a light demanding species, such as 
Nothofagus fusca, needs a large canopy gap to germinate and maintain growth, but does not 
get it, it is selected out of the system (see Wardle 1984). I believe that the dynamics of 
Aptness as adaptability in non-human situations does not differ in type from the human 
example given above. 
I am talking about love, but not erotic love. This condition can be achieved in any culture 
as every person as a human being has a true (i.e. authentic) nature. I do not mean a 
universal essence as is the case with the Humanist project (see Best and Kellner 1991). I 
mean an authentic contextual subjectivity. I believe that if the condition is Apt, driven by 
agape, community results spontaneously. A group of people cannot help but exist in a 
mutually compassionate way, if their relationships are mediated by agape. Compassion here 
arises out of our nature as social beings. Hermits can and do happen. This can be Apt as 
well, but if and only if, such a condition is true to the nature of that person. This is not an 
appeal to any universal discourse concerning human nature, as I believe that we all have 
a unique nature which arises as the dialectical product of the intersubjectivity of our 
existence as beings in Nature. My nature is not your nature. I am here in this landscape and 
you are there in yours. My self has a geography that is particular to me and my landscape 
(socially and geographically). 
If a condition of synagapeosis is achieved in a social setting then, I believe that the social 
group has achieved a condition that falls into line with the evolutionary process, with 
ecological sustainability. This is because it is driven by the same Aptness that drives the 
evolutionary process. It is part of the same· equation of adaptation, of· Aptness, of 
authenticity, of indigenousness, of ecological sustainability. It is a moving down-stream, a 
moving' with the Will to Be. It is evolution working to the 'grass roots' of interpersonal 
relations, mediated by mystical experiences of the presencing of Being in the social domain. 
It is the social ecology of unmitigated nonchalance. The ecology of letting go, of letting 
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beings be. 
Here the last fl'agments of the humanitylNature dualism are finally shattered. Ecology at last 
enters into the social domain without reducing sociology to ecology, or ecology to 
sociology. We get something that is bigger than both - a form of transcendental cultural 
ecology which I call eco-mysticism. I will not give it any grand title, because it has all been 
said before, in many different cultures, only perhaps not quite in this way. I have shown 
how and why a holistic process ontology combines with a dialectical, transcendental 
empiricist epistemology, in combination with soteriology to bring us to a point at which we 
can begin to frame an authentic question concerning ecological sustainability in general and 
in the Vunivia catchment in particular. What it does is substantiate the bioregional narrative 
concept, enabling us to talk about it more casually and confidently in the pages to follow. 
8.8 THE BIOREGIONAL NARRATIVE REVISITED 
Cheney (1989a) has provided a valuable framework for the development of the bioregional 
nan-ative approach. He begins by acknowledging the dangers in sustaining privileged or 
totalizing discourses in ethical praxis, demonstrating the need for both conceptual and 
existential deconstruction. Deconstruction bottoms out in nihilism at the level of language 
(conceptually) and the self (existentially). This leads to the conceptual possibility of ethical 
reconstruction mediated by a perspectivistic, contextualized notion of epistemic truth via 
social negotiation, where the source of coherence for that truth need not lie within language 
at all. This process of negotiation is then existentially extended to the spatial surroundings 
where the landscape is brought into the social discourse through primordial language. This 
is made possible through an identification of the self as existing in a unity with the 
landscape Self as Sself. 
Liberating language from a normative self-referencing system of rules and predicates (which 
obstructs ecological sustainability) necessitates the realisation that any theOlY (as a 
narrative) is language all the way down. As such, there can be many truths in the same 
landscape. The second realisation required for liberating language from unauthenticity is to 
acknowledge that it is 'world all the way up' as Cheney (1989a) puts it, which provides the 
mandate for reconstruction, the possibility of authenticity in language, and hence ecological 
sustainability as culture. 
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A bioregional narrative, begins with truth as negotiation, and language as either primordial 
or derivative, and attempts to build a politico-linguistic framework that allows a culture to 
engage in a descriptive conversation with the surrounding landscape. The outcome is 
adaptation, Aptness, indigenousness, compatibility and ecological sustainability. The 
language that develops is able to grow from the local soil in situ. If it doesn't it will not be 
genuinely poetical or empirical as it will not be grounded in real experiences of the real 
landscape. And as Cheney puts it: "To prepare a theory, religion, or culture for expOlt is 
to turn it into a potential tool for the colonisation of the minds of other people" (Cheney 
1989: 120). 
The next task is to develop a practical framework for achieving such a condition as a means 
of rescuing a culture from unsustainability. This is perhaps the most challenging task 
humanity has before it, in the light of the deepening ecological crisis and the ever-
increasing distance modern culture is moving from such a possibility. And in echoing Karl 
Marx the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it. But how 
can this change be brought about? It needs to be a political process. It needs to be 
soteriological. It needs to be emancipatory. It needs to be linguistic. It needs to be capable 
of going beyond human democracy and extend to a biospherical egalitarianism (as suggested 
in deep ecology) that includes the rest of Nature in human actions and decisions concerning 
cultural life. It needs to be free from epistemological and political structures that contradict 
or obstruct such holistic egalitarianism. But where might we begin? 
I believe that a valuable place to start is to seek out the most oppressed human group 
possible. From there one will be able to study the condition of the lowest common 
denominator of human existence which finds itself in such a condition as a result of 
oppression itself. When viewed through their view-finder (Le. their life experience) one is 
able to gain a perspective of the structures of oppression in operation. This oppression is 
grounded either in blatant violence or in clandestine, totalizing discourses of self-referencing 
legitimation. Humanity is part of Nature. By seeking to assist the emancipation of oppressed 
human groups one is doing something in Nature, with Nature. The human starting point 
enables us to locate the source of oppressive discourses which manifest their violence 
throughout Nature. If your language game is incapable of oppressing any being, buy ridding 
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itself of all forms of totalizing structures of control and manipulation your culture will be 
non-oppressive in all directions. It will be non-stoic, non-manipulative, letting beings be, 
Apt, adaptive, and ecologically sustainable. Such egalitarianism can be achieved through 
non-stoic holism as mentioned above, that sees the whole in every part. It is for this reason 
that I believe postmodern feminism to be an ideal theoretical starting point as it seeks to 
point to the source of oppression in politico-linguistic frameworks, where the subordination 
of women is one manifestation of such oppressive discourses (see Best and Kellner 1991 
pp 205-214; Flax 1990; Fraser and Nicholson 1988, for example). 
The holism and process rationality I see as so important can be planted into a language 
game through contextual discourses of difference. This is achieved by assimilating language 
to the local (contextual) situation (which is different from other places - hence 'difference') 
and shapes it to the local social and spatial reality. Language of this form is not concerned 
with overall coherence in any universal sense. The result is a mosaic of language serving 
numerous different purposes simultaneously. Contextualized language thus becomes one 
among many possible linguistic truths for a particular landscape. The impOltance is the way 
language functions, not the way it sounds. Different languages from different cultures can 
become indigenous to the same landscape - provided they are contextualized and creative 
as opposed to normative. Language of this type is able to articulate cultural conceptions of 
the self in a way that reinforces the contextual nature of a self that is tied to a particular 
landscape as Sself. This type of language game is common in tribal cultures but has been 
poorly understood by anthropologists in the absence of a non-totalizing and contextual 
conception of linguistic theory. Postmodern linguistic theory is one way of achieving this 
kind of understanding. 
Tribal languages have, in many cases, been overlain with modernist language structures and 
meanings that transform not only the language structure but also the contextual self as 
subject. This has happened in Fiji where the meaning behind words in language have 
changed in spite of the words remaining. The meaning of Fijian life now has a basis in 
modern standards of rationality as mentioned before. This includes a modern conception of 
the self, a self that has been ripped up from the landscape. This is why I have rather 
provocatively suggested that, on the most part, Fijian culture is already dead. 
But as Jay (1989) has suggested "Psychology without ecology is lonely and vice versa" 
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(cited in Cheney 1989a: 122). This refers to the spatialization of intersubjective relationships 
between people and their living surroundings, between the self and the landscape. 
Furthermore, "The aboriginal landscape was a democracy of spirits where everyone listened, 
careful not to offend the resource they were a working part of" (cited in Cheney 
1989a: 113). This leads to mythic thinking as a way of carrying creative contextual 
knowledge of place through a culture. Myth is a language construct that contains the power 
to transform as a kind of vehicle of psychological development and transformation (see 
Neumann 1959; Gablik 1991; Stevens 1992; Campbell 1986). According to Cheney (1989a): 
Postmodernism makes possible for us the conception of language conveying an 
understanding of the self, world, and community which is consciously tuned to and 
shaped by considerations of the health and well-being of individuals, community, 
and land and on ethical responsibilities for each. This postmodernist possibility is 
an actuality in the world of [some forms of] tribal myth and ritual (ibid.:123-124). 
He makes a careful disclaimer that this is not always realised as an actuality in tribal 
cultures that have these potentialities and also that not all tribal cultures possess these 
potentialities. The task ahead is to explore whether the Fijian culture did or does have these 
possibilities/actualities and wether such is able to be employed as a basis for ecological 
sustainability in Fiji. 
There is a strong connection between contextual discourse as a basis for a bioregional 
nanative and contemporary feminist theory on contextualism, narrative discourse, and 
standpoint (perspectivistic) epistemologies (e.g. Harding 1986). Prompted by a feminist 
critique of narrative and the concept of "home" by Maltin and Mohanty (1986), Cheney 
(l989a) asselts that relations to people are elaborated through spatial relations and historical 
understanding where the importance stems from the contextualization of such relations and 
the avoidance of any purely psychological (anthropocentric) explanation. 
As such, although the key to liberation from domination is narrative, it needs to be 
grounded not in a linear, essentialized narrative self but in geography. Our location becomes 
all important where the Sself and its geographical surroundings are bounded together in a 
"narrative which locates us in the moral space of defining relations" (Cheney 1989: 126). 
This provides a liberationist arrow pointing to the importance of cognitive maps or 
mindscapes in relation to the simultaneity of social and ecological emancipation from 
oppressive, instrumental, and unsustainable, domination. Thus, in the shattered ruins of 
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deconstructed totalizing discourses emerges a contextualized discourse of place. 
There is an important connection here between narrative, myth and art. O'Biso has 
recognised this in relation to Maori 'rut' which was displayed in the United States in the Te 
Maori exhibition. She reflects: 
.. .it had been difficult for the Maori people to discuss their art with Americans. 
There is no single word for art in the Maori language. A piece of wood has no 
significance. It is transformed through the art process. The contact with people, the 
words and stories built into the piece of wood during its making and in the centuries 
that might follow, tum it into a taonga, something treasured. The object is actually 
clothed with words, animated and transformed into a cultural object whose mana ... 
are increased by continued association with people and events during its lifetime 
(O'Biso 1987:90-91). 
Similarly, Lopez (1989) talks about narrative and its relationship with landscape as a means 
of apprehending the unity of what he calls the inner and outer landscape. For Lopez the 
birds of a place and their song are part of this landscape. 
Perhaps a black throated spalTOW lands in a paloverde bush - the resiliency of the 
twig under the bird, that precise shade of yellowish-green against the milk-blue sky, 
the fluttering whir of the arriving sparrow, are what I mean by "the landscape" 
(Lopez 1989:64). 
Our inner landscape is also shaped by the outer landscape and one will influence the other 
(Campbell 1986). They share a dialectical unity. "The interior landscape responds to the 
character and subtlety of an exterior landscape; the shape of the individual mind is affected 
by land as it is by genes" (Lopez 1989:65). This sounds very similar to what Goethe is 
telling us in his plays. He was at pains to bring humanity and divinity down to earth and 
show how such a realisation would enable wisdom to unfold. 
8.8.1 BELONGING TO THE LAND 
The meaning of the landscape is geographically contextual, representing intersubjective 
relationships within a particular place in the cosmology, a cosmology which is connected 
to the landscape. This facilitates the realisation of politicized geography as opposed to the 
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land existing as it neutral tabula rasa where social and political events take place l & (see 
Jameson 1984). The place does not precede the human activities - it is comprised of these 
very activities arid social, political and emotional undercurrents. From this standpoint it 
becomes easier to comprehend the Fijian notion of Vanua in its political, social, and 
geographical contexts. I, for example, do not live in or on the land of Otautahi/Christchurch 
- I am this place and this place is me. Both I and my hypostatized spatial surroundings 
comprise each other dialectically, the same can be said for the collective human population 
of this landscape as well as the non-human aspects of place. To take it a step further, the 
geographical context of life in a place constitutes an integral aspect of the Sself. For this 
reason Sseifrealisation cannot be separated from the very landscape in which the Sself came 
into being. Because the Sself is that landscape. 
People grow to unconsciously identify, in some intangible way, with the place that nUltures 
them in their formative years (see Stevens 1992, pp54-164 for an account of the analytical 
psychology of Carl Jung in relation to childhood). They become that place, which becomes 
psychologically ingrained in their personality, and this in turn cultivates a sense of 
belonging. There is no guarantee that any such belonging will develop vis-a-vis a landscape 
if children are obstructed from experiencing their geographical surroundings at an early age. 
Such a condition is, however, endemic to modern urbanised cultures. Many children in 
modern societies grow to identify with surrogate landscapes mediated by television (see 
Postman 1987; Playfair 1990). I for one know the sense of euphoria that comes with 
hearing the theme music to celtain favourite television programmes that inspired me in 
some way as a child. Upon hearing those sounds I suddenly feel childishly 'at home'. But 
thankfully, more 'at home' I feel when I taste the salty fragrance of the Wellington coastline, 
blended with the hot summer resonance of a symphony of cicadas and the shade of 
pohutokawa trees above the rocky shore. 
But sadly, many modern children (of any race) grow up as aliens to the landscape that 
surrounds them (Fijian children growing up in Suva are an example). And it is no wonder 
that concern for the 'environment' is such a barrier to modern people outside an instrumental 
l&Zablocki (1971) shows how in modern urban social environments, identity is lost from 
the immediate physical community and security is found in isolation from it. In such 
situations people are unable to nurture communal relationships (which are so common in 
Fijian villages) necessary for a sense of belonging to develop. 
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utility concern. These instrumental concerns form the subtexts for countless modern 
environmental movements who are seeking to protect only the instrumental value of the 
natural 'resources' that they have an erotic (grasping, wanting) affinity with. This is in 
contrast to deeper environmental concerns that are the result of an immeasurable sense of 
loss of place, of landscape, and a loss of Ssel/ 9 suffered, not only by tribal peoples at the 
dismantling of their cultural landscapes, but also non-tribal peoples that have nurtured a 
spiritual connection with place (see Phillips 1987; Suzuki and Knudtson 1992). 
This cultural condition has been achieved by many tribal cultures (not all of them of course) 
in such a way that what we in the West call 'art' and 'science' are woven together as culture 
itself. For Lopez:-
Art, architecture, vocabulary, and costume, as well as ritual, are derived from the 
perceived natural order of the universe - from observational meditations on the 
exterior landscape. An indigenous philosophy - metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, 
aesthetics, and logic - may also be derived from a people's continuous attentiveness 
to both the obvious (scientific) and ineffable (artistic) orders of the local landscape. 
Each individual, fUlther, undeltakes to order (their] interior landscape according to 
the exterior landscape. To achieve this means to achieve a balanced state of mental 
health (Lopez 1989:67). 
In this way Lopez indicates his belief that the landscape can and does give culture a loom 
(standard of rationality) and threads (experiences) to weave a graceful life - hence the poem 
Weaving mentioned in chapter 6. For such a culture the landscape exists as an intricate web 
of countless interpretations, of many different truths, both human and non-human where the 
spontaneous product of that web of different perspectives comprises that landscape. 
Furthermore, the individual comes to realise that their own Sselfis one of those connections 
of the web, and to dismantle the web is to dismantle the Sself. The net of Indra in Hindu 
cosmology forms a parallel to this notion which does not need a religious precedent for its 
realisation (see Campbell 1988). People are constantly in the process of unconsciously 
realising their place in the landscape in spite of its denial in modern culture. ContralY to 
Western thought since Aristotle, there is no objective ontological condition of place that 
stands prior to the unique subjective experiences that take place in such a space. As shown 
19The loss of the Sself in modernised tribal cultures will be extremely traumatic as the 
very basis of identity and the meaning of life is destroyed. Modern Western people will find 
it difficult to comprehend this if they have never realised the self as Sself. 
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by Whitehead and Bergson space is not existentially prior to matter within it, nor is it prior 
to a unique subject (see also Capra 1975, 1982; Zohar 1989; Davies and Gribbin 1991). 
Within this cultural geography of place the contextual voice must be recreated through a 
process of constant re-contextualizing, thus preventing distOited normative tendencies that 
result from the captivation of the language game under the misguided framework of 
totalizing and universalizing discourse. This contextual unity between people and place is 
able to be encultured through mythic images as metaphors for the relationship which 
extends well beyond the reach of language. This is how an ethics 'beyond good and evil' 
is able to inform a culture about its responsibilities in the landscape. As Cheney puts it: 
An important aspect of the construction or evolution of mythic images is their 
ability to articulate such moral imperatives and to carry them in such a way that 
they actually do instruct; that they locate us in a moral space which is at the same 
time the space we live in physically; that they locate us in such a way that these 
moral imperatives have the lived reality of fact...For a genuinely contextualistic ethic 
to include the land, the land must speak to us: we must stand in relation to it; it 
must define us, and we it (Cheney 1989a: 129). 
This is the bioregional narrative, and this is how a landscape can speak to people, and 
through people, thus reciting its autobiography. It is an autobiography, because people are 
speaking from a position within the flux of Nature, and so it can be ecologically sustainable. 
If it is merely biographical, where humans speak in their own invented normative language 
referring to Nature as an 'other', then Nature will not be the author. There it is. There you 
have it at long last. A general theory of ecological sustainability that enables us to posit an 
authentic question concerning ecological sustainability in Fiji. 
8.9 REVISITING THE RIVER OF SILENCE 
Western philosophy and Western culture since the fall of Medieval Europe has a fear of 
water (i.e. the linguistic silence of nihilism) and finds all sorts of excuses for avoiding it. 
Truth defined according to logic (the rules of a normative language) does this. Metaphysics 
is afraid of nihilism to the point of denying its existence. As such, Western philosophers 
steer their discourses away from the river and try to prevent people from seeing it. Then 
one day, Nietzsche came along, discovered that logically defined truths are really fables, 
and in the process was confronted by the river of silence. He declared that this was a great 
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achievement, which it was. The modernists (who are afraid of water) told him to shut up, 
and tried to stop other people from seeing the river that Nietzsche pointed to. Nietzsche 
went to the waters edge and pointed to the other shore and shouted: "Look! There is a land 
beyond good and evil". But he never got there. He was happy to pass through nihilism 
conceptual1y but not existentially. He did not want to get wet. Heidegger came along and 
told us to get wet, as we need to pass through the silence conceptually and existentially. 
Whereas Western metaphysics has been avoiding water for most of its life, mystical 
traditions talk about the water all the time, and talk about the need to get wet if we want 
to understand our condition. To get to ecological sustainability we must get wet. A mystical 
experience is the getting wet, the passing through the silence. This is what baptism in 
Christianity symbolises. Passing through the silence, the wilderness, the abyss: when you 
are hungry - eat, when tired - sleep. Listen to your intuitions, which are now able to be 
heard in the silence where language cannot venture. The busy traffic is gone and you can 
at last hear the bird song. Nomadism or something similar can also foster the same or 
similar level of detachment enabling peoples' intuitions to be heard (see Chatwin 1987). 
Different traditions bring people to the water in different ways and at different rates. 
Scripture orientated religions, found in Asia and the West, take people there after a process 
of learning. Mystics and poets get wet and describe their experiences. This is the source of 
inspiration for their poetry. Many poets achieve this in the absence of scripture. This is why 
it is common for mystics and poets to be branded as heretics, as they get to where scripture 
points to by throwing scripture away. 
Zen and the Christian via negitivia, both drag you straight to the water's edge, points to the 
water, and instructs you to get wet immediately. This is where mysticism begins - in 
silence, nothingness. Zen teaches you how to swim as it has developed a skilled swimming 
tradition. This is why I think that the equivalent of Zen practice (a form of meditation 
which in Japan is called zazen) is so valuable. It can be used in any cultural context - even 
Fijian culture. It is not a culturally specific doctrine of stories set up for expOlt. It is non-
cultural as it is non-linguistic. Any culture can turn language off. It is a method of listening 
to the silence, and upon hearing the echo of stillness one can bring those experiences into 
language and thus create language anew. Any language. A language that al10ws the 
landscape to speak, to recite its autobiography. 
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Now we can begin to understand the following statement by Ch'uan Teng Lu (a Zen 
master): 
Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and waters 
as waters. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge I came to the point where 
I saw that mountains are not mountains, and waters are not waters. But now that I 
have got it's very substance, I am at rest. For its just that I see mountains once 
again as mountains, and waters once again as waters (Ch'uan Teng Lu20 cited in 
Watts 1957: 146). 
In normative linguistic state, our apprehension of the world around us is normative, and 
essentialist. We assume that what we are looking at is the whole picture. "This is a tree" 
we say and think that it is a true statement. "I saw mountains as mountains, and waters as 
waters". This is an example of the naive conception of essence from the perspective of the 
self. But upon passing through the silence of nihilism one begins to realise the what we 
called "tree" is not an autonomous being at all. There is much more to the 'tree' than meets 
the eye. The 'tree' is not an isolated phenomenon or 'thing'. It is an epiphenomenon of 
Nature. It is a part of the landscape and thoroughly interconnected with the rest of the 
landscape. At this stage the person begins to understand that it is not a 'tree' as the 'tree' is 
not an autonomous 'thing' at all. It is no-thing - nothing, viewed from the perspective of the 
Self. "Mountains are not mountains, and waters are not waters". This a realisation of the 
unity of existence. But this is not the end of the story, as the tree does have a being in the 
sense that it has a character of its own, even if it is interconnected with the rest of the 
landscape. "But now I have got it's very substance ... 1 see mountains once again as 
mOllntains, and waters once again as waters". This is a realisation of the dialectic of 
essence and existence, apprehended from the perspective of the (see Abe 1985 for an 
excellent account of the meaning of this well known Zen statement). 
A bioregional narrative must be able to achieve this viz. an apprehension of the essential 
differences of beings, in the light of their interconnectedness and unity in existence. I am 
not yet able to posit my question concerning ecological sustainability, but I am very close. 
r must first go to Fiji again and take a closer look at culture in that country, in the light of 
the understanding made possible by the theoretical developments of the last three chapters. 
2°Cited in Watts (1957: 146). 
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PART IV 
THE RE-ENCHANTMENT OF FIJI'S FORESTS 
Throughout this thesis I have been attempting to show that there are many ecological 
differences between different human cultural groups. These differences can be traced to 
the rationality, world view and language games of different cultural systems, in 
combination with the landscapes that embrace such cultures. Ecologically speaking we 
are dealing with different functional 'species' even though we are supposedly referring 
to a single biological taxon viz. Homo sapiens sapiens. The dualism between humanity 
and the rest of Nature was dissolved in chapter 8. Because of this the notion of 
separating culture from ecology becomes a non sequitur. The ecology of a human group 
is in no way ontologically prior to its social character. They are one and the same. 
Dialectical thinking can decipher this. We are biological beings, but we are also sociaL 
The ecological dimension does not stand above the social, and the social does not stand 
above the ecologicaL Instead our character is simultaneously ecological and social. 
I set out in the beginning of Part III to resolve this theoretical and common sense 
contradiction. First I looked into the social sciences for a critical account of social life 
in the landscape that did not commit the same mistake. I could not find a solution whilst 
remaining within the domain of the social, but instead found that a cultural perspective 
was more appropriate. This cultural perspective looked into the cultural aspects of the 
tools of inquiry and the cultural dimensions of the object of inquiry. It was at this point 
that I made my depmture from a purely rational to a post-metaphysical theoretical 
perspective, as purely rational cultural epistemologies carried with them cultural 
misconceptions in the tools of inquiry. This helped to expose the cultural roots of the 
misconceptions relating to the humanitylNature dualism. 
The cultural system that has led to modernity is founded on a series of flaws in its 
underlying rationality which makes such a dualism possible. This flaw is the reification 
of language and its rules, and the extension of linguistic norms into the domain of the 
real world. This linguistic illusion leads to problcms in the human interpretation of the 
world around them - epistemology, and in existential, psychological problems leading 
to anxieties that serve to alienate humanity from its place in the landscape. 
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The cultural system that has given rise to modernity and its epistemologies is a very 
different one from many non-Western cultural systems. Modernity is in Fiji, and Fiji is 
a modern cultural entity. Fiji also has pre-modern tendencies, but then so too has 
Europe. The critique of modernity was simultaneously a critique of the existing culture 
in Fiji ilTespective of race. It was also a critique of the ecology of modern cultural 
systems in comparison with pre-modern cultural systems. This critique led me to 
understand the ecological character of these different cultural groups. Such cultural 
groups can be named according to their cultural and ecological character. This can help 
to expose which cultural tendencies are adaptive and which ones are not. The adaptive 
cultures are capable of achieving ecological sustainability. And this is what I originally 
set out to achieve in this research viz. an understanding of the question concerning 
ecological sustainability in relation to the forests of Fiji. 
To help explain my thinking in relation to different cultural groupings I have developed 
a taxonomy according to politico-linguistic systems that underlie cultures. This 
taxonomy is only designed to help pOltray my story in a coherent form, which can then 
be used to frame my question concerning ecological sustainability. I contend that only 
a celtain type of politico-linguistic system is capable of achieving a condition of 
ecological sustainability as a culture. I call this politico-linguistic system Homo-
Heraclitia agapensis. It is a functional species, an ecological entity, an ecological niche. 
It is not universal, as it will need to be have its local form added as a sub-species. If 
such an ecologically sustainable politico-linguistic system existed in the Vunivia 
catchment I might call it Homo-Heraclitia agapensis vunivia. It would have a different 
ecological character to an ecologically sustainable culture of Fiji's upper Ba catchment, 
because the Ba landscape is a different landscape and would influence such an culture 
in a different way. This is a contextual taxonomy and I will explain its details in the 
pages to follow. 
CHAPTER 9 - THE QUESTION OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 
9.1 A TAXONOMY OF DEEDS 
An interesting aspect of Goethe's thinking was his reflections on the idea of the human 
essence. Goethe rejected the Kantian notion of a noumenal self which lies beyond or 
behind the world of experience or appearances as shown in his book Doctrine of 
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Colours (published in 1810). Goethe explained his view in this way: "We exert 
ourselves in vain to describe the character of a human being; but assemble [humanity's] 
actions, [humanity's] deeds, and a picture of [human] character will confront us" (cited 
in Kaufmann 1980a: 23). 
Goethe argued that humanity is its deeds, and I agree: operari sequitur esse ~ what we 
do follows from what we are. But what of these deeds? How are they arranged and are 
there patterns that can be recognised? Of course - we call them cultures. But they exist 
within a landscape and engage in a dialectical relationship with the rest of Nature - thus 
I call them eco-cultures. All cultures are eco-cultures as all cultures have an ecological 
character. This ecological character comprises its collective deeds. 
In biological terms, the functional ecological character of an organism is termed its 
ecological niche. I believe that the actual functioning niche of any 'species' is far more 
important in relation to ecological dynamics than the genetic heritage of a 'species'. Any 
'species' in the formal phylogenetic sense can have a number of functional 'species' in 
terms of the ecological character of different groupings within a genetic taxon. In 
ecology it is commonly refel1'ed to as intra-specific niche differentiation (or something 
similar). The impOltance of functional systematics in general has been recognised by 
many other ecologists in recent years. According to Keddy (1990) classification should 
serve two main purposes: (a) constructing phylogenetic taxonomies as a basis for 
determining evolutionary history, and (b) constructing functional classification for 
purposes of predictive ecology. Keddy (1990) argues (as I do) for an increased emphasis 
on the functional dimension. 
Functional systematics in ecology has quite a well developed heritage where functional 
'guilds lt have been identified for animals and plants (see Platt and Weiss 1977; Cody 
1986; Day et al 1988; Gillison and Brewer 1985; Gillison 1988). Pianka (1983) has also 
recognised the importance of functional typology, as have Diamond and Case (1986), 
Terborgh and Robinson (1986) in relation to bird and mammal community ecology. 
Cummins and Klug (1979), and Cummins (1988) have used the concept of functional 
feeding groups in the study of aquatic invertebrates. Niche differentiation in animal 
species is commonly based on functional feeding guilds, whereas in plants it has been 
applied to the regeneration niche hypothesis (see Grubb 1977), and the resource-ratio 
IThe concept of functional 'guilds' in plants can be traced back to Theophrastos 
(circa. 300 b.c.) (Keddy 1990), who was one of the earliest of the natural philosophers 
engaging in a discipline that was to form the conceptual basis for science (Kahn 1979). 
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hypothesis (Keddy 1990). 
The recognition of different niche groups within a single phylogenetic taxon may lead 
biologists to rename them as sub-species, but to do so establishes a challenge to the 
basic concept underlying the species definition. As a functional ecologist I cannot help 
but recognise the impOltance of the actual living ecological character of a plant or 
animal grouping. In this sense the niche and the species concepts begin to merge into 
one. It amounts to the functional niche of a group of organisms that may maintain a 
form of unity by doing similar deeds. This is the way the niche is expressed and I call 
it the 'functional niche expression'. It is not the fundamental (i.e. hypothetical) niche but 
the realised niche. To clarify this it will be useful to look briefly into the niche concept. 
Whittaker (1975) tells us: "Within each habitat one can describe for a species its 
position in the space, time and functional relationships of the natural community that 
occupies that habitat. The species position in a community in relation to other species 
is its niche" (ibid.:77). 
The fundamental niche is described as the abstract hyper-volume that sets the potential 
ecological boundaries of that species' niche space. The realised niche is the actual niche 
space that the species occupies in response to existing environmental factors such as 
nutrient availability, substrate, and competition (see Hutchinson 1967; Pianka 1981; 
Begon and MOltimer 1986). Some debate still exists as to the specific definition of 
different aspects of niche space in terms of 'fundamental' and 'realised' categories 
(Whittaker and Levin 1975; Cohen 1978; May 1979; Usher et al 1979). Colwell and 
Futuyma (1971) for example, use the terms 'actual' and virtual' niche to describe the 
potential and apparent niche expression in a species. Since the mid 1960s, however, the 
concept of 'ecological niche' has also been identified with resource utilisation in 
combination with reproductive success, which can point to a better understanding of 
niche space (see Pianka 1981). But in so doing, the species concept as a solely 
phylogenetic grouping becomes less valuable when interpreting the actual ecological 
character of a group of plants or animals. 
I am studying human ecology. In phylogenetic terms we are one single species - Homo 
sapiens sapiens. However, it is quite obvious that functionally speaking we are not 
homogenous. Instead we are highly diverse. This diversity, I believe, can be explained 
in terms of culture - the actual living, functioning culture. And in this sense I an talking 
about the realised niche of a human group the functional niche expression. The 
ecosystem cares little for what organism groups (including humans) look like. What they 
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do is far more important vis-a-vis ecosystem dynamics, evolution and adaptation. 
Ecological sustain ability and indigenousness is an aspect of ecosystem dynamics in 
relation to human ecology. It is about human adaptation and evolution. So, I am at the 
point of being able to define culture as the functional niche expression and furthermore 
employ a nomenclature for such a purpose. This is my taxonomy of deeds. As 
mentioned above, I have come to recognise a number of distinct human 'deed' groups 
or eco-cultures, underwritten by politico-linguistic systems. I have found there to be at 
least two genera with numerous species and sub-species. 
9.1.1 REVISITING HOMO SAPIENS 
In the previous three chapters I have painted a picture of two major human cultural 
systems. One is characterised by an attachment to a normative linguistic condition, 
which has culminated in modernity, the other is based on a rationality of constant flux -
tribal cultures and a number of mystical traditions. These two systems are broad 
categories and could be regarded as generic as opposed to specific. The normative form 
I shall call Homo-Pannenidia (as a genus), is named after Parmenides who argued in 
favour of the steady state rationality in the 6th century b.c. The descriptive genus, which 
makes ecological sustainability possible, I will call Homo-Heraclitia, after Heraclitus 
who attempted to convince those around him that (contra Parmenides) "all things flow". 
The species of these two genera will be many, and varied, as each will develop in their 
own particular way in their own landscape. 
Recognition of this taxonomy can help us begin to see how a dialogue between Fijian 
culture and the West might be possible. I have traced in the West a rationality and a 
culture that is not different in type (in terms of the genus) from pre-modern Fijian 
culture, which originally gave meaning to words in the Fijian language. The pre-modern 
Fijian genus was of the Homo-Heraclitia form. This is not different at the generic level 
from numerous Western cultural tendencies. In chapter 7 I traced such a genealogy from 
Heraclitus through to my own work via Goethe, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
and so forth. It is the Western forms of the Homo-Heraclitia genus that is capable of 
dialogue with Fijian culture. 
The meaning of pre-modern languages in Fiji was linked to a process rationality (see 
Ravuvu 1987a, 1987b, 1988). The Westerners that arrived in Fiji in the 19th century 
carried their steady state systems with them in their heads. When they tried to 
understand the Fij ian language they plugged their own steady state meanings into the 
300 
Fijian words, thus misapprehending the Fijian language game2• Since then the 
penetration of modern culture into Fiji has meant that the cultural context of life, even 
for people of the Fijian race (for the most part), has changed to a modern one. The 
world that many Fijians now walk in is a modern world underpinned by a modern 
rationality. Because of this the Fijian language, for many people of the Fijian race, is 
no longer the language it was in pre-modern times. Because of this, even people of the 
Fijian race are losing sight of what it is to be culturally Fijian. 
However, should a Westerner who walks in a process world (someone like Goethe) 
arrive in Fiji, they would be capable of beginning to understand translations without 
leaving the meaning behind. I believe that this is the primary task that the West must 
confront if it wishes to enter into dialogue with the Fijian culture, and any non-Western 
culture, without politico-linguistic coercion. It is also the task of modern Fijians who 
have any interest in rediscovering the meaning of Fijianness. A process rationality is the 
key to dialogue in Fiji concerning the relationship between Fijian culture and other 
cultures. Moreover, because Nature is in a constant state of flux any discourse 
concerning the question of ecological sustain ability must be undertaken under the eves 
of a process rationality. The pre-modern Fijian language game has a significant head 
start. 
9.2 THE V ANUA IS DEAD 
A diversion into the Vanua will be useful to demonstrate what I mean in relation to the 
modernisation of the Fijian language game. The actual meaning of the word 'Vanua' is 
being transformed in Fiji into that commensurate with the English word 'land' together 
with the modern utilitarian baggage that goes with it. And so, even for many Fijians the 
Vanua has been disconnected from pre-modern Fijian culture and disenchanted in the 
process. The mystery and the spirit of the Vanua is being lost to Fijian culture as its 
meaning has been transfOlmed into a mundane social utility and a mere resource for 
economic exploitation. This is why Nietzsche's madman was introduced in chapter 4 
who ran around Kedra village searching for the spirit of the land, but then announced 
that it had died. Because culture is recreated through language the Fijian culture has 
dramatically changed. Utilitarian meaning behind the word Vanua has surreptitiously 
21 do not suggest that all Westerners did this as some would have understood Fijian 
culture by participating with it. However, most of the translations would have carried 
the Fijian words over but left the meanings behind. This is because most Westerners 
living in Fiji were not living in the Fijian cultural world. 
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crept in to the language game, veiled by the maintenance of the word as a symbol. This 
has happened through Fijian subservience to a hegemonic Western cultural system 
underwritten by a normative (Homo-Parmenidian) standard of rationality which has 
tarnished both the language and the Vanua itself. 
This, of course, is not true for all Fijians, as many still maintain the meaning of the 
Vanua, which for them is still alive. But these people are commonly patronised by 
modernised Fijians, who refer to them as kai colo (backward), because their world view 
is not consistent with the disenchanted modern version sustained by many of their 
cousins. But it is the kai colo that hold the secrets of the Vanua close to their heart, and 
they are the ones that are capable of re-educating modern Fijians, and modern people 
of other races, who have all lost the meaning of belonging. The kai colo3 can teach us 
all about the true meaning of vaka Viti, and vaka Vanua. 
The reality of the Vanlla, encompassing people and place, has been dishonoured and 
tainted (one only has to look at contemporary environmental degradation to see what I 
mean). This has been done partly by Fijians themselves, who now act out in culture a 
non-traditional language game that has killed the Vanua, in the same way that Nature 
and God have been murdered by Western culture, as Nietzsche suggested last centmy. 
The Vanua is also being butchered by non-Fijians who brought with them a murderous 
culture in the 19th century. It was also being dishonoured and disgraced by violent and 
coercive pre-modern Fijian social and political systems that employed the chiefly system 
for egotistical and totalitarian ends. 
I should make it clear that I do not regard 'tradition' as being virtuous in any a priori 
sense and do not defend 'tradition'. Instead I simply wish to contend that, in many cases, 
the contemporary Fijian language game (even though the same words are being used) 
is substantially different from the language game that developed and existed in Fiji prior 
to the arrival of Europeans in the 19th century. As such, many (but not all) of the people 
claiming to be practising 'traditional' Fijian culture today, cannot claim to be any more 
traditionally Fijian (in the sense of being tied to the Fiji landscape) than an Australian 
tourist whose (modern English) language game is tied to no landscape at al1. This is 
3The Fijian word 'colo' means 'interior, and kai colo translates into - people from the 
highlands. Traditional wisdom can be found in places other than the highlands, as much 
of it still remains on outer islands, and even in coastal villages on the mainland. As 
such, the term 'kai colo' is perhaps not appropriate, particularly in the light of its 
derogatory connotations. 
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because the modern Fijian language game is precisely that - modern. It is infused with 
the cultural meaning of modernity and can claim to be indigenous only to that landscape 
which modernity is indigenous to - Mars. Simply sitting on the mat every now ahd then 
and presenting a sevusevu4 in Bauan5 before singing songs and getting drunk on yaqona 
is an insufficient criteria for claiming to have Fijianness. I can do this, and I have done 
this many, many times, but I do not claim to be Fijian I was even born in Fiji. 
Many people of the Fijian race are no longer Fijian by culture. Race is not culture. 
However, scattered about the landscape the diminishing fragments of Fijian culture are 
holding on against a tide that is threatening to drown them for ever. These people, who 
are being misunderstood by others of the Fijian race, are among those who can save Fiji 
from ecological and cultural ruin. They are not the only ones, as there are also many 
people of other races, minorities in a similar way, who are capable of understanding 
what it means to belong to the land. But to hear them we must all put our prejudices 
aside, so that the different dialects of ecological wisdom, that are uttered in different 
sounding voices, can be understood. In this way someone like Goethe could speak with 
Ratu Sukuna and both would understand and agree: noqu Kalou, llOqu Vanua (my God 
is my Land). 
However, with all due respect, the modern chief has no clothes. Much of the Fijian 
culture is already dead. This is because the Vanua is dead, and without the ValUta 
Fijians have got nothing in terms of an authentic cultural relationship with the landscape, 
which is what it means to be Fijian (Ravuvu 1987a, 1987b). This dismal cultural 
condition equates well with the 'nothing' that most other people enslaved to modernity 
have. We are lost. We are all lost. And because we are all in it together, the imperative 
exists for us to all work together to establish a re-birth of the Vanua. This is the only 
option left for Fiji if it has any interest in ecological sustainability. 
An uncoerced discourse at last becomes possible between Fiji and the West by exposing 
the eco-cultural genera that both 'cultures' share. Both Fiji and 'the West' have 
sustainable and unsustainable elements. Neither can claim to be more sustainable than 
the other. Neither can claim to hold the secret, or the only key to eco-cultural harmony. 
4A sevusevu is a ritual conducted at the beginning of a visit to a respected household 
or village. 
5Ba l/an is the national dialect of the Fijian languages. 
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The kai valagi6 can do this, as can the kai India, the kai China, the kai loma7, and the 
kai Vitis. For this reason all people living in Fiji, irrespective of race, must be invited 
to enter into a discourse concerning ecological sustainability in that country. 
Indigenousness is not about where you are from, but where you are going. Where you 
have been can be important, depending on what kind of culture you inherited from your 
ancestors. But because the landscape is always changing you must recreate your 
relationship with the landscape ever anew. Otherwise it becomes normative, non-
adaptive, unsustainable. Anyone recreating a linguistically normative culture in Fiji (even 
if they are racially Fijian) is not indigenous. Anyone of any race can become indigenous 
to Fiji, but it depends on passing through the silence of the linguistic abyss, enabling the 
landscape to recite its autobiography through a bioregional narrative. If your ancestors 
were born in Calcutta you can still achieve this in Fiji. Because what is important is not 
what you look like or what your language sounds like - it is what you are, what you do, 
and what your language means. 
I will return to my taxonomy in a few pages to follow, once the grounds for further 
linguistic differentiation has been elaborated. Before I do this I will take a brief 
diversion into ecological theory to show that my views on human evolution are not 
greatly different from existing ecological thinking. Indeed ecology is where my 
academic background lies, and human ecology is what I have been practising for the 
entire duration of this thesis. 
9.3 POSTMODERN ECOLOGICAL THEORY 
Having prepared the way for reconstruction by running the gauntlet of fundamental 
ontology I can now approach ecology with a recognition of the need to avoid lining it 
with coercive political or sociological structures. But what is different about this 
ecological theory of mine? Actually, it is not very different from a great deal of 
ecological theory of the late 20th century. It agrees with very much of what has been 
said in an enormous volume of papers and books written by those who are coming to 
grips with the constant process of Nature. Elements of process are emerging in modern 
'scientific thought. Community ecology is a good example (e.g. Pomeroy et al 1988; 
6This word means 'foreigner' but tends to refer to Europeans. 
7People of mixed racial descent where one of those races is Fijian. Predominantly 
referring to part Fijianl pmt European. 
8This is the Fijian (Bauan) word for Fijian. 
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Agnew et al 1993; Pickett and White 1985; Veblen and Ashton 1978; Veblen and 
Stewart 1980, Whitmore 1982; Burrows 1990). But a few significant problems still 
remain, because this rationality, arising from a lengthy scientific tradition of dealing 
with the puzzles of ecosystems, is on the periphery of Western cultural thinking rather 
than a dominant cultural feature. Secondly, traces of stasis and reductionism remain even 
in modern ecology, which prevents many ecologists from letting go of their tight cultural 
and psychological grip on an imaginary solid state. Emergent features of systems are the 
rule, not the exception. 
The difference is, that those who are attempting to ground their observations of process 
in some fmID of materialistic, mechanistic or stoic holism (Le. seeking to find a logical 
ground for their discoveries), meet me coming in the other direction. It is this 
mechanistic and materialistic systems theory that I stalted from three years ago. Through 
relentless questioning I ran my theories through the "heavily soiled" wash cycle, thus 
cleansing them of what traces of political domination that clung to them. As a result, 
hopefully no total ising discourse is now able to stain my theoretical garments. 
But why might a total ising discourse be so poorly suited to ecology? It is because each 
landscape is unique. This is true for all species. A Fiji kauri tree growing in the Wabu 
catchment is not the same as a Fiji kauri growing in the Vunivia catchment. They are 
ecologically different due to the differences in their ecological surroundings, and because 
they are not autonomous beings. They are beings in Being, and because of this, their 
relationship with their ecological surroundings is dialectical, and context dependant. 
This also applies to human functional species. Each place is different and each human 
community that may engage in a relationship with that landscape will do it in different 
ways. This is not to say that similar types of ecological processes may not occur in 
many different places they do, which is why I do not reject 20th century ecological 
theory. Instead I take it a little further in the opposite direction to certainty and 
verifiability, towards a perspectivistic, contextual, and localised theoretical domain. 
I will not go into the finer details of demonstrating the coherence of an entire discipline 
of postmodern ecological theory. That would require another thesis. For the same reason 
I refrain from showing how quantum physics is able to lend credence to this 
epistemological formula. Space does not allow such excursions into every corner of this 
story. I give you instead its core. It is not a single theory, but a form of thinking which 
can be applied to many different subjects. The work of Waddington (1977), Prigogine 
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and Stengers (1984), Lorenz (1987), Sheldrake (1981, 1991), Best (1991), Griffin 
(1988a, 1988b) are examples of this tradition beginning to emerge in the biological 
literature. Bohr, Bohm, Capra, Zohar, Zukav are examples from the quantum physics 
domain. However, there is also much literature outside the traditional realm of 'science' 
that helps to support these views. The artificial boundaries established by modern 
science are not usually adhered to by postmodern thinkers (or those who are in much 
agreement with a postmodern or post-metaphysical approach). As such, one will not 
neceSSaIY find a specific segment of this literature that comments solely on 'biology' or 
'ecology'. For example, Goethe's plays are unlikely to be given out as standard texts in 
a modern university course on evolution, and yet I think that they are extremely relevant 
to this topic (see Gearey 1992 for example). 
In other words, going out in search of a postmodern literature relating specifically to a 
particular modern discipline is likely to lead to failure. Instead you will find holistic 
thinkers that bring many different 'disciplines' together as a matter of course. 
Furthermore, this form of thinking does not always fit into the imaginaIY modern 
categOlY of 'non-fiction' as many thinkers have long dissolved the non-existent boundary 
between 'fact' and 'fiction'. Instead what you get are naITatives. A good example might 
be the book 'Songlines' by Bruce Chatwin (1987). There you will find a narrative on 
naITatives. Chatwin explores the Aborigine songlines as a linguistic mediator between 
culture and landscape and exposes a bioregional naITative in operation. I believe that it 
is a stOlY that reveals more about ecological sustainability than any text book on modern 
ecology I have seen. 
Before revisiting the new taxonomy of Homo I will return to the political and linguistic 
component. This will lead back into the question of ecological sustainability in teITnS 
of the ecological character of different politico-linguistic systems. 
9.4 MANAGEMENT OR DISCOURSE? 
Cosmetic changes to a culture are made through 'management' which, although 
frequently undertaken with benign intentions, can actually serve to perpetuate an 
unsustainable economy and culture. Such a critical view of environmental management 
is similar to the neo-Marxist critique of the capitalist welfare state. The welfare state 
arose as a reaction to the Great Depression and was designed to protect capitalism from 
collapse (see Galbraith 1987). Such economic management does not solve the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism (such as value in exchange having precedence over value 
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in use). Instead it serves to manage an unsustainable economic system so that it survives 
in spite of its innate injustices (Levins and Lewontin 1985). This view does not imply 
that industrial socialism is any better. Indeed under the latter economic framework (if 
it is ever practised) most individuals in a culture simply get to share equally in the 
unsustainable exploitation of ecosystems (Bahro 1984). 
A similar critique of environmental management is necessary in order to reveal what in 
management is merely patching up symptoms and leaving the causes unscathed. This is 
precisely what I have done in the preceding chapters, and in the process shown that 
patching up the symptoms of an innately unsustainable meta-cultural (meta-linguistic) 
system will not deliver ecological sustainability. Instead of management it becomes 
obvious that a cultural transformation is the only way that ecological sustain ability can 
be achieved. And not just any transformation - a major linguistic turn. A turn in the 
relation between language, knowledge, truth, and myth. In the previous three chapters 
I have shown why such a turn is necessalY, in this chapter I hope to show how it can 
be done. 
A major touch-stone of culture lies in the language game. Another is the landscape. A 
third is perception of the world beyond the rules of language. A language game can 
negate the latter two if it has a deluded over-confidence in the capacity of the rules of 
language to disclose the 'truth' of reality. This is what has happened in Western culture 
since that wrong turn was taken by ancient Greek thinkers such as Anaxagorous, 
Pannenides, Democritus, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (Whitehead 1929, 1930). And yet, 
even back then Western culture had a conceptual alternative that could have saved it 
from the cultural malign that has (so far) brought it through centuries of totalitarianism 
of various forms, which are still alive and well in modern Fiji. 
There are two major themes of change necessary for ecological sustainability to become 
manifest in cultural life in Fiji. The first is the establishment and operation of an 
ecologically sustainable culture in Fiji, the second is the same condition in the global 
situation. The necessity of the former is fairly self-evident, but the latter may need 
explanation. Imagine an ecologically sustainable culture functioning happily in a part of 
Fiji for a number of centuries. Such a culture achieves a bioregional narrative and allows 
the landscape to recite its autobiography through them. Indeed, this situation was 
probably achieved in many parts of Fiji in the past. Now, I do not suggest that a 
condition of ecological sustainability has been achieved in this situation - only an 
ecologically sustainable culture, and there is an important difference. For ecological 
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sustainability to come about there needs to be an ecologically sustainable culture and 
the ability of that culture to continue to be. This necessitates the removal of external 
obstructions to the on-going ecological sustainability of that culture. In Fiji external 
influences are very real, and very unsustainable. 
A cultural invasion by an unsustainable, expansionist, hegemonic politico-linguistic 
system will extinguish an ecologically sustainable condition. This has happened in Fiji 
with the arrival of capitalism, but is also likely to have happened with the expansion of 
totalitarian tribal chiefdoms in premodern Fiji. These invasions from outside thwart the 
possibility of an ecologically sustainable condition in the landscape, but through no fault 
of the local culture. The eco-cultural halmony achieved in the local situation prior to the 
invasion was not sustained, it did not continue to be. It is for this reason that ecological 
sustainability will only be achieved in Fiji if, and only if, such unsustainable, 
expansionist, totalitarian cultural systems also cease to be. 
'Sustainability' means an ability to be sustained, to continue to be, to endure without 
yielding, and to continue to do so in perpetuity. Ecological sustainability is not real if 
it lasts only for ten years. That is a contradiction in terms, inane, meaningless. A person 
who suggests that ecological sustainability can be achieved for limited periods has failed 
to comprehend the meaning of 'ecological sustainability' and have trivialised it to the 
point of absurdity. A front page newspaper article of the same ·calibre of meaning might 
read:- "Yesterday, the Fiji Government declared, in a cabinet decision, that the nation 
achieved ecological sustainability between 6.15am and 6.25am on the morning of August 
23, 1994". Totally meaningless. It would be like holding your breath underwater for 
36.02 seconds and then declaring that you are now a fish. 
This thesis has achieved two major things:-
1. It demonstrated that a major source of unsustainability lies in modernity, and 
similar cultural systems that reify the rules of their language game as a sure path 
to ontological truth. This leads to unauthenticity, and unsustainability. It 
deconstructed this meta-cultural (meta-linguistic) system to demonstrate how 
such a culture could be dismantled. This was achieved by exposing the gaping 
holes in the ontological claims of its self-referencing tautologies (which it calls 
philosophy), which legitimates totalizing epistemologies, and consequent 
totalitarian politico-linguistic systems. Such a linguistic system left a substantial 
domain of reality out of the picture viz. that which lies beyond the reach of 
language. FUlthermore, it was demonstrated that much of the information we 
gain from the world around us is apprehended from outside language and should 
be regarded as legitimate. 
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2. A creative alternative was reconstructed which did not harbour the same 
conceited overconfidence in the rules of language, but rather embraced its 
limitations as a tool. The basis of a contextualised linguistic system was shown 
to be capable of being constantly recreated by regularly passing through the 
silence of linguistic nihilism, thus constantly creating language anew. Such a 
linguistic system allows the constant flux of Nature to be explicitly recognised 
by a culture and brought into language. This provides a source of ethical 
instruction mediated by myth and ritual, where the coherence of culture lies not 
in the rules of language but in Nature. Hence the bioregional narrative. 
As mentioned above, at least two tasks are necessary for ecological sustainability to 
come into being. This first is to establish an ecologically sustainable cultural system 
through the bioregional narrative. The second is to dismantle unsustainable cultural 
systems that will obstruct the achievement of an ecologically sustainable condition from 
actually being achieved. Both tasks involve a very challenging political process. I will 
show below that both tasks can only be achieved if the political style is essentially the 
same for both. However, I will acknowledge that the chances of both of these situations 
actually coming into being are very remote indeed. The reason for this stems from the 
nature of language itself, which all cultures have. 
The achievement of an ecologically sustainable culture through a bioregional narrative 
is possible and has been achieved many times. However, because all cultures have 
language, which is used to 'create' a world for people (by 'world' I mean a subjective 
cognitive experience), there has been, and always will be, the possibility of oppressive 
cultural systems that will tend to obstruct their own ecological sustainability and that of 
other cultural groups. This is because language, any language, is able to foster the 
linguistic illusion of the autonomous self - the ego-self (as explained in chapter 8). A 
culture that tolerates such an illusion will also come to tolerate the political 
consequences of this linguistic condition. Egotism, which makes selfishness possible, 
also provides the seed for oppressive alienating actions that break the chain of agape, 
as the ego-self cannot let go of eros (desiring, graphing, wanting). Once the chain of 
agape is broken, the condition is no longer ecologically sustainable as it has become 
unauthentic - in contradiction to the way of Nature, which is what agape is. As a result, 
synagapeosis becomes impossible. In such a system the source of coherence for actions 
and ethical instruction no longer lie in Nature (through being true to your nature in 
Nature), but in language only. Because of this it is unauthentic. 
Such an eco-cultural condition of egotism, which makes expansionist and hegemonic 
political systems possible, does not need to be legitimated by a sophisticated system of 
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coherent fables to continue to be. Many tribal cultures did exist and still do exist in this 
form of unsustainability (as an unsustainable culture). It does not differ in type from the 
tinauthenticity that underlies a stoic culture, such as modernity. The only difference is 
that modernity, and its stoic predecessors in Western culture, invented a sophisticated 
system of logical fables (Le. narratives) which substantiated and legitimated such 
egotism (unauthenticity). In other words, unauthentic cultures, even if they think that 
they are civilised, are still barbarians in an ecological sense. Stoic cultures (which 
legitimate egotism with philosophy), and unauthentic tribal cultures (which do not bother 
to logically defend their immodesty), are tarred with the same brush. They contradict 
and damage Nature in the same way - through the ego. 
The only difference between egotistical tribal cultures and egotistical stoic cultures is 
that in the latter case, the technologies it produces as a by-product of logical scholarship, 
allow it to damage Nature (and each other) at a much greater scale. Should an egotistical 
tribal culture be given access to such technologies they are likely to do the same degree 
of damage - as the hegemonic Fijian tribes did with guns in the 19th century and 
continue to do so in this century (cf. the coups of 1987). A non-egotistical (authentic) 
tribal culture will be capable of using technology responsibly. For this reason technology 
(as a tool) is not itself a liability to the landscape, it is the culture of the hand that holds 
it (see Heidegger 1977). I believe that Fiji supported tribal cultures of the authentic and 
unauthentic types even though the Fijian language game in general was of the Homo-
Heraclitia form. The Homo-Heraclitia form only begins to make ecological 
sustainability possible. The unauthentic Fijian cultures were the egotistical hegemonic 
ones. The authentic were the non-expansionist ones. 
And here we are able to clarify our eco-cultural taxonomy introduced earlier. The eco-
cultural genus Homo-Parmenidia positively obstructs ecological sustainability at the 
generic level because its language game is grounded in a steady state condition. Homo-
Heraclitia (which supports a process rationality) makes ecological sustainability possible. 
However, some species within the Homo-Heraclitia genus will still remain unsustainable 
even though they sustain a process rationality. This will happen if they do not control 
the ego-self. As such, Homo-Heraclitia egoensis (an egotistical process species) is 
unsustainable. On the other hand, Homo-Heraclitia agapensis is non-egotistical and will 
be ecologically sustainable as an eco-culture. I believe that Fiji had both of these species 
in pre-modern times, I also believe that the West has these species, and had them in the 
past. 
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As such, no person can authentically claim that all pre-modem Fijians were expressing 
an ecologically sustainable cultural system, or that pre-modem Fijian culture is a model 
for ecological sustainability. Some forms of pre-modern Fijian culture were definitely 
not sustainable, some probably were. It is for this reason that it would be foolish to pick 
a pre-modem Fijian cultural system (such as Bau) and use it as a model for ecological 
sustainability. To do so would serve to cover over, yet again, the meaning of ecological 
sustainability, of authenticity, of mana in relation to the Vanua. 
In acknowledging that all linguistic systems are capable of fostering the illusion of the 
autonomous ego-self, I must also acknowledge that the likelihood of the ego-self 
disappearing from humanity completely is probably out of the question. This being the 
case, the condition of ecological sustainability becomes essentially out of Nature's 
reach9. But ecologically sustainable cultures are not out of reach, only, they are likely 
to get disrupted every now and then by egocentric cultures that develop. This is perhaps 
the best we can hope for. 
9.5 THE QUESTION 
I hope to have shown, through the course of this thesis, that ecological sustainability is 
not something we can define in a positive sense. We cannot hold it conceptually as there 
is nothing for us to hold. Because of this the best we can do is try to define what 
ecological sustainability isn't. This is because its ultimate meaning cannot be uttered. 
This is rather like sculpture, where the essent of the being is revealed as things are 
removed. Part of this process of conceptual sculpture involves questioning; relentless 
questioning so that we can arrive at a point at which an authentic question can be put. 
The answer lies underneath. And yet the answer still can never be uttered. But like the 
sculpture we are able to see it. 
In developing the above taxonomy in relation to the ecology of linguistic systems this 
nmTative has. reached a point at which the meaning of ecological sustainability is very 
close at hand. The best we can hope for is to begin to define what is necessary for 
ecological sustainability to be possible. 
9The extinction of the illusion of the autonomous ego-self is needed. This may 
happen and is celtainly possible (see Wilber 1981). 
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The question is:-
Is ecological sustainability able to be achieved in relation to the forests of Fiji? 
To frame this question authentically I would need to ask:-
A. Is culture in Fiji able to achieve a bioregional narrative that allows the 
landscape to recite its autobiography? and; 
B. Does a global eco-cultural condition exist that will allow this condition 
to be sustained? 
To add to its authenticity I must now ask in relation to A.:-
Are people (of any race) in Fiji living in or able to move into a politico-
linguistic framework consistent with the ecological species Homo-
Heraclitia agapensis? 
I believe that the answer is 'yes', but it would require a substantial cultural 
transformation in Fiji in order to achieve such an eco-cultural condition. This would 
involve a rediscovery of Fijianness for people who identify with this cultural system or 
the establishment of a new form of Fijianness for those of different cultural descent. 
In relation to B. a fUlther question must be added:-
Are cultures outside Fiji able to move into a politico-linguistic framework 
consistent with the ecological species Homo-Heraclitia agapensis? 
I believe that the answer is:- 'yes it is possible, but it is unlikely to happen in the shOit 
term'. 
I conclude that ecologically sustainable cultures are possible, but that ecological 
sustainability in general (which requires that all cultures achieve this) is possible but 
may take a very long time (hundreds, perhaps thousands of years). I also believe that 
the latter condition will only become possible when all members of all human cultures 
achieve the equivalent of enlightenment - an existential condition within the field of the 
Will to Be, where all relationships are mediated by an undercurrent of agape, as a 
collective realisation of the dharmakaya. I also think that this is what is meant by 
'paradise' in Christianity, and 'nirvana' in Buddhism. It is certainly worth aiming for as 
a form of cultural and spiritual destiny. It stands as an turning point in the evolution of 
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the human consciousness, which is perhaps inevitable provided humanity is able to 
survive for long enough for it to come about. Wilber (1983) sees humanity as cunently 
caught in" the tragic 'middle ground' between the beasts and the gods. This is our place 
in the evolution of our consciousness, which has advanced from the pre-conceptual 
phase of life in blissful ignorance, to our current condition of ego-consciousness and the 
knowledge systems that this makes possible. There are many joys and many anxieties 
in this tragic paradox. 
But the evolution of this consciousness, according to Wilber, will lead us to another 
phase at which we are all capable of leaving the ego-self behind as a distant and 
perplexing memory. Some cultures have constructed massive obstructions to this 
possibility, while others have kept the way clear. The latter are the ones we need to 
respect and learn from. Such wisdom is being nUltured in genuinely indigenous cultures, 
esoteric (gnostic) religions, and in the mystical spirit of the modern arts. Goethe's Faust 
may stand along side Meister Eckhart, those Australian Aboriginals still singing the 
Song lines, the Fijians who still understand the meaning of the Vanua, beside Cezanne 
and his paintings, William Blake, Walt Whitman and Thoreau. And we, as onlookers, 
will be able to recognise the method in their madness, and perhaps be inspired to 
awaken to the underlying poetry in ourselves. 
9.6 ECO-POLITICS 
I believe that no goal can justify an unjust means of achieving it. The goal is not an end 
at all but a new beginning. If this new beginning is stained by injustices calTied over 
from a previous phase in history, those injustices are still there and will remain as long 
as they are defended in the new order. 
Totalitarianism of all forms must be broken, even in its most meagre and subtle forms. 
If not, the seeds of oppression remain in the language game and the culture. Postmodern 
discourses argue for an explicit recognition of difference and contextual ism in the very 
axioms of the linguistic equation. This helps a discourse, language game (and hence 
culture) steer away from universalistic and totalizing tendencies which themselves (in 
spite of the best intentions of its practitioners) lead us straight back into the problems 
we started with. 
I do not suggest that all aspects of a modernist discourse should be thrown out with the 
bath-water of universalism and the primacy of reason. On the contrary, many modernist 
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discourses are bringing Western culture to the beginning of an understanding of the 
structure of oppression and domination. I for one was a former convert to a number of 
modernist discourses as I charted my course through the literature. During this thesis I 
went from a non-critical social perspective, to Marxism (because of Marx's dialectics 
and critique of capitalism), then ecological economics, then hermeneutics, followed by 
critical theory and critical social science (neo-Marxist). Phenomenology and 
existentialism were always quietly there in the background which helped to give words 
to my thoughts. At each point along this path I was astounded at the ability of these 
reflexive sociological frameworks to disclose more to me about the nature of oppression 
(an oppression also extended to the landscape) in modern society than I had ever before 
imagined. 
However, I was also reading Heidegger during this time but could not understand him. 
Feminism (particularly eco-feminism) was also a major influence. Once I began to 
explore postmodern theory and postmodern philosophy (much of which was influenced 
by Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein) I started to find the beginnings of what 
made the most sense to me. The deeply rooted cultural aspects of alienation grounded 
in the language game were beginning to come clearer, particularly with the help of 
feminist theory. Ecofeminism showed me how oppression in relation to gender, through 
the creation of an 'other' in women, was also a major source of oppression in relation 
to every thing else, including the rest of Nature. Removing the source of this alienation, 
and dissolving all 'otherness' is a way out of both human and non-human violence. Asian 
philosophy, which had always been an undercurrent to my thought, had been loudly 
telling me this since my first exposure to process rationality in Buddhism in high school. 
Reading Capra (1982) early on in the thesis led me to realise that such a radical critique 
of the West was possible and supremely important to my quest. However, whereas 
Capra (1982) placed an emphasis on the use of Asian viewfinders for conducting such 
a critique (e.g. Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism), I felt the need to frame a similar 
critique of the West explicitly from within a tradition of Western thinkers, which is 
what I have done. This served to demonstrate that the West has always had a rich 
heritage of ecological wisdom (very similar to Eastern and tribal examples), only it had 
been covered over. 
I had always been uncomfortable with the modernist viewpoint due to its inability to 
sufficiently dissolve the humanity/Nature dualism. I needed to be able to talk 
simultaneously about social life and ecology without having to keep changing 
epistemologies. I was also dubious about the question of truth and the way modernist 
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discourses claimed to know what it was. Wittgenstein then explained what I had always 
believed concerning the limitations of language and its relation to truth. I then began to 
read Nietzsche who introduced me to the ancient Greeks (particularly the dialectical 
world view of tragedy as depicted in Greek drama) and led me to Goethe and 
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer helped me to understand why I could never agree with 
Kant, and also why I did agree with many Asian thinkers. 
All of this helped me to begin to understand what Heidegger had been saying all along 
(or at least in his later works). Heidegger and Schopenhauer, who were comfortable with 
mysticism, led me to Eckhrut. Eckhart helped me understand Dogen, which gave me a 
fuller understanding of Goethe and Thoreau. And Thoreau is where I started from when 
I was a teenager when I first read Walden, and he is still there now. Thoreau (and 
Watts, who was also there at that time) gave me the initial inspiration to do what I am 
now doing. I understood Thoreau then and understand him now, only in a much broader 
fashion. This grand hermeneutical process began with Walden, and has taken me back 
to Walden. The difference is that now I am able to line my story with my own 
experiences of my own 'Walden Pond' - Vunivia. 
I trace this genealogy for you to expose exactly where I am coming from. It may also 
help to show how and why I went where I did. It will also show how and why the 
following pages are to be lined with a quite radical political discourse, and you will 
know where it comes from. 
We have two politico-linguistic tasks if ecological sustain ability is desired. They are 1. 
the establishment of a bioregional narrative, and 2. the rescuing of modernity (and any 
other normative politico-linguistic system) from unauthenticity. The question remains 
as to whether a method exists that is capable of fostering either process. I believe that 
there is and that it has all been said before. In this way, what I am doing is not 
discovering anything new, only helping to reveal that which has been covered over. I 
also believe that the political and epistemological style of one will also be able to be 
used for the other. I will begin by exploring how a bioregional narrative might be able 
to come about from a modern starting point in general. Following this I will look at how 
it could happen in Fiji. 
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9.7 OVERCOMING MODERNITY. 
One thing that tends to unite a number of postmodern frameworks is the agreement that 
modernity can only be overcome by running its full course thus completing itself. In the 
process it will discover the circular nature of its various story lines and see that these 
story lines are not grounded in the bedrock it claims to have found in reason. This 
process has already begun. Nietzsche was a major turning point in relation to 
metaphysics, where he showed that nihilism was philosophy's greatest achievement. This 
nihilism serves to cast out the" foundations of totalizing political discourses that 
legitimate forms of oppreSsion with philosophy. This is because such oppression can 
only be legitimated by a coherent moral discourse which employs the rules of language 
as its touch-stone for truth and virtue. But as I showed in chapters 6, 7, and 8 such 
moral discourses are indeed logical, but still have no basis outside language itself. 
Because of this the totalizing discourses that legitimate alienating ethical, social, political 
and scientific practices are without basis. This does not mean the they are necessarily 
wrong, but it shows how they cannot claim to be necessarily right by viItue of being 
logical. This being the case the way lies open for their refutation in the absence of this 
rock-solid foundation. 
There are many discourses that do refute various universalist practices, but the basis for 
such refutation is not logic. They tend to be grounded in non-logical discourses inspired 
by personal experiences, contemplations, and meditations of various forms. I do not 
suggest that they are necessarily germane or authentic simply because they are not 
logical. In this sense, I do not argue in favour of bestowing a position of privilege on 
illogical story lines. I only contend that they cannot be ruled out of court and must be 
listened to in social and political frameworks. This leads to the notion of a transpersonal 
democracy similar to the transpersonal ecology developed by Fox (1990). 
Democracy implies a form of egalitarianism - the spirit or practice of political, legal or 
social equality. In a radical modernist democracy scientific forms of knowledge are 
brought down from their privileged position, and must engage in uncoerced discourse 
with non-scientific forms of knowledge. In a transpersonal democracy, knowledge itse1f 
must step down also. As Wittgenstein said - that which we cannot speak about we must 
pass over in silence. This silence must be brought into political discourse. But how? The 
silence refers to that which lies beyond the reach of language. It can be spoken about 
in metaphor, this is what myth is. Myths must be brought back into political debate. 
They must not be taken literally, but a culture needs them if the landscape is to be 
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allowed into the debating chamber. 
EmancipatOlY movements cannot claim to be representative by proxy. Freire (1972) 
showed us that even the oppressed must be emancipated from those that claim to 
represent them. If this does not happen the oppressed will remain oppressed. If the 
landscape is to be brought back into politics in an uncoerced fashion it must be able to 
'speak for itself. This is not as far fetched as it first sounds. In the previous chapter I 
showed that if a bioregional narrative is happening the landscape is able to recite its 
autobiography through the language of poetic, artistic metaphor, myth and ritual. It is 
the landscape speaking through people just as it speaks through birds in their song. The 
'landscape' includes people, their feelings, intuitions - that which lies outside language 
and its rules. Even in modern cultures there are people who can and do listen to the 
'landscape' in this way. Only their stories are passed off as illegitimate in the modernist 
framework illegitimate because they are not logical. But if it is logical then it is 
unlikely to be the landscape talking. 
I believe that the modernist framework of critical social science and critical systems 
theOlY does provide a valuable template for the structural dimension of our politico-
linguistic system. As described in chapter 5, critical social science is a prescription for 
a democratic praxis. It is a discourse designed to assist oppressed groups to bring about 
their own emancipation through an on-going process of action and reflection. This 
framework is well suited to the task of bringing about changes in modem culture, as it 
was developed within this context. It is a radical democracy, but without the illogical 
linguistic aspect that allows the landscape to speak, it is not radical enough. 
Furthermore, if the landscape is able to speak, then a discourse is able to move beyond 
democracy, where a culture engages in a conversation with the landscape as a matter of 
course. The political discussion is not between people but with Nature. This, however, 
can only come about following a process of change that makes such a transcendence of 
democracy possible. In the mean time democracy must be taken to its limits (see Mouffe 
1988). 
The details of the structure of this political process were summarised in chapter 5 but 
I repeat them here to place them into context. There are three principle functions in 
which each step leads to the next:-
1. The formation of critical theories which stand up to open discourse -
statements arising from open discourse and consensus. This must begin 
with exercising a hermeneutic of respect in relation to all perspectives 
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engaging in such discourse. 
2. The organisation of understanding (knowledge and wisdom) which 
transforms the consciousness of participants - authentic insights. This can 
be brought about by exercising a hermeneutic of suspicion in relation to 
the consciousness of the participants. The process must thereby be 
reflexive and phenomenological. This is the learning process of a group 
and is a social and political activity. Participants must aim at self 
reflection as part of the process of understanding their social condition 
and relationships with other members of the landscape. Each person 
should have an equal opportunity to question or affirm the validity of 
what is discussed. The process is more impOltant than the result. The end 
loses its supremacy and the means becomes all impOltant. 
The style of this learning process as promoted by Habermas appears to 
have much in common with the Maori hui or the Fijian bose. Where it 
differs from these tribal frameworks is that the latter are explicitly 
mythical whereas Habermas' project is not. Cheney (1989a) conectly 
pointed out that some tribal cultures have achieved what a postmodern 
framework points to. 
3. The selection of appropriate strategies for social change - prudent 
decisions. The solutions to tactical questions are developed, rituals 
designed or reaffirmed, ethical instructions are brought into the discourse 
(Carr and Kemmis 1986). 
This outlook is similar to the framework underlying the critical systems theory of Flood 
and Ulrich (1990) but I add a post-metaphysical dimension in a similar fashion to 
Morrison (1994). 
An important addition to this prescription is the need for participants to have the 
opportunity to engage in a process of self-realisation which is conducted personally and 
outside the political framework. Here the 'conversation' in this post-metaphysical 
pedagogy extends outward to the landscape. The psychological dimensions of this 
fOlmula, I believe, should be transpersonal, in line with the transpersonal psychology of 
Campbell, and the analytical psychology of Jung, and Neumann, as opposed to the 
Freudian undercurrent of Habermas's work. 
In the formula I present, the organisation of understanding in particular differs from the 
critical social science framework due to my emphasis on ritual as a mediator in the 
process of coming to apprehend the source of one's psychological and social condition. 
For Habermas (who is a Freudian) there is no basis in notions such as the Jungian 
'collective unconscious' and the spiritual possibility of the Sself. For Freud, our 
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psychological condition was able to be explained solely according to sexuality, and 
spirituality was merely the games played by the super-ego (see Wilber 1983). But for 
Jung sexuality was part of the equation, but not all of it, and the divine was certainly 
beyond the individual. In transpersonal psychology, as it is with Jung, Neumann, 
Maslow, Sutich, and Campbell, our psychological condition is a reflection of our 
position in the process of self realisation in relation to our transpersonal surroundings 
including the landscape. There are sexually orientated aspects of the psyche, but the 
sexual undercurrent is able to be transcended towards spiritual relationships with other 
people and the landscape. 
This is confirmed in Hindu cosmology, for example, in relation to psychological aspects 
of the process of self realisation, symbolised in the form of chakras or lotus points on 
the body. The first of the seven chakras is the muladhara (basic survival), second is the 
svadhishthana (sexual urges), the third (manipura) is that of empowerment. These three 
are the lowest of the seven chakras and need to be transcended through self realisation 
according to a form of virtue (dharma) that allows the individual to move through the 
remaining four chakras, the last three of which symbolise the highest of spiritual 
realisations for Hinduism (see Wilber 1983; Campbell 1986; Ross 1993). Such views 
encompassing the spiritual dimensions of psychology are also explored by Sheldrake 
(1981, 1991) who looked into cultural ecology in relation to his theory of an aspect of 
evolution by means of formative causation and morphogenetic fields. 
I contend that these non-material, non-individualistic aspects of personal self attainment 
need to be brought into the equation of what amounts to a transpersonal democracy. I 
demonstrated the need for a soteriological dimension in chapter 8 above. This 
psychological and spiritual dimension does not need to be undertaken in the actual 
process of interpersonal human political discourse, but instead needs to happen along 
side this. The process of uncoerced political discussion, however, is able to facilitate this 
aspect of cultural development by allowing such discourses (that refer to self realisation) 
to be regarded as legitimate and useful. As such, political decisions are then able to take 
into account this psychological and soteriological part of culture, and as a result, provide 
resources for such activity. This might include the organisation of calendar events such 
as rituals, where these rituals are not branded as merely entertainment. Such rituals 
become essential to the authentic functioning of the community. Seasonal festivals are 
a good example. 
However, an insufficiently egalitarian democratic system that argues that the content of 
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legitimate debate must be rational (as is the case with modern discourses), will not be 
capable of supporting such activities. To do this they will either have to bend their own 
rules or find a logical form of legitimation for what is a necessarily illogical cultural 
practice. Modernity must be overcome, not merely completed. The way it can be 
overcome is for emancipatOlY movements to recognise the legitimacy of illogical stories 
and illogical practices. The result is the establishment of a democratic politico-linguistic 
system in both style and content. Only then can it claim to be truly egalitarian. 
This forms the basis for cultural change in modern cultures that can free us from 
modernity. It can only be undertaken by those who have no vested interest in the 
cultural status quo. The group that are most likely to be of this condition are the 
oppressed, and those who sympathize with them. It is for this reason that I believe a 
post-metaphysical feminist approach provides an appropriate viewfinder when in search 
of the touch-stone of oppression and alienation. Patriarchy is a by-product of such 
alienation made possible by totalizing politico-linguistic systems. So is environmental 
degradation. They are indicators of unauthentic cultural systems (see Radford-Reuther 
1989; Merchant 1980, 1990; Salleh 1990, 1993 for example). 
Those who sustain privileges made possible by a totalizing politico-linguistic system, 
are unlikely candidates for exposing a path to emancipation from such sttuctures. This 
is because they will tend to defend their privileges, and in the process defend the 
oppressive structures that sustain their position. This is what often happens in 
environmental management. Environmental managers who wish to sustain their 
privileges in an innately oppressive society will not be capable of fostering the degree 
of cultural change necessary for ecological sustainability to come about. Instead 
'pragmatic' incremental changes are suppolted in tight and tidy bureaucracies where 
allegiance is to the Act and the minister, and not to Nature. In the process the 
environment is managed in order to clean up our culturally generated mess. The 
symptoms of unauthentic cultural deeds are thus hidden from the general population and 
the impetus for a realisation of the need for change is continually washed clean. It is for 
this reason that so many different counter-cultural mystical traditions argue that the 
place to find the highest virtue is amongst the 'poor'. I tend to agree. 
In my attacks on management I do not suggest that we simply sit down and let the 
planet be totally wrecked by unmitigated industrialism. But I do not think for a moment 
that stopping the forests of the Vunivia catchment from being felled will is sufficient for 
ecological sustainability. It can only buy us time, but that is about alL It might help to 
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point out to other people in a culture of the need for conservation efforts. But the 
process must lead to cultural change. If it stops short of this then we are only helping 
the capitalists of the future have nice resources to log at their leisure. Any modern 
protected area is protected only by the strength of law. Laws can change with the stroke 
of a pen and the waving of a few hands in even the best liberalist 'democracy'. 
Stopping current destructive practices is not what I mean by management. By 
management I refer to the invention of models of how the world should be and then 
forcing it to fit the model. The actions of people attempting to stop the violence of the 
world is not of this same type. These actions are often grounded in a totally different 
ethical and linguistic domain. Such actions can be, and often are, driven by ethical 
instructions (moral intuition) coming from outside the rules of language. People are 
driven by their intuitions to think "this is very wrong" (see Naess 1984). Also there is 
no need to stretch the imagination very far to find logical reasons for not destroying 
forest ecosystems. Such reasons range from the need to protect a variety of resources, 
to the desire to maintain the habitat of a particular species of endangered animal or 
plant. But this is not the 'management' I refer to when I accuse 'management' of being 
another form of stoicism. It is mitigation, not control. But there is still a danger that 
such mitigation of environmental (and/or social) violence can lead to complacency, 
because the causes of environmental devastation that lie in totalitarian discourses may 
remain unscathed. 
I believe that environmental mitigation is legitimate if, and only if, it is matched by an 
equivalent effort put into cultural self reflection which can help a culture discover the 
ecological and social flaws in its foundations. These are the flaws which give rise to the 
environmental degradation and social oppression in the first place. All forms of 
environmental mitigation must be seen as indicative of cultural failure vis-a-vis its 
relationship with its landscape. The landscape is not only the concern or the 
responsibility of the 'environment sector'. It engages in a relationship with all aspects of 
human culture, from tying your shoe-laces to building a house. Environmental mitigation 
can only be seen as a pathetic last-ditch effort to protect remaining unadulterated 
ecosystems from immanent destruction and to give people a little longer to re-discover 
their accountability to Nature. Such a process of cultural self reflection, in parallel with 
personal self reflection, can be fostered through a postmodern transpersonal democracy 
described above. This will not guarantee anything, but it will, at least not obstruct the 
kind of discourse needed, if ecological sustainability is to become remotely possible. 
You cannot force anyone or anything to be free you can only clear away obstructions 
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to freedom. 
If a process of cultural change were to succeed through the employment of a sufficiently 
egalitarian democracy, the democracy itself must not be discarded. It must remain as 
part of the on-going task of keeping a culture politically honest, of allowing uncoerced 
discourse to continue. In this way the means and the end are one and the same thing, 
as the structures employed as a means are also those that are capable of sustaining the 
'end'. They take their torch from the same fire. But in reality, of course, there is no real 
end, only the constant possibility of ever-new beginnings. As Thoreau said: "healthy 
natures remember that the sun rose clear" - it is new every day. And furthermore we 
need to be capable of "anticipat[ing], not the sunrise and the dawn merely, but Nature 
[it]self!" (Thoreau 1980: 11, 16). 
9.8 BIOREGIONAL NARRATIVES IN FIJI 
A bioregional narrative in Fiji, by definition, must be contextually tied to the Fiji 
landscape. A bioregional narrative operating in the Andes will not successfully apply to 
the Vunivia catchment The Vunivia narrative must grow from the landscape in situ. 
Before continuing, I wish to point out that much can be learnt, by any cultural group, 
from the many centuries of human experience of the Fiji landscape which the pre-
modern Fijian culture had attained. I am not suggesting that because the Fijian people 
have been in Fiji for many centuries that they all developed a bioregional nan'ative 
capable of delivering ecological sustainability. People have been in Europe for a long 
time and many have found ways to wreck it for a long time too. However, I do believe 
that many Fijian communities probably did come close and some may have indeed 
achieved this condition. My reason for making such a statement stems from my 
demonstration in previous chapters that the pre-modern Fijian language games were of 
the Homo-Heraclitia (i.e. process orientated) form which is a necessary predicate for a 
bioregional narrative. Furthermore, the Fijian linguistic system and world view was 
mythical, it did not establish a basis for truth in logic or reason, and it was holistic (see 
Ravuvu 1987 a). As to the form of holism it was - I am unsure. It is likely to have been 
of the non-stoic form due to the process undercurrent to the rationality. However, this 
question begs further research and points to where it should be conducted. 
The reason I refrain from suggesting that the holism of pre-modern Fiji was non-stoic 
tout court, is that totalizing political regimes did develop from within that politico~ 
linguistic system. Either, some forms of holism in pre-modern Fiji were an equivalent 
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to the stoic form or, simply the expansionist tendencies of many different chiefdoms 
were driven by little more than the mass egotism of their cOlTupted leaders who did not 
even seek to legitimate their politics in any system of morality. I think that the latter is 
most likely to be the case, as sophisticated systems of linguistic moral legitimation for 
oppressive cultural practices tend to require first the establishment of institutions of 
learning (playing with the lUles of language) where such a practice is able to be 
encouraged. The West venerates such institutions as the very pillars of its culture, 
whereas tribal cultures rightly see little necessity for them. 
It can be seen that the pre-modern Fijian linguistic system does provide an existing 
(although cU1,-entIy altered) framework capable of beginning the process of building a 
bioregional nalTative in that country. This is a very general statement as I have not 
adequately studied the language to be capable of saying much more than this. As such 
it remains a possibility but a very real and tangible one at that.· Other linguistic systems 
are also capable of providing a similar framework. Examples include Hindi, and Chinese 
(either mandarin or cantonese) which, like Fijian have their rational roots in an 
equivalent to Heraclitian soil (see Capra 1975; Watts 1957; Ross 1993). In this wayan 
Indian (Indo-Fijian) can recover the meaning of process in Vedanta and the Bhagavad-
Gita, a Chinese person can rediscover the Tao or the meaning of the Diamond Sutra and 
the Sutra of Hui-Neng. Other Pacific Islanders can recapture the meaning of process in 
their own pre-modern tribal culture. 
European languages, however, have far larger obstructions to achieving a bioregional 
nalTative, due to their development within the Homo-Parmenidia cultural genus. They 
are modern (like much of the extant Fijian, Hindi, and Chinese forms) but they have 
their roots also in Homo-Parmenidia soil due to the long hist011' of the Western 
(Parmenidian) standard of rationality that preceded the evolution of the cunent forms 
of these languages 10. European culture was not all of the Homo-Parmenidia type, 
however, as tribal cultures did exist which did not base their language game on a 
tradition that reaches back to the Greeks. Celtic languages are an example, and there is 
a rich history of the process orientated, mythical, holistic cultural and linguistic systems 
of pre-modern and non-modern Europe. 
Western culture has, since the 15th century, been in an evangelistic stupor bringing the 
JDrhis is probably why Heidegger felt the need to invent his own philosophical 
language in order to avoid confusion. 
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savages of the globe into the fold of 'civilisation' - into stoicism. I have shown that the 
opposite is needed. We need to de-civilize the world if ecological sustainability is to 
become possible, as we need to free cultures from stoicism and its equivalents in 
totalizing politico-linguistic discourses. We, in the West, must let go of our most 
treasured prejudices (which have become fetishes) if ecological sustainability is to 
become remotely possible. Not only must Europeans do this but so too must other 
civilized peoples, cUlTently under the influence of the stoic drug. This includes modern 
Fijians and other no-longer-indigenous peoples. It may be a hard pill to swallow but 
ecological sustainability demands nothing less. 
Europeans can begin this task by uncovering this non-stoic heritage in places such as 
the pre-Socratic thinkers and poets (e.g. Heraclitus), process orientated Christian 
mysticism (e.g. by seeing the Bible as a text of meaningful myth (Williams 1978), 
reinterpreting Thomistic mysticism, Eckhart, and aspects of Byzantine Orthodoxy}, 
apprehending the messages of Goethe, Blake, Wordsworth, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, 
Thoreau, Whitman, Heidegger, and Whiteheadll , or reactivate Western pre-Christian 
process orientated mysticism (see Starhawk 1979; Stone 1979; Spretnak 1989; Ross 
1993). This list is not, of course, exhaustive. It only serves to illustrate the innumerable 
possibilities for establishing a non-stoic, process orientated language game that is able 
to enter into meaningful discourse with pre-modern Fijian culture, and achieve a 
bioregional narrative in its own right. 
Fijians will need to begin to appreciate that the land they calJ 'Viti' can grow many 
IIFeminist readers may wonder why all of these people cited here are men. Yes they 
are men, and this in itself is a message that I hoped would emerge from between the 
lines. There are many men that, in the past and present, have embraced what has been 
called the feminine the creative, the poetic, the mystical, the intuitive, as feminist 
theorist Ross (1993) called for us all to do. I have presented a genealogy of men who 
have contributed greatly to the deconstruction of the dominance of what has been called 
the masculine reason, law, order, control, domination. In this sense this thesis is Palt 
of a feminist story, as it agrees to take up the feminist challenge and dismantle the basis 
of male domination in any society. Not all of the men cited in this thesis have a clean 
slate in relation to androcentricism or even misogyny. Nietzsche is a good example, and 
Heidegger has even been associated with Nazism i.e. he was a member of the Nazi Party 
prior to the Second World War, and some have argued that his philosophy is totalitarian 
to the core (e.g. Kaufman 1992). But an unprejudiced eye will have the serenity to 
recognise the contribution these men have made for social and environmental justice, 
particularly by showing us (men and women) how to deconstruct the massive 
accumulation of stories that men in the past have used to legitimate male domination, 
and environmental degradation. 
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different indigenous cultures. The large number of different languages that Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are able to support in the same landscape are 
examples of such a possibility. Fijian racist nationalism is simply not an option if 
ecological sustainability is at stake. People belong to the land. The opposite is needed 
for any form of nationalism to become sensible. And the land can only belong to people 
if the world view of a culture is totalitarian in some way. This lies at the heart of the 
notion of property and ownership. For something to be owned it must first be alienated 
as an object - made into an 'other'. This is only possible if an autonomous notion of self 
and an atomistic conception of reality is sustained. But, as shown in chapters 7 and 8 
such a view of the self and the atom is (ontologically speaking) an illusion created by 
language. You need an autonomous 'me' before you can have a condition of 'mine'. But 
the 'me' and the 'mine' have no basis apart from being linguistic illusions. The alienated 
object (another linguistic illusion) such as the land, then comes under the linguistic 
control of a dominating autonomous subject (~nother illusion). Back to stoicism. 
The pre-modern Fijian world view (particularly amongst the non-expansionist groups) 
was not tarnished with such notions of ownership - the rationality was incommensurable 
with such an idea. For ownership of the Vanua to be possible the Va/Uta first had to die. 
It has long since died for many Fijians, only they do not yet recognise this. Some do 
realise this but are not being heard. As I keep saying - what remains important is what 
language means - not what it sounds like. And so, like the difference between race and 
culture, there is a difference between sounds (i.e. what language sound like) and 
meanings. And in this regard we must also remember that true mana (integrity, prestige), 
is earned, not merely inherited. 
The different language games of all people in Fiji are capable of transforming into a 
linguistic system that makes an authentic bioregional narrative possible. This can be 
expressed in different cultural formulas, that are each capable of becoming indigenous, 
sustainable, and hence co-existing in harmony with all other beings in that landscape. 
This cannot happen over night but is an on going process of becoming. There is no 
single grand theory to be followed, as the character of the cultures that might be 
recreated as a result of such conversation with the landscape will &~termine itself. 
Sovereignty of the Fijian people can be maintained, but on a far deeper level than 
merely a Western idea of land tenure. The Fijian people will be able to maintain 
sovereignty over their cultural rationality, the meaning of words in their own language, 
and the integrity of their ancestors and future generations. A purely modern form of 
sovereignty in the way of a guarantee to ownership of land is not enough. The land is 
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not a commodity for sale. It is something to belong to. The Australian Aboriginals 
walked about on that landscape for 40,000 years or more, but never did they own it. 
Instead Fijian people will be able to maintain their mana vis-a-vis the landscape which 
itself grew from their relationship with the land. Other cultures can also earn mana in 
their own way in the same landscape. 
In this regard, we must remember that we cannot turn the clock back and send all Indo-
Fijians back to India, the Chinese back to China, the Europeans back to where ever they 
came from, and all other Pacific Islanders back to their homelands. Those wishing to do 
this have missed the point. It may serve those wishing to use the land for commercial 
purposes of personal gain. But it will not guarantee the integrity of the Fijian people or 
give them back any indigenousness to the land they once had. Many of the so called 
'foreigners' now living in Fiji been there for many generations. And for that matter, what 
does this word 'foreign' mean? An unsustainable way of thinking is more foreign than 
having your ancestors born to another land. We are all foreign to some land, but does 
that make us inherently bad? The dilio (Pluvialis dominica fulva) is a migratory bird, 
but is it not indigenous to Fiji? What are now called 'Fijians' were once foreign to the 
land now called Fiji as they did not grow out of the rock and soil but alTived as 
immigrants to a new land, and later as immigrants to a land already occupied by local 
people. 
People of the Fijian race and people of other races must, in their own way, become 
culturally Fijian if ecological sustainability is to happen. To argue that the practicability 
of this programme is unrealistic, is to ignore what is real about the land. And in the 
process of ignoring such a programme of radical cultural transformation, one discards 
the possibility of ecological sustainability. Should this be the case then, many 
environmental managers and environmentalists must admit that what they are advocating 
and implementing in the form of management is not necessarily ecological sustainability. 
Also it must be remembered that sustainability is not the end of history, it is not an ideal 
unchanging state. It is a constant critical means of 'becoming' in a landscape. There is 
no end - only means as process, and thus sustainability must be recreated each moment 
in the very fabric of our lives. 
9.8.1 TRANSPERSONAL DEMOCRACY 
What can this critique tell us about the best solution for dealing with deforestation in 
Fiji? If sustainability is what is sought then a transformation of culture in Fiji is 
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necessaly. Such a transformation amounts to a regaining of meanings that already exist 
in Fiji that hide there beneath the surface of all cultures in that country. A process of 
discourse both within and between these cultures needs to be initiated or reactivated 
where they have died out. What of pragmatics? What about the realities of the 
international economic order that holds Fiji in its grip? It will not be easy. But at this 
point we must remember that the forests of Fiji are not alone in their plight. 
Exploitation and alienation is a condition suffered by many different groups in that 
countly, although the way it is manifested may vary greatly. For example, women of 
different races are subordinated in that country by different patriarchal systems which 
under values their contribution to social and economic life. Their condition is justified 
as the will of some universal transcendent agency, through misinterpreting metaphorical 
and allegorical myths of origin by taking them literally 12. The working classes, 
irrespective of race, are exploited for their labour; rivers are polluted, natural resources 
and rural communities are exploited by urban and transnational elites; political 
representation of the non-Fijian members of the population is dispropOltionately reduced 
(palticularly the Indo-Fijian segment of the population) to what amounts to apaltheid; 
and a large segment of the (racially) Fijian population is discriminated against by the 
Fijian ruling elite 13, 
Many different oppressed groups exist in Fiji, including those that represent a non-
human oppressed realm - the environment. Social justice groups of various descriptions 
and those involved in environmental issues must acknowledge that, although somewhat 
12Both the Fijian and European myths of origin are able to account form this (see 
Ravuvu 1987a) for an account the Fijian origin myth. 
13Changes in the geographical and tribal distribution of power structures following 
the 1987 elections was a significant contributing factor behind the coups of 1987 which 
effectively restored the geographical and tribal status quo that had survived from 
colonial days. It is important to note that the tribal groups that were groomed into the 
civil service during the 20th century by the ruling British colonial government were the 
same tribal groups that secured power following independence in 1970. It was these 
tribal groups that supported the British annexation of Fiji in 1874 as it served to 
preserve their hegemony over other tribal groups which were at war with them at the 
time of British settlement. They effectively became willing or unwilling 'house slaves' 
to the ruling British and benefitted from the privileges that ensued. The perpetuation of 
these privileges coupled with the way political power has been taken up by certain Fijian 
groups is a major (yet much obscured) issue in contemporary Fiji politics (see Routledge 
1985; Robertson and Tamanisau 1988; Sutherland 1989; Overton and Ward 1989; 
Bravadra 1990; Robie 1989; Lal 1988, 1986; Scar 1984 for example). 
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different in appearance, they all share one thing in common - their condition is the result 
of an unjust cultural order. As such, the locus of change needs to be cultural as well . 
. As part of this change there needs to be a recognition of unity within the diversity of 
these many different interests, because it is a monolithic culture that has itself caused 
so many problems. Any problem of culture cannot be reduced to a single issue because 
of the innate diversity in social reality. The call for a reorientation of the politics of 
extra-parliamentary protest has come loud and clear from many postmodern theorists 
(see Peters 1991; Cheney 1989a; Young 1990; Phillips 1993), who recognise the need 
for an appreciation of this diversity. This is the politics of 'difference' alluded to in 
earlier chapters, which throws up a significant challenge to traditional conceptions of 
democracy. 
The reduction of a political message to a single voice falls back into monolithic 
totalitarian stlUctures that cover over many different legitimate social concerns. There 
needs to be discourse - conversation, so that the different views of different people can 
be heard. There needs to be dialogical communication (Freire 1972), as opposed to 
totalitarian instlUctions from 'on high', as is the case with liberalist democracy. Any 
government that claims that its role is to govern in the absence of tlUe dialogue is 
totalitarian. This is the condition of almost every liberalist democracy in the world 
today, and in this sense Aldous Huxley, in the book Brave New World, was correct in 
his predictions of what would become of totalitarianism after the fall of the blUtal 
fascism of the early and mid 20th century. Huxley saw how totalitarianism would 
change from the "government by clubs and firing squads" into a far more clandestine 
and efficient form where the "all powerful executive of political bosses and their army 
of managers control a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced, because they 
[have been conditioned] to love their servitude" (Huxley 1968:11). Brave New World 
is a biography of modern liberalism, only instead of an army of state managers we have 
a legion of corporations doing the same thing. And Huxley adds, liTo make [the 
population] love [their oppression] is the task assigned, in present day totalitarian states, 
to the ministries of propaganda, newspaper editors and school teachers. [And 
furthermore] Great is the tlUth, but greater still from a practical point of view, is silence 
about the tlUth" (ibid.:i1). 
The locus of cultural change of the form required can only come from those who do not 
have a vested interest in the current oppressive and unsustainable cultural structures (see 
Freire 1972). A starting point and a constant means of emancipatory action rests in open 
discourse where each group is able to engage in speech where the access to speech is 
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not coerced by any single group. This is able to be conducted in parallel with 
conversations with the landscape as mentioned earlier. 
Not all people would agree that a democracy is the best thing for Fiji. Democracy itself 
has even been called a facade by Ravuvu (1991) who comments on what form 
democracy has taken in colonial and post-colonial Fiji. Although Ravuvu argues that 
democracy is innately flawed and serves to benefit only the majority, I have shown 
above that this is true only for certain forms of 'democracy' such as liberalism (see 
chapter 5 for an account of liberalism, and chapters 7 and 8 for a critique of obstructions 
to egalitarianism). Participatory consensus orientated democracy which extends to the 
interpersonal level of politics, that includes legitimate nanatives such as moral intuition, 
ethics and non-scientific discourse, does not exclude the minorities at all. Indeed it is 
the only way of ensuring that all are able to be heard on their own terms. 
Furthermore, if the Fijian people are able to maintain the authentic meaning of their 
language game, through maintaining the meaning of the Vanua as a basis for meaning 
in their language, their culture will need to be capable of being recreated on their own 
terms. Being able to recreate one's culture in the absence of coercion by other cultures 
gives the Fijian people the "positive discrimination" that Ravuvu (1991) asks for 
without the oppression that would be sustained in his formula of cultural politics in that 
country. I agree with Ravuvu in his rejection of oppressive political structures that 
exploited the Fijian people for the last two centuries and that the Fijian people "have 
been made to feel helpless, and to lose confidence in themselves and in their ability to 
determine their own destinies" (ibid.:97). However, I am unsure who he refers to here -
people of the Fijian race or people of the Fijian culture? Notwithstanding this 
unfOltunate conflation of race and culture in Ravuvu's argument, I believe that the 
alternative presented by Ravuvu (whether he refers to race or culture) is not really an 
alternative. 
The model for cultural life sustained in Ravuvu's argument is the same modern one 
which I reject as unsustainable. He advocates that a positive discrimination be practised 
in favour of Fijians in "education, politics, busin'ess development and other areas in 
which they are Zagging behind" (Ravuvu 1991 :99, my emphasis). Lagging behind? It 
sounds like this argument is in support of the kind of 'progress' sought in the 
Enlightenment which wa'l underwritten by the historicism of people like Hobbes, Locke, 
Voltaire, and Turgot. In this way Ravuvu is just as Western as those he so vehemently 
attacks. He goes on to say that positive discrimination towards Fijians must continue 
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"until [Fijians] are on par, with those who have been well established through close 
contact with colonial and capitalist elites and institutions"(ibid.:99). This is merely an 
extension of the oppressive colonial structures that put Fijians in the position they find 
themselves in today, and thus would perpetuate the same structures that he spent the 
entire book criticising. 
I believe that a cultural model that sustains stoicism of any form, irrespective of what 
race is plugged into it, is inappropriate for Fiji and would continue to damage the Fijian 
culture and the landscapes of that country including its forests. Under Ravuvu's model 
there is no guarantee of the sovereignty of Fijianness to anyone because the modern 
context of life with its rationality of universals and an ontological steady state is at odds 
with what it is to be Fijian in the authentic and sustainable sense. As alluded to above, 
I suggest that the first appropriate step is a rejection of a rationality that negates the 
limitations of language, the flux of Nature, and the innate differences between different 
places. From there on the possibilities are endless. These can be revealed through open 
discourse that does not place scientific, and knowledge based narratives in a position of 
privilege in that discourse over other narratives (such as intuition), which can only be 
recreated symbolically as metaphor and myth. 
Such open and radically democratic discourse is a necessary condition for commonality 
to be found whilst retaining diversity. This enables community to develop and is a 
necessary condition for wisdom to be unearthed. It is a necessary condition for a culture 
to regain a respect for all of Nature. In Fijian culture, structures for such discourse 
already exist in the soqoni vata or bose, which are traditional types of meetings. The 
difference between the current use of the bose and the kind necessary for a true radical 
democracy is the explicit reclaiming of un-coerced discourse. As such, women must not 
be relegated to the dark shadows as is currently the case. Other cultural formulas in Fiji 
can re-discover a radical democracy in their own way and even learn from Fijians about 
how to go about it. Resistance to such a political model will, of course, be vicious, and 
it will come from those who most wish to protect their cun'ent positions of privilege 
either as oppressive rulers or as their house slaves. 
Some people may now be willing to confess that ecological sustainability demands a 
much deeper analysis of culture than a mere tinkering with management problems. It is 
essential that such an inquiry does not sweep important issues beneath the carpet. To 
achieve this and to create a robust alternative, the approach must be openly critical. It 
must be able to call into question the assumptions that underlie tradition in order to test 
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the ability of the past to be used as a model for the present, given that tomorrow will 
always be full of surprises. Many people will be happy to admit that this onerous task 
of ecological sustain ability through a cultural transformation is not an option, If this is 
so then perhaps this story may at least force some people to admit that ecological 
sustainability is, for them, unattainable, Otherwise they may be happy to change their 
definition of ecological sustainability. But to do this will no doubt herald environmental 
management successes in much the same vein as the military advances celebrated in 
Heller's 'Catch 22', One night while everyone was asleep, a soldier sneaked up to the 
strategic map and moved the front line (a red ribbon on the map) to a point beyond their 
cutTent real position. The following morning all of the officers and soldiers greeted the 
map with delight and threw a party to celebrate the meritorious acquisition of new 
territory, But of course, the gains were only on the map, 
9.9 BOWING OUT IN STYLE - ECO-CHIVALRY 
In this thesis I established a prescription that was able to substantiate and justify the 
bioregional narrative idea, showing how the landscape is able to recite its autobiography. 
I did this only after deconstructing the foundations of the unsustainable cultural basis 
of modernity, by demonstrating the ontological and epistemological flaws which it uses 
to substantiate its narratives. I make no apologies for being so casually tactless in my 
style of criticism which, at times, plunges into a rather polemical discourse. I also make 
no apologies for being so intensely critical of modern culture, It deserves such an 
exposure of its hidden social and ecological tyranny, However, the truth of it can only 
be established through negotiation and discourse. This story represents part of such 
discourse, 
Critique is never enough, The tenor of a creative alternative tests the integrity of the 
critic, The creative response which this thesis embodies did not come from a 
professional mask, Instead my personal convictions emerged right here before you, This 
is why I ordained Don Quixote as the patron of my quest Style is all important. And, 
in adopting such a confident style I had hoped to demonstrate that being a counter-
cultural maverick can be enjoyable, and done with finesse and valour as it was with that 
man from la Mancha. Like that courageous knight errant of Castile, I do not expect to 
personally succeed in over-turning my culture, And if I appear to fail, I will do so 
without relent, standing firm in my convictions which will, no doubt, evolve the more 
I learn, I owe it to Nature to give it my all. The eventual turning may indeed come to 
pass, but I accept that I am unlikely to be here to see it. 
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What you have found in these pages are the innermost thoughts of an environmentalist 
who is not afraid to pursue an adventure in honour of Nature. In the process I took 
pleasure in confronting countless giants· (philosophers of the Socratic tradition) and 
dragons (those driven by prejudice) and engaged them in fierce and unequal debate, in 
defence of Nature's integrity, in defence of ecological sustainability. Such a style, which 
I call eco-chivalry, is one in which the violence of lesser forms of environmental and 
social esteem is discarded and replaced with a commitment to break the cycle of social 
and ecological brutality itself. It takes courage to stand and receive the kind of criticism 
that comes, but more courage not to be tempted to pick up the tools of violence 
employed by those that torture the Vanua and each other. This is what I mean by eco-
chivahy. 
In so doing, I was compelled to defend the grace of Nature by means of the strength and 
excellence of the wit. Bco-chivalry is not to be confused with male dominated war-
games as it was in past ages of mythical culture. Instead the word 'chivalry' is used to 
merely denote an aspiration to selfless conviction, valour and honour, mixed with 
poetical savoir-faire. The ideal is to disarm Nature's enemies (knowing that aspects of 
my own character are among them) so that they are no longer capable of hurting 
anything, anyone, or even themselves. Such traits are so thin on the ground these days, 
in the wake of so many blind, and naively iconoclastic modem societies where the 
energies of all people is directed into the selfish pestilence of the Great Me. This 
alternative style, however, does not deny the deeper meaning of myth, is poetical, and 
fulfilling. It requires bravelY, which is also madness .... 
332 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abe, M. 1985: Zen and Western Thought. Macmillan, London. 
Adair, M., and Howell, S. 1989: The Subjective Side of Power. In Plant, J. (ed) Healing 
the Wounds. The Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society Publishers, Philadelphia. 
Adorno, T. W., Albert, H., Dahrendorf, R., Habermas, J., Pilot, H., and Popper, K. R. 
1976: The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. Trans. G. Adey, and D Frisby. 
Heineman, London. 
Agnew, A. D. Q., Collins, S. L., and van derMaarel, E. 1993: Mechanisms and Processes 
in Vegetation Dynamics: Introduction. Journal of Vegetation Science 4 0): 
146-148. 
Alexander, R. D., and Noonan, K. M. 1979: Concealment of Ovulation, Parental Care, 
and Human Social Evolution. In Chagnon, N. A. and Irons, W. (eds). Evolutionary 
Biology and Human Social Behaviour: an Anthropological Perspective. Duxbury, 
North Scintuate, M. A. 
Ali, 1., and Overton, J. 1989: Agriculture: Crisis and Recovery. Pacific Viewpoint 30 (2): 
179-191. 
Amratlal, J., Baro, E., Griffen, V., and Singh, G. B. 1975: Women's Role in Fiji. South 
Pacific Social Sciences Association, Suva. 
Anell, L. and Nygren, B. 1980: The Developing Countries and the World Economic 
Order. St Martins Press, NY. 
Aristotle : The Politics. Stephen Everson (ed). 1988. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge. 
Aronowitz, S. 1988: Science As Power. Discourse and Ideology In Modern Society. 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
Aronson, J. L. 1984: A Realist Philosophy of Science. The MacMillan Press, London. 
Arraj, J. 1986: St. John of the Cross and Dr. C. G. Jung. Christian Mysticism In the Light 
of Jungian Psychology. Inner Growth Books, Chiloquin. 
Arraj, J. 1988: God Zen and the Intuition of Being. Inner growth Books, Chiloquin. 
Asian Development Bank 1989: Minimum Quality Criteria for Ecologically Sensitive 
Areas. ADB Environment Paper No.4. Environment Division, Asian Development 
Bank. 
Ayer, A. J. 1985: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Penguin Books, London. 
333 
Ayres, R U., and Kneese, A. V. 1989: Externalities: Economics and Thermodynamics. 
In Archibugi, F., and Nijkamp, P. (eds). Economy and Ecology: Towards 
Sustainable Development. Kluwer Academic Publications, London. 
Bahro, R. 1984: From Red to Green. Verso, London. 
Barber, W. J. 1967: A History of Economic Thought. Penguin Books. 
Baumol, W. l 1972: On Taxation and the Control of Externalities. American Economic 
Review 62: 307-322. 
Bayliss-Smith, T., Bedford, R., Brookfield, H., and Latham, M. 1988: Islands, Islanders 
and the World. The Colonial and Post-colonial Experience of Eastern Fiji. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Bedford, R. 1989: Out of Fiji...A Perspective On Migration After the Fiji Coups. Pacific 
Viewpoint 30 (2): 142-153. 
Bell, D. 1990: Husserl. Routledge, London. 
Bellam, M. 1980: A Question of Balance. New Zealand Trade III the South Pacific. New 
Zealand Coalition For Trade and Development, Wellington. 
Belshaw, C. S. ]964: Under the Ivi Tree. Society and Economic Growth in Rural Fiji. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Bergson, H. 1911: Creative Evolution. Trans. A. Mitchell. Henry Holt, New York. 
Bergson, H. 1946: The Creative Mind. Trans. M. L. Andison. Greenwood Press. Westpolt, 
Connecticut. 
Berman, M. 1988: All that is Solid Melts into Air. The Experience of Modernity. Penguin 
Books, New York. 
Bernstein, R J. 1976: The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. New York. 
Berry, M. J., and Howard, W. J. 1973: Fiji Forest Inventory. Overseas Development 
Authority. Surbiton, UK. vol 1, 2, & 3 
Bertram, G. 1987: The Political Economy of Decolonisation and Nationhood in Small 
Pacific Societies. In Hooper, A., Britton, S., Crocombe, R, Huntsman, l, and 
Macpherson, C. (cds) Class and Culture in the South Pacific. Centre for Pacific 
Studies, University of Auckland, and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific. 
Bessarab, R 1992: Luddites, Eco-fascists, and Eco-fundamentalists. Ecopolitics V 
Proceedings: 73-82. 
334 
Best, S. 1991: Chaos and Entropy in Postmodern Science and Social Theory. Science as 
Culture. (cited in Best and Kellner 1991). 
Best, S., and Kellner, D. 1991: Postmodern Theory. Critical Interrogations. The Guilford 
Press, New York. 
Bhagwati, J. 1988: Protectionism. The MIT Press, Boston. 
Bhaskar, R. 1975: A Realist Theory of Science. Harvester. Hertfordshire. 
Bhaskar, R. 1979: The Possibility of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences. The Harvester Press. Sussex. 
Bhaskar, R. 1981: The Consequences of Socio-Evolutionary Concepts for Naturalism in 
Sociology: Commentaries on Harre, and Toulmin. In Jensen, U. J., and Harre, R. 
(eds) The Philosophy of Evolution. Harvester Press, Sussex. 
Bhaskar, R. 1986: Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. Verso. London. 
Billington, R. 1988: Living Philosophy. An Introduction to Moral Thought. Routledge, 
London. 
Bilton, T., Bonnett, K., Jones, P., Stanworth, M., Sheard, K., and Webster, A. 1986: 
Introductory Sociology. Macmillan, London. 
Birch, C. 1984: Religion and Nature. In Sharpe, K. J., and J. M. Ker. (eds). Religion and 
Nature, with Charles Birch and others. Proceedings of the Eighth Auckland 
Religious Studies Colloquium. The University of Auckland Chaplaincy. 1-22 
Birch, C. 1992: Salvation for Kangaroos. Ecopolitics V Proceedings: 441-445. 
Birch, C., and Cobb, J. 1981: The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Birkeland, J. 1992: Ecofeminism and Ecopolitics. Ecopolitics V Proceedings: 546-554. 
Blaikie, P., and Brookfield, H., with Clarke, W. (eds). 1987: Land Degradation and 
Society. Methuen, London. 
Blake, W. 1993: Selected Poems. Everyman, London. 
Bleicher, J. 1980: Contemporary Hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and 
Critique. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Blyth, R. H. 1942: Zen in English Literature and Oriental Classics. The Hokuseido Press, 
Tokyo. 
Bohm, D. 1980: Wholeness and the Implicate Order. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London. 
Bookchin, M. 1986: The Ecology of Freedom. Sierra Book Club, San Francisco. 
335 
Botkin, D. B. 1990: Discordant Harmonies. A New Ecology For the Twenty-First 
Century. Oxford University Press. New York. 
Bottomore, T. B., and Rubel, M. 1961: Karl Marx. Selected Writings In Sociology and 
Social Philosophy. Penguin Books. Middlesex. 
Bratton, S. P. 1992: Loving Nature: Eros or Agape? Environmental Ethics 14(1): 3-26. 
Bravadra, T. 1990: Bravadra. Prime Minister, Statesman. Man of the People. Selection 
of Speeches and Writings 1985-1989. Edited by A. Bain and T. Baba. Sunrise 
Press, Nadi. 
Brockie, R. 1992: A Living New Zealand Forest. David Bateman, Auckland. 
Brookfield, H., and Overton, J. 1988: How Old Is the Deforestation of Oceania. In 
Dargavel, J., Dixon, K., and Semple, N. (eds). Changing Tropical Forests. 
Tropical Forest History Working Group (S.6.07.0l) Australian National University, 
Canberra. 
Brown, J. E., and Wolf, H. A. 1971: Economics: Principles and Practices. Charles E. 
Merrill Publishing Co. Columbus, Ohio. 
Brown, R. H. 1992: Social Science and Society as Discourse: Toward a sociology for 
Civic Competence. In Seidman, S. and Wagner, D. G. (eds) Postmodemism and 
Social Theory. Blackwell, Cambridge, M. A. 
Browne, C. 1989: Economic Development In Seven Pacific Island Countries. 
International Monetary Fund. Washington D.C. 
Bureau of Statistics (Fiji). 1989: Report on Fiji Population Census 1986. Analytic Report 
on the Demographic, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population. 
Government of Fiji, Suva. 
Burgers, P. 1984: Theory of the Avant-Garde. Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
Burrows, C. J. 1990: Process of Vegetation Change. Unwin Hyman, London. 
Byron, N. 1988: Market Prospects For Indigenous Timbers and Plantation Hardwoods 
From Fiji - Australasia! Asia! Pacific. Fiji Forest Sector Development Study. FAO. 
FO: DPIFU/88.006 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome. 
Cabaniuk, S. 1989: NLTB and Forests. Unpublished report, Native Land Trust Board, 
Suva. 
Cahn, S. M. (ed) 1977: Classics of Western Philosophy. Harkett Publishing Company, 
Indianapolis. 
Campbell, L C. 1989: A History of the Pacific Islands. University of Canterbury Press, 
Christchurch NZ. 
336 
Campbell, J. 1986: The Inner Reaches of Outer Space. Metaphor as Myth and as 
Religion. Harper and Row, New York. 
Campbell, J. 1988: The Power of Myth. Doubleday, New York. 
Capell, A. (ed) 1991: A New Fijian Dictionary. Government of Fiji. 
Capra, F. 1975: The Tao of Physics. Flamingo. London. 
Capra, F. 1982: The Turning Point. Science, Society and the Rising Culture. Fontana 
Paperbacks. London. 
Caputo, J. D. 1978: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought. Ohio University Press, 
Ohio. 
Caputo, 1. D. 1986: Hermeneutics as the Recovery of Man. In Wachterhauser, B. R. (ed). 
Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy. State University of New York Press, 
Albany. 
Caputo, J. D. 1993: Against Ethics. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. 1986: Becoming Critical. Education, Knowledge and Action 
Research. The Falmer Press. London & Philadelphia. 
Cartwright, N. 1983: How the Laws of Physics Lie. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Cassou, 1. 1979: The Concise Encyclopedia of Symbolism. Omega Books, Hertfordshire. 
Catton, P. 1989: Marxist Critical Theory, Contradictions, and Ecological Succession. 
Dialogue XXVIII: 637-653. 
Cervantes, M. 1950: The Adventures of Don Quixote. Originally published in 1604. Trans. 
J. M. Cohen. Penguin Books, Middlesex. 
Chaitin, G. 1991: A Random Walk In Arithmetic In Hall, N. (ed) the NewScientist Guide 
To Chaos. Penguin Press, London. 
Chang, A. 1991: Fiji: Country Report. In Tang, H. T. and Finiasi, L. S. (eds) Proceedings 
of Heads of Forestry Meeting. South Pacific Forestry Development Programme. 
08-12 October 1991, Lautoka, Fiji. 
Chatwin, B. 1987: The Songlines. Pan Books. London. 
Checkland, P. 1981: Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. John Wiley & Sons. Chichester. 
Checkland, P. 1982: Soft Systems Methodology As Process. A Reply To M. C. Jackson. 
Journal of Applied Systems Analysis 9: 37-39. 
Cheney, J. 1989: Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative. 
Environmental Ethics 11 (2): 117-134. 
337 
Cheney, J. 1989: The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism. Environmental Ethics 
11(4): 293-326. 
Chung, M. 1991: Politics, Traditional and Structural Change: Fijian Fertility in the 
Twentieth Century. Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 
Canberra. 
Churchland, P. M. 1979: Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge. 
Clarke, W. C. 1988: A Scientific Look at Rainforest in the Face of Development. Fiji's 
Rainforest: Our Heritage and Future. Proceedings of the Second National 
Conservation Congress, Suva, Fiji. National Trust For Fiji. 
Clarke, W. C. 1994: Learning from Ngirapo: Indigenous Knowledge and Sustainable 
Agricultural Development. In Waddell, E., and Nunn, P. (eds) The Margin Fades. 
Pages 231-266. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific. 
Cody, M. L. 1986: Structural Niches in Plant Communities. In Diamond, J., and Case, T. 
J. (eds) Community Ecology. Harper and Row, New York. 
Cohen, J. E. 1978: Food Webs and Niche Space. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Colwell, R. K., and Futuyma, D. J. 1971: On the Measurement of Niche Breadth and 
Overlap. Ecology 52 (4): 567-576. 
Connolly, J. M., and Keutner, T. (eds) 1988: Hermeneutics versus Science? Three 
German Views. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. 
Conway, G. R., and McCracken. 1990: Rapid Rural Appraisal and Agroecosystem 
Analysis In Altieri, M. A., and Hecht, S. B. 1990. Agroecology and Small Farm 
Development. CRC Press, Boston. 
Cox, M. 1986: A Handbook of Christian Mysticism. The Aquarian Press, Great Britain. 
Cox, P. A. and Elmqvist, T. 1993: Ecocolonialism and Indigenous Knowledge Systems: 
Vil1age Controlled Rainforest Preserves in Samoa. Pacific Conservation Biology 
1 (1): 6-13. 
Cozzens, S. E., and Gieryn, T. F. (eds). 1990: Theories of Science in Society. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington. 
Crocombe, R., and Ali, A. (eds). 1985: Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics. Institute of 
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Cuff, E. C., Sharrock, W. W., and Francis, D. W. ] 990: Perspectives in Sociology. 3rd 
edition. Unwin Hyman, London. 
338 
Cummins, K. W. 1988: The Study of Stream Ecosystems: A Functional View. In 
Pomeroy, L. R. and Alberts, 1. J. (eds) Concepts of Ecosystem Ecology. 
Springer-Verlag. NY. 
Cummins, K. W., and Klug, M. J. 1979: Feeding Ecology of Stream Invertebrates. Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics 10: 147-172. 
Curtis, M. (ed). 1981a: The Great Political Theories. Volume 1. From Plato and Aristotle 
To Locke and Montesquieu. Avon Books, New York. 
Curtis, M. (ed). 1981 b: The Great Political Theories. Volume 2. From Burke, Rousseau 
and Kant To Modern Times. Avon Books, New York. 
Daly, H. E. 1973: Toward a Steady State Economy. W. H. Freeman. San Francisco. 
Daly, H. E. 1989: Steady State and Growth For the Next Century. In Archibugi, F., and 
Nijkamp, P. (eds). Economy and Ecology: Towards Sustainable Development. 
Kluwer Academic Publications, London. 
Daly, H. E. 1991: Towards an Environmental Macroeconomics. Land Economics 67 (2): 
255-59. 
Daly, H. 1992: Review of International Policies to Accelerate Sustainable Development 
in Developing Countries, and Related Policies. The World Bank, Washington D. 
C. 
Daly, H. E. and Cobb. J. 1989: For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy 
Towards Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future. Beacon Press, 
Boston. 
Daly, H., and Goodland, R. 1992: an Ecological-Economic Assessment of Deregulation 
of International Commerce Under GATT. Discussion Draft. Environment 
Department, the World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Daly, M. 1978: GynlEcology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. Beacon Press. Boston 
Darwin, C. 1958: The Origin of Species. Originally published in 1859. Mentor, New 
York. 
Davies, P. 1987: The Cosmic Blueprint. London. 
Davies, P. 1991: Is the Universe a Machine? In Hall, N. (ed) The NewScientist Guide To 
Chaos. Penguin Press, London. 
Davies, P. W. c., and Brown, J. R. (eds). 1986: The Ghost In the Atom. A Discussion of 
the Mysteries of Quantum Physics. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Davies, P., and Gribbin, J. 1991: The Matter Myth. Towards 21st-Century Science. 
Viking, London. 
339 
Dawkins, R. 1976: The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Day, R. T., Keddy, P. A., McNeill, J. and Carleton, T. 1988: Fertility and Disturbance 
Gradients: A Summary Model for Riverine Marsh Vegetation. Ecology 69: 
1044-1054. 
de la Croix, H., and Tansey, R. G. 1980: Gardner's Art Through the Ages. Seventh 
Edition II Renaissance and Modem Art. Harcourt Brace Jovanivich, Inc. New 
York. 
De Rougemont, D. 1974: Love in the Western World. Harper and Row, New York. 
Delahunty, R. J. 1985: Spinoza. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Deleuze, G. 1988: Bergsonism. Zone Books, New York. 
Devall, B. 1990: Simple in Means Rich in Ends. Practising Deep Ecology. Green Print, 
London. 
Diamond, J. M., and Case, T. J. (eds). 1986: Community Ecology. Harper and Row, New 
York. 
Dohelty, J., Graham, and Malek, M. (eds) 1992: Postmodernism and the Social 
Sciences. St Martins Press, New York. 
Dostal, R. J. 1993: Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. In Guignon, C. 
B. (ed). The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Douglas, R. 1980: There's got to be a Better Way: A Practical ABC to solving New 
Zealand's Major Problems. Fourth Estate Books, Wellington. 
Dreyfus, H. L. 1987: Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation In Late Heidegger and Recent 
Foucault. In Gibbons, M. T. (ed) Interpreting Politics. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 
Dunlap, R. C. 1980: National Parks and Reserves System. A Plan for Fiji. National Trust 
for Fiji, Suva. 
Dunn, J. 1984: Locke. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Dwyer, P. D. 1986: Living With the Rain Forest: The Human Dimension. In Kikkawa, 
1. and Anderson, D. 1. (eds) Community Ecology: Pattern and Process. Blackwell 
Scientific Publications. 
Earle, W. 1. 1992: Introduction To Philosophy. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Ehrenzweig, A. 1967: The Hidden Order of Art. A Study in the Psychology of Artistic 
Imagination. Weidenfeld and Nicloson, London. 
Ehrlich, P. 1988: The Machinery of Nature. Paladin, London. 
340 
Ehrlich, P. R. 1968: The Population Bomb. Ballantine Books, New York. 
EI Sarafy, S. 1991: The Environment as Capital. In Constanza, R. (ed). Ecological 
Economics. The Science and Management of Sustainability. Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
Elton, G. R. 1963: Reformation Europe 1517-1559. Collins. London. 
Engels, F. 1934: Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers 
Estes, C. 1989: Consensus and Community. In Plant, J. (ed) Healing the Wounds. The 
Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society Publishers. Philadelphia, PA. 
Fairbairn, T. 1. J. 1985: Island Economies. Studies From the South Pacific. Institute of 
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Fairbairn, T. 1. J. 1987: Subsistence Economy and Policy Options For Island Economies: 
Unsustainable Growth and Trade. In Hooper et al (eds). Class and Culture in the 
South Pacific. Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Auckland and Institute of 
Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Fay, B. 1987: an Alternative View: Interpretive Social Science. In Gibbons, M. T. (ed) 
Interpreting Politics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Ferber, M. A., and Nelson, J. A. 1993: Beyond Economic Man. Feminist Theory and 
Economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Feyerabend, P. K. 1981: Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Field, H. H. 1980: Science Without Numbers. A Defence of Nominalism. Princeton 
University Press. Princeton. 
Fiji Government 1986: Fiji's Ninth Development Plan 1986-1990. Policies, Strategies and 
Programmes for National Development. Suva. 
Fiji Government 1990: Fiji Round Table Meeting on Development Assistance 
Requirements. Suva. 
Flax, 1. 1990: Thinking Fragments. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Flenley, J. R. and King, S. M. 1984: Late Quaternary Pollen Records From Easter Island. 
Nature 307: 47-50. 
Flood, R. L., and Ulrich, W. 1990: Testament To Conversations On Critical Systems 
Thinking Between Two Systems Practitioners. Systems Practice 3 (l): 7-29. 
Foltz, B. V. 1984: On Heidegger and the Interpretation of Environmental Crisis. 
Environmental Ethics 6 (4): 323-338. 
341 
Food and Agriculture Organisation 1985: Tropical Forestry Action Plan. Rome. 
Forman, R. T. T. 1989: Ecologically Sustainable Landscapes: The Role of Spatial 
Configuration In Zonneveld, I. S., and Forman, R. T. T. (eds) Changing 
Landscapes: an Ecological Perspective. Springer-Verlag, NY. 
Foucault, M. 1982: On the Genealogy of Ethics. In Dreyfus, H. L., and Rabinow, P. (eds) 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago. 
Fox, W. 1990: Towards a Transpersonal Ecology. Developing New Foundations For 
Environmentalism. Shambha1a. Boston. 
Fraser, N., and Nicholson, L. 1988: Social Criticism without Philosophy: an Encounter 
between Feminism and Postmodernism. Theory, Culture and Society 5 (2-3): 
373-394. 
Freire, P. 1972: Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Penguin Books, London. 
Freire, P., and Faundez, A. 1989: Learning to Question. A Pedagogy of Liberation. 
Continuium, New York. 
Frodeman, R. 1992: Radical Environmentalism and the Political Roots of Postmodernism: 
Differences that make a Difference. Environmental Ethics 14 (4): 307-320. 
Fromm, E. 1988: To Have or to Be? Abacus, London. 
Fromm, E. 1991: Fear of Freedom. First Published in 1942. Routledge, London. 
Funk and Wagnalls. 1975: Standard Desk Dictionary. Funk and Wagnalls, New York. 
Gablik, S. 1991: The Reenchantment of Art. Thames and Hudson, New York. 
Gadamer, H. 1975: Truth and Method. Seabury, New York. 
Gadamer, H. 1988: On the Circle of Understanding. In Connolly, J. M., and Keutner, T. 
(eds), Hermeneutics Versus Science? Three German Views. University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. 
Galbraith, J. K. 1987: A History of Economics. The Past As the Present. Penguin Books. 
London. 
Gale, G. 1979: Theory of Science. An Introduction To the History, Logic, and Philosophy 
of Science. McGraw-Hill Book Company. New York. 
Gaston, J. (ed). 1978: The Sociology of Science. Problems, Approaches, and Research. 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Fransisco. 
Gearey, J. 1992: Goethe's Other Faust. The Drama, Part II. University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto. 
342 
Gebhardt, E. 1978: A Critique of Methodology: Introduction. In Arato, A and Gebhardt, 
E. (eds). The Essential Frankfurt School Reader. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Geertz, C. 1973: The Interpretation of Cultures. Harper and Row, New York. 
Geertz, C. 1987: From the Native's Point of View': On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding. In Gibbons, M. T. (ed) Interpreting Politics. Basil Blackwell. 
Oxford. 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1976: Energy and Economic Myths. Pergamon, NY. 
Geraghty, P. A. 1983: The History of the Fijian Languages. University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu. 
Gibbons, M. T. 1987: The Politics of Interpretation. In Gibbons, M. T. (ed) Interpreting 
Politics. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 
Giddens, A. 1980: Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. An Analysis of the Writings of 
Marx Durkheim and Max Weber. Cambridge Press. Cambridge. 
Giddens, A. 1990: The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California. 
Giddens, A. (ed). 1992: Human Societies. A Reader. Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Gillison, A. N. 1988: A Plant Functional Proforma for Dynamic Vegetation Studies and 
Natural Resource Surveys. Technical Memorandum 88/3. Institute of Natural 
Resources and Environment, CSIRO, Atherton, Australia. 
Gillison, A N. 1992: Report on Terrestrial Resource Management. Resource Report, 
National Environment Management Project, IUCN. Technical Assistance to the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Fiji. 
Gillison, A, and Brewer, K. R. W. 1985: The Use of Gradient Directed Transects Or 
Gradsects In Natural Resource Surveys. Journal of Environmental Management 20: 
103-127 
Godron, M. and Forman, K. T. T. 1983: Landscape Modification and Changing 
Ecological Characteristics. In Mooney, H. A., and Godron, M. (eds). Disturbance 
and Ecosystems. Components and Response. Springer Verlag, NY. 
Goethe, J. W. von 1959: Faust, Pa,rt I. Trans. Jarrel, R. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New 
York. 
Goethe, 1. W. von 1959: Faust, Part II. Trans. Wayne, P. Penguin Books, Middlesex. 
Goldsmith, E. 1978: The Stable Society. The Wade bridge Press, Cornwall. 
Goldsmith, E. 1988: The Great U- Turn. De-industrialising Society. Green Books, Devon. 
343 
Goneyali, E. 1975: Who Wants to Stay on the Farm? In Tupouniua, S. et al The Pacific 
Way: Social Issues in National Development., pp. 58-62. South Pacific Social 
Sciences Association, Suva. Cited in Baylis-Smith, T., Bedford, R., Brookfield, H., 
and Latham, M. 1988. Islands, Islanders and the World. The Colonial and 
Post-colonial Experience of Eastern Fiji. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Goodland, R. 1992: The Case that the World has Reached Limits: More Precisely that 
Current Throughput Growth in the Global Economy Cannot be Sustained. 
Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 13 (3): 
167-182. 
Gowdy, J. M. 1991: Bioeconomics and Post Kensian Economics: A Search For Common 
Ground. Ecological Economics 3: 77-87 
Grace, G. W. 1959: The Position of the Polynesian Languages within the Austronesian 
(Malayo-Polyneaisn) Language Family. Memoir 16 of International Journal of 
American Linguistics. Indiana University. Bishop Museum Special Publication 46. 
Cited in Geraghty, P. A. 1983. The History of the Fijian Languages. University 
of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. 
Graham, Doherty, 1., and Malek, M. 1992: The Context and Language of 
Postmodernism In Doherty, J., Graham, and Malek, M. (eds) Postmodernism 
and the Social Sciences. St Martins Press, New York. 
Graham, G. 1990: Living the Good Life. An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. Paragon 
House, New York. 
Griffin, D. M. 1988: Innocents Abroad In the Forests of Nepal. An Account of Australian 
Aid To Nepalese Forestry. Anutech, Canberra. 
Griffin, D. R. 1988: The Re-enchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. State 
University of New York Press, Albany. 
Griffin, D. R. 1988: Spirituality and Science: Postmodern Visions. State University of 
New York Press, Albany. 
Griffin, D. R. 1989: Postmodern Theology and AlTheology: A Response to Mark C. 
Taylor. In Griffin, D. R., Beardslee, W. A., and Holland Varieties of Postmodern 
Theology. State University of New York Press, Albany. 
Griffin, D. R., Beardslee, W. A., and Holland, J. 1989: Varieties of Postmodern Theology. 
State University of New York Press, Albany. 
Griffin, S. 1978: Woman and Nature. The Roaring Inside Her. Harper and Row. New 
York. 
Grubb, P. J. 1977: The Maintenance of Species Rishness in Plant Communities: The 
Importance of the Regeneration Niche. Biological Review 52: 107-145. 
344 
Grundmann, R. 1991: Marxism and Ecology. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Gudmunsen, C. 1977: Wittgenstein and Buddhism. MacMillan, London. 
Guillaumont, A., Puech, H. Ch., QUispel, G., Till, and Yassah, 'abda al Masih. (trans) 
1959: The Gospel According to Thomas, Coptic Text. Leiden: E. J. Brill; Harper, 
New York. 
Gunn, A. 1992: What Good is Environmental Ethics? Ecopolitics V Proceedings: 453-459. 
Haas, A. 1985: New Zealand: Pacific Island or Metropolitan Power? In Crocombe, R., 
and Ali, A. (eds) Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics. Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of the South Pacific. 
Habermas, J 1968: Knowledge and Human Interests., Trans. T. McCarthy. Beacon Press. 
Boston. 
Habermas, J. 1973: Theory and Practice. Trans. T. McCarthy. Beacon Press. Boston. 
Habermas, J. 1975: Legitimation Crisis. Tr. McCarthy, T. Beacon Press. Boston. 
Habermas, J. 1979: Communication and the Evolution of Society. Trans. T. McCarthy. 
Beacon Press. Boston. 
Habermas, J. 1983: Modernity - an Incomplete Project. In H. Foster (ed) the 
Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Bay Press. Washington. 
Habermas, 1. 1985: The Theory of Communicative Action. Trans. T. McCarthy. Beacon 
Press. Boston. 
Habermas, J. 1987: The Hermeneutic Claim To Universality. In Gibbons, M. T. (ed) 
Interpreting Politics. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 
Halliburton, D. 1981: Poetic Thinking. An Approach to Heidegger. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
Hallman, M, O. 1991: Nietzsche's Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics 13: 
99-125 
Hamlyn, D. W. 1980: Schopenhauer. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Hanfling, O. 1989: Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy. State University of New York Press, 
Albany. 
Harding, S. 1986: The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Hau'ofa, E. 1987: The New South Pacific Society. Integration and Independence. In 
Hooper et a1 (eds). Class and Culture in the South Pacific. Centre for Pacific 
Studies, University of Auckland and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific, Suva. 
345 
Hawking, S. W. 1988: A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang to Black Holes. 
Bantam Books. NY. 
Heidegger, M. 1959: An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. R. Manheim. Yale 
University Press, New Haven. 
Heidegger, M. 1962: Being and Time. Harper and Row. New York. 
Heidegger, M. 1968: What is called Thinking? Trans. F. D. Wieck and J. G. Gray. 
Harper and Row, New York. 
Heidegger, M. 1971: On the Way to Language. Harper and Row. New York. 
Heidegger, M. 1973: The End of Philosophy. Trans. J. Stambaugh. Souvenir Press, 
London. 
Heidegger, M. 1975: Early Greek Thinking. Trans. Krell, D. F. and Capuzzi, F. A. 
Harper and Row. New York. 
Heidegger, M. 1975: Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. A. Hofstadter. Harper and Row, 
New York. 
Heidegger, M. 1976: The Piety of Thinking. Trans. J. G. Halt, and J. C. Maraldo. Indianna 
University Press, Bloomington. 
Heidegger, M. 1977: The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays. Trans. W. 
Lovitt. Harper and Row, New York. 
Heidegger, M. 1985: History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena. Trans. T. Kisiel. 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
Heidegger, M. 1992: The Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge. Trans by M. Heim. 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
Hein, H. 1984: Liberating Philosophy: and end to the Dichotomy of Matter and Spirit, In 
Gould, C. C. (ed) Beyond Domination. Rowman and Allanheld, New Jersey. 
Heine, S. 1985: Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen. 
State University of New York Press. 
Hekman, S. J. 1986: Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. 
Held, D. 1980: Introductions to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas. University 
of California Press, Berkeley. 
Heller, H. R. 1968: International Trade. Theory and Empirical Evidence. Prentice-Hall, 
New Jersey. 
346 
Heller, J. 1964: Catch 22. Corgie, London. 
Henderson, H. 1978: Creating Alternative Futures. The End of Economics. AT. 
Hirshleifer, J. 1984: Price Theory and Applications. Third Edition. Prentice/Hall 
International Inc. London. 
Hobbes, T. 1991: Leviathan. Originally published in 1651. Edited by R. Tuck. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Holland, J. 1989: The Postmodern Paradigm and Contemporary Catholicism, In Griffin, 
D. R., Beardslee, W. A., and Holland, J. (eds) Varieties of Postmodern Theology. 
State University of New York Press, Albany. 
Honour, H. and Flemming, J. 1982: A World History of Art. Macmillan, London. 
Hooker, C A. 1987: A Realistic Theory of Science. State University of New York Press. 
Albany. 
Hopa, N. 1990: Papatuanuku' 'Spaceship Earth'. Ecopolitics IV Proceedings: 574-580. 
Horkheimer, M. 1974: The Eclipse of Reason. Seabury, New York (originally published 
in 1947). 
Howard, C, and Durutalo, S. 1987: The Political Economy of the South Pacific to 1945. 
Centre for South East Asian Studies. Monograph Series No. 26. James Cook 
University, Townsville, Australia. 
Hutchinson, G. E. 1967: A Treatise On Limnology: Vol. 11. Introduction To Lake Biology 
and the Limnoplankton. John Wiley & Sons Inc. NY. 
Huxley, A. 1968: Brave New World. A Novel. Heron Books, London. 
Ives, J. D., and Pitt, D. C. (eds). 1988: Deforestation: Social Dynamics In Watersheds and 
Mountain Ecosystems. Routledge, London & NY. 
James, D. 1992: Achieving Sustainable Development in Fiji: Integration of Economics and 
Environment. Resource Report. National Environment Management Project. IUCN. 
Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Housing and 
Jameson, F. 1984: Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. New Left 
Review, 146: 53-92. 
Jameson, F. 1988: Cognitive Mapping In C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, (eds) Marxism and 
the Interpretation of Culture. Macmillan Press. London. 
Johansson, 1. 1989: Ontological Investigations: an Inquiry into the Categories of Nature, 
Man, and Society. Routledge, London. 
347 
Jonas, H. 1963: The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings 
of Christianity. Beacon Press, Boston. 
Joyce, J. 1916: A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Egotist, London. 
Jung, C. G. 1959: The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul., London. 
Kahn, C. H. 1979: The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Kalou, J. 1992: National Environment Strategy. Fiji Times. September 9, 1992. 
Kant, L 1907: Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. F. M. Muller. Macmillan, New York. 
Kant, I. 1956: Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. L. W. Beck. Liberal Arts Press, New 
York. 
Kant, 1. 1991: The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. M. Gregor. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Kaptchuk, T. J. 1983: The Web that has no Weaver. Understanding Chinese Medicine. 
Congdon and Weed, Chicago. 
Kaufmann, W. 1980a: Discovering the Mind. Goethe, Kant, and Hegel. McGraw-Hill, 
New York. 
Kaufmann, W. 1980b: Discovering the Mind. Vol. 3. Freud versus Alder and lung. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Kaufmann, W. 1992: Discovering the Mind. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber Transaction 
Publishers, New Bmnswick. 
Keddy, P. A. 1990: The Use of Functional as Opposed to Phylogenetic Systematics: A 
First Step in Predictive Community Ecology. In: Biological Approaches and 
Evolutionary Trends in Plants. Academic Press. 
Keesing, R. M. 1989: Creating the Past: Custom and Identity In the Contemporary 
Pacific. The Contemporary Pacific 1 (1): 19-42. 
Keesing, R. M. 1991: Reply to Trask. Contemporary Pacific 3 (1): 168-171. 
Keffer, S., King, S., and Kraft, S. 1991: Process Metaphysics and Minimalism: 
Implications For Public Policy. Environmental Ethics 13 (1): 23-47. 
Kenney, D. 1991: Education For Creative Responsibility. In Kroon, F., Hinchcliffe, J., 
Haystead, J., and Hucker, B. (eds) Ethics At Work. Issues In the Work Place and 
In Education. Proceedings from a Conference held at the Auckland Institute of 
Technology, 20-22 June 1991. 91-112. 
348 
Keyfitz, N. 1990: The Growing Human Population. (In) Managing Planet Earth. Readings 
Form Scientific American Magazine. W. H. Freeman and Company, New York. 
Kheel, M. 1989: From Healing Herbs To Deadly Drugs: Western Medicine's War Against 
the Natural World. In Plant, 1. (ed) Healing the Wounds. The Promise of 
Ecofeminism. New Society Publishers. Philadelphia. 
Kikau, E. 1981: The Wisdom of Fiji. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific and Pacific Social Sciences Association. 
King, Y. 1981: Feminism and the Revolt of Nature. Heresies 13: 12-16. 
King, Y. 1989: The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of Ecology. In Plant, J. (ed). 
Healing the Wounds. The Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society Publishers. 
Philadelphia. 
Kirch, P. V. 1982: Ecology and Adaptation of Polynesian Agricultural Systems. 
Archaeology in Oceania 17 (1): 1-6. 
Knapman, B. 1987: Fiji's Economic History, 1874-1939. Studies of Capitalist Colonial 
Development. Australian National University National Centre for Development 
Studies. Pacific Research Monograph No. 15 
Knorr-Cetina, K. D., and Mulkay, M. (eds). 1983: Science Observed. Perspectives on the 
Social Study of Science. Sage Publications, London. 
Knox, P. and Agnew, J. 1989: The Geography of the World Economy. Edward Arnold, 
NY. 
Kockelmans, J. J. 1972: On Heidegger and Language, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston. 
Koestler, A., and Smythies, 1. R. (eds), 1969: Beyond Reductionism. New Perspectives in 
the Life Sciences. Hutchinson, London. 
Kotoh, T. 1987: Language and Silence: Self Inquiry in Heidegger and Zen. In Parkes, G. 
(ed) Heidegger and Asian Thought. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. 
Krips, H. 1987: The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
Kuhn, T. S. 1970: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Kuhn, T. S. 1977: The Essential Tension. Selected Studies In Scientific Tradition and 
Change. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 
Kyburg, H. 1990: Science and Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Lacey, A. R. 1989: Bergson. The Arguments of Philosophers. Routledge, London. 
349 
Laffer, A B., and Miles, M. A. 1982: International Economics in an Integrated World. 
Scott, Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois. 
Lal, B. 1983: Grimitiyas. The Origins of the Fiji Indians. the Journal of Pacific History, 
Canberra. 
Lal, B. 1986: The Emergence of the Fiji Labour Party. In Lal, B. (ed) Politics in Fiji. 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
Lal, B. 1988: Power and Prejudice: The Making of the Fiji Crisis. Wellington. 
Lal, B. (ed). 1986: Politics in Fiji. Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
Lang, T, and Heines, C. 1993: The New Protectionism. Earthscan, London. 
Lange, V. (ed) 1968: Goethe. A Collection of Critical Essays. Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs. 
Larmour, P. 1985: The Decolonisation of the Pacific Islands. In Crocombe, R., and Ali, 
A (eds) Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics. Institute of Pacific Studies, University 
of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Lasaqa, 1. Q. 1980: The Fijian People. The Spate Report Revisited. In Jennings and Linge 
(eds) Of Time and Place. Australian National University Press, Canberra. 
Lees, A 1989: A Representative National Parks and Reserves System for Fiji's Tropical 
Forests. Maruia Society Policy Reports Series, No.9, May 1989. 
Lees, A. 1991: A Representative Protected Forests System for the Solomon Islands. 
Report prepared on behalf of the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 
Canberra. 
Lenin, V. 1. 1978: Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Progress Publishers, 
Moscow. 
Leplin, J. (ed). 1984: Scientific Realism. University of California Press. Berkeley. 266 
Lerner, G. 1986: Women and History. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Leslie, A 1988: Strategy for Forestry Sector Development. Forestry Sector Development 
Study - Fiji. Working Paper No.1 FO:DPIFIJ/88/006. FAO. 
Levins, R., and Lewontin, R. 1985: The Dialectical Biologist. Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge. 
Levy, R. 1. 1984: Emotion, Knowing and Culture. In Shweder, R. A, and LeVine, R. A 
(eds). Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Lewis, C. S. 1960: The Four Loves. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanivich. New York. 
350 
Linnekin, J. and Poyer, L. 1990: Cultural Identity and Ethnicity In the Pacific. University 
of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. 
Lopez, B. 1989: Crossing Open Ground. Vintage Books, New York. 
Lopez, D. S. Jr., and Rockefeller, S. C. (eds) 1987: The Christ and the Bodhisattva. State 
University of New York Press, Albany. 
Lorenz, K. 1966: On Aggression. Trans. M. K. Wilson. Harcourt, New York. 
Lorenz, K. 1987: The Waning of Humanness. Unwin Paperbacks. London. 
Lovelock, J. E. 1987: Gaia. A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Low, P. 1992: International Trade and the Environment: an Overview In Low, P. (ed) 
International Trade and the Environment. The World Bank, Washington D. C. 
Luckett, D. G. 1987: Monetary Policy in Fiji. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of 
the South Pacific, Suva. 
Lukes, S. 1987: On the Social Determination of Truth. In Gibbons, M. T. (ed) 
Interpreting Politics. Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 64-81. 
Lyotard, J-F. 1984: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. G, 
Bennington and B. Massumi. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 
MacNaught, T. J. 1982: The Fijian Colonial Experience. A Study of the Neotraditiollal 
Order Under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II. Australian National 
University Pacific Research Monograph No.7. 
Macy, J. 1989: Awakening to the Ecological Self. In Plant, J. (ed) Healing the Wounds. 
The Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society Press, Philadelphia. 
Mandel, 1983: An Introduction To Marxist Economic Theory. Pathfinder Press. 
Martin, B. and Mohanty, C. T. 1986: Feminist Politics: What's Home got to do with it? 
In de Lauretis, T (ed) Feminist Studies/Critical Studies. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington. 
Marx, K. 1967: Writings of the Young Marx On Philosophy and Society. Ed. & Tr. by 
Easton, L. D. and Guddat, L. D. Anchor Books. New York. 
Maslow, A. H. 1971: The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. Cited in Fox (1990). 
Matanitobua, A. (Ratu) 1988: Panel Discussion. Fiji Rainforests, Our Heritage, and 
Future. Proceedings of the Second National Conservation Congress, Suva, Fiji. 
Mathews, F. 1992: Relating to Nature. Ecopolitics V Proceedings: 489-496. 
351 
May, R. M. 1979: The Structure and Dynamics of Ecological Communities. In Anderson, 
R. M., Turner, B. D., and Taylor, L. R. (eds) Population Dynamics. Blackwell 
Scientific Publications, Oxford. 
McAllister, T. 1990: Second Law Economics. Ecopolitics IV Proceedings: 48-53. 
McCarthy, T. 1975: Introduction to: Legitimation Crisis by Habermas, 1. Beacon Press, 
Boston. 
McCarthy, T. 1978: The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. the MIT Press, Cambridge. 
McEvoy, 1. 1984: St Augustines Account of Time and Wittgenstein's Criticisms. Review 
of Metaphysics 38: 547-577. 
McLoughlin, Q. 1991: Relativistic Naturalism. A Cross-Cultural Approach To Human 
Science. Praeger, New York. 
McMullin, E. 1984: A Case For Scientific Realism. In Leplin, J. (ed). Scientific Realism. 
University of California Press. Berkeley. 
Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. 1., and Randers, J. 1992: Beyond the Limits. Global 
Collapse or a Sustainable Future. Earthscan Publications. London. 
Mehta, 1. L. 1987: Heidegger and Vedanta: Reflections On a Questionable Theme. In 
Parkes, G. (ed) Heidegger and Asian Thought. University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu. 
Merchant, C. 1980: The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution. 
Harper and Row. San Francisco. 
Merchant, C. 1990: Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory. In Diamond, 1., and Ornstein, G. 
F. (eds) Reweaving the World, the Emergence of Ecofeminism. Sierra Club Books, 
San Fransisco. 
Midgley, M. 1978: Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature. Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca. 
Mill, J. S. 1963: The Six Great Humanistic Essays of John Stuart Mill. Washington 
Square Press, New York. 
Ministry for the Environment 1993: Making Connections: an Overview of Agenda 21. 
New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, Wellington. 
Ministry of External Relations and Trade. 1990: Tropical Forests: Sustained Yield 
Management. A Discussion Paper. Appraisal, Evaluation and Analytical Support 
Unit, Development Cooperation Division. Ministry of External Relations and 
Trade, Wellington. 
Mockler, A. 1976: Francis of Assist. The Wandering Years. Phaidon, Oxford. 
352 
Morrison, K. 1994: A Postmodern Feminist Approach to Floodplain Management. 
Unpublished PhD thesis (in prep), School of Natural Resources Engineering, 
Lincoln University. 
Morse, M. 1993: Baskets Speaking Volumes. American Craft 53 (6): 44-49. 
Mouffe, C. 1988: Radical Democracy: Modern Or Postmodem? Trans. P. Holdengraber. 
In A. Ross (ed) Universal Abandon? the Politics of Postmodernism. University of 
Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 
Mulkay, M. 1979: Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. George Allen and Unwin, 
London. 
Mulkay, M. 1991: Sociology of Science. A Sociological Pilgrimage. Indiana University 
Press. Bloomington. 
Murdoch, L 1993: Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Penguin Books, London. 
Naess, A. 1968: Four Modern Philosophers. Carnap Wittgenstein Heidegger Sartre. 
Trans. by A. Hannay. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Naess, A. 1984: Intuition, Intrinsic Value and Deep Ecology. The Ecologist 14: 201-202. 
Naess, A. 1988: Self Realisation: an Ecological Approach to Being in the World. In Seed, 
J., Macy, 1., Flemming, P., and Naess, A. Thinking like a Mountain. Towards a 
Council of all Beings. Heretic Books, London. 
Naess, A. 1989: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Trans. D. Rothenberg. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
Nandy, A. (ed). 1988: Science, Hegemony and Violence. A Requiem For Modernity. The 
United Nations University, Tokyo. Oxford University Press. Bombay. 
Native Land Trust Board 1986: Annual Report. Native Land Trust Board, Suva. 
Nayacakalou, R. R. 1978: Tradition and Change In the Fijian Village. South Pacific 
Social Sciences Association, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific, Suva. 
Nectoux, F., and Kuroda, Y. 1989: Timber from the South Seas. World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) Internationa1. Gland, Switzerland. 
Needleman, J., and Appelbaum, D. 1990: Real Philosophy. An Anthology of the Universal 
Search for Meaning. Penguin, London. 
Neemia, U. F. 1986: Cooperation and Conflict: Costs, Benefits, and National Interests in 
Pacific Regional Cooperation. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South 
Pacific, Suva. 
353 
Neumann, E. 1959: Art and the Creative Unconscious. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Nietzsche, F. 1911: Early Greek Philosophy and other Essays. Trans. M. A. Mugge. 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London. 
Nietzsche, F. 1956: The Birth of Tragedy, and the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Francis 
Golffing. Doubleday, New York. 
Nietzsche, F. 1967: The Will to Power. Translated and edited by W. Kaufmann. Vintage 
Books, New York. 
Nietzsche, F. 1969: On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale. Ecce Homo. Trans. W. Kaufmann. Vintage Books, New York. 
Nietzsche, F. 1973: Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Penguin Books, 
Middlesex. 
Nietzsche, F. 1974: The Gay Science. Trans W. Kaufmann. (Originally published in 
1887). Random House, New York. 
Nollman, J. 1990: Spiritual Ecology. A Guide to Reconnecting with Nature. Bantam 
Books, New York. 
Norris, C. 1985: The Contest of Faculties. Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction. 
Methuen. London. 
Norton, R. 1986: Colonial Fiji: Ethnic Divisions and Elite Conciliation. In Lal, B. (ed) 
Politics In Fiji. Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
Nunn, P. D. 1991: Human and Nonhuman Impacts on Pacific Island Environments. 
Occasional Papers of the East-West Centre Environment and Policy Institute. 
Paper No. 13. 
Nygren, A. 1957: Agape and Eros. Trans. Watson, P. S. S.P.C.K. London. 
O'Biso, C. 1987: First Light. Pan Books, Auckland. 
OHear, A. 1989: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Odum, H. T. 1988: Self-organisation, Transformity, and Information. Science 242: 
1132-1139 
Odum, H. T. 1989: Simulation Models of Ecological Economics Developed With Energy 
Language Methods. Simulation August 1989. 60-75. 
Olafson, F. A. 1993: The Unity of Heidegger's Thought. In Guignon, C. B. (ed) The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
354 
Oldroyd, D. 1986: The Arch of Knowledge. An Introductory Study of the History of the 
Philosophy and Methodology of Science. University of New South Wales Press. 
Kensington. 
Outhwaite, W. 1987: New Philosophies of Social Science. Realism, Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory. St Martins Press. New York. 
Overton, J. 1993: Fiji: Options for Sustainable Development. Scottish Geographical 
Magazine 109 (3): 164-170. 
Overton, J., and Ward, R. G. 1989: The Coups In Retrospect: The New Political 
Geography of Fiji. Pacific Viewpoint 30 (2): 207-218. 
Park, G. N., Hay, R., and Whistler, A. 1992: The National Ecological Survey of Western 
Samoa. The Conservation of Biological Diversity in the Coastal Lowlands of 
Western Samoa. Complied by the New Zealand Department of Conservation on 
behalf of the New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade. Wellington. 
Parkes, G. (ed). 1987: Heidegger and Asian Thought. University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu. 
Peet, J. 1992: Energy and the Ecological Economics of Sustainability. Island Press, 
Washington. 
Percival, 1. 1991: Chaos: A Science For the Real World. In Hall, N. (ed) The 
NewScientist Guide To Chaos. Penguin Books, London. 
Perrings, C. 1987: Economy and Environment. A Theoretical Essay On the 
Interdependence of Economic and Environmental Systems. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Peters, C. M., Gentry, A. H., and Mendelsohn, R. O. 1989: Valuation of an Amazonian 
Rainforest. Nature 339: 655-656. 
Peters, M. 1991: Postmodernism: The Critique of Reason and the Rise of the New Social 
Movements. Sites 22: 142-160 
Pfeffer, R. 1972: Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus. Bucknell University Press, Lewisberg. 
Phillips, A. 1993: Democracy and Difference. Pensylvannia State University Press, 
Pensylvannia. 
Phillips, J. (ed). 1987: Te Whenua Te Iwi. The Land and the People. Allen & Unwin 
Wellington. 
Pianka, E. R. 1981: Competition and Niche Theory. In May, R. M. (ed). Theoretical 
Ecology. Principles and Applications. 2nd Edition. Blackwell Scientific 
Publications, Oxford. 
Pianka, E. R. 1983: Evolutionary Ecology. 3rd. ed. Harper and Row, New York. 
355 
Pickering, A. (ed). 1992: Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Pickett, S. T. A., and White, P. S. 1985: The Ecology of Natural Disturbance and Patch 
Dynamics. Academic Press, Inc. 
Pirsig, R. M. 1974: Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Corgie, London. 
Plant, J (ed). 1989: Healing the Wounds. The Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society 
Publishers. Philadelphia. 
Platt, W. J., and Weiss, L M. 1977: Resource Partitioning and Competition within a guild 
of fugitive Prarie Plants. American Naturalist 111: 479-513. 
Playfair, G. L. 1990: The Evil Eye. The Unacceptable Face of Television. Johnathon 
Cape, London. 
Plumwood, V. 1992: Ecosocial Feminism as a General Theory of Oppression: Towards 
a New Synthesis. Ecopolitics V Proceedings: 63-72. 
Pomeroy, L. R., Hargrove, E. C., and Alberts, 1. J. 1988: The Ecosystem Perspective. In. 
Pomeroy, L. R. and Alberts, J. J. (eds) Concepts of Ecosystem Ecology. A 
Comparative View. Springer-Verlag. NY. 
Popper, K. R. 1982: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Hutchinson. London. 
Postman, N. 1987: Amusing Ourselves to Death. Methuen, London. 
Price, A. F. and Woong Mou-Iam (transl) 1990: The Diamond Sutra & the Sutra of 
Hui-neng. Shambhala Publications. Massachusetts. 
Prigogine, L 1979: From Being to Becoming. San Fransisco. 
Prigogine, I., and Stengel's, L 1984: Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with 
Nature. Bantam, New York. 
Pulea, M. 1991: Environmental Law in Fiji. A Description and Evaluation. Resource 
Report. National Environment Management Project. Technical Assistance to the 
Department of Town and Country Planning, Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development, Fiji. 
Rabuka, M., and Cabaniuk, S. 1988: NLTB's Role In the Administration of Native Lands 
Under Forest. Fiji's Rainforests, Our Heritage and Future: Proceedings of the 
Second National Conservation Congress, Suva, Fiji. National Trust For Fiji. 
Radford-Reuther, R. 1988: To Change the World. Christology and Cultural Criticism. 
Crossroads. NY. 
Radford-Reuther, R. 1989: Toward an Ecological-Feminist Theology of Nature. In J. Plant 
(ed) Healing the Wounds. The Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society, Philadelphia. 
356 
Rainbow, P., and Sullivan, M. 1979: Interpretive Social Science. A Reader. University 
of California Press. Berkeley. 
Randall, A. 1987: Resource Economics. An Economic Approach To Natural Resource and 
Environmental Policy. 2nd Ed. John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Raphael, D. D. 1959: The Paradox of Tragedy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 
Raphael, D. D. 1994: Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Ratu Sukuna. 1940: In Legislative Council on Native Land Trust Bill, 22 February 1940. 
In Scarr, D. 1983 (ed). Fiji: The Three-Legged Stool. Selected Writings of Ratu 
Sir Lala Sukuna. Macmillan Education, London. 
Ravuvu, A, D. 1987: The Fijian Ethos. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific, Suva. 
Ravuvu, A. 1987: Fiji: Contradictory Ideologies and Development. In Hooper et al (eds). 
Class and Culture In the South Pacific. Centre of Pacific Studies, University of 
Auckland and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Ravuvu, A. 1991: The Facade of Democracy. Fijian Struggles For Political Control 
1831-1987. Reader, Suva. 
Ravuvu, A. D. 1988: Development Or Dependence. The Pattern of Change In a Fijian 
Village. University of the South Pacific. Suva. 
Reed, T. J. 1984: Goethe. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Repetto, R (ed). 1984: The Global Possible. Resources, Development and the New 
Century. Yale University Press. New Haven and London. 
Repetto, R, and Gillis, M. 1988: Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Reti, L 1985: Resolving Conflicts Between Traditional Practices and Park Management. 
Proceedings of the Third South Pacific National Parks and Reserves Conference. 
Apia. pp 154-161. 
Rickard, M. J. 1970: Geology of North Eastern Vanua Levu. Bullitin No. 14. Geological 
Survey Department, Ministry of Natural Resources, Fiji. 
Ricklefs, R E. 1983: The Economy of Nature. Chiron Press, NY. 
Ricoeur, P. 1973: The Task of Hermeneutics. Philosophy Today. 17 (2-4): 112-128. 
Ricoeur, P. 1981: Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays on Language, Action 
and Interpretation. Trans. 1. B. Thompson. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
357 
Rist, J. M. (ed). 1978: The Stoics. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Robertson, R. T., and Tamanisan, A. 1988: Shattered Coups. Pluto Press in association 
with the Australian Council for Overseas Aid and the Fiji Independent News 
Service. 
Robie, D. 1989: Blood On Their Banner. Nationalist Struggles In the South Pacific. Pluto 
Press, Australia. 
Rosenberg, B. 1993: Can Aotearoa Survive? Sovereignty, Transnationa1s, and Economic 
Policy. Paper presented at the Peace, Power, and Politics Conference, Wellington, 
June 1993. 
Ross, G. 1993: The Search for the Pearl. A Personal Exploration of Science and 
Mysticism. ABC Books, Sydney. 
Rota, G. 1990: Mathematics and Philosophy: The Story of a Misunderstanding. Review 
of Metaphysics 44: 259-271. 
Rouse, J. 1987: Knowledge and Power. Towards a Political Philosophy of Science. 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
Routledge, D. 1985: Matanitu. The Struggle For Power In Early Fiji. University of the 
South Pacific. 
Ryan, K. 1984: Woman and Nature Under Christianity, Or, How Hierarchies Distort. In 
Sharpe, K. 1., and J. M. Ker (eds). Religion and Nature With Charles Birch and 
Others. Proceedings of the Eighth Auckland Religious Studies Colloquium. 
University of Auckland Chaplaincy.m 31-42 
Sachs, M. 1969: Space, Time, and Elementary Interactions in Relativity. Physics Today 
22: 51-60. Cited in Capra (1975). 
Salleh, A. 1984: Deeper than Deep Ecology. Environmental Ethics vol 6: 339-345. 
Salleh, A. 1990: Living with Nature: Reciprocity or Control? Ecopolitics IV Proceedings: 
629-636. 
Salleh, A. 1992: The EcofeminisrnJDeep Ecology Debate: A Reply to Patriarchal Reason. 
Environmental Ethics 14(3): 195-216. 
Salleh, A. 1993: Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the EcofeminisrnJDeep. Ecology 
Debate. Environmental Ethics 15(3): 225-244. 
Sanday, 1. 1989: The Coups of 1987: A Personal Analysis. Pacific Viewpoint 30 (2): 
116-131. 
Sarup, M. 1989: An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Postmodernism. 
University of Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia. 
358 
Scar, D. 1984: Fiji. A Short History. Allen and Unwin, Sydney. 
Schacht, R. 1971: Alienation. Allen and Unwin, London 
Schopenhauer, A 1965: Oil the Basis of Morality. Originally published in 1840. Trans. 
E. F. Payne. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis. 
Schopenhauer, A 1966: The World as Will and Representation. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. 
(originally published in 1859). Dover Publishing Inc., New York. 
Schumacher, E. F. 1973: Small Is Beautiful. Economics As If People Mattered. Bond and 
Briggs, London. 
Schutte, O. 1984: Beyond Nihilism. Nietzsche Without Masks. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
Seaward, P. 1991: The Restoration, 1660-1688. Macmillan, London. 
Seidman, S., and Wagner, D. G. (eds). 1992: Postmodernism and Social Theory. The 
Debate over General Theory. Blackwell, Cambridge, M. A 
Sevele, F. V. 1987: Aid To the Islands Reviewed. In Hooper et al (eds). Class and 
Culture In the South Pacific. Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Auckland 
and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Shand, D. 1985: Australia: The Intermediate Umbrella. In Crocombe, R., and Ali, A. (eds) 
Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific. 
Sheldrake, R. 1981: A New Science of Life. The Hypothesis of Formative Causation. 
Blond & Briggs. London. 
Sheldrake, R. 1991: The Rebirth of Nature. The Greening of Science and God. Bantam 
Books, New York. 
Shields, R. 1990: Places On the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity. 
Routledge, Chapman, Hall. London. 
Shields, R. 1992: Social Science and Postmodern Spatialisation: Jameson's Aesthetic of 
Cognitive Mapping. In Doherty, J., Graham, E., and Malek, M. (eds) 
Postmodernism and the Social Sciences. St Martins Press. New York. 
Simmel, G. 1991: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Trans. H. Loiskandl, D. Weinsrein, and 
M. Weinstein. University of Illinois Press, Urbana. 
Singer, L 1966: The Nature of Love. 1 Plato to Luther 2nd edition. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Singh, B. 1985: Owner Involvement in the Establishment of Parks. Proceedings of the 
Third National Parks and Reserves Conference. Apia. pp 269-270. 
359 
Slesser, M. 1989: Towards an Exact Human Ecology. In Grubb, P. J., and Whittaker, J. 
B. Towards a More Exact Ecology. Blackwell, Oxford, UK. 423-436. 
Smedes, L. B. 1978: Love Within Limits. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich. 
Smith, M. 1973: Studies in Early Mysticism in the Near and Middle East. Philo Press, 
Amsterdam. 
Snyder, G. 1980: The Real Work: Interviews and Talks - 1964-1979. Edited and 
Introduced by William Scott McLean. New Directions, New York. 
Sofer, M. 1985a: Yaqona and Peripheral Economy. Pacific Viewpoint 26 (2): 415-436. 
Sofer, M. 1985b: The Dependancy Paradigm Applied to the Fiji Periphery. Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 6 (2): 127-138. 
Sofer, M. 1988: Core-Periphery Structure in Fiji. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 6 (1): 55-74. 
Soja, E. W. 1989: Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space In Critical Social 
Theory. Verso. London. 
Sokolowski, R. 1990: The Question of Being. Review of Metaphysics 43: 707-710. 
South Pacific Policy Review Group. 1990: Towards a Pacific Island Community. 
Government of New Zealand, Wellington. 
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme 1989: Action Strategy for Nature 
Conservation in the South Pacific. South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN). 
South, G. R. 1993: The South Pacific Biodiversity Conservation Programme. Pacific 
Conservation Biology 1 (1): 2. 
Southern, W. 1986: The Late Quaternary Environment of Fiji. Unpublished PhD Thesis. 
Australian National University, Canberra. Cited in Brookfield and Overton (1988). 
Spate, O. H. L. 1959: The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects. Legislative 
Council Paper No. 13 of 1959. Fiji Government, Suva. 
Sponsel, L. E., and Natadecha, P. 1988: Buddhism, Ecology, and Forests In Thailand: 
Past, Present, and Future. In Dargavel, J., Dixon, K, and Semple, N. (eds). 
Changing Tropical Forests. Tropical Forest History Working Group (S.6.07.0l), 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
Spretnak, C. 1989: Toward an Ecofeminist Spirituality. In J. Plant (ed) Healing the 
Wounds. The Promise of Ecofeminism. New Society, Philadelphia. 
360 
Sprigge, T. L. S. 1988: The Rational Foundations of Ethics. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London. 
Starhawk 1979: The Spiral Dance: Rebirth of the Ancient Religion of the Goddess. Harper 
and Row, San Fransisco. 
Steele, D. 1990: Where To the Socialist Left Now? the Implications of Eastern Europe 
and Other Questions. The Republican, April. 12-20. 
Stevens, A. 1990: On lung. Routledge, London. 
Stone, M. 1979: The Ancient Mirrors of Womanhood. Beacon Press, Boston. 
Storm, H. 1972: Seven Arrows. Ballantine Books. 
Sundrum, R. M. 1983: Development Economics. A Framework For Analysis and Policy. 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. NY. 
Sutherland, W. 1989: The New Political Economy of Fiji. Pacific Viewpoint 30 (2): 
132-141. 
Sutich, A. J. 1976: The Emergence of the Transpersonal Orientation: A Personal Account. 
The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 8: 5-19. Cited in Fox (1990). 
Suzuki, D. T. 1969: An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. Rider and Company. London. 
Suzuki, D., and Knudtson, P. 1992: Wisdom of the Elders. Honouring Sacred Native 
Visions of Nature. Bantam Books, New York. 
Tamas, R. 1991: The Passion of the Western Mind. Understanding the Ideas that have 
shaped our World View. Ballantine Books, New York. 
Tavaiqia, J. 1988: Opening Address - Minister of Forests. Proceedings of the 2nd 
National Conservation Congress. National Trust For Fiji. 
Taylor, M. C. 1984: Erring: A Postmodern A/theology. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Taylor, R. 1976: Critique of Kantian Morality. In Rachels, 1. (ed) Understanding Moral 
Philosophy. Dickenson, California. 
Tejera, V. 1987: Nietzsche and Greek Thought. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht. 
Terborgh, J. and Robinson, S. 1986: Guilds and their Utility in Ecology. In Kikkawa, J., 
and Anderson, D. J. (eds) Community Ecology: Pattern and Process. Blackwell, 
Melbourne. 
361 
Thaman, R. R 1985: Microparks In The Pacific Islands - the Role of Traditional and 
Modern Small Scale Conservation Areas In the Pacific Islands. Conference Report 
- Vol 2. Third South Pacific National Parks & Reserves Conference. South Pacific 
Commission. 215-236 
The Frankfurt Institute For Social Research. 1973: Aspects of Sociology. Heinemann, 
London. 
Thetford, W., and Walsh, R. 1985: Theories of Personality and Psychopathology: Schools 
Derived from Psychology and Philosophy. In Kaplan, H. L, and Sadock, B. 1. 
(eds) Comprehensive Textbook Psychiatry. 4th ed. Williams and Wilkins, 
Baltimore. 
Thoreau, H, D. 1987: The Maine Woods. Originally published in 1864. Harper and Row, 
New York. 
Thoreau, H. D. 1980: Walden. Originally published in 1854. Reprinted by the New 
American Library, New York. 
Thorpe, R, and Humphreys, L. 1991: Management Plan for Waisali Protected Area. 
National Trust for Fiji, Suva. 
Tilling, A. J. 1989: Alternative Use of the West Coast Indigenous Forests. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis. School of Forestry, University of Canterbury, NZ. 
Tongamoa, T. (ed) 1988: Pacific Women. Roles and Status of Women in Pacific Societies. 
Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
Toulmin, S. 1981: Human Adaptation. In Jensen, U. 1., and Harre, R. (eds) The 
Philosophy of Evolution. Harvester Press, Sussex. 
Trainer, T. 1985: Abandon Affluence! Zed Books, London. 
Trainer, T. 1989: Developed to Death: Rethinking Third World Development. Green 
Print, London. 
Trainer, T. 1992: The Nature of a Sustainable Society. Ecopolitics V Proceedings: 
193-198. 
Trask, H. 1987: Hawaii: Colonisation and Decolonisation. In Hooper, A, Britton, S., 
Crocombe, R, Huntsman, J., and Macpherson, C. (eds) Class and Culture in the 
South Pacific. Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Auckland, and Institute 
of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific. 
Tuck, R. 1989: Hobbes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Tukai, M. 1988: Modernisation Theory and a Fijian Village. In Overton, 1. (ed) Rural 
Fiji. Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva. 
362 
Twyford, 1. T., and Wright, C. S. 1965: The Soil Resources of the Fiji Islands. 
Government Printer, Suva 
United Nations 1990: World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of 
Children. World Summit for Children, United Nations, New York. 
Usher, M. B., Davis, P. R, Harris, J. R. W., and Longstaff, B. C. 1979: A Profusion of 
Species? Approaches Towards Understanding the Dynamics of Populations of the 
Micro-Althropods In Decomposer Communities. In Anderson, R. M., Turner, B. 
D., and Taylor, (eds). Population Dynamics. Blackwell Scientific Publications, 
Oxford. 
Vattimo, G. 1988: The End of Modernity. Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modem 
Culture. Trans. Jon R. Snyder. Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Veblen, T. T., and Ashton, D. H. 1978: Catastrophic Influences On the Vegetation of the 
Valdivian Andes, Chile. Vegetato 36: 149-167. 
Veblen. T. T., and Stewart, G. H. 1980: Comparison of Forest Structure and Regeneration 
On Bench and Stewart Islands, New Zealand. New Zealand Journal of Ecology 3: 
50-68. 
Vincent, D. 1987: The Eternity of Being. On the Experience of Time in Goethe's Faust. 
Bouvier, Bonn. 
Vusoniwailala, L. 1985: Communication, Social Identity and the rising cost of Fijian 
Communalism. Pacific Perspective 12 (2): 1-7. 
Wachterhauser, B. R 1986: Introduction. History and Language in Understanding. In 
Wachterhauser, B. R. (ed) Hermeneutics and Modem Philosophy. State University 
of New York Press, Albany. 
Wachterhauser, B. R. (ed) 1986: Hermeneutics and Modem Philosophy. State University 
of New York Press, Albany. 
Waddell, E. 1977: The Return To Traditional Agriculture. The Only Means of Solving the 
World Food Problem. The Ecologist 7 (4): 144-147. 
Waddell, E. 1994: Jean-Marie Tjibaou: Kanak Witness to the World. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Waddington, C. H. 1977: Tools For Thought. Johnathon Cape, London. 
Wallerstein, 1. 1974: The Modem World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins 
of the European World-Economy In the Sixteenth Century. Academic Press, NY. 
Walsh, R N., and Vaughan, F. (eds) 1980: Beyond Ego: Transpersonal Dimensions in 
Psychology. J. P. Tarcher, Los Angeles. 
363 
Wardle, J. A. 1984: The New Zealand Beeches. Ecology, Utilisation and Management. 
New Zealand Forest Service. 
Watling, D. 1992: The National Environment Strategy. IUCN. Technical Assistance to the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Fiji. 
Watling, D., and Chape, S. P. (eds) 1992: Environment Fiji - the National State of the 
Environment Report. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland. 
Watts, A. 1974: Cloud-Hidden, Whereabouts Unknown. A Mountain Journal. Vintage 
Books, New York. 
Watts, A. W. 1957: The Way of Zen. Pantheon Books. New York. 
Watts, G. R. 1980: Forestry, In R. G. Ward and A. Proctor (eds) South Pacific 
Agriculture: Choices and Constraints. Asian Development Bank, Manila and ANU 
Press, Canberra. 293-323. 
Weaver, S. A. 1987: An Introduction to the Regeneration of Fijian Kauri following 
Logging. Unpublished BSc Hons Dissertation. Victoria University, Wellington. 
Weaver, S. A. 1989: Surveying the Forests of the Fiji Dry Zone. Forest and Bird 29 (2): 
22-25 
Weaver, S. A. 1992: The Eco-fix That Needs Fixing. Pacific Islands Monthly 62 (1): 54 
Weaver, S. A. 1992: Forest History and Environmental Policy in Fiji. Ecolopitics V 
Proceedings: 291-295 
Weaver, S. A. 1992: Paradise Lost? Treading the Delicate Balance Between Economy and 
Ecology. Pacific Islands Monthly 62 (7): 17-18 
Weaver, S. A. 1992: Fiji Environmental Management Areas Programme Proposal. 
Resource RepOlt. Fiji National Environment Management Project. Technical 
Assistance to the Department of Town and Country Planning, Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Development. Suva. 
Weaver, S. A. 1993: Conserving Forests. Can Environmental Protection With a Human 
Face Be Achieved In Tribal Lands In the Pacific? Pacific Islands Monthly 63 (2): 
48-49 
Weber, A. 1990: Lyotard's Combative Theory of Discourse. Telos (3), Spring 1990. 
141-150 
Weber, M. 1958: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In Giddens, A. 1980. 
Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, 
Durkheim and Max Weber. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Weber, R. 1986: Dialogues with Scientists and Sages. The Search for Unity. Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. London. 
364 
Weinstein, D. A., and Shugart, H. H. 1983: Ecological Modeling of Landscape Dynamics: 
In Mooney, H. A., and Godron, M. (eds). Disturbance and Ecosystems. 
Components of Response. Springer Verlag, NY. 
Weiskrantz, L. (ed). 1988: Thought Without Language. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Weiss, P. A. 1969: The Living System: Determinism Stratified. In Koestler, A., and 
Smythies, J. R. (eds) Beyond Reductionism: New Perspectives in the Life Sciences. 
Hutchinson. London. 
Weissermann, G. 1990: Economics, Entropy and the Environment: Why Economics has 
no Answer for Environmental Problems. Ecopolitics IV Proceedings: 161-168. 
Westphal, M. 1986: Hegel and Gadamer. In Wachterhauser, B. R. (ed). Hermeneutics and 
Modem Philosophy. State University of New York Press, Albany. 
White, L. Jr. 1967: The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis. Science. 155 (3767): 
1203-1207 
Whitehead, A. N. 1929: Process and Reality. An Essay In Cosmology. 1978 edition edited 
by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne. MacMillan. New York. 
Whitehead, A. N. 1930: The Concept of Nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Whitman, W. 1959: Leaves of Grass (first edition). Edited and introduced by M. Cowley. 
First published 1855. Penguin Books, New York. 
Whitmore, T. C. 1982: On Pattern and Process In Forests. In Newman, E. I. (ed). The 
Plant Community As a Working Mechanism. Special Publication No.I. British 
Ecological Society. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford. 
Whittaker, R. H. 1975: Communities and Ecosystems 2nd ed. Macmillan, New York. 
Whittaker, R. H., and Levin, S. A. 1975: Niche. Theory and Application. Dowden 
Hutchinson and Ross Inc. 
Whorf, B. L. 1956: Language, Thought, and Reality. The MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A. 
Wilber, K. 1983: Up From Eden. A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution. Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London. 
Wilber, K. 1990~ Eye to Eye. The Quest for the New Paradigm. Shambhala, Boston. 
Williams, 1. G. 1978: Yeshua Buddha. An Interpretation of New Testament Theology As 
a Meaningful Myth. Quest Books. Wheaton, Illinois. 
Williams, T. 1858: Fiji and the Fijians. Volume I the Islands and Their Inhabitants. 
Alexander Heylin, 28, Paternoster Row. 
365 
Wilson, B. A. 1989: About Interpretation. From Plato to Dilthy - a hermeneutics 
Anthology. Peter Lang, New York. 
Wiser, J, L. 1983: Political Philosophy: A History of the Search For Order. Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., New Jersey. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1922: Tractartus Logico-Philosophicus. Paperback edition published in 
1974 by Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1953: Philosophical Investigations. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Wood, D. K. 1982: Men Against Time. Nicolas Berdyaev, T. S. Eliot, Aldous Huxley, and 
C. G. Jung. University Press of Kansas, Kansas. 
Woodiwis, A. 1990: Social Theory After Postmodernism. Rethinking Production, Law and 
Class. Pluto Press. London. 
World Commission On Environment and Development. 1987: Our Common Future. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
Worsley, P. (ed). 1992: Introducing Sociology. Penguin Books, London. 
Wrangham, R. W. 1987: The Significance of African Apes for Reconstructing Human 
Social Evolution. In Kinzey, W. G. (ed) The Evolution of Human Behaviour. 
Primate Models. State University of New York Press, Albany. 
Wright, W. 1992: Wild Knowledge. Science, Language, and Social Life in a Fragile 
Environment. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
Wynne, B., and Mayer, S. 1993: How Science Fails the Environment. New Scientist vol 
138 (1876): 33-35. 
Yabaki, K. T. 1988: Managing Fiji's Rainforests. Fiji's Rainforests, Our Heritage and 
Future: Proceedings of the 2nd National Conservation Congress, Suva, Fiji. 
National Trust For Fiji. 
Young, 1. M. 1990: Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Zablocki, B. 1971: The Joyful Community. Penguin, Baltimore. 
Zimmerman, M. F. 1983: Toward a Heideggerean Ethos For Radical Environmentalism. 
Environmental Ethics 3 (2): 99-131. 
Zohar, D. 1990: The Quantum Self. A Revolutionary View of Human Nature and 
Consciousness Rooted In the New Physics. Bloomsbury. London. 
Zukav, G. 1979: The Dancing Wu Ii Masters. Rider Press. 
366 
Zwart, P. J. 1976: About Time. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of 
Time. North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam. 
367 
APPENDIX 1 - A GENEALOGY OF DOMINATION 
The positivist paradigm is a philosophical approach to natural and social science that has 
become the most predominant intellectual force in western thought since the second half 
of the 19th century (Carr and Kemmis 19861). Positivism is a form of scientific 
empiricism. Included in this empiricist tradition is the eady positivism of Comte, logical 
positivism, Carnapian empiricism, Popperism, conventionalism, pragmatism, and the 
classical empiricism of Hume (see Outhwaite 1987; Hooker 1987 for example). 
Empiricism refers to an epistemology based solely on sensory experience, thus rejecting 
any claims that knowledge can be derived from anything beyond the human senses. 
Empiricism could be regarded as a development within the Cartesian reductionist world 
view. I will explain the influence of Descartes below. In the empiricist view reality is 
regarded as inherently simple and mathematical and therefore can be described most 
precisely in mathematical terms. It accordingly relies on the collection of empirical data 
as the basis for uncovering objective knowledge from an objective reality. It also claims 
that by being quantitative and thus 'objective' the scientist can retreat from the 
investigation as a subjective personality through the empiricist claim to value neutrality. 
The ideal of empiricism is to objectively explain nature through statistical correlations 
and universal causal laws (see Gale 1979; Kyburg 1990; McLoghlin 1991; Oldroyd 1986 
for explanations of empiricism). 
The roots of empiricism lUn deep into the history of Western philosophy and can be 
traced at least as far back as the 17th century. One underlying feature in the 
development of modern science was the desire to be value neutral and thus objective in 
scientific inquiry. The desire to be value neutral was evident in the efforts of European 
scientists of the early modern era who were developing a new science that was to 
overcome the limitations of the hitherto existing intellectual climate based on the 
authority of tradition and the Church. An alternative epistemology was developed that 
attempted to communicate a message of reality in a language as if Nature itself were 
speaking. Such a language would not tolerate the subjectivity inherent in the human 
condition, such as emotions, ethics, or religious beliefs, and wished to allow Nature 
itself to speak uninterlUpted. In his book 'New Organon' Francis Bacon wrote:-
I...dwelling purely and constantly among the facts of nature, withdraw my 
intellect from them no further than may suffice to let the images and rays of 
natural objects meet in a point, as they do in the sense of vision; whence it 
follows that the strength and excellence of the wit has but little to do in the 
matter (Bacon 1620: 13-14, cited in Wiser 1983). 
Through such an approach Bacon wanted to bring a form of egalitarianism into science. 
Plato had made access to knowledge hierarchically stlUctured where it was mediated 
ICarr and Kemmis (1986) focus more specifically on positivism which is one variant of 
empiricism, although all of the empiricist formulas share much in common in terms of their 
ontology and the general epistemology. Differences tend to come in the form of variants in 
the finer details of epistemology (see Hooker 1987). 
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through the practice of reason and rationality carried out by philosophers. But under the 
influence of Bacon knowledge through objective science was available to all. Bacon was 
also critical of the Greeks in their armchair deductivism and set about to develop a form 
of science based on empirical induction using perceived facts to piece together 
explanations of Nature (Wiser 1983; Capra 1982). According to Bacon such a method 
would circumvent disagreements among scientists leaving consensus to be the judge of 
truth. 
Within the Baconian view the entire context of science began to change to a pursuit of 
knowledge for purposes of the domination and control of Nature (Capra 1982). The 
latter view was sustained by the church where humans were to dominate Nature as 
directed in the book of Genesis (Ryan 1984). In Bacon's view Nature became 
personified, made feminine, and 'hounded in her wanderings', 'bound into service', made 
a 'slave', and 'put into constraint', where scientists would 'torture nature's secrets from 
her' (Ryan 1984; Capra 1982). The sexist language used by Bacon when referring to the 
rest of Nature was not new to science as the use of a feminine metaphor for 'Nature' was 
used as far back as Aristotle. But not only did the ancient Greeks use the feminine 
metaphor of 'Nature' but they also contributed to the entrenched Western ethic whereby 
this feminine object was provided exclusively for 'man'. In this regard Aristotle states 
"Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be 
that she has made all animals for the sake of man." (Aristotle - The Politics 1256b 20). 
Under the influence of Bacon such language became incorporated into his new science. 
The social implications for such a language and use of a feminine metaphor for the rest 
of Nature was to help reinforce the domination of women in modern society (Kheel 
1989; Daly 1978; Harding 1986; Merchant 1980). 
Given the context of social and political life in the late middle ages being dominated by 
the enormous bureaucracy of an authoritarian church entangled in political hegemony 
(Elton 1963), the scientific revolution can be seen as a refreshing departure. The 
dawning of the new science did not constitute an absolute rejection of Christianity, far 
from it. The early scientists were also reinterpreting the image of Nature through science 
as a direct experience of God's creation (David Bohm in Weber ] 986). These early 
scientists were also contributing to a rising religious order. Theology and science were 
eager to crush alternative doctrines such as alchemy and witch craft which represented 
a threat to them both. Such a relationship between the church and the rising science is 
a testament to the holocaust of the late middle ages in the genocide of herbalists and 
witches (Kheel 1989; Ryan 1984; Capra 1982). 
The views of Bacon were built upon by many involved in assembling the foundations 
of the modern scientific age. A notable example is Rene Descartes (1596-1650). 
According to Descartes, reality is inherently simple and therefore our knowl~dge of it 
should be precise (Wiser 1983). This desire for precision paved the way for the rise of 
mathematics as the language of the new science. Descartes claimed that mathematics 
was the superior of the sciences and he explicitly rejected the non-mathematical ones. 
jhis commitment to mathematics as the most superior of the sciences also represents a 
commitment to an empiricist ontology where mathematics is seen as the language of 
Nature (see Oldroyd 1986). Should Nature be inherently mathematical the human 
language of mathematics would represent the discovery of an epistemology that directly 
corresponds with reality. This is indeed what the early scientists (and many modern 
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scientists) believed they had found. 
CARTESIAN REDUCTIONISM 
Cartesian reductionism is a method of gaining scientific knowledge about the world. 
Descartes developed a methodological framework that greatly influenced the subsequent 
development of science. Reductionism as an epistemology (theory of knowledge) implies 
a certain theory of reality (ontology) in order that we may come to have knowledge 
about it. Levins and Lewontin (1985) have identified at least four ontological 
commitments inherent in Cartesian reductionism. 
1. There is a natural set of units or parts of which any whole is made. 
2. These units are homogenous within themselves with respect to the whole. 
3. The parts are ontologically prior to the whole; i.e. the isolated parts come 
together to form the whole. The parts have properties which they lend to 
the whole. 
4. Causes are separate from effects. Causes are the property of subjects, and 
effects are the property of objects. Causes may respond to feedback 
effects but there is no ambiguity about where the cause is, i.e. the 
location of the subject and the object. 
Using such an ontology, complex reality is broken down into its simplest forms which 
are also broken down if possible. Complex structures are then reconstructed by 
progressing from the simple to the complex - from the Palt to the whole. Such a view 
is contrary to the view of Aristotle who suggests that" ... the whole is of necessity prior 
to the part;" (Aristotle - The Politics 1253a20). 
In terms of systems theory such a commitment to the reductionist method claims that 
the whole is no more than the sum of its parts. This is what a machine is, and for this 
reason Descartes coined the great metaphor of the modern age - that the universe as a 
machine. This notion has since spread from the physical to the biological and the social 
sciences in the form of the Cartesian reductionist paradigm. It has contributed to the 
biomedical model and the corresponding allopathic conceptualisation of disease and 
healing expressed in modern medical science (see Capra 1982; Davies 1991). Molecular 
biology and a great deal of modern genetics has also developed along these reductionist 
lines where a living organism is merely a complex machine made up of molecules and 
organised by special molecules called DNA. 
The machine metaphor for living systems has been developed to great lengths in 
molecular genetics by what Levins and Lewontin (1985) describe as 'vulgar Darwinists' 
such as Richard Dawkins (1976) who describes living organisms as "robots ... controlled 
body and mind" by the genes as merely a way of making other genes. Such a view 
would make the study of ecology and evolution as valid only if carried out by means 
of molecular biology and geology (Levins and Lewontin 1985). 
Descartes' work can also be understood in terms of his dualist ontology where body and 
mind are seen as mutually exclusive. In attempting to define the self he could 
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conceptualise that the only thing that pointed to his existence was the fact that has was 
thinking. All other aspects of his existence such as his body were theoretically 
expendable, and from this he coined the well known phrase "cognito ergo sum" (I think 
therefore I am) (see Wiser 1983 for example). Such a view teaches people to 
conceptualise of themselves as a mind trapped inside a biological machine thus 
alienating body from mind. 
The work of Isaac Newton (born in 1642) essentially realised Descartes revolution in 
science by synthesizing the works of Copernicus, Bacon, Kepler, Descartes and Galileo 
into a unified theory of science (Oldroyd 1986). Prior to Newton there had been a 
conflict between the inductive methodology of Bacon and the rational deductive method 
of Descmtes (Capra 1982). But in his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica 
(published in 1687) Newton introduced a mixture of both induction and deduction 
encompassing experimentation with systematic interpretation and deduction with 
experimental evidence. This piece of work is regarded by some as the most important 
single piece of work published in the physical sciences (e.g see Hawking 1988). 
Newtonian mechanics fOlmed the basis for modem physics from the realms of 
astronomy to subatomic particles. It is also provides the conceptual basis for classical 
and neo-classical economics, political philosophy since John Locke (referred to below), 
many forms of modern science, and some forms of environmental management. The 
Newtonian paradigm has been the pre-eminent form of science for three centuries, 
challenged in physics only recently (in the 20th century) with the work of Einstein, 
Bohr, Hisenberg, Born, Schrodinger, Bohm, and de Broglie among many others, on 
quantum mechanics. 
Newton contributed greatly to the tradition of empiricist ontology where Nature is 
assumed to be governed by mechanical mathematical laws with mathematics as the 
language of Nature. His mathematical depiction of Nature through differential calculus 
supposedly corresponded to reality itself (Gale 1979). Leibinz, who was a contemporary 
of Newton, also contributed to the development of calculus but differed from Newton 
in his metaphysical interpretation of the application of calculus. Leibinz rejected 
Newton's idea of ultimate particles as the building blocks of reality forwarding the 
alternative view of energy fields as the basis for material existence (Gale 1979). The 
field concept has, of course, become a central feature of contemporary quantum 
mechanics under the influence of Einstein, Faraday, de Broglie, Schrodinger for example 
(Kripps 1987). 
The on-going schism in physics that developed during the 20th century is based on 
different metaphysical interpretations of the anomalies of quantum mechanics and 
arguments relating to the role of the consciousness of the observer, the Einstein-
Podolski-Rosen paradox, and the wave! particle duality (Popper 1982; Krips 1987; Capra 
1975, 1982; Zohar 1990; Weber 1986; Zukav 1979; BohITl, 1980). Such challenges do 
not concern particular issues within the standard Newtonian scientific paradigm but 
relate to fundamental aspects of ontology that call into question the Newtonian paradigm 
itself. In other words the Newtonian ontology becomes unstuck in contemporary 
quantum mechanics. Other challenges to the Cartesian and Newtonian ontologies can 
also be found in a variety of disciplines including systems theory, mathematics, and the 
biological and social sciences (see Outhwaite 1987; Bhaskar 1978, 1979, 1986; Flood 
and Ulrich 1990; Field 1980; Levins and Lewontin 1985; Koestler and Smythies 1969 
for example). 
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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Developments in the philosophy and methodology of science were inextricably linked 
with social and political life. The emerging Cartesian/Newtonian scientific paradigm, 
which comprised the fertile soil from which empiricism later grew also found its way 
into political and social philosophy, thus influencing the scientific interpretations of 
social and political reality. It is important to briefly trace the initial construction of 
modem social and political theory as a breed of CartesianlNewtonian philosophy, as 
these developments remain central to the assumptions that legitimate current social and 
political practices in modem Fiji. Modem applications of Cartesian and Newtonian 
philosophy arise in Fiji in' neo-classical economics and economic development, the 
structure of the Fiji political economy, and in forms of environmental research and 
management. 
The 17th century thus saw parallel epistemological developments in social and political 
theory. The work of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were important contributions to 
political philosophy (Curtis 1981a) representing an embryonic political and economic 
branch of the emerging modem scientific age (Wiser 1983). Hobbes (1588-1672) was 
a contemporary of Galileo and Descartes and at one time worked as a secretary to 
Francis Bacon. Inspired by Euclidean geometry he attempted to graft it to philosophy 
and produce a new science of politics. His most important work in relation to this study 
was Leviathan published in 1651 (see Tuck 1989). He pursued a Cartesian notion of 
atomism in a social context where society is merely the sum of its parts with the 
individual comprising the natural social unit. He was a mechanical philosopher (Oldroyd 
1986) who applied the Cartesian machinery to humanity. For Hobbes society is 
constructed for the individual. This theme became a fundamental assumption for 
liberalism that developed into a major intellectual force during the 19th century (e.g. J.S. 
Mill). 
In the works of Hobbes the search for natural laws of human nature become prominent. 
Whereas the Greeks looked toward the character of the philosopher as the yardstick to 
understand humanity (e.g Aristotle The Politics), Hobbes looked towards the passions 
of the solitary 'primitive' individual. People are seen to move towards pleasure and away 
from pain and the natural human condition is one of competitive struggle. Like 
Machiavelle, Hobbes sought to influence a particular political order, which in this case 
was the English monarchy at the time of the English civil war (Seaward 1991). His 
epistemology subordinates politics to economic life and moral order to the dictates of 
economic production. In this he set in motion the value of utility over quality for 
economic goods (Wiser 1983). 
John Locke (1632-1704) became involved in the rising English protestant bourgeois 
movement which was attempting to secure constitutional parliamentary government 
against an Anglican monarchy (Curtis 1981a; Dunn 1984). Support for the monarchy 
came largely from the landed nobility, whereas the supporters of parliament were 
predominantly capitalists (Wiser 1983). Locke's self appointed task was to set the 
philosophical underpinnings of Newton's scientific work using empiricist techniques in 
philosophy which became very useful for the rising capitalist economic order. It also 
represented an early form of scientific naturalism where the methodologies and/or 
theories of the physical sciences were used for gaining knowledge of and interpreting 
the social world. In the process Locke (a protestant) broke away from the rationalism 
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of Descmies and Newton and developed a form of nominalism. This nominalism was 
not unlike the nominalism of William of Ockham (1285-1347) who criticised the 
apparent rationalism of Thomas Aquinas (Catholic). Martin Luther was influenced by 
Ockham, and came to set in motion the Reformation and the birth of protestantism in 
the early and mid 16th century (Elton 1963; Wiser 1983). Locke's protestant and 
bourgeois partisanship was a transparent undercurrent to his philosophy. 
Locke referred to the human mind as a tabula rasa2 upon which the senses record their 
perceptions and in the process prepared the philosophical basis for empiricist psychology 
used by the utilitarians. This theory of mind was to be used as the philosophical 
justification for various scientific undertakings of the time including mechanical 
philosophy and principles of causality. Such a world view held that practically all 
phenomena (including mental) could be defined in mechanical terms (Oldroyd 1986). 
Locke's political thinking was, according to Curtis (1981a), a philosophical 
generalisation about the virtues of the English revolution of 1688. Locke provided a 
philosophical counter attack to the absolutism of Hobbes and contributed greatly for the 
liberalism that was to follow in subsequent centuries. In this regard Locke contributed 
to the growing popular debate such that private gain naturally contributes to the public 
good - the notion of enlightened self interest. According to Wiser (1983) Locke's 
argument was that private appropriation increased the amount of product available for 
others which is a positive condition. With Locke the value of utility over all other forms 
of value is given a philosophical boost. Unlimited appropriation supports unlimited 
productivity, which is said to be the primary source of social improvement. Such a view 
represented a substantial contribution to the capitalist morality later expanded on by 
Jeremy Bentham, Edmund Burke, David Ricardo and Adam Smith. Smith's famous term 
"the invisible hand" refers to the notion of enlightened self interest (see Galbraith 1987). 
The political expression of Locke's philosophy was an argument for a limited 
constitutional government (i.e liberalist) that did not limit private gain over public good. 
Locke's contribution to politics is also significant in the area of the structure of 
parliamentary government where he splits government into a legislative ann and an 
executive arm. This structure of government has been used throughout Fiji's European 
political history although it has since been modified with the new constitution of 1990. 
On human nature, Locke's philosophy contributed to the ideas later developed in the 
French Enlightenment in the mid to late 18th century. Views such as individualism, 
representative government, property rights and free markets promoted in the 
Enlightenment became very popular both in European and North American politics. 
Thomas Jefferson, for example, was influenced by Locke and incorporated his ideas into 
the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution (Wiser 1983). 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
Modern scientific thought was championed during the years of the Enlightenment by 
prominent theorists such as Voltaire, Diderot, and Turgot. The science of Newton and 
the politics of Locke were popularised in the years leading up to the French Revolution 
in 1789. Locke's view of human nature as guided by physics was consistent with the 
2"Tabula rasa" refers to a clean slate. 
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language of Newton and thereby legitimised in the eyes of Voltaire (Wiser 1983). The 
notion of enlightened self interest appealed to Voltaire as it justified the control of 
government as sought by the French revolutionaries. A major contribution to the 
popularisation of reductionist science was Diderot's Encyclopedia. This work involved 
the establishment of a new tradition in the scientific world view. Science was placed 
above the church as a worldly authority although God was still seen as the author of the 
Caltesian machine. 
An important ethic to rise from the French experience was that of universal human 
'progress' which, according to Curtis (1981b), became the animating and controlling idea 
of Western civilisation. Non-western cultures are seen as primitive and in need of 
civilisation. Such ideas were to become canonised as the illustrious moral cornerstones 
of European colonialism and the social and cultural conversion of tribal peoples 
unfortunate enough to become objects of Western cultural evangelism. Condorcet 1743-
1794 promoted the ideas of modern historicism (Curtis 1981 b) where 'progress' is 
interpreted as a pre-determined historical trajectory that leads all cultures towards the 
celebrated end point in human cultural evolution - a condition equivalent to noble 
French society. Voltaire also viewed history as a trajectory of human intellectual 
development leading from the barbarian to the civilised. This view was also supported 
by Turgot (Wiser 1983) who described three stages in human intellectual evolution 
which proceed in the order given below:-
1. Barbarian 
2. Greek philosophy! Christian theology 
3. Modern scientific 
The third stage is supposed to be one of renewed equality through the workings of 
enlightened self interest (Adam Smith's invisible hand). These views were developed at 
a time of European colonial expansion and an intensification of the intemationalisation 
of industrial capitalism. During this time Adam Smith was promoting the ideas of an 
economic nation in his book The Wealth of Nations published in 1776. Smith promoted 
the internationalisation of capitalism from the economic base of a single nation state as 
part of the development of the industrial revolution (Galbraith 1987; Barber 1967). It 
was during this time that England colonised Ireland and India with its newly expanding 
Empire where the lessons of Smith were put into practice. The internationalisation of 
capitalism and its partnership with colonialism is, of course, a crucial component in the 
cultural history of Fiji which was officially established as a colonial economy in 1874. 
HUME, KANT AND CLASSICAL EMPIRICISM 
Science went through a period of transition during the 18th century with the substantial 
contributions from David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
Significant in the philosophical works of Kant and Hume was their break away from the 
rationalism of Descartes and Newton which paved the way for classical empiricism. For 
Kant no real things actually existed apart from our theories or concepts of them - hence 
Kant's transcendental idealism (Bhaskar 1975). Hume on the other hand put forward the 
notion that the mind cannot know cause or effect, only their empirical manifestations. 
Because we cannot know cause or effect we cannot know causal laws, but we can find 
evidence for them in empirical research. This, according to Hume, is both necessary and 
sufficient for scientific knowledge to be possible (Outhwaite 1987). 
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Whereas rationalism claimed to know reality through reason, Hume claimed that even 
if natural laws did exist they cannot necessarily be known. This is due to Hume's 
'problem of induction'. According to Hume induction is not proof, and induction is 
limited to what the human senses are capable of perceiving. Hume states that: [f]here 
can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had 
no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience (his emphasis, cited in 
Oldroyd 1986: 114). 
Inductive reasoning suggests that past experiences can be accurately extrapolated to 
future predictions. But inductive arguments cannot be turned into deduction. For this 
reason there will always be a division between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. 
Notwithstanding the problem of induction, empirical science from the time of Bacon 
until the present has relied very heavily on inductive reasoning as a basis for knowledge 
and explanation. In response to Hume's criticism of empiricism vis-a-vis induction 
people such as Kant, Mill, and Herschel worked to develop and strengthen the logical-
empiricist scientific tradition (Oldroyd 1986). 
According to Kant the use of Cartesian rationalism did not succeed in increasing the 
sum of human knowledge (Curtis 1981b). As mentioned above Hume had already stated 
that the problem of induction prevented humanity from knowing causes which suggested 
that science was not firmly grounded in a hole-proof ontology, Kant disagreed with this 
and submitted that the rationalists had failed due to their attempts in building a priori 
knowledge without statements of empirical fact. In this sense metaphysics without 
induction was not contributing to knowledge. Kant wanted to demonstrate that 
rationalists could prove statements that were in total contradiction to each other. KUl1 
Godel's incompleteness theorem in mathematics has since shown this in the 20th century 
in arithmetic (Chaitin 1991). In this sense deductive proof could work to prove and 
disprove the same statement and for this reason Kant believed that a priori deduction 
alone cannot be used as a means of increasing knowledge. In short Kant adds weight 
to the empiricist argument and to the notion that every event has a cause. This view was 
also held by Leibniz (1646-1716) who argued that everything has a ground - a reason 
(see Caputo 1978). Kant raised an argument concerning perception that differed from 
his predecessors. Whereas Newton had conceived of an absolute space and time, Kant 
saw space and time as functions of perceivers where they are buried in the human 
psyche. According to Kant the fact that humans experience a three dimensional 
Euclidean spatial world is a feature of human experience, not of reality itself. This is not 
inconsistent with the views of Capra (1982) and Bohm (1980) where reality as we 
perceive it is a three dimensional projection of a multiple dimensional reality. Kant's 
moral philosophy was one of his major contributions and established a basis for moral 
worth on inner reasoning. Kant's metaphysics of morals is discussed in chapter 7. 
LIBERALISM 
Liberalism and utilitarianism were emerging philosophies that were used in England to 
protect the privileges of the commercial classes in a rapidly growing economy during 
the industrial revolution (see Bottomore and Rubel 1961; Marx 1967), The theoretical 
neutrality of utilitarianism served to foster the partisan interests of the business 
community (Wiser 1983). The theory to support such a practice was developed by 
Jeremy Bentham. 
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Bentham believed that public good could only be achieved politically if it coincided with 
the private interests of politicians. He advocated regular elections in representative 
government, free press and official information and thereby led the process of refonn 
in English parliament where political power was gradually transferred away from the 
landed nobility towards the representatives of the rising commercial class. Bentham's 
conception of science was one of naturalism as he believed that the methods of the 
physical sciences were appropriate for use in understanding social reality, although he 
suggested that the social sciences needed the precision of physics to become valid. He 
used the reductionist methodology in the political sciences where the complex is reduced 
to the simple. Politics is explained in terms of the individual and the individual 
explained in terms of their primitive passions (Wiser 1983; Mill 1963). In this he 
continues in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke. 
Bentham wished to solve what he called conceptual social fictions, which in his view 
included justice, power, rights, and community. According to Bentham, "Community is 
a fictitious body, comprised of the individual persons who are considered as constituting 
as it were its members. The interests of the community then is what? - The sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it." (Bentham 1789, cited in Wiser 
1983:296). John Stewart Mill (1806-1873) continued in the utilitarian line but sought to 
reform Bentham's style of liberalism into a more humanitarian form. Mill's major works 
include Utilitarianism (1863) On Liberty (1859) A System of Logic (1843) and 
Considerations on Representative Government (1860) (see Wiser 1983; Curtis 1981b; 
Mill 1963). His writings did much to modify utilitarian ethics along classical empiricist 
lines (see chapter 7). This philosophical view begins with the observation of constant 
conjunctions between events. On this Outhwaite (1987:21) quotes Mill from A System 
of Logic:-
We have no knowledge of anything but phenomena; and our knowledge of 
phenomena is relative not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode 
of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of 
succession or similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same 
in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phenomena 
together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and 
consequent, are tenned their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we know 
respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient 
or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us. 
For Mill the purpose of all science (both natural and social) is to establish the causal 
laws for each observed event. The emerging rational political order was infonned by 
modern empirical science of this form. J. S. Mill was a contemporary of Auguste Comte 
who was the first to use the term 'positivist' in relation to scientific analysis. 
EMPIRICISM AND CAPITALISM 
The intluence of empiricist science extended well beyond the laboratory. By the 
beginning of the 19th century Cartesian reductionist science and its empiricist offspring 
were well established in Europe. Reductionist science had made significant inroads in 
the social, physical, and political spheres, present day legacies of which can be found, 
of course, in the political economy of modern Fiji. Capitalism was expanding having 
benefitted greatly from this science with its political reductionism, laissez faire 
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liberalism, ideas on human nature and universal progress, technology and the industrial 
revolution. The consolidation of the nation state paved the way for the 
internationalisation of capitalism. However the roots of this movement run far deeper 
in European cultural heritage. . 
The fragmentation of the European Holy Roman Empire that followed in the wake of 
the Reformation in the 16th century3 provided the political environment for a number 
of major developments that were to contribute greatly to the rising capitalist order. One 
was the rise of the nation state, another was the replacement of the monarchies with 
parliamentary democracy, a third was the Protestant work ethic and individualism. 
The emergence of reductionist science from the ashes of medieval life was paralleled 
by the rise of capitalist economic theory partly because reductionism served to 
substantiate this style of political economy. Because of this, theoretical advances in 
capitalism also represented advances in the development of science. Many scientific 
philosophers were also political commentators and social theorists. This became 
particularly noticeable in the period beginning in the late 18th century where western 
monarchies were being replaced by various forms of parliamentary democracy. Francis 
Bacon had a seat in the English House of Commons and later became the Lord 
Chancellor of the Realm. Thomas Hobbes supported the failing English Monarchy, John 
Locke was a parliamentary revolutionary. Parliamentary democracy was a political 
manifestation of the rise of the capitalist class who, dissatisfied with monarchies, sought 
political power and representation for their commercial interests under the banner of 
liberal utilitarianism. 
The monarchies, as a legacy of feudal medieval Europe, were threatened by the rise of 
the capitalist class as support for the crown lay in the landed aristocracy. Their claim 
to moral authority tended to rest with their allegiance to the Papacy (or the Anglican 
Church in the case of England) whereby the church as the earthly representative of God 
claimed to be the only legitimate holder of the key to truth. The rise of science thereby 
encompassed a direct challenge to the existing political-economic order of the 
monarchies and the church. Science therefore facilitated the rise of capitalism as the 
emerging political-economic order by stealing worldly authority from the church which 
supported the monarchies and vice versa. 
With the French and American revolutions of the late 18th centuries came the dawning 
of a new era which witnessed the amalgamation of liberal democracy, science, and 
capitalism. It was in this period that colonialism began to take on a new flavour. With 
the influence of monarchic polities pushed aside together with the rise of the nation state 
colonial expansion of the European economic powers shifted into a higher gear. One the 
main reasons for this stems from the social character and internal contradictions of 
3The 16th century is not a long time ago in terms of forest or landscape ecology. At the 
time of the Reformation many Fiji kauri trees currently being logged on Vanua Levu would 
have been saplings or mature trees. It is important to remember that the time scales involved 
in cultural ecology must reflect the dynamic functioning of the ecosystems concerned. The 
cultural influences in Fiji to be discussed in chapter refer to changes that have taken place 
over the last 3,00 years. For this reason discussing events in the cultural history of resource 
use in Fiji such as the rise of a major economic system is not merely a trivial sideline. 
377 
capitalism itself .. 
Excess capital generated through monopoly conditions needs to be re-invested. If it is 
invested in the domestic market production will increase and prices will fall, followed 
by a fall in profits. A company can avoid this by investing the excess capital in a 
foreign market so that domestic prices remain high. This provides a substantial 
motivation for the securing of foreign markets and foreign production as doing so will 
allow domestic production to continue at high prices whilst exporting the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism to other countries. This transforms the class character of 
capitalism into an international class system where rich countries exploit the labour and 
resources of poor countries (see Anell and Nygren 1980; Mandel 1983; Lenin 1978 for 
example). 
Thus the inherent unsustainability of capitalist production and its external effects are 
hidden from the general popUlation of the stronger capitalist countries. This provides an 
ideal political environment for a continuation of unsustainable production as the social 
checks and balances have been exported. At the same time the poverty in the exploited 
countries is portrayed in the rich countries as reflecting the primitive nature of human 
society in these so called uncivilised and backward parts of the world. Racist doctrines 
such as social Darwinism thus served 19th and 20th century international capitalism very 
well as part of the grand equation of imperial expansion (see Anell and Nygren 1980). 
The missionary movement was also captured by the capitalist colonial regime. For a 
start it had the appearance of a benevolent attempt to civilise the unfOltunate heathen 
savages of the colonies. However, for the successful expansion of an economy into a 
country like Fiji the indigenous population (which are to help sustain the government 
bureaucracy through the payment of taxes) needed to be socially, and economically 
transformed, so that they would take up wage labour on colonial plantations. This was 
particularly true for English colonialism (such as Fiji) where colonial policy demanded 
that the colonial government was largely self sustaining. 
A further economic spin-off provided by colonialism was that the domestic economies 
of Europe could grow from the absorbtion of cheap imports from the colonies and the 
standard of living in general was seen to increase (Anell and Nygren 1980). This 
improved the lot of domestic workers and so reduces antagonisms between the working 
class and the capitalist class in the metropolitan core. A further advantage of this form 
of international capitalism was that it catalysed nationalistic tendencies among the 
workers of the metropolitan countries. Workers in one country began to compete with 
workers in other countries for a place in international production. Thus any likelihood 
of international worker solidarity was undermined. This served to protect a rapidly 
growing unsustainable economic system riddled with social injustices. 
The relationsh.ip between science, politics and economics did not end with colonialism 
as they all developed further into more sophisticated forms, particularly since the 
beginning of the 19th century. One such development which served all three well was 
the movement from classical empiricism to positivism. This not only helped to set the 
scientific context for capitalism and its supporters, but it also became the basis for 
socialist movements as well. One of the projects of Karl Marx (1818-1883), for 
example, was to promote scientific as opposed to utopian socialism (see Engels 1947). 
Influential in Marx's early thinking was the works of Saint-Simon (1760-1825), whose 
secretary for a time was Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Comte was an influentialligure 
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in empiricist social science with his conception of 'positivist' science although Marx 
rejected Comte's conception of society. 
This appendix has provided a genealogy of the modern status quo resident in Fiji. It 
serves to demonstrate that the CUITent condition of the modern world view, modern 
industrial economic systems, and modern political structures are not the inevitable 
product of universal laws of human nature. Instead they are the result of a long and 
drawn out process of cultural transformation influenced greatly by political, social, 
religious, and ideological factors. It helps to place modern Fiji in an historical context 
where the cultural influences of Europe can be seen. This appendix also serves as a 
prelude to the discussion of positivist science undertaken in chapter 5. 
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APPENDIX 2· TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM 
In developing and defending a methodology for studying the ecology of culture in 
relation to the question of ecological sustain ability I have sought to establish a coherent 
theoretical basis for analysis. What I present here is a theory of science which is capable 
of being employed as a form of naturalism which studies social reality as an ecological 
phenomenon. Unlike positivism, this theoretical framework is grounded in the notion of 
intersubjectivity. It is also careful to accept the limitations of knowledge of any form, 
but realises that evidence for aspects of reality lying beyond the reach of sense 
perception and language can be sustained. Furthermore the source of coherence for such 
aspects of reality beyond the reach of human sensibilities may also lie in that domain 
and hence be illogical. 
Kant established a bifurcation of ontology separating reality into two distinct domains. 
One is the domain of the noumena, the other the domain of the phenomena. The former 
(according to Kant) lies beyond sense perception and includes an objective realm of the 
'thing in itself. The realm of phenomena includes that which is accessible to us in sense 
awareness. I believe that the Kantian division is useful but I do not sustain the view that 
the noumenal real is in any way objective. I agree that such an inaccessible domain does 
exist but I see the division between the two as merely the result of human limitations. 
In other words, I do not regard them as two separate worlds. Instead it is one reality in 
which a small sub-set of that reality includes a. the domain of human sense awareness 
(i.e. potentially or actually empirical), and b. that within the reach of language (the 
linguistic world). An example of a. would be the sensation of pain. An example of b. 
would be the linguistic concept of 'up'. Pain is a sense perception and hence accessible 
to humans. The concept 'up' is a linguistic norm and has meaning only within language. 
There is no such ontological condition of 'upness' outside the linguistic domain (in this 
case English). What we call 'up' in the English language might be defined as 'away from 
the centre of the earth' in an ontological sense, but the notion 'up' is a relative entity. 
Two English speaking astronauts might agree that 'up' means towards the bow of the 
craft. It is relative, not absolute. 
This notion of a domain that is inaccessible to either sense awareness or the reach of 
language lends itself to the concept of a transcendental condition. The theory of science 
as developed by Bhaskar is 'transcendental realism'. Realism broadly holds the view that 
there are real 'things out' there as opposed to reality being a projection of the mind as 
is the case with idealism. Some forms of realism sustain a 'con'espondence theory of 
truth' (see Leplin 1984). Such a view suggests that a statement is true if it corresponds 
with how Nature is really is. This theory of truth makes one major assumption in 
relation.to ontology - that the ontological condition of an event is self evident. 
I do not support a correspondence theory of truth for this reason, simply because I do 
not believe that ontology is quite that simple. My interest lies primarily in ontology 
(theories about what reality is like), as opposed to epistemology (how we organise out 
thoughts and theories about that reality). The question under scrutiny is the meaning of 
ecological sustainability. I do not simply wish to spend my time organising my thoughts 
on this subject, I instead seek to uncover ontological meaning of an issue (ecological 
sustainability) which I believe has been obscured by the very nature of our Western 
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rationality. 
Although I do not sustain a correspondence theory of truth I am a realist in the sense 
that I believe that there are real things out there, but unlike Kant I do not believe that 
these 'things' are in any way objective in the sense of an objective 'thing in itself'. This 
perspective is explained through the course of chapters 7, and 8. The pages to follow 
consist of an account of a theory of science explained in relation to debates in the 
philosophy of science. 
A META-THEORETICAL BASIS 
Debates in the philosophy of science have tended to focus on the epistemological basis 
of the natural sciences on one hand, and the intrusion of the methodologies of the 
natural sciences into the social sciences on the other. Within the natural sciences, as they 
developed over the last few centuries, a number of different schools of thought have 
arisen. These include the broad camps of rationalism (Descartes and Newton), classical 
empiricism (Hume), transcendental idealism (Kant), and logical positivism (Popper). 
Within the social sciences there is - positivism (Comte and later Durkheim), dialectical 
materialism (Marx), hermeneutics (Weber and later Gadamer), critical theory 
(Habermas), and postmodernism (Foucault, Lyotard). Some of these traditions claim to 
be universal in their application in both the social and physical worlds. Notable 
examples include positivism (as suggested by the Vienna Circle and its more recent 
disciples), and dialectical materialism (as articulated by Levins and Lewontin). 
In the current study of culture in Fiji the relationship between culture and landscape is 
of central importance. For this reason both social and physical realities are under 
investigation simultaneously, and as such a unifying methodology is sought where the 
realms of the social and the ecological are able to be studied as a single domain. 
An attempt will not be made to merely reduce social reality to biological relations which 
is a mistake of functionalism (e.g. Durkheim), or ignoring ecological reality in the wake 
of an over-emphasis on the importance of social relations as Marx did (Catton 1989). 
The outcome will be a meta-theory that reveals and reinforces the dialectical relationship 
between the spheres of the social and that of the ecological via culture. One way of 
achieving this is to retreat a step further from the theoretical canvas and head straight 
for ontology - a theory of reality (not merely a theory of knowledge). 
Many theories of science focus on how to legitimate this or that form of knowledge 
system. The approach presented here asks instead "what forms of knowledge are 
possible'. This is undertaken by maintaining a central focus on ontology (theories about 
reality). 
EMPIRICAL OR TRANSCENDENTAL REALITY 
The word 'empirical' refers to what is experienced or experienceable by the human 
senses. Transcendental' refers to a domain that is partly accessible to the human senses 
but which also exists beyond the capacity of the human senses to access it. The word 
'transcendental' should not be confused with the term 'transcendent' which refers to a 
domain that is wholly inaccessible to human sense perception. The practice of 
metaphysics asks questions such as "what must the world be like in spite of the 
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existence of human thought or experience?". And "is reality more than what we can 
perceive?" Empirical science does not employ such metaphysical questions and asks that 
truth only be discernable from what can be experienced. But such a practice of truth 
judgement necessarily requires a reality which consists only of that which is accessible 
to the human senses. The possibility of unexperienced or unexperienceable aspects of 
reality (or experienceable outside logic or reason) are either ruled out of court or said 
to be of no relevance or significance to the authentication of truth. This view of reality 
is necessarily anthropocentric and confident that nothing more than what is manifest to 
human sensory apparatus can exist. Such is the case in an empiricist ontology. 
A transcendental ontology does not deny the value of empirical knowledge, but does 
deny that empirical knowledge is necessarily universal. Here aspects of reality could be 
unexperienceable. This does not claim that unexperienceable reality can be a basis for 
knowledge but it does point to the limits of empirical knowledge about reality and 
indeed the limits of knowledge itself and the need to accept mystery. In this fashion 
empirically testable claims about reality can be correct but are not necessarily capable 
of disclosing the whole picture. To make sense of this point it will be useful to discuss 
the difference between ontology and epistemology. 
Ontology is a theory of what reality is like, whilst epistemology is a theory of how we 
might come to have knowledge about that reality (see Johansson 1989). Another way 
to visualise this is to regard epistemology as a theory concerning the organisation of 
maps, and ontology as theories concerning what the landscape is really like that makes 
map drawing possible and sensible (Bhaskar 1975). It must be made clear that the map 
is only a map, and can be no more than a map. Knowledge is not the landscape itself. 
In this sense knowledge can be seen as a form of cartography. But we must ask the 
question - "can we know all of reality or is knowledge necessarily limited?" In other 
words, is reality equal to or greater than what is accessible to human sense perception 
andlor language? As Outhwaite (1987) has pointed out: 
"No serious account of knowledge can begin without the assumption that 'to be' 
is more than 'to be perceived'. And no theory of science is conceivable without 
the assumption that what we are pleased to call laws of nature operated in the 
same way as they do now before humans evolved and a fortiori before they 
began to do science" (ibid: 19). 
In other words is 'being' really the same as 'knowledge of being' or is it something 
more? If 'being' is reducible to 'knowledge of being' or perception as is the case with 
empiricism, then there is no world outside knowledge or perception of the world. This 
means that either the rainbow only exists if you are there to see it (idealism), or the 
rainbow only exists if humans are capable of perceiving it (logical empiricism). 
The ontological problem of being vs knowledge of being points towards one of the most 
significant debates in philosophy (Johansson 1989; Bhaskar 1975). The interpretation of 
this question also divides philosophers of science into two broad camps. On the one 
hand there are those who claim that being is the same as knowledge of being (the map 
is the territory), and on the other there are those who admit that 'to be' is more than 'to 
be perceived' (maps describe the territory). 
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Throughout chapter 5 a number of different schools of thought in the philosophy of 
science have been mentioned. We have seen idealism, realism, empiricism, positivism, 
materialism, rationalism, and relativism for example. What makes the description or 
definition of these different schools difficult is the fact that many of them overlap or 
exist as combinations of each other. Thus we get transcendental idealism, logical 
positivism, empirical realism, materialist realism, dialectical materialism, transcendental 
realism, relativist empiricism for example. 
Differences between a variety of theories of science are described below where 
ontologies are separated from epistemologies I. 
1. Ontologies (there are effectively 2 broad ontological camps):-
A. Idealism - there is no territory - only maps 
e.g. Kantian transcendental idealism, Hegelian idealism 
B. Realism - there is a territory and we construct maps 
Empirical realism (including logical positivism) 
Materialism (including Marxian dialectical materialism) 
Transcendental realism 
2. Epistemologies (there are basically 2 broad camps):-
A. Rationalism (Descartes, Newton) - the map is the territory 
Nominalism 
B. Empiricism (Hume) the map is not the territory 
As mentioned earlier most theories of science have developed as epistemologies with 
ontological assumptions rather than ontologies with epistemological possibilities. This 
adds to the confusion as the conflation of ontology with epistemology ('being' as reduced 
to 'knowledge of being') has served to obscure the picture. Bhaskar (1975) calls this the 
epistemic fallacy. 
Ontological idealism sustains the idea that reality is merely an extension of the human 
mind or thought. Here the objects of science are theories and models, and that there are 
only theories or models, no actual things, laws or events that are existentially 
independent from human thought. There are only maps. 
Ontological realism suggests that there are real things 'out there' that science finds, and 
which exist independently of human thought processes. However there are some major 
differences within the realist camp which can be divided into two main branches. On the 
one hand there are the anthroporealists which claim that things are only real if they are 
perceived or perceivable by the human senses. For anthroporealists there is a territory 
which is separate from the map, and the territory is totally accessible to the human 
senses. The other group include the transcendental realists which acknowledge the 
possibility of things existing independently of human knowledge and independently of 
IKeith Morrison (pers. comm.) helped to clarify this taxonomy - see Morrison (1994). 
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human sense perception Le. things do not need to be perceived or be perceivable in 
order to exist (Bhaskar 1975). Under this view there is a territory, and humans construct 
maps to understand it, but the territory is not completely accessible to human perception 
or cognition. 
Rationalism, as an epistemology, sustains the view that ideas perceive reality directly 
as reality is rational. Here authentic know ledge can theoretically be gained entirely 
through a priori reasoning due to the rational nature of reality and the assertion that God 
(a rational being) created both reality and the human mind whereby reason allows us to 
reveal God's creation in the world and ourselves (see Capra 1982). Here the territory is 
the map. 
Empiricism as an epistemology acknowledges that experiences perceive projections of 
reality, not necessarily reality itself. But the empiricist camp is sharply divided 
depending on the ontology used. On the one hand there are those that mould an 
empiricist ontology with an empiricist epistemology (e.g. positivism) where reality is, 
in totality, perceived or perceivable and that an epistemology based on that experience 
is merely an epiphenomenon of reality. Here the map is part of the territory. A 
refinement of this line of thought is held by logical positivism where theories are only 
valid if they are empirically logical and able to be reduced to mathematical equations. 
This group also sustain an implicit commitment to epistemic ethnocentricity. Here 
objective knowledge is possible in spite of ones cultural background provided positivist 
scientific methodologies are used. Rationality is seen as universal and not culturally 
specific. Here there is only one valid map - that of modern positivist science. 
A second broad empiricist group includes those who sustain a relativist empiricist 
epistemology where, knowledge is seen as a map, but not the territory. This view does 
not commit the mistake of epistemic ethnocentricity and sees truth as culturally 
determined. A transcendental realist ontology and a relativist empiricist epistemology 
is the philosophical formula employed and defended in this research. 
If a transcendental realist ontology is used with a relativist empiricist epistemology then, 
although truth and reason are culturally determined and hence only internally valid 
within that culture, different cultures can see and name the same manifestations of 
reality in their own subjective epistemologies. "One tree" and "e dua na kau2 .. can refer 
to the same manifestation of reality in the same landscape from two rationally different 
yet internally rational cultures. Under this view different cultures can construct their own 
maps of the same territory, according to their own standards of rationality. These maps 
can be accurate and authentic even though they are unintelligible or irrational to other 
cultures. This is because they are looking at the same reality through their own 
subjective, culturally specific viewfinder. 
For example, consider the ontological reality of the landscape of part of Northern 
Queensland, Australia. One culture constructs a map of this territory - a modern 
scientific topographic map. The map is constructed and recreated on paper or computer. 
This map is accurate (Le. corresponds to the territory in a way that is consistent with the 
calibration techniques employed) and serves a cultural purpose of authentically depicting 
2"e dua na kau" is Fijian (Bauan dialect) for "one tree". 
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the relative position of landmarks such as rivers and mountains. Another culture also 
constructs a map of the same territory - an Aboriginal dreaming or songline. This map 
is constructed and recreated orally, but still accurately describes the territory for a 
different cultural purpose of navigation and the maintenance of a spiritual relationship 
with the landscape. Both maps are very different from each other and one culture can 
prima facie make no sense out of the map constructed by the other culture without 
understanding the meaning behind the respective symbolisms and the cultural purpose 
of the map. 
At this point some would argue that such "a view plunges into nihilism where there is 
no meaning to anything and no solid foundation for any knowledge. If truth is only 
relative and only culturally determined there would be no possibility of common truths 
held between different cultures except by pure accident. However, such nihilistic 
tendencies can be avoided provided the notion of truth is adequately defined and if 
ontology and epistemology are maintained as separate realms. Lukes (1987) for example, 
has already shown that cross-cultural communication is common and indicates the 
existence of truths that are not culturally exclusive. 
TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM 
Transcendental realism is a meta-theory of science that has been developed in recent 
years by Roy Bhaskar (1975; 1979; 1986). This meta-theory has been applied to the 
natural sciences and explored as a form of naturalism3• Its application to the social 
sciences has been explored by Outhwaite (1987), and its compatibility with postmodern 
thought has been investigated by Woodiwiss (1990). 
Transcendental realism defended here is an ontology with epistemological possibilities. 
It refers to a reality that exists independently of human knowledge and culture even 
when the reality that is under investigation is within a culture. It is appropriate for the 
practice of a form science that is epistemologically cautious and ontologically robust. 
Because it is an ontology it explicitly employs metaphysics in the practice of science. 
In this way metaphysics does not operate apart from the various sciences but considers 
precisely that world from the view point of what can be said about it by a priori 
argument. An example of an a priori argument of central importance to science is: 
science finds things empirically (through experience via the senses) which means that 
there must be a world which exists independently of science for it to find. 
This formula is different from other forms of realism in a number of important ways. 
According to Bhaskar (1975) empirical realism requires naturally occurring closure of 
systems, a mechanistic conception of action and denie~ science as a social activity. 
Furthermore, Bhaskar argues that to reduce knowledge to the accumulation of empirical 
'facts' commensurate with sense experience, and to view the sense experience as the 
objective basis of knowledge which literally defines the world, results in and is 
dependant on the development of an ontology of atomistic events. 
3'N aturalism' here refers to a methodology or theory of science that can be used for 
understanding both the physical, non-human world (natural science) and the social world 
(social science). 
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Considering the differences between ontology and epistemology Bhaskar suggests that 
there are at least two dimensions of science. The transitive and the intransitive. The 
intransitive dimension comprises the objects of our knowledge (a philosophical 
ontology) which exist independently of that knowledge (contra idealism) or 
independently of human experiences (contra empirical realism). If this can be established 
then there must be a second dimension - a culturally determined relative transitive 
dimension where changing knowledge of unchanging reality is possible. Oxygen used 
to be known as phlogiston in the transitive dimension, but the discovery of oxygen as 
an advance on the idea of phlogiston did not change the molecular structure of the 
element. It is merely a change in the transitive dimension of changing knowledge of the 
world, not of reality. Under this view, knowledge consists of the construction of maps 
that attempt to explain the territory but are not the territory. Under transcendental 
realism, knowledge can be seen as a form of cartography where the map can be accurate 
but is not necessarily accurate nor complete. The transitive objects of science are 
socially active components of knowledge. Books are examples of transitive objects of 
science, but what the books are about (i.e. the reality they attempt to explain or 
describe) may be intransitive. Conceptual models, theories, mathematics and other 
languages are examples of transitive objects of science. 
In addition to these two dimensions of science Bhaskar (1975, 1986) has suggested a 
stratification of reality. These include the domains of the real, the actual, and the 
empirical. The domain of the real refers to an intransitive dimension where generative 
mechanisms (tendencies) may exist but do not necessarily become manifest at the next 
level - the actual. Two opposing forces may cancel each other out and effectively make 
nothing happen, such as when gravity pulls down on a book, but the opposing force of 
the structure of the shelf prevents for book from falling. No event happens in spite of 
the existence of real generative mechanisms that interact in the real world. The next 
level is the actual, where events do occur as a result of generative mechanisms, but these 
events are not necessarily accessible to human sensory perception or cognition. This 
refers to transcendental possibilities that lie beyond our ability to perceive them 
empirically. The third domain is the empirical where events are experienced or 
experienceable. 
EXPERIMENTAL CLOSURE 
The notion of causal law is partially discarded in a transcendental realist account where 
what are deemed laws in empiricism or empirical realism are regarded as tendencies 
only. This stems from epistemological difficulties with the identification of these 'laws' 
and the idea that laws may change, as we have no grounds for claiming that Nature is 
fixed. A caterpillar living on a kauri tree may have reason to believe that the tree is 
immortal a legitimate belief grounded in experience and communication with earlier 
generations via oral tradition or 'books'. However, there are no metaphysical grounds for 
ruling out the possibility of radical change in the normal state of affairs vis-a-vis the life 
of the tree given the limited capabilities of the caterpillars in experiencing the sum total 
of their reality. To claim that the tree could die would be absurd and ruled out if the 
caterpillar society authenticated knowledge via empirical methods only. However, a 
transcendental realist caterpillar society would have no choice but to grant it as possible 
that the tree could die and thus revise their 'law' viz. "kauri trees never die" to a 
tendency such that "kauri trees live a long time". The latter epistemology is more 
cautious and recognises the limitations of empirical techniques of gaining knowledge. 
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The identification of tendencies and possibilities does not stop a society from practising 
science but it does assert that the results of research are necessarily provisional. 
There are also philosophical problems in the empirical methods of law identification 
which call. into question their ability to be regarded as fixed laws. This comes from the 
problems of experimental closure. Bhaskar (1975, 1986) makes it clear that causal laws 
(tendencies) do not exist in the transitive dimension. They are intransitive. This means 
that in an experiment a scientist may observe the constant conjunction of events but 
these are only the empirical manifestations of laws (tendencies) not the laws themselves. 
Any experiment can go wrong but this does not change the law concerned. 
According to Bhaskar (1986:28):-
Experimentation is deliberate intervention in the course of nature. It is practically 
necessary to the extent that the experimentally designed, produced and controlled 
sequence would not have occurred without it. It is epistemologically significant 
to the extent that the causal law it enables us to identify and test holds outside 
and independently of the experiment. Conversely, reducing laws to constant 
conjunctions .... commits the empiricist either to the absurdity that scientists 
actually produce, Le. create the laws of nature ( ... voluntaristic super-idealism) or 
to the self-immolation of denying either our causal agency or its significance in 
science ( ... reductionistic and/or deterministic hyper-rationalism). 
Bhaskar suggests that empirical realism relies on ignoring this ontological distinction. 
He states "[causal] laws cannot be both empirical and universal" because only the 
constant conjunctions of events within experimental closure are empirical, whereas the 
causal laws (or tendencies) that generate the events are not. Also, once the prevalence 
of open systems (in Nature) is acknowledged the empiricist is forced to insert a ceteris 
paribus4 clause in each law defined within experimental closure. 
Also, experiments can only be valid and apply to the world outside experimental closure 
if reality exists in an atomistic state where bits are autonomous and come together to 
form the whole in a mechanical fashion. Experimental science that searches for causal 
laws within experimentally closed systems commits itself to ontological atomism, 
assuming that the behaviour of the object of an experiment will be the same when 
artificially isolated from all circumambient conditions as would be the case outside 
experimental closure. Bhaskar (1986) calls this the assumption of transfactual identity. 
In addition to this are what he calls the assumptions of essential independence (parts are 
autonomous), actual separability (that the object of investigation can be separated 
undamaged from its extra-experimental surroundings), physical reproducibility (that what 
happens in extra-experimental reality actually happens within the experiment), spateo-
temporal generality (the problem of induction), and plasticity of context to human 
manipUlation and control. 
In summary of experimental reasoning Bhaskar (1986) suggests that where x = a causal 
law (tendency) and y = the constant conjunction of events, x cannot be reduced to, 
defined or analyzed in terms of y. This is because x (but not y) exists in open systems; 
. 4All other things being equal. 
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and y (but not x) is praxis dependant (Le. dependant on experimentation) and exists in 
experimentally constructed closed systems. This he calls the 'ontological gap' in 
experimentation between causal laws and empirical events which the empiricist cannot 
bridge, because the existence of the gap comprises the condition of the existence of the 
activities under examination. Experimentally verifiable scientific knowledge and the 
implicit atomistic ontology it requires in order to be sensible is the achilles heal of the 
empiricist tradition. 
THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
The practice of science as an empirical doctrine has been confounded with difficulties 
in attempts to solve the problem of induction as first articulated by Hume (see appendix 
1). Some theorists according to Bhaskar (1975) claim to have 'solved' the problem by 
saying that science is deductive in character (e.g. Popper). Others have attempted to 
strengthen inductive arguments (e.g J. S. Mill). Inductive conclusions have been reduced 
to probability judgements (e.g. Carnap), justified pragmatically or attempts made to 
vindicate it in practice. Bhaskar (1975) believes that none of these approaches have 
succeeded and that the underlying questions remain unsolved viz. 'can we assume that 
the course of Nature will not change?' and 'can we believe that a statement or theory is 
true?'. 
The problem of induction continues to arise if we seek to accept evidence as a fixed 
law. But if we do not claim to be finding fixed laws there is no need for inductive 
argument, and similarly if we are not attempting to convert explanations into predictions 
then induction is also unnecessary. Induction implies the desire to employ a certain 
degree of certainty in the practice of science. However uncertainty is endemic in an 
empirical discipline that is attempting to understand a reality that can and does transcend 
the empirical realm. 
In the light of this, Bhaskar (1975) asserts that induction is only justified when:-
A. A model of a mechanism exists which allows us to say 'when Eb then 
Ea'. 
and 
B. When we have knowledge of the mechanism that generates Eb from Ea. 
In other words, induction is only justified when the generalisation concerned is a law 
of Nature. But we cannot know if it is a law or not because laws are not empirical -
only their empirical manifestations are (Bhaskar 1975). This is because in an experiment 
we must create a closed system in order to concoct a ceteris paribus situation which 
constitutes the necessary conditions for the observation of the constant conjunction of 
specific events. This allows scientists to observe the empirical manifestation of laws 
(tendencies) - not the laws themselves because the laws (tendencies, generative 
mechanisms or Nature of things) exist in the intransitive dimension independently of the 
existence of humans and their experiments. Furthermore, reality exists in open systems, 
which means that the definition of laws must necessarily be accompanied with ceteris 
paribus clauses every time, or laws as empirically evidenced in closed experiments are 
deemed applicable in closed systems only (i.e. cannot necessarily be applied in Nature 
or outside experimental closure). As mentioned above, an atomistic ontology is 
necessary in order to make sense of experimentally derived laws. Such an ontology is 
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the result of philosophic predication - it is a linguistic convention assumed to exist in 
Nature (see chapter 7). 
The problem of the application of generalisations from empirical instances only becomes 
a problem if we are attempting to know or claim to know more about reality than is 
humanly possible. If scientists, as humans, accept the limitations of their cognitive and 
perceptual capacities by acknowledging a transcendental (as opposed to empirical) 
realism, the problem of induction dissolves. Thus, if science can remain content as a 
potentially precise explanatory (as opposed to predictive) discipline the problem of 
induction disappears and science can make the 'quantum leap' into an ontologically 
robust and episternically cautious form. 
Instead of trying to define the practice of science in terms of induction or deduction, 
transcendental realism employs what Bhaskar calls retroduction (praxis). This involves 
the process of utilising the transitive dimension to explain the happenings of the 
intransitive dimension. It can be defined as a dialectical process whereby the object of 
investigation changes from the phenomenon to the explanation and back again in an 
ongoing fashion5• Retroduction is the building of a conceptual model by utilising ones 
cognitive resources and controlled by the logic of analogy and metaphor in such a way 
that if the model were to exist (i.e. if the map were ontologically accurate) it would 
explain the phenomenon in question. However, more than one explanation will serve to 
account for the phenomenon concerned (more than one map can be drawn of the same 
territory). It is for this reason that the explanation itself must be repeatedly called into 
question and explained - i.e. it is a critical process. The practice of retroduction as a 
method may involve the following:-
1. The identification of the phenomenon in question; 
2. The construction of explanations which are empirically tested which leads 
to the identification of the generative mechanisms which causes the 
phenomenon; 
3. The generative mechanism, once identified, becomes the object of 
investigation (even when the generative mechanism is non-
experienceable; this will not stop a scientist from collecting empirical 
evidence that points towards its existence). 
This formula is similar to hypothetico-deductivism but employs ongoing retroduction as 
a dialectical process where the phenomena and the explanation are the objects of study. 
A transcendental realist formula of science embodies the movement from our knowledge 
of manifest phenomena to knowledge of the structures that generate them. It differs from 
empirical realism by not stopping with empirically accessible reality (phenomena) as an 
object of investigation. This is because there may be empirical evidence (which is not 
necessarily logical or rational) for a generative mechanism that exists only in the 
intransitive domain and may be inaccessible to direct empirical inquiry. 
5This is similar to the praxis of Habermas, and Freire (see chapter 5). 
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SUMMARY OF TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM 
Some of the central themes that characterise transcendental realism as developed by 
Bhaskar include the following:-
It is an ontological doctrine with epistemological possibilities. 
It sustains the view that causal laws be regarded as tendencies. 
It regards most of philosophy as over-emphasising epistemology at the 
expense of ontology. 
It sustains a relativist epistemology. 
There are transitive and intransitive objects of science. 
There is an important distinction between the domains of the real, the 
actual, and the empirical. 
It agrees with the empiricist movement in science but denies the 
empirical claim to universality and more specifically it denies an 
empirical realist ontology. 
Philosophy is a necessary part of the practice of science but is not the 
final judge of science. 
The conception of explanation involves the postulation of explanatory 
mechanisms and the attempt to demonstrate their existence through 
retroduction as opposed to the employment of induction or deduction per 
se. 
It is a form of science that is explanatory not predictive. 
It insists that science is a social activity. 
There is no justification for science as a social activity to hold a 
privileged position in a society. But science should participate with other 
groups in a society in the democratic practice of uncovering knowledge 
through open and critical discourse6• 
The question must then be asked - 'is it possible for such a meta-theory to be justifiably 
employed in the human sciences?' We must now explore the possibility of transcendental 
realism as a meta-theoretical candidate in the practice of social science. Because this 
theory of science has shown to be possible for the natural sciences, where empirical 
6This aspect of the social practice of transcendental realism was not made explicit by 
Bhaskar but was discussed by Outhwaite (1987) and Woodiwis (1990). The form of 
transcendental realism as developed here is not inconsistent with postmodernism (see 
Woodiwiss 1990). 
390 
methods and epistemic caution are embellished with metaphysics, the use of such a 
methodology in the social world implies a form of naturalism. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM 
Bhaskar (1979) believes that the question of whether social reality can be studied in the 
same way as Nature is the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences. 
Traditionally naturalism claims have come from the natural sciences via positivism 
which claims to be a unifying methodology of science based on the Humean notion of 
law. It is primarily in the context of a positivist naturalism that, anti-naturalism has 
developed in the social sciences (ibid.). In this sense many of the arguments against 
naturalism are really arguments against positivism. The criticism of naturalism from the 
perspective of the social sciences has shown that positivist naturalism cannot explain 
social reality which is comprised of meaningful objects, where the understanding of 
meaning is of central importance (Outhwaite 1987) (see chapter 5). 
According to Bhaskar (1979) and Outhwaite (1987) the anti-naturalism sentiment arising 
in the social sciences is the erroneous practice of equating naturalism with a positivist 
naturalism. Thus the naturalism as portrayed in the social sciences is that same old straw 
figure which is repeatedly burned at the anti-positivist tribunal. Many social theorists 
seek to maintain the distinction between the natural and social sciences. But the contrast 
soon dissolves if the metatheoretical account of the natural sciences mutates into a form 
that is also diametrically opposed to positivism as is the case with transcendental 
realism. For example transcendental realism, of the form developed by Bhaskar, sustains 
the following views:-
Experimental activity and practical activity involve an analysis of causal 
laws as expressing the tendencies of things not the constant conjunction 
of events. 
The development of scientific knowledge entails that scientific inferences 
must be analogical and retroductive, not simply inductive or deductive. 
This is consistent with the views held by Checkland (1981) where the 
metaphorical meaning in general systems theory have been mistakenly 
taken literally in hard systems thinking. 
and at the social level; 
The predicates that appear in the explanation of social phenomena will 
be different from those in the natural sciences. 
The procedures used to establish the predicates will be contingent on and 
determined by the properties of the object under study. For example, we 
would not be justified in using a thermometer to measure the height of 
a tree or class theory to advise someone how to terminate a telephone 
conversation. In this way epistemologies and their methodologies can 
differ between different objects of investigation, but they can also be 
consistent with a unifying ontology that sustains a unity of humanity and 
the rest of Nature. 
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The principles that govern the production of such predicates in the social 
sciences will remain substantially the same as they are in the natural 
sciences. 
In this way the form of naturalism developed and defended in this thesis does not 
represent an intrusion of the natural sciences into the social realm. Instead it embodies 
a reformulation of the principles of both the natural and social sciences in order to 
establish an account of the social relationships within humanity and between humanity 
and the rest of Nature. It is this account of science that makes a transcendental cultural 
ecology possible as a form of science, where one can sensibly study the relationship 








Being (upper case 'B') 










Prior to experience. Deductive reasoning, e.g. 'all 
triangles have three sides'; non-empirical. 
After experience; inductive reasoning; empirical. 
More importantly; with greater force. 
View that reality is reducible to indivisible 'bit' - atoms. 
An ontological position that sustains reductionist 
epistemologies. 
Established principle used as a basis for further 
deduction; underlying philosophy; assumed to be self 
evident. 
The ground (basis) of existence. 
A thing which exists as such. 
Absolute, unconditional. Applies to Kantian ethics and 
the 'categorical imperative'. 
An absolute, unconditional 'ought' as a universal, fixed 
moral instruction. 
All other things being equal. 
That which is known as truth; understood as knowledge. 
Cognitive meaning is meaning held within the sphere of 
knowledge (as opposed to intuition). 
Non-universal; specific to context, as in contextualised 
discourse. 
Applying general a priori statements to particular 
instances. 
interplay of polar opposites seen as one and the same, 
i.e. different aspects of the same whole; e.g. yin/yang, 
male/female. See tragedy. 












The view that sensory experience is the only source of 
gaining knowledge. 
Theory of how we gain knowledge about reality. 
The core of what something is as that something 
View that things have a unique essence independent of 
our classifications. It tends to refer to a naive 
conception of essence which ignores the complexities of 
intersubjectivity. 
Pertaining to ones personal existence. 
A process of coming to understand deeper meanings 
either from texts or from real social or ecological 
situations. If you watch a movie once you get a degree 
of understanding. See the same movie twice and more 
. meaning is revealed. A third time and more still etc. 
The hermeneutical understanding comes from the 
overview gained and then the clarity of the particulars 
improves which in turn helps the clarify the next 
viewing of the whole and on it goes ... 
Term for a range of views having a common emphasis 
on the importance of understanding theories, institutions, 
actions within their historical periods. Sometimes 
followed by claims that comparisons across periods is 
impossible. 
View that parts can only be understood in terms of their 
place within the whole of which they belong to. There 
are different forms of holism. Totalising forms of 
holism (e.g. stoic holism) see the whole as greater than 
the sum of the parts. A non-totalising holism is one 
where the parts and the whole interpenetrate each other 
where neither have any prior ontological existence - the 
whole is in every part. 
Doctrine that all reality is mental or in the mind, or a 
view that denies the existence of a fully mind-
independent reality. 
A system of interconnected ideas. Often referred to as 
false of biased ideas where the system as a whole serves 
as an instrument to the bias. 

















The interaction of two or more subjective agencies. 
Apprehending information as a form of 'knowing' from 
outside reason, language or thought as such. 
The view that knowledge of morality can be based on 
intuition. 
By that fact; thereby. A fish is ipso facto and animal. 
Amongst other things. 
That which is comprehended through cognition and 
linguistic norms. Knowledge is that which applies to the 
information held linguistically (Le. within language) and 
organised according to an established set of rules (e.g. 
reason). It contrasts with intuition, and sense perception. 
Term coined by Wittgenstein to denote a language and 
the conventions (rules) it has as a basis for its internal 
organisation and consistency. A linguistic system that 
follows its own logical grammar (i.e. its own rules). 
A term used in economics for non-intervention of 
government in economic affairs. 
Form of metaphysical monism which holds that every 
real thing is material in character. 
View that everything can be explained in mechanical 
terms; view that Nature is a giant machine. 
Philosophy dealing with non-empirical knowledge. 
Effectively ontology. 
Metaphysical view that there is only one basic category; 
one basic kind of 'stuff. 
Having a massive uniform structure that does not permit 
variations on that structure. 
Use of a theory or methodology common to the natural 
sciences and the social sciences. 
Absence of meaning - nothingness. Also absence of 















View that only particulars are real, and that general 
terms apply to particulars on the basis of their mutual 
resemblance. For example, there is no such property as 
'redness' only red things. 
That which does not follow from what precedes it. If b 
does not follow a (either 10gically or existentially) then 
b is a non sequitur in relation to a. 
Having the force of a norm; following as a convention. 
N on-descripti ve. 
Things that exist but which are not perceived or 
perceivable; opposite of phenomena (after Kant). 
Passive 'thing' that is acted upon by a subject. A 
'thing' is only an absolute object if it is not 
active as a subject in any way, having no 
subjectivity, free will, creativity or intrinsic 
value. 
Objects revealing themselves through no influence by 
any subject i.e. no relative or contingent perspective -
an absolute perspective where reality is expressed totally 
uninfluenced by subjectivity. 
Theory of reality. 
View that there are not truths out side particular 
perspectives (a form of relativism). 
The study of phenomena in relation to the means of 
perception. Studying the subjectivity of both the object 
and the subject of study. 
Something seen or perceived to exist; empirically reaL 
Refers to the interpenetration of politics and linguistics. 
Linguistics as a mediator in social communication is 
political and can have differing political characters. 
Contradictory argument; controversy; point directed 
against a particular opponent. 
A broad school of scientific thought closely aligned to 
empiricism. Holds the idea that positivist (empiricist) 
knowledge is the only valid form of knowledge, and 


















An on-going process of action and reflection. 
A method of praxis. 
On the surface; at first glance. 
A narrative (such as a theory) that claims to have a 
perspective on reality that is higher than another (i.e. a 
privileged view of a situation). 
In the capacity of; as. 
Theory of knowledge that the mind or intellect (as 
opposed to the senses) is the only or main source of 
knowledge. 
The view that a world exists independently of the mind 
to which our statements might correspond if such 
statements were true. 
Theory of knowledge (epistemology) which assumes 
that in order to understand something we must break it 
down into constituent parts and study the parts. 
Corresponds to an atomist theory of reality (ontology). 
Self reflective in character. 
View that truth is relative (particularly in relation to 
epistemological stand points). There are different forms 
of relativism, some relative at the level of knowledge 
(allowing for universals beyond knowledge e.g. 
inUIition), and absolute relativism, which argues that 
there is no possibility of general truths. 
Conception of identity as an autonomous individual. 
Conception of identity in unity with ones physical and 
social surroundings. Creativity is vested for the greater 
whole (totalising self identity). 
Conception of identity as a unique (creative) being in 
unity with the broader Self. Creativity is both localised 
and vested in the greater whole (non-totalising self 
identity). 
Ability to say and do the right thing. 
The view that the person proposing the view is the only 














A misleading argument or proposition. 
Totalising cosmology that assumes that reason is 
capable of 'mapping' reality in its totality. Derived from 
the philosophy of the ancient Greek Stoics. 
View that the universe is a rational whole in which all 
things happen for the best (i.e. good). Deterministic. A 
'wise' stoic is someone who has learned to accept what 
ever happens. 
Usually known as 'straw man' - argument against a 
position that no one holds. 
. An active agent that stands in relation to an object or 
other subjects. Exists in a dualism with object. A 
subject also refers to an agency that engages in active 
perceiving (e.g. a scientist). 
Observation that is influenced by the subject in an 
observation. 
Blank slate. 
Circular argument. Statement that is necessarily true due 
to its logical form. Generally regarded as devoid of 
information. 
A perspective whereby there is a conception of an 
unified totality (sometimes seen as universal). This can 
embody forms of holism which sees the whole as 
greater than the sum of the parts. It is stoic in character. 
Refers to a dialectical interplay between opposing 
forces, sometimes portrayed as such in drama. 
Only that aspect of reality that exists beyond human 
sense perception or experience. 
Both empirical and that which lies beyond empirical 
reality; both empirical and transcendent. 
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